Worley v. State , 2014 Ohio 1429 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as Worley v. State, 
    2014-Ohio-1429
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 100200
    PEREZ WORLEY
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    STATE OF OHIO
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-13-803166
    BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Keough, P.J., and McCormack, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                   April 3, 2014
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Brian R. Gutkoski
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center - 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mark Marein
    Marein & Bradley
    526 Superior Avenue
    Suite 222
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    R. Emmett Moran
    Davis & Young
    1200 Fifth Third Center
    600 Superior Avenue, East
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, the state of Ohio (the “State”), appeals from the trial
    court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Perez Worley
    (“Worley”), finding that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual under R.C.
    2743.48(A)(5). Based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Mansaray v. State,
    Slip Opinion No. 
    2014-Ohio-750
    , we reverse the trial court’s judgment on Worley’s
    motion for summary judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter
    judgment in favor of the State.
    {¶2} The facts surrounding Worley’s convictions underlying this civil case are
    described by this court in State v. Worley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94590,
    
    2011-Ohio-2779
    .     In 2009, Worley was convicted for attempted murder, aggravated
    robbery, felonious assault, kidnapping, and carrying a concealed weapon for robbing and
    shooting two males. The trial court sentenced Worley to 29 years in prison. In 2011,
    we reversed his convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial, finding that the
    investigating officer’s testimony regarding a witness and the codefendant violated the
    Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and should not have been admitted. Id. at ¶
    19.
    {¶3} Following our remand, Worley proceeded to a new jury trial, at which he was
    found not guilty of all charges. Subsequently, Worley filed a wrongful imprisonment
    complaint in March 2013.          In his complaint, he alleged that he was a wrongfully
    imprisoned individual under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). R.C. 2743.48 governs civil actions
    against the State for wrongful imprisonment, and provides in pertinent part:
    (A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the Revised Code, a
    “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an individual who satisfies each
    of the following:
    (1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised
    Code by an indictment or information, and the violation charged was an
    aggravated felony or felony.
    (2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the
    particular charge or a lesser-included offense by the court or jury involved,
    and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated
    felony or felony.
    (3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of
    imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the
    individual was found guilty.
    (4) The individual’s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on
    appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any
    further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is
    pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney,
    city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a
    municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that
    conviction.
    (5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an
    error in procedure resulted in the individual’s release, or it was determined
    by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal
    action was initiated that the charged offense, including all lesser-included
    offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed
    by any person.
    {¶4} In June 2013, Worley moved for summary judgment, arguing that he is a
    wrongfully imprisoned individual under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) because an error in
    procedure resulted in his release. The State opposed Worley’s motion, arguing that
    Worley’s error in procedure did not happen subsequent to sentencing. The trial court
    granted Worley’s motion for summary judgment, finding that he is a wrongfully
    imprisoned individual. The court stated:
    Worley is determined to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual under [R.C.
    2743.48]; that [Worley] was acquitted at retrial, and the court further finds
    that an error in procedure resulted in [Worley’s] subsequent release from
    prison; therefore[,] summary judgment of [Worley] is granted. The court
    further gives notice to [Worley] that he may commence a civil action
    against the state in the court of claims as a result of the wrongful
    imprisonment, and that he has the right to be represented in said claims by
    counsel of his choice.
    {¶5} The State now appeals, raising the following six assignments of error for
    review.
    Assignment of Error One
    The trial court committed reversible error when it purportedly granted
    Worley’s summary judgment motion.
    Assignment of Error Two
    The trial court committed reversible [error when it] denied the State’s
    motion to strike jury demand as moot.
    Assignment of Error Three
    The trial court abused its discretion when it granted Worley’s motion for
    protective order that failed to comply with the plain language of Civ.R. 26.
    Assignment of Error Four
    The trial court abused its discretion when it denied the State leave to file a
    cross motion for summary judgment when the case was only three months
    old and had not been set for trial, where the court never fixed a dispositive
    motion deadline, and where the court had granted Worley’s leave to file for
    summary judgment, instanter, less than thirty days prior.
    Assignment of Error Five
    The trial court committed reversible error when it granted Worley’s July 3,
    2013 motion to strike the evidentiary materials attached to the State’s
    opposition to summary judgment.
    Assignment of Error Six
    The trial court committed reversible error when [it] sua sponte “Note[d] an
    error was made” but nonetheless denied the State’s Civ.R. 60 motion
    without a hearing.
    Motion for Summary Judgment
    {¶6} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard of
    review.   Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 
    77 Ohio St.3d 102
    , 105, 
    671 N.E.2d 241
     (1996);
    Zemcik v. LaPine Truck Sales & Equip. Co., 
    124 Ohio App.3d 581
    , 585, 
    706 N.E.2d 860
    (8th Dist.1998). In Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 
    82 Ohio St.3d 367
    , 369-370, 
    696 N.E.2d 201
     (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the appropriate test as follows:
    Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is
    no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one
    conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party
    being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.
    Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), 
    73 Ohio St.3d 679
    ,
    
