State v. Case ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Case, 2016-Ohio-570.]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                :       JUDGES:
    :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    Plaintiff - Appellee                 :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                         :
    :
    CYNTHIA CASE                                 :       Case No. 15-CA-41
    :
    Defendant - Appellant                :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from the Fairfield County
    Municipal Court, Case No. TRC
    1500705
    JUDGMENT:                                            Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                    February 16, 2016
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                               For Defendant-Appellant
    DANIEL E. COGLEY                                     JESSICA G. D'VARGA
    Assistant Prosecutor                                 JON J. SAIA
    City of Lancaster                                    713 South Front Street
    123 East Chestnut Street                             Columbus, Ohio 43206
    P.O. Box 1008
    Lancaster, Ohio 43130
    Fairfield County, Case No. 15-CA-41                                                        2
    Baldwin, J.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Cynthia Case appeals her conviction and sentence
    from the Fairfield County Municipal Court on one count of operating a motor while under
    the influence. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}   On January 23, 2015, appellant was cited for operating a motor vehicle
    while under the influence of alcohol (OVI) in violation of R.C. 4511.191(A)(1)(a) and (d)
    and driving left of center in violation of R.C. 4511.25. The citation stated that at the time
    of the traffic stop, appellant was operating her motor vehicle in the City of Columbus in
    Fairfield County, Ohio. At her arraignment on January 28, 2015, appellant entered a plea
    of not guilty to the charges.
    {¶3}   A citation charging appellant with an open container offense in violation of
    R.C. 4301.62 was filed in the same case on February 10, 2015. Appellant, on February
    24, 2015, filed a written plea of not guilty to such offense.
    {¶4}   Thereafter, appellant, on February 26, 2015, filed a Motion to Transfer her
    case to the Franklin County Municipal Court pursuant to R.C. 1901.02, arguing that the
    Franklin County Municipal Court had proper jurisdiction over this case.       Pursuant to a
    Judgment Entry filed on March 4, 2015, the trial court overruled appellant’s motion. The
    trial court, in its Judgment Entry, stated, in relevant part, as follows:
    The Courts have held that an incident that occurs in the
    City of Columbus, County of Fairfield, may be filed in either
    the municipal court in Franklin County or Fairfield County,
    both courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Moreover, if the
    Fairfield County, Case No. 15-CA-41                                                        3
    matter goes to jury trial, the jury must be drawn from Fairfield
    County.
    It is the practice of the courts to handle a jury trial of
    these matters in Fairfield County Municipal Court.
    {¶5}   A bench trial was held on April 23, 2015. At the trial, Trooper Kaitlin Fuller
    of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified that the stop and arrest of appellant occurred
    within Fairfield County, but within the city of Columbus. At the conclusion of the State’s
    case, appellant moved to dismiss all of the charges against her based on R.C. 1901.34.
    Appellant argued that, pursuant to such statute, the City of Lancaster Law Director did
    not have authority to prosecute appellant’s case since “[t]his entire event transpired within
    the city of Columbus.” Transcript at 24. Appellant argued that the Law Director of the City
    of Columbus possessed the sole legal authority to prosecute appellant. At the request of
    the trial court, both parties filed post hearing briefs on such issue.
    {¶6}   As memorialized in an Entry filed on June 4, 2015, the trial court denied
    appellant’s motion, stating that any defect in the institution of the prosecution must be
    raised prior to trial or is waived by a defendant pursuant to Crim.R. 12(H). The trial court
    found appellant guilty of OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). All other charges were
    dismissed. Pursuant to a Journal Entry filed on August 3, 2015, appellant was sentenced
    to 180 days in jail with 177 days suspended and her driver’s license was suspended for
    6 months. Appellant also was fined $375.00 and was sentenced to two years of non-
    reporting probation.
    {¶7}   Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
    Fairfield County, Case No. 15-CA-41                                                       4
    {¶8}    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
    DISMISS BECAUSE THE CITY OF LANCASTER LACKED AUTHORITY TO
    PROSECUTE MS. CASE’S CHARGES.
    I
    {¶9}    Appellant, in her sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred
    in denying her Motion to Dismiss because the City of Lancaster lacked authority to
    prosecute her in this case.
    {¶10} Crim.R. 12 states, in relevant part, as follows:
    {¶11} (C) Pretrial motions
    {¶12} Prior to trial, any party may raise by motion any defense, objection,
    evidentiary issue, or request that is capable of determination without the trial of the
    general issue. The following must be raised before trial:
    {¶13} (1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the
    prosecution;
    {¶14} A failure to raise a defense or objection constitutes a waiver of that defense
    or objection. Crim.R. 12(H). An argument that the prosecuting entity does not have
    authority to try a case concerns a defect in the institution of prosecution. See State v.
    Herrmann, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 93 CA 2185, 
    1994 WL 534880
    (Sept. 28, 1994). Thus,
    appellant was required to argue that the City of Lancaster Law Director lacked authority
    to prosecute her in a pretrial motion pursuant to Crim.R. 12(C). However, appellant did
    not file such a motion, but rather raised the issue at the conclusion of the testimony. We
    find that appellant waived any defense or objection regarding improper prosecutorial
    authority.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 15-CA-41                                                  5
    {¶15} We note, as stated above, that appellant did file a pretrial Motion to
    Transfer, seeking to transfer venue to Franklin County pursuant to Crim.R. 18. However,
    as noted by appellee, appellant’s argument “is not persuasive because a motion to
    change venue is governed by Criminal Rule 18, not Criminal Rule 12.”
    {¶16} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    {¶17} Accordingly, the judgment of the Fairfield County Municipal Court is
    affirmed.
    By: Baldwin, J.
    Hoffman, P.J. and
    Delaney, J. concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-CA-41

Judges: Baldwin

Filed Date: 2/16/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2016