Bertovich v. St. John , 2012 Ohio 475 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Bertovich v. St. John, 2012-Ohio-475.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96619
MICHAEL BERTOVICH
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
WILLIAM ST. JOHN
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Garfield Heights Municipal Court
Case No. CVI 1003126
BEFORE: Keough, J., Cooney, P.J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 9, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Brent L. English
Law Offices of Brent L. English
M.K. Ferguson Plaza, Suite 470
1500 West Third Street
Cleveland, OH 44113-1422
Nicholas A. Reif
1220 West 6th Street
Suite 502
Cleveland, OH 44113
FOR APPELLEE
William St. John, pro se
19413 Rashell Drive
Walton Hills, OH 44146
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Michael C. Bertovich (“Bertovich”), appeals
from the trial court’s judgment finding in favor of defendant-appellee,
William St. John (“St. John”), and dismissing his small claims action for
breach of contract. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On October 21, 2010, Bertovich filed suit in Garfield Heights
Municipal Court for St. John’s alleged breach of contract in connection with
the sale of residential property owned by St. John. Bertovich claimed
damages of $2,670.98.1 St. John filed a counterclaim (which he voluntarily
dismissed at the close of trial), and the case proceeded to a bench trial on
February 17, 2011.
{¶ 3} The evidence at trial demonstrated the following. On September
17, 2009, the parties entered into an agreement for the sale to Bertovich of St.
John’s residential property located in Maple Heights, Ohio. The purchase
price for the property was $120,000, and the property was to be sold in “as is”
condition. The purchase agreement was silent regarding a closing date for
the transaction. The agreement contained the following provision regarding
compliance with point-of-sale inspections required by the city of Maple
Heights:
SELLER agrees to comply with any and all local governmental
point-of-sale laws and/or ordinances. SELLER will promptly
provide BUYER with copies of any notices received from
governmental agencies to inspect or correct any current building
code or health violations. If applicable, BUYER and SELLER
shall have ____ ( ) days after receipt by BUYER of all notices
to agree in writing which party will be responsible for the
correction of any building code or health violation(s). In the
event BUYER and SELLER cannot agree in writing, this
AGREEMENT can be declared null and void by either party.
The parties did not fill in the blanks in this provision regarding how many
days the parties would have to agree upon who would pay for necessary
Prior to trial, Bertovich filed a motion to amend his claim for damages to $3,648.98. The
1
trial court denied the motion because the municipal court has no jurisdiction to award damages over
$3,000 when the case is filed in the small claims division.
repairs after receiving notice from the city. However, in a handwritten
addendum to the purchase agreement, the parties agreed that Bertovich
would “assume all costs associated with and related to the sale of the property
and transfer of title.”
{¶ 4} Bertovich testified at trial that he agreed to pay $13,000 to
replace the gravel driveway at the property, which the parties knew was not
code-compliant, but never agreed to pay for the costs of repairing other code
violations that the city’s required point-of-sale inspection might reveal. St.
John, on the other hand, testified that Bertovich repeatedly assured him that
he would pay for all required repairs the inspection might reveal and that the
understanding of all parties to the addendum was that Bertovich was
assuming responsibility for such costs.
{¶ 5} On November 5, 2009, St. John arranged for the city to conduct
the required inspection on the following day. That evening, however,
Bertovich advised St. John that he would not pay for any repairs necessitated
by the inspection, other than to replace the driveway. St. John then
cancelled the inspection, at which point Bertovich repudiated the agreement.
Bertovich subsequently purchased a home located in Walton Hills, Ohio for
$125,000.
{¶ 6} In its findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered after trial,
the trial court found that there was no meeting of the minds between the
parties as to who would pay for repairs necessitated by the city’s inspection
and, accordingly, there was no contract. The court further found that
because the purchase agreement, including the addendum, was vague and
ambiguous regarding performance (who was to pay for the repairs) and
performance (when the transaction was to close), it was unenforceable.
Finally, the court held that even assuming there was a valid contract and a
breach, Bertovich had not suffered any damages. Accordingly, the trial court
found in favor of St. John and dismissed the complaint.
II. Meeting of the Minds
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Bertovich contends that the trial
court erred in finding that the contract was unenforceable because there was
no meeting of minds regarding who was to pay for repairs required by the
point-of-sale inspection.
{¶ 8} To prove the existence of a contract, a party must show that both
parties consented to the terms of the contract, there was a “meeting of the
minds,” and the essential terms of the contract are definite and certain.
Morganstern, MacAdams & Devito Co., L.P.A. v. Hilliard Bldg. Partnership,
8th Dist. No. 79407, 2001-Ohio-4258, 2001 WL 1612080, citing Nilavar v.
Osborn, 137 Ohio App.3d 469, 738 N.E.2d 1271 (2d Dist.2000); see also
Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Indus. Relations, 61 Ohio
St.3d 366, 369, 575 N.E.2d 143 (1991).
{¶ 9} The terms of a contract are sufficiently certain if they “provide a
basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate
remedy.” Mr. Mark Corp. v. Rush, Inc., 11 Ohio App.3d 167, 169, 464 N.E.2d
586 (8th Dist.1983). Where the parties have agreed about issues critical to
the transaction, the court may determine the meaning of ambiguous or
uncertain terms according to the parties’ mutual understanding, the custom
and practice in the trade, or other established legal principles. Id.{¶ 10} Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court of Ohio observed in Litsinger
Sign Co., Inc. v. Am. Sign Co., 11 Ohio St.2d 1, 14, 227 N.E.2d 609 (1967),
it is settled law that if the parties’ manifestations taken together
as making up the contract, when reasonably interpreted in the
light of all the circumstances, do not enable the court to
determine what the agreement is and to enforce it without, in
effect, ‘making a contract for the parties,’ no enforceable
obligation results.” Id., citing 1 Corbin on Contracts, 394 and
398, Section 95.
{¶ 11} That is the situation presented here. The evidence at trial
demonstrated that there was no “meeting of the minds” regarding
performance of the contract. St. John testified that Bertovich had agreed to
pay for the repairs necessitated by the city’s required point-of-sale
inspection,2 while Bertovich insisted that he had agreed to pay only the cost
Bertovich argues that St. John’s testimony to this effect was excluded. But Bertovich called
2
St. John on cross-examination in his case-in-chief and asked him whether it was his understanding
upon signing the addendum that Bertovich was to pay the repair costs: “[Y]our understanding when
you signed that it was all costs, it wasn’t just closing – it wasn’t the closing costs?” St. John
of replacing the driveway. But Bertovich’s alleged agreement to pay to
replace the driveway was not included in the purchase agreement, nor did
either the purchase agreement or the addendum provide who was to pay for
the repairs. St. John testified that the parties’ intent in signing the
addendum to the purchase agreement, which provided that Bertovich was to
assume “all” costs “related to the sale,” was that Bertovich was to pay the
repair costs. But the addendum can also be reasonably interpreted to mean
that Bertovich assumed only such costs related to the sale as title and closing
costs.
{¶ 12} Bertovich’s argument that the parties agreed in the purchase
agreement on a procedure for handling repairs resulting from the
point-of-sale inspection is without merit because the parties did not complete
that part of the agreement. Thus, not only was there no agreement as to
who would pay for the repairs, there was also no agreement as to how many
days the parties would have after receiving notice of necessary repairs to
agree on who was to pay for them before the agreement could be declared
void. Hence, there was no agreement as to procedure or performance.
{¶ 13} In light of the evidence at trial and the ambiguity in the
responded, “It was everybody in the room’s understanding because we talked about it.” No one
raised any objection to this testimony. Later, when St. John’s counsel asked St. John about his
understanding of the addendum, the trial court sustained Bertovich’s objection to any further
testimony about what Bertovich had told him.
addendum, it is apparent there was no agreement regarding performance of
the contract. Under such circumstances, for the court to have decided that
either Bertovich or St. John was responsible for the repair costs would have
essentially created a contract for the parties. The trial court properly held
that without a meeting of the minds, the agreement was unenforceable and,
therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Specific Closing Date
{¶ 14} In his second assignment of error, Bertovich contends that the
trial court erred in holding that the purchase agreement was not enforceable
because it lacked a specific closing date. He contends that the court should
have concluded from the evidence presented at trial that the parties agreed
that the closing date was to be a “reasonable time” after the transaction was
signed, which he interprets to mean prior to the end of November 2009, the
date he had to be out of the house he was living in.
{¶ 15} “A closing date is not a per se essential term required to validate
a [real estate purchase] contract. * * * If the agreement does not contain a
date as to when payment is to be made or performance is to be rendered, a
reasonable time can be imposed.” Park v. Acierno, 160 Ohio App.3d 117,
2005-Ohio-1332, 826 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 45 (7th Dist.), citing Cionni v. Reid, 7th
Dist. No. 90J19, 1991 WL 139579 (July 25, 1991), and Walkana v. Hanna, 7th
Dist. No. 87CA174, 1988 WL 117988 (Oct. 28, 1988).
{¶ 16} Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that the lack of a
closing date in the purchase agreement made the contract unenforceable.
The court could have determined a reasonable time for performance, whether
the end of November or otherwise, from the facts presented at trial.
{¶ 17} Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained.
Nevertheless, we find the court’s error to be harmless because, as discussed
above, the contract was unenforceable due to its ambiguity regarding who
was to pay for necessary repairs. Further, as discussed below, even
assuming there was a contract and a breach, Bertovich did not incur any
damages.
IV. Damages
{¶ 18} In his third assignment of error, Bertovich contends that the trial
court erred in determining that even assuming a contract and breach,
Bertovich did not incur any damages.
{¶ 19} To prove breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
existence of a contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant,
and damage or loss to the plaintiff. Nilavar v. Osborn, 127 Ohio App.3d 1,
11, 711 N.E.2d 726 (2d Dist.1998), citing Doner v. Snapp, 98 Ohio App.3d 597,
600, 649 N.E.2d 42 (2d Dist.1994).
{¶ 20} The damages awarded for a breach of contract should place the
injured party in as good a position as he would have been but for the breach.
Mercury Fin. Co., LLC v. Smith, 8th Dist. No. 87562, 2006-Ohio-5730, 2006
WL 3095664, ¶ 29, citing Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 115
Ohio App.3d 137, 684 N.E.2d 1261 (9th Dist.1996). A corollary of this legal
principle is that a party generally should not recover a greater amount in
damages for breach of an obligation than he could have gained by full
performance thereof on both sides. Id., citing Computer Sciences Corp. v.
Owens-Illinois Corp., 6th Dist. No. 7778, 1975 WL 182484 (Apr. 18, 1975).
{¶ 21} Just two weeks after he repudiated the contract for the Maple
Heights home, Bertovich purchased a home in Walton Hills. Bertovich
testified that he paid $125,000 for the home and that it needed no repairs.
Bertovich also testified that if his purchase of the Maple Heights home had
gone through, he would have paid $133,000 ($120,000 for the house plus
$13,000 to repair the driveway). Even adding Bertovich’s alleged expenses
related to the uncompleted purchase of the Maple Heights home 3 to the
$125,000 that he paid for the Walton Hills home, Bertovich’s net cost for the
Walton Hills home is still less than what he would have paid if his purchase
of the Maple Heights home had gone through. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in concluding that, even assuming there was a contract and a
breach, Bertovich incurred no damages.
$3,000 for the lost down payment assistance grant, $350 for an appraisal of the Maple
3
Heights property, $240 to clean the Maple Heights property, and $58.98 to transport items from the
{¶ 22} We are not persuaded by Bertovich’s argument that he sustained
money damages because every piece of real estate is unique, and he was
denied the opportunity to purchase the Maple Heights property. Contracts
involving interests in land may be specifically enforced, even without
evidence there is no adequate remedy at law, because interests in land are
unique. Gleason v. Gleason, 64 Ohio App.3d 667, 672, 582 N.E.2d 657 (4th
Dist.1991). Bertovich requested only money damages, however; he did not
ask for the equitable remedy of specific performance. Moreover, as the trial
court noted, there was no testimony at trial as to the uniqueness of the Maple
Heights home.
{¶ 23} The third assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
Maple Heights property to the Walton Hills property (total $3,648.98).
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR