Wightman v. Ohio Real Estate Comm. ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as Wightman v. Ohio Real Estate Comm., 
    2017-Ohio-756
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    Kenneth A. Wightman,                              :
    Appellant-Appellant,              :
    v.                                                :                  No. 16AP-466
    (C.P.C. No. 15CVF 10548)
    Ohio Real Estate Commission,             :
    Ohio Department of Commerce, Division                          (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    of Real Estate & Professional Licensing, :
    Appellees-Appellees.              :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on March 2, 2017
    On brief: Kevin E. Humphreys, for appellant.              Argued:
    Kevin E. Humphreys.
    On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Keith O'Korn
    and Zachary C. Schaengold, for appellees. Argued:
    Zachary C. Schaengold.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
    TYACK, P.J.
    {¶ 1} Kenneth A. Wightman is appealing from an adjudication order entered by
    the Ohio Real Estate Commission on November 12, 2015. For the following reasons, we
    affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Wightman assigns
    four errors for our consideration:
    I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
    NOVEMBER 10, 2015 ADJUDICATION ORDER, BECAUSE
    THE COMMISSION WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
    PROCEED WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
    DUE TO THE PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE NOTICE OF
    HEARING.
    No. 16AP-466                                                                             2
    II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATIONS
    THAT WIGHTMAN'S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
    DUE PROCESS WERE NOT VIOLATED IN THE
    ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
    III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
    THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS
    OF OHIO'S OPEN MEETINGS ACT, R.C. 121.22.
    IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
    THE OHIO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION'S NOVEMBER 10,
    2015, ADJUDICATION ORDER WAS SUPPORTED BY
    RELIABLE, PROBATIVE AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;
    AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A DEFECT IN THE
    PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY THAT
    WOULD SUPPORT A VIOLATION OF R.C. 4735.18,
    PREDICATED UPON R.C. 4735.67(A).
    I. Facts and Case History
    {¶ 2} Kenneth Wightman, a licensed real estate sales person, was involved in the
    sale of a condominium to Rachel Boggs. Wightman was the agent for the seller. After the
    sale closed, Wightman gave Boggs a note from the seller telling her how to avoid clogs in
    the plumbing system and warning her of telltale signs that a clog might be developing.
    {¶ 3} Boggs felt that she should have been warned of the potential for clogs before
    the closing and filed a complaint with the Ohio Real Estate Commission ("Commission"),
    through the Ohio Division of Real Estate and Professional Licensing ("Division").
    Eventually a hearing on the complaint was conducted and Wightman was found to have
    failed to reveal information about potential clogs. An adjudication order was entered
    requiring him to pursue six hours of continuing education in real estate matters.
    {¶ 4} Apparently several of the drainage pipes for the condominium are
    connected, including the upstairs bathtub, upstairs toilet, upstairs sink, and the clothes
    washer. The sellers had had plumbers out to the condominium on a number of occasions
    but the plumbers had not been able to recreate the problem of the clogs and therefore had
    not been able to fix it.
    {¶ 5} At some point in time, the seller had figured out a way to ameliorate the
    problem, mainly by using a heavy duty plunger on the upstairs toilet when warning signs
    No. 16AP-466                                                                               3
    of a back-up or a clog showed up. The sellers felt it was important for them to inform
    Boggs of the situation and wrote a note and sent an email to Wightman weeks before
    closing. Wightman did not convey the information and the contents of the note until after
    Boggs had signed the paperwork for the sale and basically finalized the sale on April 5,
    2013. When Boggs received the information, she was not pleased and was particularly
    displeased with the timing of Wightman's revelation of the problem.
    {¶ 6} Based upon the above facts, a hearing examiner for the Commission found
    that Wightman should have revealed the problem before the closing.                 The full
    Commission adopted the hearing examiner's conclusions.            A common pleas judge
    affirmed the Commission's order based upon a finding that Wightman should have shared
    the information his sellers wanted to share with Boggs and which Boggs understandingly
    wanted to know before closing on the sale.
    II. Standard of Review
    {¶ 7} Pursuant to R.C. 119.12, when a common pleas court reviews an order of an
    administrative agency, it must consider the entire record to determine whether the
    agency's order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in
    accordance with law. Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad, 
    63 Ohio St.2d 108
    , 110-11 (1980);
    Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 
    164 Ohio St. 275
    , 280 (1955). "Reliable" evidence is
    dependable; that is, it can be confidently trusted. In order to be reliable, there must be a
    reasonable probability that the evidence is true. "Probative" evidence is evidence that
    tends to prove the issue in question; it must be relevant in determining the issue.
    "Substantial" evidence is evidence with some weight; it must have importance and value.
    Our Place v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 
    63 Ohio St.3d 570
    , 571 (1992).
    {¶ 8} The common pleas court's "review of the administrative record is neither a
    trial de novo nor an appeal on questions of law only, but a hybrid review in which the
    court 'must appraise all the evidence as to the credibility of the witnesses, the probative
    character of the evidence, and the weight thereof.' " Lies v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Bd., 
    2 Ohio App.3d 204
    , 207 (1st Dist.1981), quoting Andrews at 280.            In its review, the
    common pleas court must give due deference to the administrative agency's resolution of
    evidentiary conflicts, but the findings of the agency are not conclusive. Conrad at 111.
    No. 16AP-466                                                                           4
    {¶ 9} In reviewing an order of an administrative agency, an appellate court's role
    is more limited than that of a common pleas court reviewing the same order. It is
    incumbent on the common pleas court to examine the evidence. Such is not the charge of
    the appellate court. The appellate court is to determine only if the common pleas court
    has abused its discretion. Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations
    Bd., 
    40 Ohio St.3d 257
    , 261 (1988). As to questions of law, "this court must make its own
    independent determination of the law to be applied to the facts found by the agency and
    held by the common pleas court to be supported by reliable, probative and substantial
    evidence." Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 
    92 Ohio App.3d 585
    , 588 (10th Dist.1993).
    III. The Order is Supported by Reliable, Probative, and Substantial Evidence
    {¶ 10} The fourth assignment of error argues that the Commission's adjudication
    order was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence; as there was no
    evidence of a defect in the property that would support a violation.
    {¶ 11} We cannot find that the trial court erred as to the basic findings that
    Wightman should have shared the information provided to him by his sellers. His failure
    to do so violated R.C. 4735.67(A), which reads:
    A licensee shall disclose to any purchaser all material facts
    of which the licensee has actual knowledge pertaining to the
    physical condition of the property that the purchaser would
    not discover by a reasonably diligent inspection, including
    material defects in the property, environmental
    contamination, and information that any statute or rule
    requires be disclosed. For purposes of this division, actual
    knowledge of such material facts shall be inferred to the
    licensee if the licensee acts with reckless disregard for the
    truth.
    The trial court found that the condominium's plumbing issues described in the note
    constituted material facts. The note stated:
    We had occasional problems with the drain in the second
    bathroom. We had plumbers out a number of times. They
    could find nothing to explain why the drains had stopped up.
    They would snake the drains and that would free them up
    but the snake was always clean. The developers stepped in
    once, even worked on the drain pipe in the condo below but
    No. 16AP-466                                                                            5
    that still didn't fix the problem. But we figured out a work
    around to possibly keep the plumbers away.
    If, when draining the bath tub or sink, and you hear and see
    the toilet start to gurgle/bubble then immediately stop
    draining the tub or sink. (The second bathroom drains and
    utility closet drain are all connected so it could back up to the
    utility closet drain. I believe the clothes washer is in the mix
    too.) We kept a heavy duty plunger in the second bathroom.
    Take the plunger and plunge the toilet until it flushes
    smoothly. The tub or sink should then drain fine (but to be
    safe keep an eye on the utility closet drain while the tub or
    sink drains). Thought we better tell you about this situation
    before you call a plumber or have a big mess to clean.
    (Note to the New Buyers, Compl., Ex. A.) The note here speaks for itself as well as
    Wightman's actions of waiting a few minutes after closing to deliver the note. The trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the adjudication order was supported by
    reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
    {¶ 12} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
    IV. The Commission had Jurisdiction
    {¶ 13} Turning to the other three assignments of error, Wightman's first
    assignment of error argues that the Commission was without jurisdiction due to a prior
    withdrawal of the notice of the administrative hearing. The argument submits that R.C.
    4735.051 did not allow the matter to be reinstated once the notice of the hearing had been
    withdrawn.
    {¶ 14} On March 17, 2015, Wightman was informed that, upon further review of
    the matter, the charges in the case were being withdrawn and the case would be returned
    to legal for additional review and follow-up. (Mar. 17, 2015 Notice of Withdraw of
    Charges.) On June 11, 2015, Wightman was issued a second Notification of Formal
    Hearing, notifying him that a hearing was now scheduled for August 10, 2015. (June 11,
    2015 Notification of Formal Hearing.)
    {¶ 15} R.C. 4735.32 requires that the Commission commence any investigation
    within three years from the date on which an alleged violation of the Revised Code
    occurred. R.C. 4735.332(A)(1). An agency which serves as an adjudicating authority has
    " 'the inherent power to dismiss charges against an individual who has had claims of
    No. 16AP-466                                                                              6
    misconduct levied against her or him.' " State ex rel. Sizemore v. Ohio Veterinary Med.
    Licensing Bd., 
    132 Ohio St.3d 296
    , 
    2012-Ohio-2725
    , quoting State ex rel. Sizemore v.
    Ohio Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-298, 
    2012-Ohio-63
    .               An
    adjudication must be on the merits before res judicata applies. La Barbera v. Batsch, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 106
    , 109 (1967).         Res judicata does not attach in an administrative
    adjudication until there has been a determination on the merits. Yoder v. Ohio State Bd.
    of Edn., 
    40 Ohio App.3d 111
     (9th Dist.1988)(the State Board of Education withdrew its
    cause from their hearing officer and rescinded its earlier resolution and passed another
    resolution to consider the revocation of Yoder's teaching certificate).
    {¶ 16} We find no fault in the Commission or the division refiling charges after
    further investigation. The Commission retained jurisdiction and its statutory authority to
    file charges because the investigation was ongoing and the Commission commenced the
    investigation within three years of the date of the alleged violation.
    {¶ 17} The first assignment of error is overruled.
    V. Due Process was Not Violated
    {¶ 18} The second assignment of error argues that Wightman's property interest in
    his license is afforded constitutional due process protections which were violated.
    {¶ 19} First, Wightman does not have a right to his real estate license. Richard T.
    Kiko Agency, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Real Estate, 
    48 Ohio St.3d 74
    , 76
    (1990)(The state has a valid interest in promoting the character, honesty, and intellectual
    competence of real estate brokers, and the right to engage in the real estate business is in
    the nature of a privilege granted by the state).
    {¶ 20} " 'An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
    proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
    circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
    an opportunity to present their objections.' " Althof v. Ohio State Bd. of Psychology, 10th
    Dist. No. 05AP-1169, 
    2007-Ohio-1010
    , ¶ 19, quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
    Trust Co., 
    339 U.S. 306
    , 314 (1950).
    {¶ 21} "Due process requires that an individual in an administrative proceeding is
    entitled to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal." Serednesky v. Ohio State Bd. of
    Psychology, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-633, 
    2006-Ohio-3146
    , ¶ 21, citing In re Murchison, 349
    No. 16AP-466                                                                                
    7 U.S. 133
    , 136 (1955). "It is well-settled that a reviewing court must presume that the
    decision of an administrative agency is valid and was reached in a sound manner." State
    of W. Va. v. Ohio Waste Facility Approval Bd., 
    28 Ohio St.3d 83
    , 86 (1986). "This
    presumption imposes upon an appellant the burden of proving his or her contention that
    a hearing examiner in a cause was biased, partial or prejudiced to such a degree that the
    hearing examiner's presence adversely affected the board's decision." Althof at ¶ 35.
    {¶ 22} We find no violation of due process because Wightman fully knew what the
    issue was and what he was accused of not doing. He had a full evidentiary hearing to
    develop the facts. No issue of due process is breached by the issues before us.
    {¶ 23} The second assignment of error is overruled.
    VI. Ohio's Sunshine Law was Not Violated
    {¶ 24} The third assignment of error argues that the Commission violated Ohio's
    "Sunshine Law," R.C. 121.22 which requires that public officials, when meeting to
    consider official business, conduct those meetings in public.
    {¶ 25} R.C. 121.22 reads: "This section shall be liberally construed to require public
    officials to take official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only
    in open meetings unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law."             R.C.
    121.22(A). The term "meeting" in the "Sunshine Law" has a different meaning then the
    term "hearing." "Therefore, even though a public body must open all its meetings to the
    public, there is a category of gatherings, called 'hearings,' which do not have to be public."
    TBC Westlake v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    81 Ohio St.3d 58
    , 61 (1998), quoting In re
    Petition for Annexation of 162.631 Acres, 
    52 Ohio App.3d 8
     (10th Dist.1988). When
    administrative agencies are discharging their adjudication duties, conducting hearings in
    the nature of a legal proceeding, providing notice and an opportunity to introduce
    testimony through witnesses, with the opportunity to appeal to courts, then these bodies
    are quasi-judicial. See 
    id.
     Therefore "the Sunshine Law does not apply to adjudications of
    disputes in quasi-judicial proceedings." 
    Id.
     at 62
    {¶ 26} We find no violation of R.C. 121.22. State professional licensing boards are
    considered quasi-judicial and can conduct their deliberations without violating R.C.
    121.22. See TBC Westlake and State ex rel. Ross v. Crawford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
    125 Ohio St.3d 438
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2167
    .
    No. 16AP-466                                                                       8
    {¶ 27} The third assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶ 28} All four assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the
    common pleas court affirming the adjudication of the Ohio Real Estate Commission is
    affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    KLATT and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16AP-466

Judges: Tyack

Filed Date: 3/2/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/2/2017