State v. Arguelles ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Arguelles, 2012-Ohio-357.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96800
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
DANIEL ARGUELLES
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-543000
BEFORE: Jones, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 2, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Alison Foy
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Mark B. Marein
Marein & Bradley
222 Leader Building
526 Superior Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
LARRY A. JONES, J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the trial court’s decision to
grant defendant-appellee’s, Daniel Arguelles, motion to suppress. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On October 12, 2010, Parma police officer Matt Daves approached a
vehicle that was sitting in the street with its engine on, but unattended. He proceeded to
write a ticket when Arguelles approached him and told the officer that the car was his.
The officer issued the citation and handed it to Arguelles. He first told Arguelles he was
free to go, but then asked if he could search the car to see if there was drug paraphernalia
in it. Arguelles told the officer there was no reason to search the car, but the officer
persisted. Eventually Arguelles told the officer that he had just “smoked a blunt” and
the officer placed him in handcuffs. Another officer used his flashlight to look inside
the car and saw a “baggie” of suspected marijuana on the passenger-side floor. The
officer then searched the car and found marijuana and pills. Arguelles told the officers
the pills were Percocet and Valium.
{¶ 3} Arguelles was charged with drug trafficking (methamphetamine) and two
counts of possession of drugs (methamphetamine and oxycodone). He filed a motion to
suppress evidence and statements. The state opposed the motion and then dismissed the
drug trafficking charge and one count of drug possession because the substances charged
in those counts turned out not to be controlled substances. The state proceeded on the
remaining count of the indictment: one count of drug possession (oxycodone).
{¶ 4} At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties and the court agreed
that the court would make its decision based on the briefs and a dash cam video of the
incident. No testimony was taken.
{¶ 5} The trial court granted the motion to suppress in part, suppressing all of
Arguelles’s statements to police officers. The court further denied the motion in part,
not suppressing what the officers saw in plain view in Arguelles’s car. In so ruling, the
trial court stated in its journal entry, in part, as follows:
At 1:25:19 [a.m.] the officer tells the defendant that he is free to leave but
then begins to ask permission to search the interior of the defendant’s car. The
defendant does not agree to allow the search and the officer continues to press the
defendant to allow him to search the car. The officer begins to place handcuffs
on the defendant at 1:25:55 [a.m.] and continues to interrogate the defendant. It
was not until 1:27:00 [a.m.] that the officer advises the defendant of his Miranda1
rights. The defendant provided admissions about items in his car both before and
after receiving the Miranda warning. * * * The questioning of the defendant was
improper as set forth in the Farris2 decision. Consistent with that holding by the
Ohio Supreme Court, both the pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements of the
defendant are suppressed and may not be admitted at trial.
However, due to noticing an odor of marijuana about the defendant, the
officers had every right to make a plain view search of the defendant’s car and the
questioning officer’s partner did so with a flashlight prior to the search of the
interior of the car. All evidence viewed through the plain-view search is
admissible for trial.
{¶ 6} The state filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Crim.R. 12(K), raising one
assignment of error for our review, contending that the trial court erred in granting
Arguelles’s motion to suppress.
{¶ 7} In State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71,
¶ 8, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that
appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes
the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual
questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an
appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true,
the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to
the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable
legal standard. (Internal citations omitted.)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1996).
1
State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985.
2
{¶ 8} In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that an individual must
be advised of his or her constitutional rights when law enforcement officers initiate
questioning after that person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or
her freedom in any significant way. Any statement given under custodial police
interrogation, without the Miranda warnings first being given, may later be excluded
from use by the State in any resulting criminal prosecution. Id.{¶ 9} The warnings set forth in Miranda are only required when the individual is
subject to a “custodial interrogation.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122, 103
S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983). A custodial interrogation is defined as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
Miranda at 444.
The determination whether a custodial interrogation has occurred requires
an inquiry into how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have
understood his situation. * * * The ultimate inquiry is simply whether
there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest. State v. Ware, 8th Dist. No. 89945,
2008-Ohio-2038, 2008 WL 1903993, ¶ 10, citing State v. Martin, 2d Dist.
No. 19186, 2002-Ohio-2621, 2002 WL 1042066.
{¶ 10} In this case, the trial court relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
Farris, supra. In Farris, a police officer noticed the odor of burnt marijuana coming
from inside the car during a traffic stop. The officer asked the driver to step out of the
car, patted the driver down, and placed him in the front seat of the patrol car. Without
providing Miranda warnings, the officer asked the driver about the smell of marijuana
and told him he was going to search the car. At that point, the driver admitted that a
marijuana pipe was in a bag in the trunk.
{¶ 11} The Farris Court found that “the officer’s treatment of Farris after the
original stop placed Farris in custody for practical purposes.” Id. at ¶ 14. The Court
held the only relevant inquiry in determining whether a person is in custody is “how a
reasonable [person] in the suspect’s position would have understood [their] situation.”
Id. The Court determined that a reasonable person in Farris’s position would have
understood himself to be in custody of a police officer, because the officer (1) patted
down Farris; (2) took his car keys; (3) instructed him to enter the cruiser; and (4) told
Farris that he was going to search Farris’s car because of the scent of marijuana. Id.
The Court concluded that the defendant’s pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements were
inadmissible.
{¶ 12} We agree with the trial court that the issue here is whether Arguelles was in
custody at the time the officer asked him to search his car. The state distinguishes
Farris, citing the fact that the police took Farris’s keys and put him in a patrol car before
questioning him. The difference in this case, the state contends, is that Officer Daves
told Arguelles he was free to go and then proceeded to ask him a couple more
questions. According to the state, it is clear that Arguelles was not in custody at the
time; therefore, the officer did not err by questioning him prior to giving him his Miranda
warning.
{¶ 13} Arguelles argues that he was in custody at the time the officer interrogated
him because, for nearly a minute, the officer repeatedly asked him if he could search the
car despite Arguelles’s repeated refusals.
{¶ 14} Although, as the trial court noted, the facts of Farris are somewhat
distinguishable from the facts of this case, Arguelles was “in custody” for practical
purposes. Officer Daves told Arguelles he was free to go, but then immediately and
repeatedly asked him if he could search his car. Arguelles told the officer that there was
no reason to search the car, but the officer persisted in asking if he could search that car
and questioned, “so if I call in a drug dog and have him take a sniff around the car * * *.”
During the repeated questioning, Arguelles admits he had just “smoked a blunt,” and
raises his hands up. Officer Daves put Arguelles’s arms down, turned him around, and
held Arguelles’s hands together until his partner located the drugs in Arguelles’s car.
Once the drugs were located, Daves indicated to Arguelles that he was under arrest and
started to handcuff him. He then continued to question him for nearly a minute before
finally administering the Miranda warning.
{¶ 15} The officer’s continued questioning of Arguelles coupled with the physical
restraint, however slight, of holding Arguelles’s hands behind his back was improper
absent a Miranda warning. Therefore, the trial court correctly suppressed Arguelles’s
statements to police officers.
{¶ 16} The assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed and case remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR