State v. Taylor ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2014-Ohio-2001.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. Nos. 13CA010366
13CA010367
Appellee 13CA010368
13CA010369
v.
ASIM J. TAYLOR APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
Appellant COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
CASE Nos. 11CR083327
11CR083328
11CR083329
11CR083330
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 12, 2014
MOORE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Asim Taylor, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas that sentenced him to community control for failure to pay child support. This
Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Taylor failed to pay child support with respect to his four children, resulting
in an arrearage. He pleaded guilty to four charges of felony nonpayment of child support, and
the trial court sentenced him to five years of community control. Over Mr. Taylor’s objection,
the trial court imposed the condition that Mr. Taylor “make all reasonable efforts to avoid
impregnating a woman during the community control period or until such time that [he] can
prove to the Court that he is able to provide support for his children he already has and is in fact
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supporting the children or until a change in conditions warrant the lifting of this condition.” Mr.
Taylor filed this appeal challenging the community control condition.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT INFRINGED [MR.] TAYLOR’S DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS
ONE, TWO AND SIXTEEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND [MR.]
TAYLOR’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE NINTH AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION TWENTY OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION WHEN IT IMPOSED A PROBATION CONDITION ON
[MR.] TAYLOR TO TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO AVOID CONCEIVING
ANOTHER CHILD WHILE HE IS ON PROBATION. SINCE THIS
PROBATION CONDITION INFRINGED ON MR. TAYLOR’S
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST
DETERMINED THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CONDITION UNDER A
RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND THEN APPLIED STRICT SCRUTINY
ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION WAS OVERBROAD.
UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS, THIS CONDITION VIOLATES
[MR.] TAYLOR’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRIVACY, DUE
PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION.
{¶3} Mr. Taylor’s single assignment of error argues that the condition attached to his
community control sanction is unreasonable and unconstitutional. Because Mr. Taylor did not
provide this Court with the record considered by the trial court in connection with his sentencing,
however, we are unable to review the merits of his assignment of error.
{¶4} Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in fashioning community control sanctions, but
that discretion is not boundless. See State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52 (1990). See also State
v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 16. A trial court must determine community
control conditions with reference to the purposes of community control and the circumstances of
the underlying case. See Talty at ¶ 12. In so doing, “courts must ‘consider whether the condition
(1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of
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which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably
related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation.’” Id., quoting Jones at
53. When an appellant challenges the reasonableness of community control conditions, this
Court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion with these considerations in
view. Talty at ¶ 10-12. As the Ohio Supreme Court clarified in Talty, Jones addressed
nonconstitutional challenges to community control conditions. Talty at ¶ 11.
{¶5} Few cases analyze the constitutional implications of similar community control
conditions, however, and the parties’ analysis diverges at this point. Mr. Taylor seems to
maintain that constitutional challenges implicating fundamental rights should be subject to a
hybrid level of analysis that incorporates strict scrutiny review into Jones. The State, on the
other hand, argues that whether or not fundamental rights are implicated, this Court should
review the community control condition for an abuse of discretion under the guidance provided
by Jones. We need not resolve the issue at this time, however, because either analysis requires
this Court to examine the circumstances surrounding the trial court’s imposition of community
control, and Mr. Taylor has not provided us with a record adequate to complete this review.
{¶6} When an appellant does not provide a complete record to facilitate our review, we
must presume regularity in the trial court’s proceedings and affirm. State v. Jalwan, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 09CA0065-M, 2010-Ohio-3001, ¶ 12, citing Knapp v. Edwards Labs., 61 Ohio St.2d
197, 199 (1980). Consequently, when the contents of a presentence investigation report are
necessary to review the appropriateness of a sentence, an appellant must move to supplement the
record on appeal with the report to enable our review. See State v. Banks, 9th Dist. Summit No.
24259, 2008-Ohio-6432, ¶ 14.
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{¶7} The absence of the presentence investigation report leaves this Court with little to
consider. Because Mr. Taylor pleaded guilty, there is no trial record before us, and but for vague
references to consideration of the presentence investigation, the record of sentencing is minimal.
Indeed, we have little to go on other than what the trial court said in its journal entries, which is
itself limited. We therefore have no choice in this case but to presume the regularity of the
community control sanctions and to affirm. See Banks at ¶ 14.
{¶8} Mr. Taylor’s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶9} Mr. Taylor’s assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, J.
CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶10} Taylor owes almost $100,000.00 in arrearages for back child support for four
children by four different women, and he pleaded guilty to four felony charges of failure to pay
child support. Based on the facts in the record, I would uphold the trial court’s community
control condition.
{¶11} For context, the condition imposed by the trial court reads in full, as follows:
Defendant is ordered to make all reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a
woman during the community control period or until such time that Defendant
can prove to the Court that he is able to provide support for his children he
already has and is in fact supporting the children or until a change in conditions
warrant the lifting of this condition.
{¶12} The trial court found that this condition was reasonably related to rehabilitating
Taylor, had a relationship to the crimes committed, and served the statutory ends of community
control. This Court has previously upheld this type of condition. In State v. Talty, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 02CA0087-M, 2003-Ohio-3161, we held that the community control condition that
required Talty to use reasonable efforts to avoid conceiving another child was constitutional. Id.
at ¶ 34. Although the Ohio Supreme Court accepted a discretionary appeal and reversed, it did
not strike down antiprocreation conditions per se. State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-
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Ohio-4888. Instead, it examined the condition and held that, by its specific terms, it was overly
broad on nonconstitutional grounds because it did not contain any provision for lifting the
proscription against procreation even if Talty became current on his child support payments. Id.
at ¶ 21, 25.
{¶13} The leading case relating to community control conditions limiting the right to
procreate was decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 2001. In State v. Oakley, 245
Wis.2d 447, 2001 WI 103, the court upheld a condition of probation that limited Oakley’s
freedom to procreate. The condition prohibited Oakley from having any more children during
the five-year term of probation unless he could demonstrate that he had the ability to support the
new children and that he was supporting the children he already had. Id. at ¶ 6. The Wisconsin
high court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in crafting an
individualized condition that was not overly broad, that reasonably furthered the objectives of
rehabilitation, and that served to protect both society and potential victims from future wrongful
conduct. Id. at ¶ 1, 13 (further citing at ¶ 10 the long term consequences of a parent’s failure to
support “such as poor health, behavioral problems, delinquency and low educational attainment,
* * * [and] childhood poverty.”).
{¶14} The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that “convicted individuals do not
enjoy the same degree of liberty as citizens who have not violated the law.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing
State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225, 230 (1977) (asserting that “liberty enjoyed by a probationer is,
under any view, a conditional liberty” and that a probationer’s “position is not that of a non-
convicted citizen”). The high court reasoned, therefore, that “‘conditions of probation may
impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related
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to the person’s rehabilitation.’” Oakley at ¶ 19, quoting Edwards v. State, 74 Wis.2d 84-85
(1976).
{¶15} Bearing in mind the societal interests and the discretion retained by the trial court
in crafting a sentence that reflects the gravity of the offense, protects the public and potential
victims, and facilitates rehabilitation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the antiprocreation
order as valid based on the trial judge’s familiarity with the egregious facts of the case. In that
case, the trial court was aware of Oakley’s history of refusing to support his nine children despite
having been employed and being able to work. Id. at ¶ 14. Those facts, coupled with the
limitations on the duration of the condition, resulted in a condition of probation that was held not
to be overly broad. Id. at ¶ 20. For example, the condition would expire upon the termination of
the probation period, or sooner if Oakley could demonstrate that he was no longer intentionally
refusing to support his children, making it narrowly tailored to serve the purposes enunciated
above. Id.
{¶16} In discussing the Oakley decision, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the
antiprocreation provision in that case differed significantly from the condition in Talty because
“the antiprocreation condition in Oakley included the stipulation that the court would terminate
the condition if the defendant could prove to the court that he had supported his children.” Talty
at ¶ 19. Although the Ohio Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether a provision within
the antiprocreation condition supporting the lifting of the condition would have rendered the
condition valid, it did not foreclose that possibility. Id. at ¶ 21. As I earlier noted, although the
high court invalidated the antiprocreation condition as overbroad on nonconstitutional grounds, it
did not hold such antiprocreation conditions invalid per se. In fact, the high court in Talty
merely held the community control condition specific to that case to be nonconstitutionally
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overly broad within the context of the probationary goals of “doing justice, rehabilitating the
offender, and insuring good behavior” because of the lack of any limitations on the condition,
save for the term of the probationary period. See id. at ¶ 12. Therefore, the viability of this
Court’s decision regarding the constitutionality of antiprocreation conditions stands, as the Ohio
Supreme Court did not strike down that conclusion.
{¶17} As to the considerations in this case, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that
the absence of the presentence investigation report from the record prevents us from
substantively reviewing the issue. A sentencing hearing was held wherein the trial court
addressed the egregious facts in this case, just as in Oakley. The record provides the necessary
insight into the facts and circumstances to allow me to conclude that Taylor’s conduct rises to a
level warranting imposition of a narrowly crafted antiprocreation order. Taylor was convicted
for failing to pay child support for four children. From the record, we know that one child was
17 years old and another was 15 at the time of sentencing, although the ages of the other two
children were not mentioned. From the sentencing hearing, we learn that there were four
children from four different mothers and that Taylor was unmarried. At the time of the
indictment, Taylor owed arrearages in the respective amounts of $29,555.00, $27,639.90,
$10,807.14, and $10,920.08 for the children, for a total arrearage amount of $78,922.12. He was
indicted for failing to pay support for a two-year period from June 1, 2009 through June 1, 2011.
As of the date of sentencing, Taylor’s arrearages had grown to $96,115.24, indicating his
continued refusal to pay child support notwithstanding the filing of four felonies against him. In
fact, the sentencing court noted that “we haven’t gotten any payments in a year” since the case
was initiated. The trial court referenced the presentence investigation report, noting that it
“indicates that he’s at least out there earning some money. He has some jobs somewhere or is
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doing some kind of work. Once again, we are not receiving anything.” Next, the record is clear
that Taylor had retained private counsel to represent himself in the case below, indicating his
ability to pay his legal fees in defense of his failure to pay support for his children. Finally,
when asked by the trial court whether he would like to make a statement, Taylor declined and
remained silent for the entirety of the hearing. Accordingly, he showed no remorse and offered
nothing in mitigation of his failure to support his children. Defense counsel argued that the
community control condition was unconstitutional but did not dispute any of the facts relied on
by the trial court.
{¶18} Given the number of children by multiple mothers, the high amount of the
arrearages, Taylor’s ability to work, the fact that he was actually earning enough money to retain
counsel below, his continued refusal to make any payments toward the support of his children
notwithstanding his notice of the charges against him, and his complete lack of remorse or
justification for his actions, I would conclude that an antiprocreation condition of community
control was not unwarranted under these facts. Moreover, I would conclude that the condition
was narrowly tailored to serve the purposes of community control.
{¶19} The majority cites the considerations relevant to a determination of whether a
condition of community control comports with both the purposes of community control and the
circumstances of the underlying case. See State v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, at ¶ 12. Those
considerations include whether the condition “(1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the
offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3)
relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the
statutory ends of probation.” Id., quoting State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53 (1990). In
addition to those considerations regarding the reasonable relationship between the condition and
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the statutory goals of community control, the high court held that the condition must not be
overbroad. Talty at ¶ 16, construing Jones. Moreover, the Talty court recognized that the
conclusions that the condition is reasonable and that the condition is not overbroad are
necessarily intertwined. ¶ 14.
{¶20} At the end of the day, the Talty court seems to have premised its conclusion that
the antiprocreation condition was overbroad on a finding that the condition was not reasonably
related to rehabilitating the offender. I reach this conclusion because the plain language of the
condition did not provide for its modification or abatement even if Talty embraced his
responsibilities as a parent and became current in his child support obligation. Moreover, the
high court couched its analysis within the context of Talty’s argument that, notwithstanding any
future full compliance with his support orders, evidencing his rehabilitated attitude of embracing
parental responsibility, he would not be free from the condition restricting his right to procreate.
On the other hand, Talty neither argued nor did the Supreme Court dispute that the
antiprocreation condition had some relationship to the crime of nonsupport and was reasonably
related to future criminality in that the birth of future children would necessarily implicate the
need for future support.
{¶21} In this case, I would conclude that there is a relationship between a prohibition
against the creation of additional children who will require support and the failure to pay support
for children already in existence. In addition, where, as here, the defendant has demonstrated a
long-term refusal to support multiple children by multiple women notwithstanding his ability to
work and contribute something for their care, an antiprocreation condition is reasonably related
to future criminality. Taylor has here demonstrated that he is not inclined to support any of his
children. There is no reason to believe that he would be inclined to support any future children.
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The relevant question in this case, then, is whether the condition was narrowly tailored to be
reasonably related to Taylor’s rehabilitation.
{¶22} In analyzing this point, I would reject Taylor’s argument that this community
control condition is subject to a strict scrutiny review. Ohio courts have rejected the application
of a strict scrutiny analysis to probation conditions affecting fundamental rights. E.g., State v.
Conkle, 129 Ohio App.3d 177, 179 (9th Dist.1998) (recognizing the application of the three-
prong test in Jones, supra); State v. Livingston, 53 Ohio App.2d 195, 197 (6th Dist.1976).
Notably, the Ohio Supreme Court in Jones did not engage in a strict scrutiny analysis of the
validity of a condition of probation that affected Jones’ fundamental right to free association.
Instead, the high court analyzed the issue under an abuse of discretion standard of review in
consideration of three factors from Jones, enumerated above. Given that Ohio courts have
consistently reviewed the propriety of community control conditions for an abuse of discretion,
and have not applied a strict scrutiny analysis, I would analyze the instant condition likewise.
Moreover, as the dissent in Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, at ¶ 35 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), recognized,
persons who have been convicted and placed on community control enjoy only conditional
liberty, further supporting the conclusion that a strict scrutiny analysis is not implicated in these
types of cases. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987); State v. Benton, 82
Ohio St.3d 316, 318 (1998); United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.1992). Furthermore,
the analysis should not change depending on the fundamental right implicated. There is, after
all, no super fundamental right relating to procreational interests.
{¶23} In this case, the trial court heeded the lesson in Talty and crafted a condition of
community control that expressly created a mechanism via two avenues under which the
proscription against procreation could be lifted. See Talty at ¶ 20. First, the condition would
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terminate as soon as Taylor began supporting his existing four children and could prove to the
sentencing court that he was able to continue providing support. In other words, if he could
effectively demonstrate that he had come to appreciate his responsibility to support his children,
i.e., that he was rehabilitated, the limitation on his right to procreate would be lifted. Second, the
antiprocreation condition would terminate upon “a change in conditions warrant[ing] the lifting
of this condition.” This encompasses a broad spectrum of circumstances such as Taylor’s
incapacity to work, a good faith effort to pay support, marriage, or the termination of his parental
rights as to some or all of his existing children. These circumstances for lifting the condition,
coupled with the requirement that Taylor merely “make all reasonable efforts to avoid
impregnating a woman” and not that he ensure that he does not impregnate a woman, narrowly
limit, rather than terminate, his procreation rights. I believe that these mechanisms for lifting the
condition provide “easy alternative[s] that [] have better accommodated [Taylor’s] procreation
rights at de minimis costs to the legitimate probationary interests of rehabilitation and avoiding
future criminality.” See Talty at ¶ 21. Accordingly, I would substantively overrule Taylor’s
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
APPEARANCES:
DOUGLAS W. MERRILL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
STEPHEN ALBENZE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.