Cleveland v. Boyd ( 2023 )

[Cite as Cleveland v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-459.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF CLEVELAND, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 111660
v. :
JOHN A. BOYD, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 16, 2023
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
Case No. 2021-CRB-009279
Appearances:
Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Gina Villa,
Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.
Judith M. Kowalski, for appellant.
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:
John Boyd appeals his sentence for criminal mischief as imposed by the
Cleveland Municipal Court. After a careful review of the facts and law, we affirm in
part and vacate in part.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Boyd was charged with one count of criminal damaging or endangering
and three counts of criminal mischief. The charges stemmed from conduct
occurring in July 2021 where Boyd was caught on surveillance cameras tearing down
political signs at a gas station on multiple occasions, utilizing a knife to do so. A plea
agreement was reached, and Boyd entered a guilty plea to a single count of criminal
mischief, a third-degree misdemeanor.
Boyd was referred for a presentence investigation with the probation
department, but the interview was never completed due to apparent confusion
regarding Boyd’s phone number. The presentence-investigation report, therefore,
contained only information regarding Boyd’s criminal history and the instant
offense. It appears that from Boyd’s criminal history and his alleged failure to
contact the probation department, the probation officer recommended that, as part
of his sentence, Boyd complete a community orientation program (“COP”), a
community awareness program (“CAP”), a substance abuse assessment and
counseling (“SAA/C”), substance abuse testing (“SAT”), a mental health assessment
(“MHA”), anger management, and community work service (“CWS”).
At sentencing, Boyd’s counsel conceded that the COP and CAP
sanctions were both appropriate, but that the remaining recommendations were
unrelated to this offense that was nonviolent and did not cause financial loss. Boyd
noted that the two violent offenses on his record, first-degree murder and murder
while perpetrating a robbery, occurred over 50 years ago. Boyd argued that since
that time, he has become a productive member of society, citing the fact that he ran
for city council three times and county council another time, and served as a precinct
committee member. Boyd also received a degree in clinical counseling and was
employed as a mental health counselor for 15 years.
The court sentenced Boyd to 60 days in prison, all of which were
suspended, and $500 in costs, $450 of which were suspended. The court did not
impose every program recommended by the probation department and ordered
Boyd to complete two years of active probation, including completing the COP, CAP,
anger management, and SAA/C programs. He was also required to submit to the
MHA to determine his eligibility for the mental health docket and submit to SAT.
At this point, Boyd began arguing with the trial court.
THE DEFENDANT: Are you really going to give me two years active
probation for this —
THE COURT: I really am. I really am.
THE DEFENDANT: — for tearing down a sign?
THE COURT: I really am. Yes, I am —
THE DEFENDANT: What’s the jail time —
THE COURT: — Defendant to contact Probation, today. Failure to call,
warrant to issue.
THE DEFENDANT: This is — this is harsh. This is crazy.
THE COURT: Um-hum. It is crazy.
THE DEFENDANT: This is political. It’s been political from the
beginning. It seems to me, continues to be political.
THE COURT: Got it. See you tomorrow, 8:30, courtroom 15-C.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, right.
THE COURT: Um-hum.
THE DEFENDANT: You wrong, Judge. Wrong —
THE COURT: Okay. And so are you.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. You’re about —
THE COURT: It was probably something that was needed. Thanks,
Eric.
(Tr. 10-11.)
The hearing concluded immediately thereafter. Boyd timely appealed
his sentence, assigning a single error for our review:
The sentencing court erred and abused its discretion by requiring that
the appellant submit to the substance abuse assessment and
counseling, mental health court screening and evaluation, drug testing,
and anger management, as those services bear no relation to the
offense to which he pleaded guilty.
II. Law and Analysis
In his sole assignment of error, Boyd argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in sentencing Boyd to SAA/C, anger management, SAT, and the MHA
for a nonviolent offense against property. Boyd argues that these sanctions do not
relate to the offense to which he plead guilty.
Trial courts have broad discretion when sentencing a defendant in a
misdemeanor case. Euclid v. Gage-Vaughn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86498, 2006-
Ohio-1941, ¶ 28, citing State v. Yontz, 33 Ohio App.3d 342, 343, 515 N.E.2d 1012(12th Dist.1986). A trial court’s sentence will not be disturbed absent an affirmative
showing of an abuse of discretion. Gage-Vaughn at id., citing State v. Nite Clubs of
Ohio, Inc., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03 MA 20, 2004-Ohio-4989, ¶ 7; Rocky River v.
Burke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78578, 2002-Ohio-1651. An abuse of discretion
occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a
matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio
St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Such an abuse “‘“implies that the
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”’” State v.
Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 135, quoting Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams,
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
A trial court is authorized to impose a sentence of community-control
sanctions in misdemeanor offenses pursuant to R.C. 2929.27(A). R.C. 2929.27(C)
instructs that in addition to the listed sanctions within R.C. 2929.27(A), a court “may
impose any other sanction that is intended to discourage the offender * * * from
committing a similar offense if the sanction is reasonably related to the overriding
purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing.”
When imposing a misdemeanor sentence, trial courts “must consider
the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing which are ‘to protect the public
from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.”’
Lakewood v. Dobra, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106001, 2018-Ohio-960, ¶ 9, quoting
R.C. 2929.21. R.C. 2929.22(B) enumerates factors that the trial court must consider
in misdemeanor sentencing and failure to consider these factors constitutes an
abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 9-10, citing Maple Hts. v. Sweeney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 85415, 2005-Ohio-2820, ¶ 7. Nonetheless, “the trial court is not required to
make factual findings on the record related to these factors.” Dobra at ¶ 10, citing
Sweeney at ¶ 7. So long as the misdemeanor sentence is within the statutory limits,
the trial court is presumed to have considered the required factors enumerated in
R.C. 2929.22 absent a showing to the contrary by the contesting defendant. Dobra
at id., citing Sweeney at id.Further, community-control conditions must reasonably relate to the
goals of community control: “‘rehabilitation, administering justice, and ensuring
good behavior.’” State v. Mahon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106043, 2018-Ohio-295,
¶ 7, quoting State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201,
¶ 16. In State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990), the Ohio
Supreme Court set forth a test for determining whether community-control
conditions reasonably relate to these goals. The trial court must consider whether
the condition is (1) reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to
conduct that is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the
statutory ends of probation. “All three prongs of the Jones test must be satisfied for
the reviewing court to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Mahon
at ¶ 8, citing State v. White, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-1027, 2015-Ohio-3844,
¶ 10. Further, the conditions “‘cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge
upon the [offender’s] liberty.’” Talty at ¶13, quoting Jones at 52.
Boyd appears to argue the inapplicability of the second prong,
suggesting that this was a “crime against property” and therefore bears no
relationship to the trial court’s community-control sanctions requiring Boyd to
participate in SAA/C, anger management, SAT, and the MHA. Boyd also suggests
that he is older and suffers from several health conditions and that these programs
are too onerous and disproportionate to the actual offense.
Boyd directs this court to State v. Marcum, 4th Dist. Hocking Nos.
11CA8 and 11CA10, 2012-Ohio-572. In Marcum, the Fourth District applied the
Jones test to a community-control condition that forbade the defendant from having
contact with her own husband. The defendant was convicted of misuse of 911 and
obstructing official business stemming from a domestic incident where 911 was
contacted three separate times in one evening. The court ultimately found that the
first and third prongs were not met because a no-contact order could not possibly
rehabilitate the offender nor was there any pattern of conduct that led to the criminal
activity. We do not find persuasive authority in this case. Marcum stems from a
domestic dispute that resulted in a no-contact order. We cannot say that court-
sponsored programs specifically designed to rehabilitate offenders and facilitate
good behavior can be likened to a court’s attempt to limit contact with an individual.
Boyd also directs this court to State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
111173, 2022-Ohio-3233. Brown pled guilty to a single count of criminal nonsupport
and was sentenced to five years of community control. Part of Brown’s community-
control conditions forbade Brown from going anywhere where drugs and/or alcohol
were sold, served, or used. This court reversed, noting that not a single prong of the
Jones test was satisfied by this prohibition. The record was completely devoid of
any mention of drugs or alcohol and there was no evidence that Brown’s criminal
nonsupport was related to a substance abuse problem. We do find Brown
persuasive in the instant matter. The requirement that Boyd submit to a SAA/C and
SAT does not have any nexus to this offense. There is no allegation or even mention
in the record that substance abuse contributed to Boyd’s tearing down of political
signs. This is consistent with several other holdings in this court. See, e.g., N.
Olmsted v. Rock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105566, 2018-Ohio-1084, ¶ 36; State v.
Mahon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106043, 2018-Ohio-295, ¶ 11; Strongsville v.
Feliciano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96294, 2011-Ohio-5394. We therefore sustain
Boyd’s assignment of error as it pertains to SAA/C and SAT.
We are, however, unpersuaded that anger management and the MHA
do not pass the Jones test. Under the first Jones factor, anger management and the
MHA both contribute to the rehabilitation of defendants because they both fall
under the umbrella of mental health treatment and are designed to rehabilitate
individuals by their very nature. Turning to the second factor, we note that “[t]he
community control sanctions are to be related to the circumstances of the offense,
but the sanctions do not necessarily need to relate only to the conviction itself.” S.
Euclid v. Bickerstaff, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107526, 2019-Ohio-2223, ¶ 20, citing
State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162, 2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 12-14 (2d
Dist.). We therefore find that the nature of Boyd’s crime, which was tearing down
political signs, could be motivated by existing and untreated mental health
problems, therefore supporting a nexus to the underlying crime. Indeed, the record
reflects that Boyd made several attempts to tear down the sign, returning to the gas
station multiple times to finish the job. Turning to the third Jones factor, we find
that anger management and the MHA are related to Boyd’s criminality. Boyd’s
criminal history is extensive and though we note that it has tapered down in recent
years, it is wholly possible that Boyd’s inability to remain completely out of the
criminal justice system is related to untreated mental health problems and it is not
readily apparent that Boyd has benefitted from past punishments. Indeed, as
recently as 2017, Boyd was convicted of O.V.I. and two separate drug paraphernalia
charges in different municipal courts. Finally, Boyd’s candor towards the trial court
is indicative of this point. See, e.g., Bickerstaff at ¶ 24. Finding that all prongs of
the Jones test are satisfied by anger management and the MHA, we affirm the trial
court’s requirement that Boyd submit to these programs as part of his community-
control sentence.
III. Conclusion
After careful consideration of the entire record, we find that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing community-control conditions relating to
substance abuse, including SAA/C and SAT, where the record before us does not
suggest that drugs and/or alcohol contributed to Boyd’s criminal conduct. We
vacate these portions of Boyd’s sentence.
We do find, however, that the trial court did not err in requiring Boyd
to report for anger management and complete the MHA. These conditions are
supported by all three Jones factors and reasonably relate to the goals of
community-control. Those sanctions are affirmed.
Judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________________________
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR