State v. Jackson , 2019 Ohio 1697 ( 2019 )

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2019-Ohio-1697.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-18-38
v.
PARIS A. JACKSON,
OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR2018 0047
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 6, 2019
APPEARANCES:
Reed D. Searcy for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for Appellee
Case No. 1-18-38
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Paris Jackson (“Jackson”), brings this appeal
from the July 12, 2018, judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court
sentencing him to an aggregate nine-year prison term after Jackson was convicted
in a bench trial of Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of
the second degree with an accompanying three-year firearm specification pursuant
to R.C. 2941.145(A), Carrying a Concealed Weapon in violation of R.C.
2923.12(A)(2), a felony of the fourth degree, and Improperly Handling a Firearm in
a Motor Vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), a felony of the fourth degree. On
appeal, Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to convict him,
and that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Procedural History
{¶2} On March 15, 2018, Jackson was indicted for Felonious Assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second degree, with an
accompanying three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A),
Carrying a Concealed Weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a felony of the
fourth degree, and Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle in violation of
R.C. 2923.16(B), a felony of the fourth degree. It was alleged that on February 1,
2018, Jackson received a ride from Kristina Owens in her vehicle to a parking lot
behind the Fourth Street apartments in Lima in order to purchase marijuana. After
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arriving at the lot and meeting the purported “dealer,” Jackson got into an argument
with the dealer and Jackson then allegedly fired two bullets at the dealer from a
firearm he had concealed either in his pants or in his pocket. Owens did not see the
firearm when Jackson got into her vehicle. One of the bullets Jackson fired struck
the windshield of Owens’ vehicle. The “dealer” subsequently left the parking lot,
as did Owens and Jackson. Jackson pled not guilty to the charges against him.
{¶3} On May 29, 2018, Jackson’s case proceeded to a bench trial. The State
presented the testimony of four witnesses, including Owens, who said she saw
Jackson shoot at the dealer she called “J” or “Jason.” In addition, the State
introduced fourteen exhibits into evidence, along with a video of the alleged
altercation from nearby apartment surveillance cameras. Jackson cross-examined
the State’s witnesses and challenged Owens’ testimony based on inconsistent
statements she had made previously to law enforcement and at a preliminary
hearing.
{¶4} At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, Jackson made a Crim.R. 29
motion for acquittal, which was denied. He then rested his case without presenting
any further evidence, and renewed his motion for acquittal, which was again denied.
The parties proceeded to closing arguments, and then the trial court recessed to
consider the matter. When court reconvened, the trial court found Jackson guilty of
all three counts against him and the firearm specification.
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{¶5} On July 11, 2018, the case proceeded to sentencing. Jackson was
ordered to serve a six-year prison term on the Felonious Assault conviction,
consecutive to a three-year mandatory prison term for the firearm specification. He
was ordered to serve twelve months in prison on the Carrying a Concealed Weapon
conviction, and twelve months in prison on the Improperly Handling a Firearm in a
Motor Vehicle conviction. The latter two charges were ordered to be served
concurrent with each other, and concurrent to the other charges, for an aggregate
nine-year prison term.
{¶6} A judgment entry memorializing Jackson’s sentence was filed July 12,
2018. It is from this judgment that Jackson appeals, asserting the following
assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court erred in finding appellant guilty as there was not
a sufficient amount of evidence for the trial court to find that the
State had established all of the elements of each charge and
specification contained in the indictment beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The trial court’s decision finding appellant guilty on all counts
contained in the indictment was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶7} As both assignments of error deal with a discussion of the evidence, we
will address them together.
First and Second Assignments of Error
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{¶8} In Jackson’s first assignment of error, he argues there was insufficient
evidence presented to convict him. In his second assignment of error, he argues that
his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review
{¶9} Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict is a
question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 386 (1997). Sufficiency is
a test of adequacy. Id. When an appellate court reviews a record upon a sufficiency
challenge, “ ‘the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v.
Leonard, 104 Ohio St. 3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶10} By contrast, in reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines
the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387. In doing so, this Court must review
the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id.
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{¶11} Nevertheless, a reviewing court must allow the trier of fact appropriate
discretion on matters relating to the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight
standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against
the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State
v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter,
131 Ohio St. 3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Controlling Statutes
{¶12} In this case, Jackson was convicted of Felonious Assault in violation
of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), which reads, “No person shall knowingly do either of the
following * * * [c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
unborn by means of a deadly weapon[.]” The Felonious Assault charge carried a
firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A), which reads, in pertinent part,
that a mandatory three-year prison term may be imposed if “the offender had a
firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while
committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated
that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.”
{¶13} Jackson was also convicted of Carrying a Concealed Weapon in
violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), which reads, “No person shall knowingly carry or
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have, concealed on the person’s person or concealed ready at hand, any of the
following: * * * A handgun other than a dangerous ordnance[.]”
{¶14} Finally, Jackson was convicted of Improperly Handling Firearms in a
Motor Vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), which reads, “(B) No person shall
knowingly transport or have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner
that the firearm is accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving the
vehicle.”
Evidence Presented
{¶15} At trial, the State presented the testimony of Kristina Owens, who
indicated that on the afternoon of February 1, 2018, she was driving her silver
Hyundai Sonata in Lima when she saw Jackson out walking and Jackson asked her
for a ride.1 Owens testified that Jackson was wearing a blue and white jacket, but
she did not see Jackson carrying a firearm when he got into her car. Jackson asked
if Owens knew how to acquire marijuana, and Owens indicated that she called a
man named “J” or “Jason” to procure the marijuana for Jackson. Owens took
Jackson to meet Jason in the parking lot of apartments behind Fourth Street in Lima.
{¶16} Owens testified that she drove to the designated parking lot to meet
Jason and that Jason arrived in an SUV. Owens testified that Jackson got out of her
1
Owens was not the first witness who testified for the State; however, to more easily understand the narrative,
we present her testimony first.
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passenger seat and that Jackson began arguing with Jason outside the vehicles.
Owens testified that at some point, Jackson pulled out a gun that was either in his
pocket or in his pants, and that he fired two shots at Jason, one of which struck
Owens’ windshield. Owens testified that after the shots were fired Jason got back
into his SUV and drove off while Jackson got into Owens’ vehicle and they left.
Owens indicated that she dropped Jackson off on a nearby street.
{¶17} On cross-examination, Owens acknowledged that she had initially
testified in a preliminary hearing that she did not see who shot at whom, and that
she thought Jason might have had a gun at the scene. She also testified that during
an initial interview with a detective she stated that she did not think Jackson was
specifically shooting at Jason. In addition, she testified that during an earlier
statement she indicated she had not really seen what happened. However, Owens
emphasized at trial that she did actually see Jackson point a gun right at Jason and
pull the trigger.
{¶18} The State also presented the testimony of Patrolman Adrian Ramirez,
who responded to the area of the Fourth Street apartments on a call of shots fired
shortly after 3 p.m. on the date of the incident. Although the vehicles involved in
the altercation were gone, Patrolman Ramirez was able to acquire security footage
from the manager of the nearby apartment complex.
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{¶19} The footage, which was introduced into evidence, showed two angles
of the parking lot, revealing an individual in a blue jacket who had exited Owens’
vehicle—Jackson—and an individual in a yellow shirt who had exited the SUV—
Jason.2 At one point in the video, Jackson can be seen pointing what could be a
weapon at Jason, but the camera is too distant for it to be observed. At a certain
point, Jason is also pointing at Jackson, but it is similarly unclear if he has a weapon
in his hand. Notably, testimony indicated that the footage skipped at certain parts
because the cameras only recorded when sufficient movement was occurring to
initiate the motion capturing.
