Scalia v. Aldi, Inc. ( 2011 )

[Cite as Scalia v. Aldi, Inc., 2011-Ohio-6596.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
MARIA SCALIA C.A. No. 25436
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ALDI, INC. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. CV 2006 07 4183
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 21, 2011
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Maria Scalia, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to her former employer, Aldi. This Court
affirms, in part, and reverses, in part.
I.
{¶2} Ms. Scalia injured her elbow while working at Aldi in a position that required
occasional lifting under a job description that required the ability to lift fifty pounds. She filed a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits and started receiving temporary total disability
(“TTD”) payments in January 2005. In late 2005, Aldi obtained an independent medical
examination through its third-party administrator of workers’ compensation claims. Dr. Richard
Kepple, the physician who performed the examination, opined that Ms. Scalia had not reached
maximum medical improvement and still required restrictions on her ability to lift. In January
2006, Dr. Kepple examined her again. This time, he concluded that Ms. Scalia had reached
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maximum medical improvement and required no further restrictions. Ms. Scalia’s physician of
record, however, left some lifting restrictions in place.
{¶3} Based on the results of Dr. Kepple’s independent medical examination, Aldi
offered to return Ms. Scalia to her position, but did not clarify whether the offer was subject to
the restrictions imposed by her physician of record. According to Ms. Scalia, Aldi did not
respond to her inquiry on the subject. Instead, again in reliance on Dr. Kepple’s examination,
Aldi moved to terminate Ms. Scalia’s TTD benefits. After a hearing, during which Ms. Scalia
presented the opinion of her physician of record that she was still under work restrictions, the
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation determined that she had reached maximum medical
improvement and terminated her TTD benefits. Although Ms. Scalia expressed willingness to
return to work without restriction, and despite Dr. Kepple’s opinion that she could work without
restriction, Aldi did not allow Ms. Scalia to return to work. Instead, on April 20, 2006, Aldi
terminated Ms. Scalia’s employment under the terms of its attendance policy, which provided for
termination in the event that an employee had done no work for Aldi during the previous twelve
months. Ms. Scalia remained under her personal physicians’ work restrictions until February
2007, and from April 2006 until that time, she continued to pursue appeals of the TTD
determination and applications for wage loss compensation under the theory that she was still
restricted from working.
{¶4} Ms. Scalia sued Aldi for retaliating against her for participation in the workers’
compensation system in violation of R.C. 4123.90 and for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy. The basis for both claims was application of Aldi’s facially neutral attendance
policy to Ms. Scalia. In applying the policy, Aldi counted the period of time Ms. Scalia was
absent due to her injury and receiving TTD. Ms. Scalia also claimed that Aldi fired her because
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it perceived her to have a disability in violation of R.C. 4112.02. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Aldi on all three claims, and Ms. Scalia appealed.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JULY 23, [2007] ORDER BY
GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION [FOR] SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
APPELLANT’S CLAIM FOR RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF OHIO
REVISED CODE §4123.90.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APRIL 23, 2008, ORDER BY
DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
TRIAL COURT’S RULING ON APPELLANT’S RETALIATION CLAIM
FOLLOWING THE OHIO SUPREME COURT’S ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS
DECISION IN BICKERS V. W. & S. LIFE INS. CO., 116 OHIO ST.3D 351,
2007-OHIO-6751.”
{¶5} Ms. Scalia’s first two assignments of error are that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment to Aldi on her statutory retaliation claim. Ms. Scalia has made two
arguments with respect to this claim. Her first argument is that the trial court incorrectly
determined that application of a facially neutral attendance policy to a worker who has received
TTD benefits is not retaliatory conduct per se within the meaning of R.C. 4123.90. Her second
argument is that there are genuine issues of material fact that prevented summary judgment on
the retaliation claim. We agree with the trial court that application of a facially neutral
attendance policy does not constitute retaliation per se under R.C. 4123.90, and Ms. Scalia’s first
and second assignments of error are overruled to that extent. Nonetheless, they are sustained in
part because the trial court failed to consider Ms. Scalia’s retaliation claim in its broader context.
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Absenteeism and Retaliation Per Se
{¶6} Under R.C. 4123.90, it is unlawful for an employer to “discharge * * * any
employee because the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any
proceedings under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or occupational disease which
occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer.” Ms. Scalia
argues that in Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St. 3d 141, 2003-Ohio-5357,
the Ohio Supreme Court expanded the scope of conduct considered retaliatory to include
application of an otherwise neutral attendance policy.
{¶7} In Coolidge, the Court considered whether a public school teacher whose contract
was terminated for absenteeism while she was receiving TTD benefits was terminated for “good
and just cause” under R.C. 3319.16, which governs teacher contracts. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 20. The Court
noted that Ms. Coolidge was not an at-will employee, but went on to consider the public policy
underlying the workers’ compensation system because, in its view, “if Coolidge can show that
her discharge contravened public policy expressed in the Workers’ Compensation Act, she will
have established that her discharge was without good and just cause under R.C. 3319.16.” Id. at
¶20. In this context, the Court determined that the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.56 and
4123.90 required that “employees who are temporarily and totally disabled as a result of their
work-related injuries have a right not only to the compensation provided in the act, but also to
whatever period of absence from work is deemed medically necessary to complete their recovery
or stabilize their injuries.” Coolidge at ¶¶ 21-22, 44. Applying this conclusion to the question of
termination under a neutral attendance policy, the Court held that even without a retaliatory
motive, “[a]n employee who is receiving temporary total disability compensation pursuant to
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R.C. 4123.56 may not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism or inability to work,
when the absence or inability to work is directly related to an allowed condition.” Id. at syllabus.
{¶8} The Court’s opinion and broad holding in Coolidge resulted in significant
confusion regarding the extent to which it created a new cause of action, expanded an existing
cause of action, or was limited to the situation at-hand. Some concluded that Coolidge
recognized a public policy exception for at-will employees terminated for absenteeism while
receiving TTD benefits. See, e.g., Klopfenstein v. NK Parts Industries, Inc., 171 Ohio App. 3d
286, 2007-Ohio-1916. The plaintiff in Coolidge, however, was not employed at-will. See,
generally, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St. 3d 134, 150 (acknowledging “an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an at-will employee is discharged or
disciplined for a reason that contravenes clear public policy.”). Because Coolidge did not seem
to recognize a new public policy exception for this reason, others concluded that its effect was to
expand the scope of R.C. 4123.90 to prohibit application of a neutral attendance policy to
employees who were receiving TTD benefits. See, e.g., Brooks v. QualChoice, Inc., 8th Dist.
No. 85692, 2005-Ohio-5136, at ¶11 (“[C]ontrary to Brooks’ suggestion, Coolidge does not
create a public policy exception for absenteeism to at-will employment situations * * * but,
rather, expanded the type of action that constitutes retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 to include
termination for absenteeism while on TTD.”). Ms. Scalia argues that this Court should adopt the
latter position.
{¶9} Two subsequent decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court, however, shed some light
on the continuing effect of Coolidge. In Bickers v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 351,
2007-Ohio-6751, the Court considered whether Coolidge created a public policy exception to the
employment at-will doctrine. In Bickers, unlike in Coolidge, the plaintiff was an at-will
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employee who suffered an injury in the course of her employment. Id. at ¶¶3, 11. Ms. Bickers
sued her employer for wrongful discharge on the authority of Coolidge, and the employer moved
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Id. at ¶¶3-5. Noting that Coolidge
squarely addressed only the issue of whether absence from work while receiving TTD benefits
was “good and just cause” under the statute under consideration, the Court explicitly limited the
holding to the facts of that case. Bickers at ¶¶12-15, syllabus. The Court also went further,
rejecting the suggestion that it should recognize a public policy exception. Id. at ¶¶23-25,
syllabus.
{¶10} Thus, Bickers limited Coolidge to the facts of that case and concluded that there is
no public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine for a nonretaliatory discharge due
to absenteeism during a period of TTD. See id. at ¶15. The Bickers Court also stated that the
only remedy for alleging wrongful discharge is to be found in R.C. 4123.90, under which
retaliatory discharges are proscribed. Id. at ¶23. However, because Ms. Bickers had not pled a
claim for retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90, Bickers does not squarely address the
contours of a statutory retaliation claim where an employee has been terminated solely pursuant
to a facially neutral attendance policy under circumstances where the absences were accrued
during the period the employee was receiving TTD for a work-related injury.
{¶11} In Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St. 3d 153, 2011-Ohio-2723, the
Ohio Supreme Court recently considered a related question: whether a cause of action for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is available to an employee who was terminated
after sustaining a job-related injury, but before the employee “‘filed a claim or instituted, pursued
or testified in any proceedings under the workers’ compensation act.’” Id. at ¶¶13-14, quoting
R.C. 4123.90. In Sutton, the employer terminated an employee within one hour of the
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employer’s notification of the employee’s injury. Id. at ¶2. Although the issue before the Court
in Sutton was limited to a public policy claim and not a statutory claim under R.C. 4123.90, its
analysis of the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.90 is instructive. The Court concluded that
action based on a retaliatory motive was clearly in view. See Sutton at ¶¶12-14 (“R.C. 4123.90 *
* * expressly prohibit[s] retaliation against injured workers who have filed, instituted, or pursued
a workers’ compensation claim.”); id at ¶24 (“[W]e recognize that the General Assembly
intended to proscribe retaliatory firings.”). The Court also found that both the “clarity” and
“jeopardy” elements of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy were satisfied. Id. at
¶¶11-28. Although the factual elements of causation and overriding justification were not before
the Court, the Court elaborated on the causation element, noting the plaintiff’s burden to
establish that his termination “was motivated by conduct related to the public policy”:
“To establish the causation element, Sutton must prove that his discharge was
retaliatory. Because a discharge could be for reasons other than those related to
workers’ compensation, such as a reasonable suspicion that the injury was not job
related, a disregard by the employee for the employer’s safety rules, or an
immediate need for a replacement employee, no presumption of retaliation arises
from the fact that an employee is discharged soon after an injury. Rather, the
retaliatory nature of the discharge and its nexus with workers’ compensation must
be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
{¶12} In Sutton, therefore, the Court implicitly rejected the premise that under the public
policy of R.C. 4123.90, termination of an injured worker is itself an act of retaliation without
need for evidence of retaliatory motivation. In this case, however, one theory underlying Ms.
Scalia’s statutory retaliation claim is an extension of the same idea and of the issue left
unaddressed by Bickers: she maintains that by virtue of the fact that she was an injured worker
who accrued her absences under her employer’s attendance policy while receiving TTD and was
terminated solely by reason of the policy, her termination was retaliatory under R.C. 4123.90. In
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other words, Ms Scalia argues that such conduct is presumptively retaliatory under R.C. 4123.90.
Her position is understandable, as it is apparent that allowing an employer to fire an employee
under its attendance policy and for no other reason could allow an employer to retaliate against
those employees who decide to pursue a worker’s compensation claim and could place
employees in the untenable position of choosing between pursuit of a worker’s compensation
claim or retaining a job, as described in Coolidge. Moreover, it is difficult for an employee to
tease out retaliatory motive under such circumstances. We recognize that this scenario presents
a “difficult policy issue, which lacks wholly satisfactory solutions[.]” Bickers, 2007-Ohio-6751,
at ¶23. Nonetheless, our examination of Coolidge, Bickers, and Sutton leads this Court to
conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court appears to have rejected the notion of presumptive
retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 and to have left unanswered the question as to what extent an
employer may consider absences attributable to TTD in application of a facially neutral
attendance policy. Ms. Scalia’s first and second assignments of error are, therefore, overruled to
the extent that they challenge this aspect of the trial court’s judgment.
