In re J.H. ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as In re J.H., 
    2018-Ohio-2594
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    In re J.H.                                       Court of Appeals Nos. L-17-1317
    L-17-1318
    Trial Court No. AB 17264017
    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Decided: June 29, 2018
    *****
    Laurel A. Kendall, for appellants.
    Jeremy G. Young, for appellee.
    *****
    PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellants, V.B. and T.H., maternal grandmother and minor mother,
    respectively, of J.H., appeal the December 12, 2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court
    of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which awarded legal custody of J.H. to maternal
    great-aunt, H.H. Because we agree that the court’s award was in J.H.’s best interests, we
    affirm.
    {¶ 2} On August 7, 2017, appellee Lucas County Children Services (“LCCS”)
    filed a complaint in dependency and request for shelter care hearing. The complaint
    alleged that mother T.H., a minor, had recently given birth to J.H. J.H.’s maternal
    grandmother, V.B., had a long history with LCCS which included the October 2016
    termination of her parental rights of five of the youngest of her nine children.1 V.B.’s
    parental rights were terminated due to concerns about the safety of the children in her
    home which included her husband. The youngest child, an infant, had suffered from
    multiple fractures and non-organic failure to thrive. The perpetrator of the abuse was not
    identified.
    {¶ 3} The complaint further indicated that V.B. had regained custody of three of
    the older children, including appellant-mother, T.H.; LCCS had retained protective
    supervision. There were also allegations that V.B. and T.H. concealed T.H.’s pregnancy
    from LCCS. On August 7, 2017, interim temporary custody was awarded to LCCS and
    the child was placed with H.H., his maternal great-aunt.
    {¶ 4} On October 26, 2017, LCCS filed a motion to change its dispositional
    request to award legal custody to H.H. LCCS claimed that T.H. was in the legal custody
    of her mother, V.B., and due to V.B.’s “extensive history” with the agency, it would not
    1
    This court affirmed the decision in In re S.S., 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-16-1234,
    L-16-1243, 
    2017-Ohio-4474
    .
    2.
    be safe for J.H, to live in the home. The motion indicated that H.H. had allowed T.H. to
    live in her home and care for her son; H.H. reported that mother was doing a good job.
    {¶ 5} The dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in the case were held on
    October 27, 2017. Prior to the hearing on J.H., the court addressed LCCS’ motion to
    terminate its protective supervision of T.H. and her sibling R.S., and to change
    disposition of sibling S.S. to temporary custody to LCCS.
    {¶ 6} As to sibling S.S., the court awarded temporary custody to LCCS due to
    domestic violence issues between S.S. and mother, V.B. Protective supervision of T.H.
    and R.S. was terminated; R.S. was living in mother’s home and doing well, T.H. was
    attending online school, counseling sessions, and caring for her baby at her aunt’s home.
    {¶ 7} As to J.H., the adjudication phase of the hearing then proceeded with LLCS
    caseworker Mario Q. testifying as the child’s caseworker. Mario Q. stated that he had
    been involved with the family since at least 2001. V.B. is the mother of T.H. and T.H’s
    father’s whereabouts were unknown. J.H.’s putative father had not established paternity
    and was never directly contacted.
    {¶ 8} Mario Q. testified that LCCS became involved with J.H. following his
    August 2017 birth because T.H., a minor, was in the custody of V.B. Mario Q. stated that
    LCCS had concerns about the safety of V.B.’s home “due to the extensive history of
    child abuse and neglect” involving V.B. and her husband. Specifically, the youngest
    child, an infant, suffered multiple fractures and was diagnosed with organic failure to
    3.
    thrive. Mario Q. stated that permanent custody of five of V.B.’s children was awarded to
    LCCS.
    {¶ 9} Mario Q. further testified that on multiple occasions V.B. would not allow
    him in her home to confirm whether T.H. had given birth. Mario Q. explained that
    during this period LCCS still had protective supervision of T.H. and he should have been
    given access to her. Mario Q. stated that T.H. had been pregnant for over six months
    before LCCS became aware of it. He expressed that LCCS was concerned about a baby
    living in V.B.’s home due to the incidents with her own children. Following the
    testimony, J.H. was adjudicated a dependent child and the matter proceeded to
    disposition.
    {¶ 10} J.H.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) testified that he is doing very well at his
    great-aunt’s home and that T.H. is taking wonderful care of him there. The GAL
    explained that T.H. has also been living at H.H.’s home and has been caring for the child
    and attending online school regularly. The GAL stated that H.H.’s home is clean and
    well-supplied for an infant’s needs.
    {¶ 11} The GAL agreed that it was in J.H.’s best interests to remain in T.H.’s care.
    However, the GAL further stated that she would not recommend that J.H. be placed in
    V.B.’s home due to safety concerns. The GAL recommended that legal custody be
    awarded to H.H. and that it was in the child’s best interests that T.H. remain in her aunt’s
    home. The GAL indicated that T.H. did not need to be supervised with J.H. but that V.B.
    4.
    should have no unsupervised contact with the child. Specifically, the GAL recommended
    that V.B. be supervised by H.H. or another appropriate person.
    {¶ 12} During cross-examination, the GAL acknowledged that T.H. wants legal
    custody of her son. The GAL stated that she is not making that recommendation because
    T.H. is a minor and in her mother’s custody. The GAL explained that she was not sure if
    T.H. could protect J.H. in her mother’s home and that it was too big of a risk based upon
    V.B.’s history with LCCS.
    {¶ 13} The family caseworker, Mario Q., testified that LCCS is recommending
    that H.H. have legal custody of J.H. Mario Q. stated that he believes this is in J.H.’s best
    interests because H.H. has been very appropriate and has cared for T.H. while she cared
    for J.H. They have been doing very well with aunt. Mario Q. explained that T.H. should
    not have legal custody of J.H. because she is a minor and is not financially able to
    independently care for him.
    {¶ 14} Mario Q. mirrored the GAL’s testimony recommending that V.B. be
    supervised if having contact with J.H. He agreed that T.H. could not supervise any visits
    and noted that T.H. tends to do what her mother tells her.
    {¶ 15} T.H. testified that she has been living with H.H. since the birth of her son.
    When she goes to V.B.’s house the baby is not with her. T.H. testified that she wants
    legal custody of J.H. She stated that if she was in V.B.’s home she would be responsible
    for J.H.’s care and would also keep LCCS apprised of his status. T.H. admitted that if
    H.H. was awarded legal custody, V.B. would allow her to continue living with her aunt.
    5.
    T.H. further testified that she would abide by the court order not allowing her to take J.H.
    to V.B.’s house.
    {¶ 16} The court then concluded that it was in J.H.’s best interests to award legal
    custody of him to H.H., his maternal great-aunt. The court ordered that A.B., V.B.’s
    husband have no contact with J.H., and that V.B. have no unsupervised contact with J.H.
    The court specified that T.H. could not supervise her mother, and that H.H. or someone
    she determines to be suitable, could supervise visits. The magistrate’s findings of fact
    were issued on November 21, 2017.
    {¶ 17} V.B. filed a motion to set aside the magistrate’s decision (properly
    categorized as objections to the magistrate’s decision) and the matter came on for a
    hearing on December 8, 2017. The court questioned T.H. regarding her living
    arrangements and the care she provides to J.H. T.H. stated that she felt that because she
    was providing all the care for J.H., she should have legal custody of him. She also
    indicated that she receives public assistance for food and that V.B. pays for J.H.’s
    diapers. The court also questioned the respective attorneys.
    {¶ 18} V.B. explained that she filed the motion because T.H.’s attorney did not
    represent T.H.’s wishes at the prior hearing; she stated that T.H. did not agree to her aunt
    having legal custody of J.H. The court then explained that the issue was that V.B. had
    legal custody of T.H. and that if T.H. was awarded legal custody of J.H. then the baby
    would potentially reside with V.B. The court stated that based on V.B.’s prior history,
    6.
    the scenario “was not going to happen.” On December 12, 2017, the objections were
    denied. This appeal followed with appellants raising the following assignment of error:
    The trial court abused its discretion when it granted legal custody of
    the infant J.H. to maternal great aunt (H.H.) rather than the minor mother
    T.H. when there were no allegations of abuse or neglect concerning the
    infant, and when mother was primarily caring for the child.
    {¶ 19} We review a trial court’s judgment adopting a magistrate’s decision to
    award legal custody of a minor child to a relative or other interested person for an abuse
    of discretion. In re K.V., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1087, 
    2012-Ohio-190
    , ¶ 19. An abuse
    of discretion suggests that the trial court’s attitude was arbitrary, unreasonable, or
    unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    (1983).
    {¶ 20} “Where a child has been adjudicated dependent, a trial court may award
    legal custody to a nonparent where it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that legal
    custody is in the child’s best interests.” In re A.D., 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-16-059,
    E-16-060, E-16-061, 
    2017-Ohio-6913
    , ¶ 31. “In making such a determination, ‘courts
    have looked to the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), a
    combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding the
    best interests of the [child].’” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting In re A.K., 9th Dist. Summit No.
    26291, 
    2012-Ohio-4430
    , ¶ 25.
    7.
    {¶ 21} Appellants argue that T.H., as an unmarried mother, was entitled to the
    presumption of custody under R.C. 3109.042. The statute provides, in relevant part:
    (A) An unmarried female who gives birth to a child is the sole
    residential parent and legal custodian of the child until a court of competent
    jurisdiction issues an order designating another person as the residential
    parent and legal custodian. A court designating the residential parent and
    legal custodian of a child described in this section shall treat the mother and
    father as standing upon an equality when making the designation.
    {¶ 22} Supporting this presumption, appellants claim that T.H. was taking
    excellent care of J.H. and attending online school and counselling. Appellants further
    contend that the court’s concern regarding the safety of V.B.’s home was not reasonable
    in light of the fact that V.B. was never found to be the perpetrator of the abuse against her
    youngest child.
    {¶ 23} We note that the above-quoted statute does not contemplate the fact that
    T.H. is a minor mother. Reviewing the evidence before the court, we find that the
    judgment was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The court thoroughly
    explained its concerns regarding an award of legal custody to T.H. while she is in the
    custody of V.B. The infant that has serious injuries resided in V.B.’s home which she
    still shares with her husband. The safety concerns relate specifically to infants and young
    children who are unable to verbalize dangerous or abusive living conditions. Appellants’
    assignment of error is not well-taken.
    8.
    {¶ 24} On consideration whereof, we find that the judgment of the Lucas County
    Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Appellants are ordered to pay
    the costs of this appeal.
    Judgment affirmed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                       _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.
    _______________________________
    Christine E. Mayle, P.J.                                   JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    9.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-17-1317, L-17-1318

Judges: Pietrykowski

Filed Date: 6/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021