    1995-Ohio-286
    , 
    653 N.E.2d 1196
    , paragraph three of the syllabus. The
    party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there
    is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 
    75 Ohio St.3d 280
    , 292-293,
    
    1996-Ohio-107
    , 
    662 N.E.2d 264
    , 273-274.
    {¶7} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party “may not
    rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response,
    by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
    that there is a genuine issue for trial.”   Civ.R. 56(E); Mootispaw v. Eckstein, 
    76 Ohio St.3d 383
    , 385, 
    667 N.E.2d 1197
     (1996). Doubts must be resolved in favor of the
    nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 
    65 Ohio St.3d 356
    , 358-359, 
    604 N.E.2d 138
     (1992).
    {¶8} The issue in this case is whether Worley is a “wrongfully imprisoned
    individual” as defined in R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). The Ohio Supreme Court provides the
    answer to this question in Mansaray, Slip Opinion No. 
    2014-Ohio-750
    .
    {¶9} In Mansaray, plaintiff-appellee, Yanko Mansaray, filed a wrongfully
    imprisoned individual complaint after his convictions were reversed by this court.
    Mansaray at ¶ 2-4, citing State v. Mansaray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93562,
    
    2010-Ohio-5119
    .      The trial court dismissed his wrongfully imprisoned individual
    complaint, and we reversed, concluding that Mansaray satisfied all five requirements of
    R.C. 2743.48(A)(1)-(5). Id. at ¶ 4. The State appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court
    accepted jurisdiction. Id.
    {¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis focused on whether Mansaray was a
    wrongfully imprisoned individual under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5), which provides that:
    Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an
    error in procedure resulted in the individual’s release, or it was determined
    by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal
    action was initiated that the charged offense, including all lesser-included
    offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed
    by any person.
    {¶11} The court noted that
    ‘[t]he fifth factor of R.C. 2743.48(A) may be fulfilled in one of two ways:
    (1) subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment “an
    error in procedure resulted in the individual’s release” or (2) the charged
    offense (and any lesser included offense) was not committed by the
    individual or no crime was committed at all (actual innocence).’
    Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Doss v. State, 
    135 Ohio St.3d 211
    , 
    2012-Ohio-5678
    , 
    985 N.E.2d 1229
    ,
    ¶ 12.
    {¶12} The State argued that the subsequent event is an error in procedure that
    occurs after sentencing and during or after imprisonment. Mansaray argued that the
    subsequent event is a judicial determination that an error occurred, even if that error
    occurred prior to sentencing and imprisonment.              Mansaray, Slip Opinion No.
    
    2014-Ohio-750
    , at ¶ 8.
    {¶13} The court found that the State’s interpretation is correct, noting that
    the state’s version is the meaning that is obvious and common in large part
    because in the state’s version, the introductory phrase modifies “error in
    procedure,” the noun phrase closest to it. Youngstown Club v. Porterfield,
    
    21 Ohio St.2d 83
    , 86, 
    255 N.E.2d 262
     (1970). In Mansaray’s version, the
    introductory phrase modifies a noun phrase that doesn’t appear in the
    statute: “a judicial determination that an error in procedure occurred.”
    ***
    Nothing in the statute indicates that the General Assembly intended to open
    the state to liability for wrongful imprisonment when a conviction is
    reversed based on a procedural error that occurred prior to sentencing.
    Mansaray’s interpretation would greatly expand the ability of defendants to
    seek compensation for wrongful imprisonment. If that is indeed what the
    General Assembly intended, it did a remarkable job of keeping it to itself —
    and it will be able to enact such legislation upon learning that we do not
    think that it has already done so.
    Id. at ¶ 9-10.
    {¶14} The Mansaray court concluded that “when a defendant seeks a declaration
    that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual and seeks to satisfy R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) by
    proving that an error in procedure resulted in his release, the error in procedure must have
    occurred subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment.” Id. at ¶
    12; syllabus.
    {¶15} Likewise, in the instant case, the error in procedure — a Confrontation
    Clause violation — that resulted in Worley’s release did not occur subsequent to
    sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment. Accordingly, Worley did not
    satisfy R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) and is not a wrongfully imprisoned individual. We reverse
    the trial court’s judgment on Worley’s motion for summary judgment and remand with
    instructions for the trial court to enter judgment, as a matter of law, in favor of the State.
    See App.R. 12(B).
    {¶16} In the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error, the State
    argues that the trial court committed several procedural errors. However, based on our
    disposition of the first assignment of error, the remaining assignments of error are
    overruled as moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
    {¶17} Judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded with instructions for the
    trial court to enter judgment in favor of State.
    It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
    TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 100200

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 1429

Judges: Kilbane

Filed Date: 4/3/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014