Rogers v. Fuerst , 2014 Ohio 2774 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as Rogers v. Fuerst, 
    2014-Ohio-2774
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 100670
    DEMALE ROGERS
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
    vs.
    GERALD E. FUERST, ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-13-808512
    BEFORE:           Boyle, A.J., Blackmon, J., and Stewart, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      June 26, 2014
    FOR APPELLANT
    Demale Rogers, pro se
    Inmate No. 462-269, M.C.I.
    P.O. Box 57
    Marion, Ohio 43301
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Brendan R. Doyle
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:
    {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Demale Rogers, appeals pro se from the trial court’s
    judgment granting the motion to dismiss of defendants-appellees, Gerald Fuerst, Lisa
    Jones, and Candice McCafferty. Rogers raises two assignments of error for our review:
    1. Whether a grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
    predicated on: (1) res judicata * * *; (2) materials and evidence outside the
    pleading, i.e., the complaint; * * *; and (3) a finding of absolute immunity
    was/is “contrary to law” and “clearly erroneous” as a matter of law and
    fact.
    2. Whether the trial court’s inclusion of a party whom was not a defendant
    named in the initiating complaint, i.e., “ANDREA F. ROCCO,” will
    suffice to relieve the named principal defendant “GERALD E. FUERST,”
    of his default, and will equally suffice to support the trial court’s grant of
    defendants’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.
    {¶2} Finding no merit to his arguments on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    Procedural History and Factual Background
    {¶3} In June 2013, Rogers filed a complaint for false imprisonment against
    Fuerst, former Cuyahoga County clerk of courts, as well as Jones and McCafferty,
    Cuyahoga County deputy clerks of courts. Rogers alleged that because the grand jury
    indictment against him did not possess a time or file stamp from the clerk of courts, and
    the journal entry convicting and sentencing him did not possess a time stamp, they were
    never actually filed with the court.    He therefore claims that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to hear his criminal case, and as a result, he was wrongly imprisoned.
    {¶4} The defendants collectively moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Civ.R.
    12(B)(6), which the trial court granted. It is from this judgment that Rogers now
    appeals.
    Standard of Review
    {¶5} When reviewing a judgment on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, an appellate court’s standard of
    review is de novo.    Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 79
    , 
    2004-Ohio-4362
    ,
    
    814 N.E.2d 44
    , ¶ 5.
    {¶6} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
    procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey
    Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
    65 Ohio St.3d 545
    , 548, 
    605 N.E.2d 378
     (1992), citing Assn. for
    the Defense of the Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 116
    , 
    537 N.E.2d 1292
     (1989). A trial court must presume all factual allegations contained in the
    complaint to be true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
    party. Garofalo v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 
    104 Ohio App.3d 95
    , 104, 
    661 N.E.2d 218
    (8th Dist.1995), citing Perez v. Cleveland, 
    66 Ohio St.3d 397
    , 
    613 N.E.2d 199
     (1993);
    Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 
    40 Ohio St.3d 190
    , 
    532 N.E.2d 753
     (1988); Phung v. Waste
    Mgt., Inc., 
    23 Ohio St.3d 100
    , 
    491 N.E.2d 1114
     (1986).
    {¶7} Thus, in order for a court to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
    claim, it must appear “beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
    support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” (Citations omitted in original.)
    O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 
    42 Ohio St.2d 242
    , 245, 
    327 N.E.2d 753
     (1975).
    Analysis
    {¶8} Although Rogers’s arguments are difficult to decipher, he alleged in his
    complaint that the court lacked jurisdiction over him because the grand jury indictment
    did not contain either a file stamp or a time stamp.        He further alleged that the court did
    not have jurisdiction over him because, although the judgment entry convicting and
    sentencing him contained a file stamp, it lacked a time stamp.            According to Rogers,
    under R.C. 2303.08 and 2303.10, documents filed with the clerk of courts must contain
    both a time stamp and a file stamp.           Rogers, however, misconstrues the meaning of
    R.C. 2303.08 and 2303.10.
    {¶9} R.C. 2303.08 sets forth “general duties” of the clerk of the common pleas
    court.    It provides in relevant part that
    [t]he clerk of the court of common pleas shall indorse on each pleading or
    paper in a cause filed in the clerk’s office the time of filing, enter all
    orders, decrees, judgments, and proceedings of the courts of which such
    individual is the clerk, [and] make a complete record when ordered on the
    journal to do so[.]
    R.C. 2303.10 specifically explains how a clerk of court “indorses” papers filed with it,
    stating that “[t]he clerk of the court of common pleas shall indorse upon every paper
    filed with him the date of the filing thereof, and upon every order for a provisional
    remedy and upon every undertaking given thereunder, the date of its return to his office.”
    {¶10} Thus, these statutes make clear that papers filed with the clerk of courts do
    not need to state the exact time it was filed.           Rather, when papers are filed with the
    court, the clerk must “indorse” them with “the date of filing.”
    {¶11} Significant to our analysis here is the fact that Rogers attached documents
    to his complaint, namely the grand jury indictment against him and the judgment entry
    convicting and sentencing him, that patently negate his claims. In Glazer v. Chase
    Home Fin. L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 99875 and 99736, 
    2013-Ohio-5589
    , this
    court explained:
    “[D]ocuments attached to or incorporated into the complaint may be
    considered on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” NCS
    Healthcare, Inc. v. Candlewood Partners, L.L.C., 
    160 Ohio App.3d 421
    ,
    427, 
    2005-Ohio-1669
    , 
    827 N.E.2d 797
     (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel.
    Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 247
    , 249, 
    673 N.E.2d 1281
     (1997). * * * The court may also consider material
    pertinent to jurisdictional issues without converting the motion into one for
    summary judgment. Shockey v. Fouty, 
    106 Ohio App.3d 420
    , 423, 
    666 N.E.2d 304
     (4th Dist.1995).
    Glazer at ¶ 38.
    {¶12} In this case, both the grand jury indictment and judgment entry convicting
    and sentencing Rogers contain a file stamp from the clerk of courts, dated June 24, 2003
    and February 26, 2004, respectively.    The file stamps are evidence that the indictment
    and judgment entry were properly filed and journalized with the court.     “Endorsing the
    fact and date of filing on the judgment entry itself is evidence that it was filed on that
    date.” In re Hopple, 
    13 Ohio App.3d 54
    , 55, 
    468 N.E.2d 129
     (6th Dist.1983), citing
    Ferrebee v. Boggs, 
    18 Ohio St.2d 87
    , 
    247 N.E.2d 753
     (1969); King v. Penn, 
    43 Ohio St. 57
    , 61, 
    1 N.E. 84
     (1885), and Lewis v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 
    9 Ohio App.2d 215
    , 
    223 N.E.2d 828
     (7th Dist.1967).
    {¶13} Even if we were to accept Rogers’s interpretation of R.C. 2303.08 and
    2303.10, that is, that the clerk must indicate not only the date but the time of filing, it
    would not mean that the court lacked jurisdiction over him or his criminal case.
    {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that the filing of the complaint
    invokes the jurisdiction of the trial court, but that a pleading is “filed” when it is properly
    deposited with the clerk of courts.           Zanesville v. Rouse, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 1
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-2218
    , 
    929 N.E.2d 1044
    , ¶ 5, 7, judgment vacated in part on reconsideration
    on other grounds, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 1227
    , 
    2010-Ohio-3754
    , 
    933 N.E.2d 260
    . A clerk’s
    failure, however, to file stamp a document does not create a jurisdictional defect, and
    when a pleading lacks an endorsement from the clerk, filing may be proven by other
    means.     Id. at ¶ 8, 10.     The Supreme Court concluded in Rouse that there was
    sufficient evidence in the case, such as the electronic docket sheet and an affidavit from
    the clerk of courts, to show that the complaint was filed with the clerk even though it
    lacked a time or date stamp. Id. at ¶ 10-11.
    {¶15} Here, the grand jury indictment is stamped “Received for Filing June 24,
    2003 Gerald E. Fuerst.”       The judgment entry convicting and sentencing Rogers is
    stamped “Filed Feb. 26, 2004 Gerald E. Fuerst, Clerk of Courts, Cuyahoga County,
    Ohio.”     This is certainly more than sufficient evidence that the documents were filed
    with the court.
    {¶16} Rogers’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶17} In his second assignment of error, Rogers claims that the trial court and
    defendants improperly substituted the present clerk of courts for Cuyahoga County,
    Andrea F. Rocco, for Fuerst, who he named in his complaint. Rogers, however, has
    failed to cite any authority for his argument as required by App.R. 16(A)(7).    Thus, we
    decline to address it.
    {¶18} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
    into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and
    MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR