State v. Alexander , 2013 Ohio 1987 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Alexander, 
    2013-Ohio-1987
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 98762
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    VAUGHN ALEXANDER, JR.
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case Nos. CR-555041 and CR-561726
    BEFORE:          Jones, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Kilbane, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      May 16, 2013
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Thomas A. Rein
    Leader Building, Suite 940
    526 Superior Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44114
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Andrew J. Santoli
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    The Justice Center, 8th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Vaughn Alexander, appeals his consecutive sentence.
    We affirm.
    I.   Procedural History
    {¶2} In December 2011, Alexander entered into a plea agreement with the state of
    Ohio and pleaded guilty to two counts of drug trafficking and agreed to forfeit four cell
    phones in Case No. CR-555041. The trial court sentenced Alexander to two years of
    community control sanctions with conditions.       In addition, the trial court issued a
    suspended sentence of 12 months in prison on each drug trafficking count. At the time
    of his plea and sentence, Alexander was on probation to the court in Case No.
    CR-547970.
    {¶3} On July 17, 2012, Alexander pleaded guilty to one count of drug trafficking
    and one count of attempted retaliation and agreed to forfeit a bicycle and a cell phone in
    Case No. CR-561726.     The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing and revoked
    Alexander’s community control sanctions in CR-555041.          The trial court sentenced
    Alexander as follows: (1) in Case No. CR-561726, the court sentenced Alexander to 17
    months in prison on each of the two counts, to be served concurrently; (2) in Case No.
    CR-555041, the court sentenced him to 11 months in prison on each of the two counts, to
    be served concurrently; and (3) in Case No. CR-547970, the court decided to terminate
    probation.   The trial court ordered the sentences in Case Nos. CR-555041 and
    CR-561726 to be served consecutively, for a total of 28 months in prison.
    II. Law and Analysis
    {¶4} Alexander appeals, raising one assignment of error for our review, in which
    he argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences without making
    findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14.
    {¶5} An appellate court must conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s
    sentencing decision.   State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. No. 97579, 
    2012-Ohio-2508
    , ¶ 6, citing
    State v. Hites, 3d Dist. No. 6-11-07, 
    2012-Ohio-1892
    . R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that
    an appellate court must “review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence
    or modification given by the sentencing court.”       If an appellate court clearly and
    convincingly finds either that (1) “the record does not support the sentencing court’s
    findings under [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)]” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to law,”
    then “the appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * * or
    may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing.”
    Johnson at 
    id.
    {¶6} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that if multiple prison terms are imposed on an
    offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve
    the prison terms consecutively if (1) the court finds that the consecutive sentence is
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) that the
    consecutive sentence is not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct
    and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) if the court also finds any of
    the following:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
    offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
    was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
    more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).1
    {¶7} Thus, a sentencing court must analyze whether consecutive sentences are
    necessary to protect the public or punish the offender, are not disproportionate, and make
    one additional finding listed in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).
    {¶8} “A trial court satisfies this statutory requirement when the record reflects that
    the court has engaged in the required analysis and has selected the appropriate statutory
    criteria.” State v. Goins, 8th Dist. No. 98256, 
    2013-Ohio-263
    , ¶ 10, citing State v.
    Edmonson, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 324
    , 326, 
    1999-Ohio-10
    , 
    715 N.E.2d 131
    .
    {¶9} In making these findings, a trial court is not required to use “talismanic words
    R.C. 2929.14(C) refers to “convictions of multiple offenses,” but does not distinguish
    1
    between multiple counts in a single case and multiple counts in separate cases. Consequently, the
    statute applies even though Alexander was sentenced in two separate cases.
    to comply with the guidelines and factors for sentencing.”      Goins at 
    id.,
     citing State v.
    Brewer, 1st Dist. No. C-000148, 
    2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5455
    , *10 (Nov. 24, 2000).
    But it must be clear from the record that the trial court actually made the findings required
    by statute. Goins at 
    id.
     A trial court satisfies this statutory requirement when the record
    reflects that the court has engaged in the required analysis and has selected the
    appropriate statutory criteria. 
    Id.
    {¶10} In sentencing Alexander to consecutive sentences, the trial court stated that
    “the purpose of felony sentencing in the State of Ohio is to protect the public and punish
    the offender.”   The court then outlined Alexander’s “extensive” criminal history, which
    dated back to 1994, commenting that he had a “very, very poor adjustment to probation.”
    The court noted that Alexander was on community control sanctions at the time he
    committed the current crimes and showed no remorse.        The court found that “due to the
    defendant’s extensive history of narcotics trafficking, finding that these crimes were
    committed while this defendant was under sanction to this court, and given that this
    defendant does have an extensive criminal history of similar offenses * * * consecutive
    sentences are appropriate.”
    {¶11} Alexander claims that his sentence should be vacated because the trial court
    failed to specifically find that the consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the
    seriousness of his conduct and the danger he poses to the public. But the trial court
    made the appropriate findings as to proportionality when it stated that it was imposing
    consecutive sentences based on Alexander’s extensive criminal history, noting that many
    of his past crimes were similar in nature and involved drug trafficking. See State v.
    Drobny, 8th Dist. No. 98404, 
    2013-Ohio-937
    ; Goins, 
    supra
     (finding the record offered
    evidence that the trial court fully engaged in the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) analysis, even though
    specific findings were not stated on the record); State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. No. 98354,
    
    2013-Ohio-372
    ; but see State v. Battle, 8th Dist. No. 98294, 
    2013-Ohio-816
     (trial court
    failed to expressly address the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) factors and there was insufficient
    evidence in the record to show a reasoned consideration of the factors).
    {¶12} Here, the trial court considered not only Alexander’s past crimes, but the
    fact that it had twice previously sentenced Alexander to alternatives to prison, but
    Alexander continued to traffic in narcotics.
    {¶13} In light of the above, the trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis in
    deciding to run the sentence in Case No. CR-561726 consecutive to the sentence it
    imposed in Case No. CR-555041.2
    {¶14} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶15} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    Trial courts can ensure compliance with the sentencing statutes by utilizing a worksheet and
    2
    memorializing their findings from that worksheet on both the record and in the court’s journal entry.
    “Because a trial court speaks only through its journal, we have long approved the use of a
    sentencing-findings worksheet to document that the trial court has made the required findings.” State
    v. Jones, 8th Dist. No. 98371, 
    2013-Ohio-489
    , ¶ 47 (Gallagher, S., concurring), citing State v.
    Alexander, 1st Dist. Nos. C-110828 and C-110829, 
    2012-Ohio-3349
    .
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for
    execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR