State v. Casshie ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Casshie, 2012-Ohio-363.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96942
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
ADAM CASSHIE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-549414
BEFORE: Jones, J., Sweeney, P.J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 2, 2012
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cullen Sweeney
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Colleen Reali
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
LARRY A. JONES, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Adam Casshie, appeals his sentence for domestic
violence. We affirm.
{¶ 2} In 2011, Casshie was charged with domestic violence, a fourth degree
felony. He pled guilty and the trial court sentenced him to 18 months in prison. It is
from this sentence that Casshie appeals, raising the following assignment of error for our
review:
“I. The trial court violated Mr. Casshie’s constitutional and statutory right to a
sentence based on consideration of the factors set forth in the Ohio Revised Code,
and not the conduct of another defendant in an unrelated case.”
{¶ 3} We use a two-step approach when reviewing felony sentences. First, we
examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in
imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly
contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court's decision in imposing the
term of imprisonment is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. State v.
Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 26; see also State v.
Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470.
{¶ 4} Thus, in the first step of our analysis, we review whether a defendant’s
sentence is contrary to law as required by R.C. 2953.08(G).
{¶ 5} As the Kalish court noted, post- Foster, “trial courts have full discretion to
impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make
findings and give reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive or more than the minimum
sentence.” Id. at ¶ 11; Foster, paragraph seven of the syllabus. The Kalish court
declared that although Foster eliminated mandatory judicial fact-finding, it left R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 intact. Kalish at ¶ 13. As a result, the trial court must still
consider these statutes when imposing a sentence. Id., citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio
St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38.
{¶ 6} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that
a court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the
overriding purposes of felony sentencing[,] * * * to protect the public from
future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. To
achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for
incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future
crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of
the offense, the public, or both.
R.C. 2929.12 provides a nonexhaustive list of factors a trial court must consider when
determining the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood that the offender will
commit future offenses.
{¶ 7} The Kalish court noted that R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not fact-finding
statutes; rather, they “serve as an overarching guide for trial judges to consider in
fashioning an appropriate sentence.” Kalish at id. Thus, “[i]n considering these statutes
in light of Foster, the trial court has full discretion to determine whether the sentence
satisfies the overriding purposes of Ohio’s sentencing structure.” Id.{¶ 8} In the instant case, the trial court sentenced Casshie to 18 months in prison
for a fourth degree felony; although he received the maximum sentence for a fourth
degree felony, his sentence was not contrary to law. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(4). Thus,
the first prong of Kalish has been met and we proceed to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing Casshie to 18 months in prison. Kalish at ¶ 4, 19.
“An abuse of discretion is ‘more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”’ Id. at ¶ 19, quoting
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 9} Casshie claims that he was sentenced to prison, instead of inpatient
treatment, based mainly on the actions of another defendant; therefore, the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison. During the sentencing hearing,
defense counsel requested that Casshie be sentenced to “some type of inpatient treatment”
to help him with his “psychologic[al] issues.” In response, the trial court stated
I just sentenced a guy right before you, actually about an hour ago, where I
sent him to inpatient treatment for mental health and drug problems, and he
walked out the first day I put him in the treatment program. So you can
thank [that defendant] for what I’m about to do. Because I don’t feel that
you’re safe or your family is safe with you walking the streets.
{¶ 10} Although the trial court should have used greater discretion in choosing its
words, we do not find that the above-cited excerpt per se deems Casshie’s sentence
unfair. Contrary to Casshie’s claim that the trial court only sentenced him to prison
because another defendant did not complete treatment, a review of the sentencing
transcript indicates that the other defendant’s actions were not the basis for Casshie’s
sentence.
{¶ 11} In sentencing Casshie, the court noted that he had recently gotten out of
prison for another crime and was out for only seven months before committing the
domestic violence against his wife. During the hearing, Casshie’s wife read a lengthy
statement in which she detailed the history with her abusive husband as well the current
domestic violence that happened in front of their young daughter. She asked the trial
court to protect her and her children from Casshie.
{¶ 12} In sentencing Casshie, the trial court detailed his extensive criminal record
and history of incarceration, which included juvenile adjudications for assault, vandalism,
and conspiracy, and adult convictions for criminal mischief, receiving stolen property,
theft, forgery, falsification, contempt, burglary, disorderly conduct, obstructing official
business, domestic violence, and weapons charges. Moreover, contrary to Casshie’s
claim that he should have been sent to inpatient mental health treatment in lieu of prison
to treat his “diagnosed mental illness,” during sentencing defense counsel indicated only
that Casshie had “psychologic[al] issues” that had not yet been properly diagnosed.
{¶ 13} The court stated on the record that it considered the purposes and principles
of sentencing. In the sentencing journal entry, the court stated that it “considered all
factors of the law” and found “that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C.
2929.11.”
{¶ 14} Based on these facts, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Casshie to prison.
{¶ 15} The assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for
execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR