State v. Waller , 2023 Ohio 493 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Waller, 2023-Ohio-493.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-22-10
v.
JUSTYN T. WALLER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2022-CR-0045
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 21, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Brian A. Smith for Appellant
Rebeka Beresh for Appellee
Case No. 13-22-10
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Justyn T. Waller (“Waller”), appeals the July 6,
2022 judgment of sentencing of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On March 9, 2022, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Waller on
one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C 2919.25(A), (D)(4), a third-
degree felony. On March 11, 2022, Waller appeared for arraignment and entered a
plea of not guilty.
{¶3} Prior to trial, Waller filed a notice in the trial court stipulating to his
three prior domestic-violence convictions.1 Waller then proceeded to a jury trial on
June 14, 2022, wherein he was found guilty of domestic violence. Further, the jury
made findings that Waller had been convicted of two or more domestic-violence
offenses and that the State did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Waller did not
act in self-defense.
{¶4} On July 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced Waller to an 18-month prison
term.
1
It is unclear from the record if Amber Martin (“Martin”) was the victim of Waller’s 2012 and 2014
domestic-violence offenses. However, Waller testified (at trial) that Martin was the victim in his 2021
domestic-violence offense ultimately culminating in a conviction and his placement on probation in Hancock
County. (June 14, 2022 Tr., Vol. I, at 219).
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{¶5} Waller filed a timely notice of appeal and raises two assignments of
error for our review. We will address his second assignment of error first then his
first assignment of error.
Assignment of Error II
Because the State’s redirect examination of Amber Martin was
beyond the scope of cross-examination, was designed to elicit
otherwise inadmissible evidence, and prejudiced Appellant, the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to conduct
redirect examination of Amber Martin as to the Appellant’s
alleged prior acts, prior to the incident in question, beyond the
scope of cross-examination.
{¶6} In his second assignment of error, Waller argues that the trial court erred
by permitting the State to exceed the scope of cross-examination during redirect
examination. Specifically, Waller asserts that because the trial court permitted the
State to exceed the scope of Waller’s cross-examination the State was permitted to
introduce “other acts” evidence that was unfairly prejudicial under Evid.R. 403(A).
Standard of Review
{¶7} “Generally, ‘[a] trial court is given broad discretion in admitting and
excluding evidence * * * .” State v. Wendel, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-16-08, 2016-
Ohio-7915, ¶ 23, quoting State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 11 JE 7, 2013-
Ohio-2314, ¶ 7, citing State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 265 (1984).
Consequently, we review a trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. Williams at ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision
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is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d
151,157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶8} Ordinarily, “the scope of redirect examination is limited to matters
inquired into by the adverse party on cross-examination.” State v. Rucker, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 105628, 2018-Ohio-1832, ¶ 59, citing State v. Thomas, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 101797, 2015-Ohio-3226, ¶ 41, and State v. Wilson, 30 Ohio St.2d
199, 204 (1972). However, it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow a witness
to testify on redirect examination to facts, which could have been elicited during his
or her testimony in chief. Id. Nevertheless, exceeding the scope of cross-
examination in a redirect is not per se error because the redirect is not necessarily
limited to the subject areas discussed in cross-examination. Id., citing State v.
Faulkner, 56 Ohio St.2d 42 (1978), and State v. Capko, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
56814, 1990 WL 37344 (Mar. 29, 1990). “The control of redirect examination is
committed to the discretion of the trial judge and a reversal upon that ground can be
predicated upon nothing less than a clear abuse thereof.” Wilson at 204.
{¶9} Importantly, the trial court controls the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and the presentation of evidence. Evid.R. 611. Specifically, the trial court
must exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and the presentation of evidence for the purpose of “(1) mak[ing] the interrogation
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and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid[ing] needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect[ing] witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Evid.R. 611(B) then sets forth the scope
of cross-examination stating that it “shall be permitted on all relevant matters and
matters affecting credibility.” (Emphasis added.) “Relevant evidence” is “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” Evid.R. 401. Indeed, only relevant evidence is admissible. Evid.R.
402.
{¶10} On the other hand, the scope and extent of redirect examination is to
clarify matters raised on cross-examination (i.e., to explain, rebut, or avoid the effect
of a new matter brought out on cross-examination) and to rehabilitate a witness who
was attacked or impeached on cross-examination. See State v. Roby, 6th Dist.
Fulton No. F-87-3, 1988 WL 30499, *5 (Mar. 11, 1988); State v. Parker, 11th Dist.
Lake No. 9-162, 1983 WL 6153, *1 (June 20, 1983) citing Birns v. Perini, 426 F.2d
1288 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1609 (1971).
{¶11} Moreover, the trial court has the discretion under R.C. 2945.10(D) to
permit evidence to be offered out of order. State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164(1984), paragraph eleven of the syllabus; State v. Graven, 54 Ohio St.2d 114, 115
(1978).
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{¶12} Here, Martin testified as a witness during the State’s case-in-chief.
During cross-examination, the following exchange took place between Waller’s
trial counsel and Martin:
[Waller’s Trial Counsel] Ms. Martin, had you and Mr. Waller
ever been physical before?
[Martin] Yes.
[Waller’s Trial Counsel] And had you ever pushed him before?
[Martin] Probably after he pushed me.
[Waller’s Trial Counsel] But you -- it’s your testimony that you
have never been the initial aggressor
in an altercation with him?
[Martin] Correct.
(June 14, 2022 Tr. at 133). Then, on redirect examination, the following exchange
occurred between the trial court, the State, Martin, and Waller’s trial counsel:
[State of Ohio] Ms. Grandillo has referenced that the
defendant has been physical with you
before?
[Martin] Yes.
