State v. Williams ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Williams, 
    2016-Ohio-439
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals No. L-14-1056
    Appellee                                  Trial Court No. CR0201302136
    v.
    Renzie Lamar Williams                             DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                 Decided: February 5, 2016
    *****
    Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Matthew D. Simko, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Mollie B. Hojnicki, for appellant.
    *****
    OSOWIK, J.
    {¶ 1} This is an appeal brought by appellant, Renzie Lamar Williams, from the
    judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which found him guilty of
    possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d), weapons under
    disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), and aggravated possession of drugs, in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a). Appellant was then sentenced to serve a
    mandatory sentence of five years in prison as to Count 1, 30 months as to Count 2, and 11
    months as to Count 3.
    {¶ 2} On November 13, 2013, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
    appellant’s motion to suppress. At the hearing, the state presented testimony from three
    city of Toledo police officers.
    {¶ 3} These officers testified that they responded to 1561 Brooke Park in the city
    of Toledo on a report that gunshots were heard inside the apartment complex. The 911
    caller indicated that a man inside Apartment No. 5 was yelling and that he was seen with
    blood on his shirt. When these officers arrived they found fresh blood right in front of
    the door of Apartment No. 5. The officers knocked on the door and were denied
    entrance. The officers could hear a “commotion” inside. Ultimately someone answered
    the door and the officers then entered the apartment to check for any other individuals
    who could have been hurt inside the apartment or to determine if there was anyone inside
    with a weapon.
    {¶ 4} Once in the apartment, the officers went from room to room to secure the
    scene. In the living room, in plain view, they observed a scale with white powder. In the
    bedroom, they observed, in plain view, a bag of pills and a chunk of white powder on the
    bed. Looking at the bedroom window, one of the officers observed a handgun hanging
    from a string attached to the bedroom window blinds. Finally, in a search of the area
    outside and under the bedroom window officers recovered a bag of crack cocaine and
    2.
    pills. Appellant was located in a bathroom and was patted down and moved to another
    room. After the appellant was arrested, he was advised of his Miranda rights and was
    interviewed by detectives. During the interview appellant admitted to living in 1561
    Brooke Park, Apartment No. 5, regularly sleeping in the room where the drugs were
    found, knowing that the gun was in the apartment, and that he had handled it before and
    that the gun was kept nearby. He also admitted to purchasing the Percocet that was found
    in the baggie beneath his bedroom window.
    {¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that
    The unlawful search of Appellant’s residence was in violation of the
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I
    Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, and the trial court erred in allowing
    into evidence the fruits of the unlawful search.
    {¶ 6} An appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
    question of law and fact. On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate
    court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent,
    credible evidence. The court must then independently determine without deference to the
    trial court’s legal conclusions whether, as a matter of law, evidence should be suppressed.
    State v. Junk, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-07-27, 
    2008-Ohio-1564
    .
    {¶ 7} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for “the
    right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
    unreasonable searches and seizures.” It is axiomatic that the “physical entry of the home
    3.
    is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United
    States v. United States District Court, 
    407 U.S. 297
    , 313, 
    92 S.Ct. 2125
    , 
    32 L.Ed.2d 752
    (1972). And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings
    is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the
    government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v.
    United States, 
    333 U.S. 10
    , 13-14, 
    68 S.Ct. 367
    , 
    92 L.Ed. 436
     (1948).
    {¶ 8} A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, but there are
    exceptions to the rule. It is the state’s burden to prove that one of these exceptions
    applies. Xenia v. Wallace, 
    37 Ohio St.3d 216
    , 
    524 N.E.2d 889
     (1988).
    {¶ 9} One of these well-recognized exceptions permits warrantless felony arrests
    in the home where it can be shown the existence of probable cause and exigent
    circumstances. Payton v. New York, 
    445 U.S. 573
    , 588-590, 
    100 S.Ct. 1371
    , 
    63 L.Ed.2d 639
     (1980). This exception is founded on the premise that the existence of an emergency
    situation, demanding urgent police action, may excuse the failure to procure a search
    warrant. State v. Cheadle, 2d Dist. Miami No. 00CA03, 
    2000 WL 966167
     (July 14,
    2000). In such an emergent situation, based on specific and articulable facts, when
    someone could be in need of immediate assistance in the particular dwelling, police are
    not searching for evidence of a crime, but for victims or a person who could be an
    assailant with a weapon. See State v. Gooden, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23764, 2008-Ohio-
    178. If contraband is discovered by an officer, lawfully in the house pursuant to the
    4.
    exigent circumstance exception, it may be properly seized. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 
    508 U.S. 366
    , 375, 
    113 S.Ct. 2130
    , 
    124 L.Ed.2d 334
     (1993).
    {¶ 10} In this case, the facts establish that Toledo police officers responded to a
    911 call wherein the caller said that someone was yelling inside Apartment No. 5 and was
    “busting off caps.” Also, the caller indicated that there was a black male with blood on
    his shirt. Upon arrival at 1561 Brooke Park, Apartment No. 5, the officers observed fresh
    blood directly outside the door of the apartment. These facts effectively define an
    exigent circumstance, thereby enabling the responding officers to gain access to the
    apartment without violating the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Appellant’s first
    assignment of error is therefore found not well-taken.
    {¶ 11} Appellant’s second assignment of error asserts that the evidence at trial was
    insufficient to support the convictions. Specifically, appellant argues that his convictions
    of possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d), weapons under
    disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), and aggravated possession of drugs, in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a), required appellant to be found in actual
    possession of the contraband found in the apartment.
    {¶ 12} In State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), the Ohio
    Supreme Court outlined the analysis required to determine the sufficiency of the
    evidence:
    5.
    An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence
    admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
    convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979], 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
    , followed.) 
    Id.
     at paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶ 13} Appellant challenges all of his convictions on sufficiency of the evidence
    grounds. Appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the
    possession elements of R.C. 2925.11(A) which states, “No person shall knowingly
    obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.”
    {¶ 14} Appellant was also convicted of a violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). That
    section states:
    (A) Unless relieved from disability as provided in section 2923.14 of
    the Revised Code, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use
    any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply:
    ***
    (3) Such person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any
    offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration,
    6.
    distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse, or has been adjudged a
    juvenile delinquent for commission of any such offense[.]
    {¶ 15} Appellant also argues that the prosecution failed to prove the possession
    requirements of R.C. 2923.13(A).
    {¶ 16} However, possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Wolery, 
    46 Ohio St.2d 316
    , 329, 
    348 N.E.2d 351
     (1976). To establish constructive possession of the
    drugs, the state must establish that the defendant was able to exercise dominion and
    control over them. Id.; State v. Durr, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-97-056, 
    2000 WL 1033033
     (July 28, 2000). Evidence that a defendant was located in very close proximity
    to readily usable drugs may constitute circumstantial evidence to support a finding of
    constructive possession. State v. Rutledge, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1043, 2013-Ohio-
    1482, ¶ 11; Durr at * 4; State v. Morales, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2004 CA 68, 2005-Ohio-
    4714.
    {¶ 17} Constructive possession can be sufficient to support a conviction of having
    weapons under disability. State v. Munn, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1363, 2009-Ohio-
    5879, ¶ 47-48; State v. Hardy, 
    60 Ohio App.2d 325
    , 327, 
    397 N.E.2d 773
     (8th Dist.1978).
    {¶ 18} Whether a person knowingly possessed a controlled substance is to be
    “determined from all the attendant facts and circumstances.” State v. Teamer, 
    82 Ohio St.3d 490
    , 492, 
    696 N.E.2d 1049
     (1998). The responding officers found the drugs on the
    bed in the bedroom. Appellant admitted to officers that it was his bedroom and his
    roommate slept on the couch. Further, the weapon was found outside the bedroom
    7.
    window of that same bedroom. Appellant admitted to the officers to purchasing the
    Percocet that was ultimately found in the container outside the appellant’s bedroom
    window. Given the circumstances under which the cocaine was found and the location in
    appellant’s bedroom and on his bed, we find, after viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
    elements of each of the crimes proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, we conclude
    that any rational trier of fact could have found that appellant was aware of the presence of
    the weapon and had immediate access to it.
    {¶ 19} Appellant’s second assignment of error is therefore not found well-taken.
    {¶ 20} For appellant’s third and final assignment of error, he argues that his
    convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. More particularly, he
    argues that the testimony of the officers should be considered unreliable because the
    interview with the appellant was not recorded.
    {¶ 21} Where it is claimed that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, an appellate court acts as a “thirteenth juror,” weighs the evidence, and may
    disagree with a factfinder’s conclusions on conflicting testimony. State v. Lee, 6th Dist.
    Lucas No. L-06-1384, 
    2008-Ohio-253
    .
    {¶ 22} The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
    reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
    resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a
    manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and new trial
    8.
    ordered. “[E]vidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively
    different.” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997).
    {¶ 23} We defer to the factfinder in its determination of the credibility of the
    testimony of the officers concerning what appellant said to them during their interview
    with him. Under the totality of the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could reasonably
    find that appellant had knowledge of the presence of the drugs and the weapon and
    constructive, if not actual, possession of them.
    {¶ 24} We find appellant’s contention that his convictions were against the
    manifest weight of the evidence to be without merit. Appellant’s third assignment of
    error is found not well-taken.
    {¶ 25} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    9.
    State v. Williams
    C.A. No. L-14-1056
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                      _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.
    _______________________________
    Stephen A. Yarbrough, J.                                  JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
    10.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-14-1056

Judges: Osowik

Filed Date: 2/5/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/9/2016