State v. Simmons , 2012 Ohio 268 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Simmons, 
    2012-Ohio-268
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 96778
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    RONALD SIMMONS
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-541368
    BEFORE: Sweeney, P.J., Jones, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     January 26, 2012
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Robert L. Tobik, Esq.
    Assistant Public Defender
    By: John T. Martin, Esq.
    Assistant Public Defender
    310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 400
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason, Esq.
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Steven E. Gall, Esq.
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.:
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant appeals from his conviction for aggravated murder with
    firearm specifications. On appeal, he asserts that his constitutional rights were violated in
    relation to his jury waiver. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    {¶ 2} Defendant executed a voluntary waiver of jury trial on April 11, 2011 that
    was filed the same day. The court addressed defense counsel and defendant in open court
    concerning defendant’s decision to waive his right to a jury. Specifically, the court
    confirmed that defense counsel had explained the jury waiver to defendant and that he
    attested to it in writing. Defendant stated that he voluntarily executed the waiver. A bench
    trial commenced after the defendant’s waiver of jury trial was filed and journalized.
    Defendant’s sole assignment of error in this appeal is as follows:
    {¶ 3} “The Defendant’s jury waiver was not knowingly[,] intelligently and
    voluntarily entered.”
    {¶ 4} Defendant maintains that the trial court’s colloquy with defendant and
    counsel did not adequately establish that he understood the rights he was surrendering.
    However, defendant acknowledges that the written waiver that he voluntarily executed
    was “valid on its face.” We construe this to mean that it adequately advised defendant of
    his constitutional rights and memorialized the fact of his executed waiver of them. The
    written waiver also contains a certification from defense counsel as follows: “I have
    explained to my client his/her rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States
    and the State of Ohio to a trial by jury. No threats or promises have been made to induce
    the Defendant to waive that right, and I certify that this waiver has been knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily made.”
    {¶ 5} R.C. 2945.05 governs the waiver of a jury trial and provides:
    In all criminal cases pending in courts of record in this state, the defendant
    may waive a trial by jury and be tried by the court without a jury. Such
    waiver by a defendant, shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed
    in said cause and made a part of the record thereof. It shall be entitled in the
    court and cause, and in substance as follows: “I __________, defendant in
    the above cause, hereby voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a trial
    by jury, and elect to be tried by a Judge of the Court in which the said cause
    may be pending. I fully understand that under the laws of this state, I have a
    constitutional right to a trial by jury.
    Such waiver of trial by jury must be made in open court after the defendant
    has been arraigned and has had opportunity to consult with counsel. Such
    waiver may be withdrawn by the defendant at any time before the
    commencement of the trial.
    {¶ 6} In order to be valid, a jury waiver must satisfy five conditions: “[i]t must be
    (1) in writing, (2) signed by the defendant, (3) filed, (4) made part of the record, and (5)
    made in open court.” See State v. Lomax, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 350
    , 
    2007-Ohio-4277
    , 
    872 N.E.2d 279
    , ¶9. The Ohio Supreme Court has further directed, “a trial court does not need
    to engage in an extended colloquy with the defendant in order to comply with the statutory
    requirement that a jury waiver be made in open court.” Lomax, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 350
    ,
    
    2007-Ohio-4277
    , 
    872 N.E.2d 279
    , ¶42. R.C. 2945.05 does “not mandate magic words, or
    a prolonged colloquy.” Id. at ¶48. To be valid, there need only be “some evidence in the
    record of the proceedings that the defendant acknowledged the waiver to the trial court
    while in the presence of counsel, if any.” Id. at ¶42.
    {¶ 7} The record establishes that defendant acknowledged the waiver to the trial
    court while in the presence of his counsel. Defendant signed the written waiver; it was
    filed and made part of the record and done in open court. This court has found valid the
    waiver of these rights under factually analogous circumstances. See State v. Cantie, 8th
    Dist. No. 93864, 
    2010-Ohio-5350
    , 
    2010 WL 4352266
    .              This assignment of error is
    accordingly overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been
    affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for
    execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, J., and
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96778

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 268

Judges: Sweeney

Filed Date: 1/26/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016