[State of Ohio] What has he done?
[Waller’s Trial Counsel] Objection, Your Honor. That’s not
the question. The question was had
the parties been physical together
before.
[Trial Court] It’s all cross-examination. Overruled.
You may answer.
[Martin] Can you please repeat the question?
[State of Ohio] Yes. You were asked if Mr. Waller
has been physical with you before, and
how he has been?
[Martin] Yes, the same situation a year ago.
[State of Ohio] And what type of physical altercation
did he do?
[Martin] It was strangulation again.
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[State of Ohio] Okay. So he put his hands on your
neck?
[Martin] Yeah.
[State of Ohio] Was he convicted of that?
[Martin] No.
[State of Ohio] I’m sorry?
[Martin] No. I don’t know.
(Id. at 134-135).
{¶13} Contrary to Waller’s argument, we find no abuse of discretion or
prejudice here. Even though the defense stipulated to the admission of Waller’s
prior domestic-violence convictions (obviating the State’s need to prove that
element of the crime as to the penalty enhancement), the defense, on cross-
examination, Waller opened the door to evidence of the specific acts involving
Martin and Waller by attempting to prove that Martin was the primary physical
aggressor to support his self-defense claim.2 See State v. Salyer, 3d Dist. Allen No.
1-19-17, 2020-Ohio-147, ¶ 32.
{¶14} To us, on redirect, the State merely clarified the circumstances
involving Waller’s prior involvement with Martin in order to rebut the assertion that
Martin was the primary physical aggressor.3 Thus, because the defense opened the
door and placed Martin’s character at issue, the State was entitled to rebut any false
2
We decline to address whether the Waller’s act of strangulation constitutes an “other act” under the
circumstances presented in this appeal since Waller’s assignment of error asks us to address whether the
State’s questions were outside the scope of cross-examination on redirect examination and not determine the
admissibility of “other acts” evidence under Evid.R. 404(B).
3
We further decline to address whether these specific instances of conduct are admissible under Evid.R. 405
for either the accused or victim since that issue was also not raised on appeal.
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impression that may have resulted from her earlier testimony made under cross-
examination. See State v. Greene, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-238, 2019-Ohio-
4010, ¶ 75, appeal not accepted, 157 Ohio St.3d 1539, 2020-Ohio-122; State v.
Dennis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1290, 2006-Ohio-5777, ¶ 34; State v. Herron,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99110, 2013-Ohio-3139, ¶ 25 (Where the record
demonstrates defense counsel’s “questions of the witnesses ‘opened the door’ to the
evidence he now challenges, neither Evid.R. 403(A) nor 404(B) avail him.”).
{¶15} Nonetheless, we note that Waller suffered no prejudice as a result of
the State’s redirect of Martin because Waller ultimately testified, at the time of his
altercation with Martin that he called his probation officer on the phone telling him
that “I just put my hands around my girlfriend’s throat. And if I don’t go to jail,
she’s going to die.” (June 14, 2022 Tr. Vol. I, at 139). As such, Waller’s admission
cleared the way for the jury to decide the case on the facts presented, not on Waller’s
past conduct.
{¶16} Accordingly, Wallers’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error I
Because the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage
of justice in finding Appellant guilty of Domestic Violence,
Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Waller argues that the jury’s verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Waller asserts that Martin
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was not a victim, but rather the primary physical aggressor who used her knowledge
of Waller’s criminal history to provoke him to act in self-defense.4
Standard of Review
{¶18} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and
determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387 (1997), superseded by state statute on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio
St.3d 89 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on
matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. When
applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the
evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn
the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-
5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
4
To the extent Waller’s argument appears to sound in sufficiency, we need not address his argument since
Waller’s assignment of error concerns the manifest weight of the evidence. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); App.R.
16(A)(3).
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Analysis
{¶19} Ultimately, this case involves a classic “he-said/she-said” scenario
wherein Martin and Waller testified to different versions of the events transpiring
on February 23, 2022. To us, Waller is challenging Martin’s credibility, asserting
that the jury should have found him to be more credible. Indeed, in the instant case,
where there is little-to-no physical evidence of violence, credibility of the witnesses
is the primary factor in determining guilt. See State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Logan No.
8-17-50, 2018-Ohio-1681, ¶ 43. “Although we review credibility when considering
the manifest weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is primarily a
determination for the trier of fact.” State v. Banks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96535,
2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13, citing DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, at paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶20} Significantly, the jury had the opportunity to observe Martin and
Waller who both testified at trial. Based upon our review of the record it is clear
that the jury simply found Martin to be more credible. Indeed, the jury “is best able
‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and voice inflections,
and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’”
Id., quoting State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24, citing
Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Moreover, it is
within the province of the jury to parse out the credible portions of the witnesses’
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testimonies, principally as it pertained to who the primary physical aggressor was
on February 23, 2022. See State v. Wainwright, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 119 MA
0023, 2020-Ohio-623, ¶ 37, citing State v. Mastel, 26 Ohio St.2d 170, 176-177
(1971). ““‘A verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the
[jury] chose to believe the State’s witnesses rather than the defendant’s version of
the events.’”” State v. Missler, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-14-06, 2015-Ohio-1076, ¶ 44,
quoting State v. Bean, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26852, 2014-Ohio-908, ¶ 15, quoting
State v. Martinez, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0054, 2013-Ohio-3189, ¶ 16.
{¶21} After reviewing the entire record, we will not say that the evidence
weighs heavily against Waller’s domestic-violence conviction. Consequently, we
do not conclude that the jury clearly lost its way creating a manifest miscarriage of
justice such that Waller’s conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
{¶22} Accordingly, Wallers’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶23} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued in his assignments of error, we affirm the judgment
of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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