State v. Jones , 2019 Ohio 133 ( 2019 )

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-133.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-170518
C-170519
Plaintiff-Appellant, : TRIAL NO. B-1701909
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
WILLIAM JONES, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 18, 2019
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Law Office of Angela Glaser and Angela Glaser, for Defendant-Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} In 1985, defendant-appellee William Jones was indicted for rape,
aggravated burglary, attempted rape, and four counts of felonious assault. All counts
included specifications that Jones previously had been convicted of aggravated
burglary. He pled guilty to aggravated burglary and two counts of felonious assault,
and the other charges were dismissed. Jones was sentenced to an aggregate term of
11 to 25 years’ incarceration, with 11 years of actual incarceration.
{¶2} Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law became effective in 1997. Under
Megan’s Law, offenders who had committed a sexually-oriented offense that was not
registration-exempt were labeled a sexually-oriented offender, a habitual sexual
offender, or a sexual predator based upon the crime committed and the findings
made by the trial court at a sexual-offender-classification hearing. State v. Clay, 177
Ohio App.3d 78, 2008-Ohio-2980, 893 N.E.2d 909 (1st Dist.). Pursuant to the
Megan’s Law version of R.C. 2950.01(D)(3), felonious assault was a sexually-oriented
offense when it was committed “with a purpose to gratify the sexual needs or desires
of the offender.” Keeney v. State, 188 Ohio App.3d 498, 2010-Ohio-3507, 935
N.E.2d 941, ¶ 3 (1st Dist.). As we noted in Keeney, “In 2003 the legislature replaced
‘committed with the purpose to gratify the sexual needs or desires of the offender’
with ‘committed with a sexual motivation.’ ‘Sexual motivation’ as defined in former
R.C. 2971.01(J) ‘means a purpose to gratify the sexual needs or desires of the
offender.’ ” Keeney at fn. 3.
{¶3} Former R.C. 2950.09(C)(1) provided,
If a person was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented
offense prior to January 1, 1997, if the person was not sentenced for
the offense on or after January 1, 1997, and if, on or after January 1,
1997, the offender is serving a term of imprisonment in a state
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
correctional institution, prior to the offender’s release from the term of
imprisonment, the department of rehabilitation and correction shall
determine whether to recommend that the offender be adjudicated as
being a sexual predator.
{¶4} As we explained in Keeney, under Megan’s Law,
The department of rehabilitation and correction was required to notify
the trial court of its recommendation that an offender be labeled a
sexual predator. The trial court could deny the recommendation
without a hearing. If the court found that the offender was not a
sexual predator, the court was required to determine whether the
offender was a habitual sexual offender. An offender who had
committed a sexually oriented offense but was not classified as a
sexual predator or a habitual sexual offender was designated a sexually
oriented offender by operation of law.
(Citations omitted.) Keeney at ¶ 3.
{¶5} The record reflects that on September 4, 2003, the court journalized
an entry in which it stated, “Information provided to the court indicates that
Department of Correction has previously found defendant to be a sexually oriented
offender.” On July 19, 2004, the trial court ordered Jones’s return from prison for a
sexual-predator hearing on August 11, 2004. At the August 11, 2004 hearing, no
testimony was taken and no evidence outside the record of the 1985 criminal case
numbered B-8503221-B was submitted. In response to the trial court’s inquiry as to
whether “everything” was “submitted on the record,” defense counsel stated, “Judge,
it’s submitted on the record, because as a matter of law, unfortunately, you have to
find him at least a sexually-oriented offender.” The court then entered an order
reflecting in part that Jones was a sexually-oriented offender.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶6} On April 10, 2017, in the instant case, Jones was indicted for failing to
verify his current address and failing to provide notice of an address change. The
indictment stated that the basis of Jones’s duty to register was a 1985 felonious-
assault conviction. Jones filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he
had no duty to register under Megan’s Law, because he had not been convicted of a
sexually-oriented offense where there had been no finding by the court, and nothing
in the record to demonstrate, that he had committed felonious assault with a sexual
motivation. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Jones’s motion to dismiss
the indictment. The court found that nothing in the record from the felonious-
assault cases established that Jones had admitted to committing either of the
felonious assaults with a sexual motivation; therefore, they were not sexually-
oriented offenses and could not provide the basis for any sexual-offender-
registration duties. The court specifically found that Jones had never been convicted
of a sexually-oriented offense, and therefore, he never had a duty to register as a sex
offender. The court also entered an order directing the Hamilton County sheriff to
remove Jones from the sex-offender registry, but the court stayed that order pending
appeal. The state has appealed the court’s order directing the sheriff to remove
Jones from the sex-offender registry in the case numbered C-170518, and the order
dismissing the indictment in the case numbered C-170519. The cases have been
consolidated.
