State v. Sawyer , 2011 Ohio 6330 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Sawyer, 2011-Ohio-6330.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 10CA0112-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
FLOYD M. SAWYER COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 05CR0152
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 12, 2011
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Floyd Sawyer, appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas. The Court affirms, in part, and vacates, in part.
I.
{¶2} On July 5, 2005, Sawyer entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated robbery
in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, and one count of kidnapping, in
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), a felony of the first degree. The trial court accepted Sawyer’s
guilty pleas and found him guilty of both offenses. Subsequently, on July 18, 2005, the trial
court sentenced Sawyer to a term of eight years in prison for the aggravated robbery and a term
of five years in prison for the kidnapping. The trial court ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. Sawyer filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on
August 21, 2006. See State v. Sawyer, 9th Dist. No. 05CA0089-M, 2006-Ohio-4308.
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{¶3} On March 23, 2007, Sawyer filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial
court denied the motion on April 19, 2007. On July 7, 2008, this Court affirmed the trial court’s
denial of the motion on the basis that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider it in
light of our prior decision. See State v. Sawyer, 9th Dist. No. 07CA0046-M, 2008-Ohio-3370.
{¶4} Since the time of his last appeal to this Court, Sawyer has filed a variety of
motions in the trial court. On July 20, 2009, Sawyer filed a pro se motion to compel the trial
court to revise his judgment entry. On August 18, 2009, Sawyer filed a pro se motion to correct
his sentence. On September 25, 2009, the trial court issued a journal entry denying the motion to
compel. More than three months later, on January 8, 2010, Sawyer filed a pro se motion for
resentencing on the basis that he had not been properly advised regarding post-release control,
that the trial court had never made a proper finding of guilt, and that he had been improperly
sentenced on allied offenses of similar import. On April 20, 2010, Sawyer filed a pro se motion
to amend his pending motion to vacate his void sentence and a motion to compel the trial court to
rule on that motion.
{¶5} On September 3, 2010, the trial court issued a journal entry ordering the sheriff to
return Sawyer to the courthouse for resentencing. An initial hearing on the motion for
resentencing was held on September 15, 2010, but the trial court continued the matter to allow
Sawyer to confer with newly appointed defense counsel. On September 17, 2010, defense
counsel filed a motion arguing that the counts of aggravated robbery and kidnapping should be
merged for the purposes of sentencing as they were not committed with a separate animus. At a
subsequent hearing on September 22, 2010, the trial court ordered that Sawyer’s original
sentence be vacated because the error in post-release control notification rendered it void. After
hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial judge determined that Sawyer had committed the
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crimes with a separate animus and that he should be sentenced on both counts. The trial court
then imposed the same prison sentence Sawyer had received in 2005. In its subsequent
sentencing entry which was journalized on September 30, 2010, the trial court ordered Sawyer’s
original sentence to be vacated. The sentencing entry also reflected that Sawyer had been
resentenced to a term of eight years in prison for the count of aggravated robbery and a term of
five years in prison for the count of kidnapping, and that the sentences were to run consecutively.
The sentencing entry further indicated that upon his release from prison, Sawyer would be
subject to a mandatory five-year term of post-release control.
{¶6} Sawyer filed a notice of appeal on October 30, 2010. On appeal, he raises one
assignment of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT.”
{¶7} Sawyer makes three arguments in support of his assignment of error. First,
Sawyer argues the trial court erred in failing to merge the counts of aggravated robbery and
kidnapping. Sawyer also argues that the trial court failed to conduct a de novo resentencing
hearing when it had been determined that his previous sentence was void. Finally, Sawyer
argues that the trial court erred in running his sentences consecutively.
{¶8} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that an error in post-release control
notification does not result in a void sentence. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St. 3d 92, 2010-Ohio-
6238. In Fischer, the Supreme Court held that “when a judge fails to impose statutorily
mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant’s sentence, that part of the sentence is void
and must be set aside.” Id. at ¶26. The Court reasoned that “[n]either the Constitution nor
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common sense commands anything more.” Id. The new sentencing hearing that a defendant is
entitled to “is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control.” Id. at ¶29. The Court also
held that res judicata “applies to other aspects of the merits of a conviction, including the
determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the ensuing sentence.” Id. at paragraph three of
the syllabus.
{¶9} The issues Sawyer raises in support of his assignment of error fall outside the
scope of his current appeal. As noted above, Sawyer filed a direct appeal in 2005. This Court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment on August 21, 2006. Sawyer then moved the trial court to
withdraw his guilty pleas in March 2007. This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
motion on July 7, 2008. Sawyer subsequently filed a pro se motion for resentencing on January
8, 2010. The trial court vacated his original sentence on the basis that the 2005 sentencing entry
contained an error with respect to post-release control notification. The trial court conducted a
resentencing hearing on September 22, 2010, and issued a new sentencing entry. In accordance
with Fischer, the scope of the new sentencing hearing to which Sawyer was entitled was limited
to the proper imposition of post-release control. Fischer, at paragraph two of the syllabus.
Likewise, the scope of Sawyer’s appeal from that hearing is limited solely to issues relating to
the imposition of post-release control. Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. It follows that the
trial court had authority to impose the proper term of post-release control on Sawyer at the
September 22, 2010 hearing. As the lawful portion of Sawyer’s original sentence remained in
place pursuant to Fischer, the trial court did not have authority to vacate Sawyer’s original
sentence, conduct a de novo sentencing hearing, and then reissue a sentence. To the extent the
trial court properly imposed a mandatory five-year period of post-release control upon Sawyer at
the resentencing hearing, its judgment is affirmed. To the extent the trial court conducted a de
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novo sentencing hearing and reissued a sentence to Sawyer, its judgment in that respect is
vacated.
III.
{¶10} The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is vacated to the
extent the court exceeded its authority and resentenced Sawyer. The trial court’s decision to
impose a mandatory five-year term of post-release control is affirmed. The remainder of
Sawyer’s original sentence remains in place.
Judgment affirmed, in part,
and vacated in part.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
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DICKINSON, J.
CONCURS
BELFANCE, P. J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY
APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL J. CALLOW, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MICHAEL P. MCNAMARA, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.