Retaliation Under R.C. 4123.90
{¶13} The conclusion that we have reached with respect to Ms. Scalia’s argument
regarding retaliation per se should not be interpreted to say that an employee can never allege a
statutory retaliation claim based action taken under an attendance policy, or that an employer’s
use of a facially neutral attendance policy can never be a pretext for retaliation. But in every
claim under R.C. 4123.90, the employee must demonstrate a relationship between the action
taken by the employer and participation in the workers’ compensation system. See, e.g.,
Goersmeyer v. Gen. Parts, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 06CA00045-M, 2006-Ohio-6674, at ¶¶10-14. In
order to succeed on her retaliation claim, therefore, R.C. 4123.90 required Ms. Scalia to
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demonstrate that Aldi terminated her in retaliation for instituting, pursuing, or testifying in
workers’ compensation proceedings.
{¶14} “Courts analyze retaliatory-discharge claims under a burden-shifting framework
where the initial burden of proof is on the complainant.” Cunningham v. The Kroger Co., 1st
Dist. No. C-050990, 2006-Ohio-5900, at ¶15. The first step under this framework requires the
employee to establish a prima facie case by showing the existence of an on-the-job injury that
resulted in a workers’ compensation claim and a causal connection between the claim and the
employee’s termination. Id. See, also, Ferguson v. SanMar Corp., 12th Dist. No. CA2008-11-
283, 2009-Ohio-4132, at ¶¶15-17 (explaining the prima facie case for purposes of R.C. 4123.90).
The prima facie case in claims under R.C. 4123.90 does not present an onerous burden for
plaintiffs; it is, indeed, “easily met.” (Internal citations omitted.) Dover v. Carmeuse Natural
Chems., 5th Dist. No. 10-CA-8, 2010-Ohio-5657, at ¶43. “[A] plaintiff is not required to present
a ‘smoking gun’ to carry [the] burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that
the employment decision was retaliatory.” Buehler v. AmPam Commercial Midwest, 1st Dist.
No. C-060475, 2007-Ohio-4708, at ¶24. The inference of retaliatory motive may be drawn from
the surrounding circumstances, including the timing of the discharge relative to the protected
conduct, whether punitive action was directed toward the employee as a result of the claim, a
“hostile attitude[]” toward the employee once the claim was filed, disparate treatment of the
employee relative to others, and requests not to pursue a claim. See Ferguson at ¶19. Once the
plaintiff establishes each element of the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the employee. Cunningham,
2006-Ohio-5900, at ¶15. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the reason offered for the termination is a pretext for retaliation. Id.
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{¶15} Under Civ.R. 56, “[s]ummary judgment will be granted only when there remains
no genuine issue of material fact and, when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the
nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St. 3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, at ¶10.
Although our review of summary judgment is de novo, this Court has refused to consider a
matter for the first time on appeal when the trial court did not “consider alternate grounds in
support of a motion for summary judgment[ ]” or “failed to consider the evidence within the
proper legal context.” Guappone v. Enviro–Cote, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 24718, 2009–Ohio–5540, at
¶12, citing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 9th Dist. No. 20936, 2002–Ohio–5033.
{¶16} In this case, the trial court determined that Ms. Scalia could not maintain a claim
for retaliation per se under R.C. 4123.90 based on Aldi’s absenteeism policy and entered
summary judgment in Aldi’s favor. The trial court erred because it neither fully considered the
motions for summary judgment nor considered the evidence within the proper legal context –
namely, with reference to the elements of a claim for statutory retaliation under R.C. 4123.90.
Ms. Scalia’s first and second assignments of error are, therefore, sustained on that basis.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APRIL 24, 2008, ORDER BY
GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF
THE OHIO PUBLIC POLICY EMBODIED IN OHIO REVISED CODE
§§4123.90 AND 4123.56. (ASSERTED TO PRESERVE ISSUE FOR
SUBSEQUENT POTENTIAL APPEAL TO OHIO SUPREME COURT.)”
{¶17} In her fourth assignment of error, Ms. Scalia argues that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment to Aldi on her claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy because, in her view, Bickers was wrongly decided. Ms. Scalia conceded this argument in
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the trial court and in this court, and has assigned it as error to preserve her argument for appeal.
Her fourth assignment of error is overruled. See, generally, Bickers, 2007-Ohio-6751.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
“THE TRIAL COUT ERRED IN ITS AUGUST 8, 2008 ORDER BY
GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
APPELLANT’S DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM.”
{¶18} Ms. Scalia’s third assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly granted
summary judgment to Aldi on her claim of disability discrimination under R.C. 4112.02.
Specifically, Ms. Scalia has argued that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether Aldi perceived her as disabled and terminated her on that basis.
{¶19} Because Ms. Scalia has argued that Aldi terminated her in violation of R.C.
4112.02, the starting point for our analysis must be the statute itself. Under R.C. 4112.02(A), it
is illegal for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of disability. The
definition of disability, in turn, includes being regarded as having a mental or physical
impairment. R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). Specifically, the statute provides:
“‘Disability’ means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities, including the functions of caring for one’s self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working; a record of a physical or mental impairment; or being regarded as
having a physical or mental impairment.” Id.
Under R.C. 4112.02, therefore, it is illegal to discriminate against an employee on the basis of a
perceived physical or mental impairment.
{¶20} The parties agree that this Court should analyze this assignment of error in light of
Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone (1998), 82 Ohio St. 3d 569, which authorized Ohio
Courts to look to federal materials interpreting the Americans With Disabilities Act in
conjunction with claims for disability discrimination under R.C. 4112.02. See id. at 573. In
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other words, although they disagree on the outcome of the analysis, the parties agree that Ms.
Scalia must demonstrate that Aldi perceived her as having a condition that substantially limited
one or more of her daily life activities. We disagree with the parties’ conclusion, and the trial
court’s analysis, on this point.
{¶21} In McGlone, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the City of Columbus
discriminated against an applicant for the position of firefighter who suffered from
nearsightedness. Id. at 570. The plaintiff asserted claims of discrimination both on the basis of
disability and perceived disability. See id. at 574. The Court acknowledged that the version of
R.C. 4112.01(A)(13) under consideration did not prohibit “regarded as” discrimination, but read
that section in conjunction with corollary provisions of the Ohio Administrative Code and came
to the conclusion that “regarded as” discrimination was within the ambit of prohibited conduct.
Id. at 572. It did so with reference to federal caselaw interpreting the “substantially limits”
language of the ADA. Id. at 573-74, quoting Section 12102(2)(A), Title 42, U.S. Code. The
Court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff had not established that he was regarded as having a
disability under R.C. 4112.02 because “[t]he city * * * considered McGlone nearsighted, not
handicapped, merely lacking a single physical requirement for a single job. For McGlone to
succeed on a theory of perceived handicap, the city would have had to consider McGlone's
nearsightedness as foreclosing him from a class of jobs.” Id. at 574.
{¶22} In reliance on McGlone, Ohio Courts have continued to reference federal caselaw
interpreting the ADA with respect to claims alleging perceived disability discrimination under
R.C. 4112.02. Consequently, when the United States Supreme Court held that the ADA
prohibited discrimination when “(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered
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entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more
major life activities,” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1999), 527 U.S. 471, 489, Ohio Courts of
appeals applied the same standard to claims for perceived disability arising under R.C. 4112.02.
See, e.g., Hershberger v. Altercare, Inc., 5th Dist. No. 2006CA00167, 2007-Ohio-1452, at ¶58;
Hart v. Columbus Dispatch/Dispatch Printing Co., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-506, 2002-Ohio-6963,
at ¶30.
{¶23} We are not convinced, however, that this analysis is accurate because the federal
statute and the Ohio statute at issue in those cases were inconsistent. In Genaro v. Cent.
Transport (1999), 84 Ohio St. 3d 293, the Ohio Supreme Court refined its earlier position
regarding the use of federal law to interpret R.C. 4112.02. Specifically, the Court concluded that
federal materials could not be used in every situation under R.C. Chapter 4112, but only when
the terms of the federal statute are consistent with Ohio law or when R.C. Chapter 4112 leaves a
term undefined. Id. at 298.
