DJL, Inc. v. Massingille ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as DJL, Inc. v. Massingille, 2011-Ohio-6281.]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 96644
    DJL, INC. D.B.A. COUNTRY LAKES
    PARTY CENTER
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    SUSAN MASSINGILLE, ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Parma Municipal Court
    Case No. 10 CV 102637
    BEFORE: Kilbane, A.J., Blackmon, J., and S. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:               December 8, 2011
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
    Nate N. Malek
    Law Office of Nate N. Malek, LLC
    29025 Bolingbrook Road
    Cleveland, Ohio 44124
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Neal M. Jamison
    1 Berea Commons
    Suite 216
    Berea, Ohio 44017
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J.:
    {¶ 1} Defendants-appellants, Susan and Darrell Massingille, appeal from the orders of
    the trial court that entered a default judgment against them and denied their motion to vacate
    that judgment.   For the reasons set forth below, we affirm both orders.
    {¶ 2} On July 8, 2010, plaintiff-appellee, Country Lakes Party Center (“Country
    Lakes”), filed a small claims complaint against defendants for $1,676 for breach of contract
    for a wedding reception.      The summons advised defendants that the hearing would be held
    1
    on the matter on August 10, 2010, and further advised them that pursuant to R.C. 1925.05 a
    default judgment may be entered against them if they failed to appear.         The summons
    additionally indicated that if defendants had a claim against the plaintiff, they must file a
    counterclaim at least seven days before the trial date.
    1
    This amount was derived from a contract provision specifying that
    liquidated damages in the amount of $2,876 would be due if the event was cancelled
    within three months of the agreed-upon date, less two $600 deposits. The record
    additionally reflects that defendants made other nonrefundable payments for a
    gazebo rental and for a horse and carriage.
    {¶ 3} On August 6, 2010, defendants’ attorney filed a motion to continue the matter
    2
    and an “answer and counterclaim” which stated:
    “Defendants * * * move this Honorable Court to transfer the within matter to
    the regular docket and off the small claims docket because Defendants’ prayer
    on their counterclaim exceeds the small claims jurisdictional amount.”
    {¶ 4} In defendants’ answer and counterclaim filed on August 6, 2010, they denied
    liability and alleged that plaintiff breached a contract for a right of first refusal to use a larger
    banquet hall at Country Lakes.     Defendants prayed for damages in the amount of $7,950, an
    amount beyond the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court.        The court did not rule on
    the motion prior to hearing.
    {¶ 5} Defendants failed to appear for trial before a magistrate on August 10, 2010.
    Plaintiff presented evidence, and judgment was entered against defendants in the amount of
    $1,676.
    {¶ 6} On August 23, 2010, defendants filed objections to the magistrate’s decision in
    which they maintained that the court, in its discretion, should have deemed the counterclaim to
    be timely filed because defendants were initially unrepresented by counsel.                 Defendants
    additionally maintained that the matter should be transferred to the court’s regular docket in
    light of the counterclaim that contained a prayer for damages in excess of the monetary
    The court did not rule on these motions prior to trial so they are deemed
    2
    implicitly denied. State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall, 
    81 Ohio St. 3d 467
    ,
    1998-Ohio-329, 
    692 N.E.2d 198
    .
    jurisdiction of the small claims division of the court.   On December 9, 2010, the trial court
    overruled defendants’ objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopted the magistrate’s
    decision in its entirety.
    {¶ 7} On March 16, 2011, defendants filed a motion for relief from judgment in
    which they asserted that, as pro se litigants, they had failed to timely file their answer and
    counterclaim through inadvertence and excusable neglect, and that the court was required to
    transfer the matter to the court’s general division.   On March 17, 2011, the trial court denied
    the motion to vacate.
    {¶ 8} Defendants now appeal and assign two errors for our review.
    {¶ 9} Defendants’ first assignment of error states:
    “The trial court erred when it failed to allow Defendants to file an answer and
    counterclaim which would have required the case to be transferred out of the
    small claims division.”
    {¶ 10} Within this assignment of error, defendants maintain that the trial court erred in
    failing to transfer this dispute to the court’s general division, in accordance with this court’s
    previous decision in Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Quality Logistics, Inc., Cuyahoga
    App. Nos. 81242 and 81564, 2002-Ohio-7254.
    {¶ 11} Pursuant to R.C. 1925.02(A), a small claims division of a municipal court has
    jurisdiction in civil actions for the recovery of amounts not exceeding three thousand dollars,
    exclusive of interest and costs.    In accordance with R.C. 1925.02(B), if a counterclaim or
    cross-claim exceeds three thousand dollars, the case may be transferred to the regular docket
    of the court.   However, “[a]ny person who files a counterclaim or cross-claim shall file it
    with the small claims division and serve it on all other parties at least seven days prior to the
    date of the trial of the plaintiff’s claim in the original action.”   R.C. 1925.02(C).
    {¶ 12} Further, R.C. 1925.05 provides that the following notice be given to defendants
    in small claims actions:
    “If you believe you have a claim against the plaintiff, you must file a
    counterclaim with the court and must serve the plaintiff and all other parties
    with a copy of the counterclaim at least seven days prior to the date of the
    trial of the plaintiff’s claim.”
    {¶ 13} Municipal court rules for filing counterclaims that track these deadlines are
    permitted.   See Hollis v. Wheeler (May 15, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71547.
    {¶ 14} Pursuant to R.C. 1925.10, however,
    “(A) A civil action that is duly entered on the docket of the small claims
    division shall be transferred to the regular docket of the court upon the
    motion of the court made at any stage of the civil action or by the
    filing of a counterclaim or cross-claim for more than three thousand
    dollars.
    (B) In the discretion of the court, a case duly entered on the docket of the
    small claims division may be transferred to the regular docket of the
    court upon the motion of a party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
    or cross-claim is instituted or upon the motion of a third-party
    defendant. A motion filed under this division shall be accompanied
    by an affidavit stating that a good defense to the claim exists, setting
    forth the grounds of the defense, and setting forth the compliance of
    the party or third-party defendant with any terms fixed by the court.
    The failure to file a motion under this division to transfer a case to the
    regular docket of the court constitutes a waiver by the party or
    third-party defendant of any right to a trial by jury.”         (Emphasis
    added.)
    {¶ 15} In this matter, defendants maintain that the matter should have been transferred
    since they filed a motion to transfer that complied with R.C. 1925.10.       We note, however,
    that defendants did not file a motion to transfer, and did not file an affidavit indicating that a
    good defense to the claim exists and setting forth the grounds of the defense.             Rather,
    defendants indicated in a document entitled answer and counterclaim, that the basis of the
    requested transfer was that “[d]efendants prayer on their counterclaim exceeds the small
    claims jurisdictional amount.”     Accordingly, we conclude that the basis of the motion to
    transfer was the counterclaim and not the provisions of R.C. 1925.10, so the time limits of
    R.C. 1925.02(C) were applicable.      Further, because the counterclaim was not filed seven days
    prior to the date of the trial, transfer was properly denied.
    {¶ 16} In Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co. Inc., the defendant filed motions to transfer the
    cases to the municipal court’s regular docket and for discovery two months prior to trial.
    This court observed that defendant complied with the requirements of R.C. 1925.10, and the
    defendant’s motion to transfer the case to the regular docket set forth averments regarding
    several good defenses.     This court held that the case should have been transferred to the
    municipal court’s general civil docket because the case involved novel issues of law and that
    defendant was entitled to discovery mechanisms not ordinarily available in small claims court.
    Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. is therefore clearly distinguishable from this matter that
    simply asserted the untimely counterclaim as the basis for the transfer.
    {¶ 17} The first assignment of error is without merit.
    {¶ 18} Defendants’ second assignment of error states:
    “The trial court erred when it failed to allow Defendants to file an answer and
    counterclaim which would have required the case to be transferred out of the
    small claims division.”
    {¶ 19} Within this assignment of error, defendants maintain that the trial court erred in
    denying their motion for relief from judgment.
    {¶ 20} A trial court is vested with discretion in determining whether to grant a motion
    for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), and that court’s ruling will not be disturbed on
    appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 
    33 Ohio St. 3d 75
    ,
    
    514 N.E.2d 1122
    .
    {¶ 21} Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B),
    “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
    his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the
    following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
    (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
    discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud
    (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
    other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied,
    released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
    reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
    should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief
    from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
    for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order
    or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (B) does
    not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.”
    {¶ 22} To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must
    demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted;
    (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through
    (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are
    Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding
    was entered or taken. GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries (1976), 
    47 Ohio St. 2d 146
    ,
    
    351 N.E.2d 113
    , paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶ 23} Defendants maintain that they are entitled to relief from judgment on the basis
    of excusable neglect and/ or inadvertence since they initially were pro se litigants and did not
    know of the requirements for filing an answer and counterclaim.        Pro se litigants are held to
    the same rules, procedures, and standards as litigants represented by counsel. State ex rel.
    Fuller v. Mengel, 
    100 Ohio St. 3d 352
    , 2003-Ohio-6448, 
    800 N.E.2d 25
    ; Sabouri v. Ohio Dept.
    of Job & Family Serv. (2001), 
    145 Ohio App. 3d 651
    , 
    763 N.E.2d 1238
    .
    {¶ 24} Therefore, courts generally do not permit pro se litigants who are careless or
    unfamiliar with the legal system to use Civ.R. 60(B)(1) to obtain relief from judgment.
    Dayton Power & Light v. Holdren, Highland App. No.         07CA21,
    {¶ 25} 2008-Ohio-5121, citations omitted.      Further, small claims courts have been
    created in part to provide pro se litigants with a forum. Hundley v. Vectren Energy Delivery
    Of Ohio, Inc., Montgomery App. No. 19870, 2003-Ohio-6237.
    {¶ 26} Moreover, defendants were represented by counsel as of the date of trial but did
    not appear, even though their motion to continue had not been ruled upon.
    {¶ 27} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in
    denying the motion for relief from judgment.         The second assignment of error is without
    merit.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
    PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., and
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96644

Judges: Kilbane

Filed Date: 12/8/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014