State v. Walker , 2016 Ohio 1462 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-1462.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs-
Case No. 15CA104
GARY D. WALKER
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Common
Pleas Court
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 6, 2016
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
BAMBI COUCH PAGE GARY D. WALKER, PRO SE
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Inmate #554324
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO Lebanon Correctional Institution
3791 State Route 63
By: DANIEL M. ROGERS Lebanon, Ohio 45036
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Richland County Prosecutor’s Office
38 S. Park Street
Mansfield, Ohio 44902
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 2
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Gary D. Walker appeals the November 19, 2015
Judgment Entry entered by the Richland County Court of Common Pleas denying his
Motion to Correct Void Sentence and Presentence Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On June 2, 2009, Appellant was convicted and sentenced in the Richland
County Court of Common Plea on multiple charges, including Engaging in a Pattern of
Corrupt Activity, in violation of R.C. 2923.32, a felony of the second degree.
{¶3} In his most recent motion filed November 2, 2015, Appellant requested the
trial court take judicial notice of the March 25, 2004 Sentencing Journal Entry entered by
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, in CR446954. The trial court refused to
do so, noting six years had passed between Appellant’s original sentencing and when
Appellant first presented it with that entry of a prior conviction, and there was insufficient
evidence in the record at the time of sentencing to support the imposition of a mandatory
sentence.
{¶4} Appellant maintains he previously entered a plea of guilty to one count of
Drug Possession, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the second degree, in the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR446954. Therefore, pursuant to
R.C. 2929.13(F)(6), the trial court was required to impose a mandatory term of
imprisonment.
{¶5} Appellant filed a notice of appeal from his conviction and sentence on July
1, 2009. On September 24, 2009, this Court dismissed the appeal on Appellant’s motion.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 3
{¶6} On September 28, 2009, Appellant filed a Motion for Sentencing claiming
he was not properly advised of the consequences of violating post-release control. On
December 30, 2009, the trial court conducted a video conference notifying Appellant of
his post-release control obligations.
{¶7} On January 14, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction claiming the grand jury failed to return a valid indictment. On January 28,
2010, Appellant filed a Supplemental Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
{¶8} On March 3, 2010, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the
Supreme Court of Ohio regarding his motion to withdraw guilty plea. The Ohio Supreme
Court dismissed Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Prohibition on May 5, 2010.
{¶9} Thereafter, Appellant continued to file various post-trial motions with the trial
court, all of which were denied.
{¶10} Pertinent herein, on November 2, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Correct
Void Sentence and Presentence Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. The trial court denied
the motion via Judgment Entry of November 19, 2015.
{¶11} It is from that entry Appellant appeals, assigning as error,1
{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE PURSUANT TO EVID.R. 201(B)(2) OF THE MARCH 25, 2004,
SENTENCING JOURNAL ENTRY FROM CUYAHOGA COUNTY COMMON PLEAS
COURT WHEN THIS JUDGMENT ENTRY IS NOT SUBJECT TO REASONABLE
1This case has been assigned to this Court’s Accelerated Calendar pursuant to the Fifth
District Court of Appeal’s Local Rule 6 and Ohio Appellate Rule 11.1. Accordingly, the
statement of the reason for this Court’s decision as to each error may be brief and in
conclusory form.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 4
DISPUTE AND IS CAPABLE OF ACCURATE AND READY DETERMINATION BY
RESORTING TO SOURCES WHOSE ACCURACY CANNOT REASONABLY BE
QUESTIONED.
{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED A SENTENCE
CONTRARY TO LAW UNDER OHIO REVISED CODE § 2929.13(F)(6), THEREBY
RENDERING WALKER’S SENTENCE VOID.
{¶14} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ACCEPTED WALKER’S
UNINTELLIGENT AND INVOLUNTARY PLEAS WHICH WERE INDUCED BY AN
UNFULFILLABLE PROMISE TO HAVE THE COURT IMPOSE AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE
CONTRARY TO R.C. 2929.13(F)(6), THEREBY RENDERING WALKER’S PLEAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
{¶15} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT LET WALKER
RESCIND THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL
MISTAKE ALTHOUGH WALKER’S PLEAS WERE UNINTELLIGENTLY AND
INVOLUNTARILY ENTERED ON A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF THE FACTS AND LAW.”
I., II., III., and IV.
{¶16} Upon review, Appellant’s assigned errors raise common and interrelated
issues; therefore, we will address the arguments together.
{¶17} As set forth in the Statement of the Facts and Case supra, Appellant filed
various post-trial motions following his dismissal of his direct appeal.
{¶18} We find all of Appellant’s arguments raised herein were either raised (in the
trial court) or were capable of being raised via direct appeal of his original conviction and
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 5
sentence or via subsequent appeal of the denial of his various post-conviction motions.
Therefore, we find the arguments barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶19} Appellant maintains his sentence is void because the trial court failed to
impose a mandatory prison term pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(6); thus reviewable at any
time. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238. Appellant asserts because
he was convicted of a first or second degree felony, and had previously been convicted
of or entered a plea of guilty to a first or second degree felony in another jurisdiction,
failure to impose a mandatory prison term renders his sentence illegal; therefore, void.2
We disagree.
{¶20} Unlike void sentences, voidable sentences are not reviewable at any time
and are subject to res judicata. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 NE 2d 104 (1967).
The trial court sentenced Appellant pursuant to a plea agreement, to a non-mandatory
sentence. The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to impose the sentence. It would
normally be considered beneficial to a defendant not to be subject to a mandatory
sentence. Yet Appellant now seeks to benefit from an error he failed to bring to the trial
court’s attention at the time of sentencing, which error was beneficial to him. To allow
him to do so now would allow him to benefit for an error he seemingly invited, or at least
condoned.
2 Appellant cites State v. Williams, 2nd Dist. No. 2011CA44, 2012 Ohio 1240. However,
we find Williams distinguishable from the procedural history herein as Williams involved
a direct appeal of the defendant’s conviction; therefore, voidness and the doctrine of res
judicata was not at issue.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 6
{¶21} Unlike the scenario presented in the post release control sentencing line of
cases, the sentencing error alleged herein required the trial court to consider a sentencing
factor outside the four corners of the statute itself. The Fischer Court specifically held,
Our decision today is limited to a discrete vein of cases: those in
which a court does not properly impose a statutorily mandated period of
postrelease control. In cases involving postrelease control, we will continue
to adhere to our narrow, discrete line of cases addressing the unique
problems that have arisen in the application of that law and the underlying
statute. In light of the General Assembly's enactment of R.C. 2929.191, it is
likely that our work in this regard is drawing to a close, at least for purposes
of void sentences. Even if that is not the case, however, we would be ill-
served by the approach advocated by the dissent, which is premised on an
unpalatable and unpersuasive foundation.
Fischer 128 Ohio St.3d 92, at 100.
{¶22} We look to the rationale set forth by Justice Lanzinger and concurred in by
Justices French and O’Neill in the dissenting opinion in In re J.S., 136 Ohio St.3d 8, 2013-
Ohio-1721. Although only persuasive as an advisory opinion because the case was
ultimately dismissed as improvidently accepted.3 Justice Lanzinger’s dissent accurately
expresses the confusion and inconsistency in the expansion of the rule of Fischer when
a trial court does not impose a statutorily mandated period of post release control. Justice
Lanzinger opined,
3 Justices O’Connor, Pfeifer, O’Donnell and Kennedy concurred in the majority opinion
dismissing the appeal as being improvidently accepted.
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 7
This expansion of the rule of Fischer from the original cases, in which
a court does not properly impose a statutorily mandated period of
postrelease control, to an increasing number of non-postrelease-control
cases, in which the court failed to comply with a statute, has led to
confusion. It is unclear whether Fischer truly applies to the “discrete vein of
cases” identified in its text, subject to certain exceptions as recognized by
this court, or whether, contrary to its language, Fischer applies to any case
in which a court failed to comply with a statutory provision.
***
A decision in this case could help to provide order to this area of the
law. Now is the proper time to closely reexamine the void-sentence doctrine
to reaffirm basic principles of our jurisprudence.
A. A Sentencing Error Is Voidable and Does Not Mean that the Court
Lacked Jurisdiction
It is axiomatic that a judgment by a court lacking jurisdiction is void,
and thus subject to collateral attack at any time, while a judgment by a court
that has made an error in exercising jurisdiction is voidable, and thus subject
to correction only on direct appeal. State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502,
2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 27. Stated another way, a court with
subject-matter jurisdiction might impose an erroneous sentence, one that,
because it does not comply completely with a statute, is contrary to law.
That error may be corrected (i.e., the sentence is voidable) and then will
have no effect once it is vacated. But a judgment that is void is rendered by
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 8
a court without jurisdiction and is of no effect from the beginning—it was a
nullity. Before the recent void-sentence cases, Ohio law provided that errors
made by a court having jurisdiction were voidable and correctable only on
direct appeal, even when the errors involved significant matters of criminal
procedure. We clearly explained the difference between void and voidable
judgments when analyzing a court's failure to convene a statutorily
mandated three-judge panel in a death-penalty case in Pratts v. Hurley, 102
Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992:
***
The foregoing cases acknowledged the common understanding of
the terms “void” and “voidable.” The United States Supreme Court has
made the same distinction:
A void judgment is a legal nullity. See Black's Law Dictionary 1822
(3d ed.1933); see also id., at 1709 (9th ed.2009). Although the term “void”
describes a result, rather than the conditions that render a judgment
unenforceable, it suffices to say that a void judgment is one so affected by
a fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be raised even after the
judgment becomes final. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 22
(1980); see generally id., § 12. * * *
“A judgment is not void,” for example, “simply because it is or may
have been erroneous.” Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (C.A.1, 1995).
{¶23} Similarly, this Court previously held the trial court’s [erroneous] inclusion of
the term “mandatory” in a defendant’s sentence does not render the sentence illegal and
Richland County, Case No. 15CA104 9
the claimed error was capable of being raised on direct appeal.4 We find the same logic
would apply to the reverse scenario presented herein where the claimed error was the
trial court’s failure to include the term “mandatory” in the sentence.
{¶24} Accordingly, we find Appellant’s sentence was voidable, not void; therefore,
subject to res judicata.
{¶25} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur
4 State v. Roush, Fifth District Morrow County App. No. 13 CA 0008, 2014-Ohio-4887.