{¶20} Patrolman Ramirez testified that he was also involved with locating
Owens in her silver Hyundai Sonata in the days following the incident. At the time
she was located, Owens was driving her vehicle and Jackson was again in the
passenger seat, wearing a blue coat matching the coat in the video of the incident.
{¶21} The State also presented the testimony of Patrolman Stephen Torres
who went to the parking lot where the shooting occurred. Patrolman Torres found
two spent 9mm shell casings at the scene three to five feet apart from each other in
the area where the vehicles had been on the video. Patrolman Torres testified that
although both casings were 9mm shells, they were from different manufacturers.
2
The individual Owens claimed was “Jason” was initially wearing something over his yellow shirt but he
removed it.
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{¶22} Finally, the State called Detective Steven Stechschulte of the Lima
Police Department. Detective Stechschulte testified that the area where the shooting
occurred was a high crime area, and that he had investigated crimes there before,
including shootings. He also testified that it was not unusual to find different brands
of the same caliber ammunition in the same firearm, and that he had seen it often in
various cases.
Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Felonious Assault
{¶23} Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he
possessed a firearm at the scene of the incident, let alone that he knowingly
committed an overt act towards an assault on “Jason.” He argues that the shell
casings found at the scene were mismatched, could have been from a prior crime in
such a high crime area, and that there was no testing done on Jackson’s jacket for
gun residue.
{¶24} Jackson also claims that the act of merely pointing a deadly weapon at
another individual without additional evidence is insufficient to convict a defendant
of Felonious Assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) pursuant to State v. Brooks, 44 Ohio
St.3d 185, 192 (1989). Contrary to Jackson’s argument, Owens testified that
Jackson pointed the firearm at Jason and fired it at him.
Q. * * * Did you ever see Paris Jackson point a firearm at this
other individual and pull the trigger?
A. Yes.
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Q. He pointed right at him?
A. Yes.
(Tr. at 81). Courts have made clear that pointing a firearm at an individual and
firing it is sufficient for Felonious Assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). State v.
Brooks, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 02-CA-251, 2004-Ohio-3216, ¶ 18.
{¶25} When considering the question of sufficiency of the evidence related
to Felonious Assault, we are directed to look at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St. 3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77,
quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
The testimony of Kristina Owens that Jackson pointed a firearm directly at Jason
and shot at him is sufficient to establish a Felonious Assault as charged in this
matter. Although Jackson argues that there was no evidence beyond Owens’
statement that he had a firearm at the scene of the crime, and that Owens’ testimony
was inconsistent and not credible, Owens’ credibility is an issue for weight of the
evidence rather than sufficiency.
{¶26} In sum, Owens’ testimony, combined with the video footage, the shell
casings at the scene, and the damage to Owens’ windshield is sufficient to support
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the Felonious Assault charge as
alleged.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding the Firearm Specification,
Carrying a Concealed Weapon, and Illegal Handling
of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle
{¶27} Jackson next argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish
the firearm specification, his conviction for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, and for
Illegal Handling of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle.
{¶28} Regarding the concealed firearm, Owens testified that she did not see
a weapon on Jackson when he got into her vehicle wearing a blue and white coat.
However, she testified that in the parking lot of the Fourth Street apartments,
Jackson pulled a firearm out of his pocket or his pants, pointed it at Jason, and fired
at him. Owens’ testimony was corroborated to an extent by the video footage, which
showed Jackson seemingly pointing something at Jason. In addition, two shell
casings were later located at the scene, and there was damage to Owens’ windshield
from a bullet fragment.
{¶29} All of this evidence is indicative of Jackson having a firearm
concealed while he was in Owens’ motor vehicle and ultimately using the firearm
in the commission of the offense. Again, Jackson argues that Owens’ testimony
was not credible, and that she was inconsistent in her retelling of the incident, but
this is an issue for weight of the evidence rather than sufficiency. Therefore,
Jackson’s arguments as to sufficiency of the evidence are not well-taken, and his
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first assignment of error is overruled as sufficient evidence was presented to convict
him of the alleged crimes.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶30} Jackson next argues that even if there was sufficient evidence to
convict him of the crimes as charged, his convictions were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In fact, Jackson contends that his convictions were
“grossly” against the manifest weight of the evidence because the convictions were
based primarily on the testimony of Kristina Owens and there were several factors
that severely limited the reliability of her testimony.