{¶24} While the Supreme Court’s statements in McGlone are consistent with Genaro
because the version of R.C. Chapter 4112 considered in McGlone did not define “regarded as”
disability discrimination, R.C. 4112.01(A)(13) has since been amended. It now defines a
disability, in part, as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities * * * or being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.” At the
time of Ms. Scalia’s employment, the ADA, on the other hand, defined disability, in part, as “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual * * * [or] being regarded as having such an impairment.” (Emphasis added.) Section
14
12102(2)(C), Title 42, U.S. Code.1 The definition of disability under the ADA was therefore
similar, but with one significant difference: the inclusion of the word “such” had the effect of
defining perceived disability as being regarded as having an impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, quoting Section 12102(2)(C),
Title 42, U.S. Code. (“Under subsection (C), individuals who are ‘regarded as’ having a
disability are disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See § 12102(2)(C). Subsection (C) of
this version of the statute provides that having a disability includes ‘being regarded as having,’ §
12102(2)(C), ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual,’ § 12102(2)(A).”) In contrast, under a plain reading of R.C.
4112.01(A)(13), a plaintiff must show that the employer regarded her as having a mental or
physical impairment, but without regard to whether the employer regarded her as substantially
limited in her daily life activities as a result.
{¶25} Because the plain language of the definition of disability contained in R.C.
4112.01 differs in substance from the ADA, it is not appropriate to look to federal materials
interpreting the pre-2008 ADA with respect to perceived disability claims under Ohio law. See,
generally, Genaro, 84 Ohio St. 3d at 297-98. Consequently, Ms. Scalia need not demonstrate that
1
In 2008, in response, in part, to Sutton, the ADA was amended and the definition of
“disability” now conforms with the current version of R.C. 4112.01(A)(13)’s definition of a
perceived disability. See Section 12102(1)(C), (3), Title 42, U.S. Code. While the current
version of the federal statute retains the same definition of disability, it also clarifies that for
purposes of a perceived disability claim, “An individual meets the requirement of ‘being
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been
subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity.” (Emphasis added.) Section 12102(3)(A), Title 42, U.S. Code. Whether Ohio courts
may apply federal caselaw interpreting the 2008 amendments to claims under R.C. Chapter 4112
is beyond the scope of this opinion because Ms. Scalia’s employment ended before the
amendments were made. See Medlin v. Springifeld Metro. Hous. Auth., 2nd Dist. no. 10-CA-15,
2010-Ohio-3654, at ¶¶5, 44 fn.5. References to the ADA in this opinion are to the pre-2008
statute.
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Aldi perceived her as being substantially limited in a major life activity, but that it perceived her
as having “a physical or mental impairment[]” as defined by Ohio law. R.C. 4112.01(A)(13).
To the extent that the trial court required Ms. Scalia to demonstrate that Aldi perceived her as
having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, therefore, its decision was in
error. When a trial court has not considered the evidence with respect to summary judgment in
the correct legal context, as in this case, this Court has declined to consider the matter for the
first time on appeal. See Smeltzer, 2011-Ohio-2632, at ¶15. Ms. Scalia’s third assignment of
error is, therefore, sustained.
III.
{¶26} Ms. Scalia’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. Her first and second
assignments of error are overruled to the extent that the trial court determined that she could not
maintain a claim premised upon retaliation per se under R.C. 4123.90, but are sustained to the
extent that the trial court failed to completely consider her retaliation claim within the framework
for analyzing such claims under the statute. Likewise, Ms. Scalia’s third assignment of error is
sustained because the trial court did not consider the evidence before it in the proper legal
context.
{¶27} As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.
With respect to Ms. Scalia’s first, second, and third assignments of error, this case is remanded to
the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
RICHARD C. HABER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
MICHAEL J. SPISAK and BONNIE S. FINLEY, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.