{¶7} The state’s sole assignment of error asserts, “The trial court erred in
dismissing the indictment for registration offenses in violation of R.C. Chapter 2950
and in directing the Hamilton County sheriff to remove Jones from the registry of sex
offenders when Jones previously stipulated that he was a sexually oriented offender
before the court who presided over his original case and who was statutorily
obligated to preside over the sexual predator classification hearing.” The state
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
argues that Jones stipulated to his classification at the August 11, 2004 hearing, and
that based on Jones’s stipulation, the trial court entered an order determining that
Jones was a sexually-oriented offender.
{¶8} Pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09(C)(1), Jones was subject to Megan’s
Law’s registration requirements only if he was serving a prison term for a sexually-
oriented offense on or after July 1, 1997. The state argues that Jones stipulated to his
classification as a sexually-oriented offender at the August 11, 2004 sexual-offender-
classification hearing. At that hearing, the following took place:
THE COURT: Well, for purposes of the record, Mr. Jones is here for a
sexual predator hearing, and he’s represented by counsel.
Is everything submitted on the record?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, it’s submitted on the record, because,
as a matter of law, unfortunately, you have to find him at least a
sexually-oriented offender.
***
THE COURT: Just for the record, we’ll say the Court has determined
the defendant is found to be a sexually-oriented offender * * *.
No testimony was taken and no evidence was presented as to whether Jones’s
felonious-assault offense had been committed with a sexual motivation.
{¶9} As we stated in Keeney,
Felonious assault is a “sexually oriented offense” only when it is
committed with a sexual motivation. Whether an assault was
committed with a sexual motivation, i.e., whether it was committed
with a purpose to gratify the sexual needs or desires of the offender, is
a question of fact that depends for its resolution on the circumstances
surrounding the offense. A hearing may be required where there is an
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
issue of fact as to whether an offense was committed with a sexual
motivation. The burden is on the state to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that an offense was committed with a sexual
motivation.
(Internal citations omitted.) Keeney, 188 Ohio App.3d 498, 2010-Ohio-3507, 935
N.E.2d 941, at ¶ 8.
{¶10} Defense counsel “submitted” the matter “on the record.” But there
was nothing in the record to show that Jones had committed felonious assault with a
sexual motivation. Based on the record before the court, the statement that Jones
was “at least a sexually-oriented offender” was incorrect. Jones was not “at least a
sexually-oriented offender” based on the record submitted to the court, because that
record did not show any sexual motivation. Counsel’s statement that Jones was “at
least a sexually-oriented offender,” which was prefaced with counsel’s statement that
the matter was “submitted on the record,” was not supported by the record;
therefore, it could not have constituted a stipulation that Jones had committed
felonious assault with a sexual motivation.
{¶11} There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Jones committed
felonious assault for the purpose of gratifying his sexual needs or desires. Jones
pleaded guilty to two counts of felonious assault as charged in the 1985 indictment.
The felonious-assault counts in that indictment do not allege any sexual motivation.
There is no transcript of the 1985 plea hearing. At the 2004 sexual-offender-
classification hearing, the parties submitted the matter “on the record,” a record
which did not demonstrate that Jones had been convicted of a sexually-oriented
offense. The trial court in the instant case specifically found that nothing in the
record from the 1985 case established that Jones had pleaded guilty to committing
either of the felonious assaults with a sexual motivation, and therefore, “the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
convictions in 1985 for felonious assault cannot, as a matter of law, serve as a basis
for either offense to constitute a ‘sexually oriented offense.’ ” The record supports
the trial court’s determination.
{¶12} The record does not show that Jones has been convicted of a sexually-
oriented offense, and therefore, he is not required to register as a sex offender. See
Keeney at ¶ 10. The assignment of error is overruled. The judgments of the trial
court are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
MYERS and DETERS, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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