{¶31} Specifically, Jackson argues that Owens’ testimony was contradicted
by her own prior inconsistent statements, including her prior sworn testimony at a
preliminary hearing. Jackson argues that Owens made a number of statements at
the preliminary hearing, and in her interview with Detective Stechschulte, that were
inconsistent with her testimony at trial. He argues that Owens testified that she put
her head down in her car because she heard gunshots, that she was on the phone
during the shooting, and that she initially told Detective Stechschulte that she did
not really see who fired the shots. Jackson also points to Owens’ testimony at the
preliminary hearing wherein she had stated that she did not believe that Jackson was
aiming at Jason with his gun, and that she believed Jason also had a firearm.
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{¶32} In addition, Jackson emphasizes that Owens testified that she could
not hear what the argument was about between Jackson and Jason because she
“wasn’t really paying attention.” (Tr. at 64). He also argues that the evidence other
than Owens’ testimony was “vague or uncertain” since the surveillance video did
not show a firearm or a clear shooting, and since the shell casings did not match and
were found in a high crime area known for multiple shootings.
{¶33} Regarding the credibility of Owens’ testimony, Owens was
thoroughly cross-examined as to her earlier statements in this case and she
unequivocally testified at trial that Jackson argued with Jason outside of the vehicles
in the parking lot, that Jackson pulled out a firearm, that he pointed it directly at
Jason, and he fired the weapon at him. Moreover, on the witness stand, Owens was
shown the video recording of the incident and she testified to what was happening
as it played. Furthermore, on re-direct, Owens testified that she did not want to be
involved in these proceedings, and that she told the truth at trial.
{¶34} Jackson argues that in “many ways” his case is similar to State v.
Shamblin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93APA07-965, 1994WL109685, because
Owens’ credibility was so questionable in this matter. In Shamblin, the Tenth
District Court of Appeals reversed a conviction where a defendant was convicted of
Felonious Assault for actions in a bar fight, because there were serious questions as
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to whether the defendant was the person who actually committed the crime rather
than someone else.
{¶35} Shamblin has no relevance here because Owens clearly and
unequivocally identified Jackson as the shooter, and Jackson was even found in her
vehicle again days after the incident. This case is actually more similar to State v.
Brooks, supra, wherein it was determined that the act of pointing a firearm at an
individual and shooting it constitutes the “attempt to cause physical harm to
another[.]” Brooks at ¶ 18; see also State v. Mincy, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
060041, 2007-Ohio-1316, ¶ 68 (“In cases involving firearms, evidence that the
defendant discharged or tried to discharge a firearm is “strongly corroborative” of
an intention to cause harm. [FN omitted] More subtly but similarly corroborative of
an attempt to cause harm is evidence of an act of pointing a gun at someone,
combined with a threat that would indicate the actor’s intention to use the gun.”).
{¶36} Finally, it is well-settled that credibility determinations are primarily
for the trier-of-fact, and the trial court’s guilty determinations on the charges in this
case imply that the trial court found Owens credible, at least when combined with
the video footage of the scene, the shell casings that were located there, and the
damage to Owens’ windshield caused by a bullet. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St. 2d
230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). When combining all these pieces of evidence,
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we cannot find that the trial court clearly lost its way in convicting Jackson of the
charges in this matter.
{¶37} In sum, the standard of review directs this Court to reverse a
conviction on manifest weight only when the evidence weighs heavily against
conviction. State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9,
quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St. 3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. After a review
of the record and the exhibits presented, we cannot find that the trial court erred in
this matter. Therefore, Jackson’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶38} For the foregoing reasons, Jackson’s assignments of error are
overruled and the judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr
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