State ex rel. Agosto v. Gallagher , 2011 Ohio 4514 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Agosto v. Gallagher, 
    2011-Ohio-4514
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 96670
    STATE OF OHIO EX REL.
    JOSE AGOSTO
    RELATOR
    vs.
    JUDGE HOLLIE L. GALLAGHER, ET AL.
    RESPONDENTS
    JUDGMENT:
    WRITS DENIED
    Writ of Mandamus and/or Procedendo
    Motion No. 444365
    Order No. 446666
    2
    RELEASE DATE:         September 2, 2011
    FOR RELATOR
    Jose Agosto, Pro Se
    Mansfield Correctional Institution
    Inmate No. 493-626
    Post Office Box 788
    Mansfield, Ohio 44901
    ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: James E. Moss
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    8th Floor Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    MARY J.     BOYLE, J.:
    {¶ 1} Relator, Jose Agosto, Jr., 1 is the defendant in State v. Agosto,
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-455886, which has
    been assigned to respondent judge. 2 The grand jury issued a three-count
    indictment. The state nolled one count, and the jury found him guilty of the
    1
    The caption of relator’s complaint stated his name as “Jose Agusto, Jr.” By
    separate order, this court instructed the clerk to correct the caption to reflect the
    proper spelling of relator’s last name as “Agosto.”
    2
    Agosto has also named the “Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas” as a
    respondent.
    3
    two remaining counts, murder and felonious assault. The court of common
    pleas issued a sentencing entry on November 3, 2005. This court affirmed
    Agosto’s conviction in State v. Agosto, Cuyahoga App. No. 87283,
    
    2006-Ohio-5011
    , and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Agosto’s appeal as
    not involving any substantial constitutional question. State v. Agosto, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 1414
    , 
    2007-Ohio-2632
    , 
    867 N.E.2d 846
    .
    {¶ 2} In this action, Agosto contends that the November 3, 2005
    sentencing entry is void because: (1) it does not contain a disposition of count
    1; (2) the trial court improperly imposed sentence on allied offenses of similar
    import; and (3) the trial court improperly imposed postrelease control. He
    requests that this court issue a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo
    “compelling the Respondents’ [sic] to cause the Relator to be physically
    brought back before the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to be
    sentenced to a lawful sentence and cause to be rendered and filed as a valid
    final judgment in the Relator’s case sub judice.” Complaint, Ad Damnum
    Clause (capitalization in original).
    {¶ 3} The requirements for mandamus are well established: (1) the
    relator must have a clear legal right to the requested relief; (2) the respondent
    must have a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief; and (3) there
    must be no adequate remedy at law.           Mandamus may compel a court to
    4
    exercise judgment or discharge a function, but it may not control judicial
    discretion, even if that discretion is grossly abused. Additionally, mandamus
    is not a substitute for appeal and does not lie to correct errors and procedural
    irregularities in the course of a case. If the relator has or had an adequate
    remedy, relief in mandamus is precluded — regardless of whether the relator
    used the remedy. State ex rel. Smith v. Fuerst, Cuyahoga App. No. 86118,
    
    2005-Ohio-3829
    , at ¶4.
    {¶ 4} The criteria for relief in procedendo are also well established.   The
    relator must demonstrate: (1) a clear legal right to proceed in the underlying
    matter; and (2) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
    law.    See, e.g., State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 76
    ,
    
    2007-Ohio-2882
    , 
    868 N.E.2d 270
    , at ¶13.
    {¶ 5} Initially, we note that Agosto previously sought — and this court
    denied — relief in mandamus and procedendo regarding the same November
    3, 2005 sentencing entry. He requested “that this court compel respondents
    to ‘cause to be rendered and filed a valid final judgment in the Relator’s
    above-cited criminal case.’ Complaint, ad damnum clause.”            State ex rel.
    Agosto v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga App. No. 90631,
    
    2007-Ohio-6806
    , ¶1, affirmed State ex rel. Agosto v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of
    Common Pleas, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 366
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4607
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 314
     (“Case
    5
    No. 90631”). In Case No. 90631, Agosto complained that the sentencing
    entry was “defective because it does not mention his plea and ‘the entry does
    not set forth the Relator’s verdicts; it sets forth a description of the Relator’s
    verdicts * * *.’   Relator's Brief in Opposition to Respondents’       Motion to
    Dismiss, at 2. Emphasis in original.” Case No. 90631, 
    2007-Ohio-6806
    , ¶2.
    {¶ 6} Although, in Case No. 90631, Agosto asserted a different basis for
    holding that the November 3, 2005 sentencing entry was defective, he
    requested the same relief as he requests in this action. That is, he wants this
    court to compel respondents to issue a final appealable order. Not only did
    this court reject his request for relief in mandamus and/or procedendo, the
    Supreme Court affirmed and held: “Thus, based on [State v. Baker, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 197
    , 
    2008-Ohio-3330
    , 
    893 N.E.2d 163
    ], neither the common pleas court
    nor the judge either refused to render or unduly delayed rendering a judgment
    in the criminal case, and Agosto is thus not entitled to the requested
    extraordinary relief in mandamus and procedendo.” 
    2008-Ohio-4607
    , ¶10.
    Additionally, the Supreme Court held that Agosto had an adequate remedy by
    way of appeal. “In fact, Agosto has already exercised his right to appeal the
    judgment in the criminal case, albeit unsuccessfully, and he could have raised
    his present claims in that appeal.” Id., ¶12 (citation deleted).
    6
    {¶ 7} In light of the Supreme Court’s prior determination in Agosto’s
    appeal of this court’s decision in Case No. 90631, we must hold that res
    judicata bars this action.
    {¶ 8} Agosto also erroneously argues that the absence of the state’s nolle
    from the sentencing entry is a defect. The trial court is not required to state
    the means of exoneration in the sentencing entry. See State v. Robinson,
    Cuyahoga App. No. 90731, 
    2008-Ohio-5580
    , ¶18.           This ground does not
    provide a basis for relief in mandamus or procedendo. See State ex rel. Davis
    v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 29
    , 
    2010-Ohio-4728
    ,
    
    936 N.E.2d 41
    .
    {¶ 9} Agosto also contends that the trial court improperly imposed
    sentence on allied offenses of similar import. “[A]llied offense claims and
    sentencing issues are not jurisdictional. Thus, they are properly addressed
    on appeal and not through an extraordinary writ.” State ex rel. Martin v.
    Russo, Cuyahoga App. No. 96328, 
    2011-Ohio-3268
    , ¶8 (citations deleted). We
    must, therefore, hold that Agosto’s contention that he was improperly
    sentenced on allied offenses does not provide a basis for relief in mandamus
    and/or procedendo.
    {¶ 10} Likewise, his argument that the sentencing entry is void because
    the court of common pleas improperly imposed postrelease control is not well
    7
    taken. The November 3, 2005 sentencing entry stated: “Post release control
    is part of this prison sentence for the maximum time allowed for the above
    felony(s) under R.C. 2967.28.” In State ex rel. Shepherd v. Astrab, Cuyahoga
    App. No. 96511, 
    2011-Ohio-2938
    , the sentencing entry included comparable
    language regarding “‘the maximum period allowed.’”          Id.   at ¶3.    In
    Shepherd, we denied the request for relief in mandamus and/or procedendo
    and held that the language of the sentencing entry provided sufficient notice
    that postrelease control was part of the sentence. That is, the relator had an
    adequate remedy by way of appeal. In this action, we must reach the same
    conclusion and hold that Agosto had sufficient notice that postrelease control
    was part of his sentence and had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise
    any purported errors.
    {¶ 11} Accordingly, respondents’ motion for summary judgment is
    granted. Relator to pay costs. The clerk is directed to serve upon the parties
    notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).
    {¶ 12} Writs denied.
    _______________________________
    MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and
    MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR