Williams v. State ( 2011 )

[Cite as Williams v. State, 2011-Ohio-4118.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Nos. 96038, 96039, and 96040
RICARDO L. WILLIAMS, ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
vs.
STATE OF OHIO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CV-667345, CV-648777, and CV-655465
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 18, 2011
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Daniel T. Van
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
By: Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
Suite 200
310 Lakeside Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio, in a consolidated appeal, appeals the trial courts’ decisions to
deem Samual Dan’s, Randall Laraway’s, and Ricardo Williams’s (collectively “appellees”)
reclassification under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”) unconstitutional in each of their
respective cases pursuant to State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d
753. For the following reasons, we affirm the decisions of the trial courts.
{¶ 2} Dan and Laraway were convicted, in sister states, of crimes substantially similar
to Ohio sex offenses. Both were required to register as sex offenders upon residing in Ohio
and did so under Megan’s law — ultimately replaced by the AWA. Their registration duties
arose by operation of law. Williams was convicted of rape and felonious assault with
specifications in Cuyahoga County; however, Williams was never adjudicated a sexually
oriented offender. Therefore, there is no prior judicial order requiring Williams to register.
His registration requirements likewise arose by operation of law. Upon enacting the AWA,
the Attorney General reclassified the appellees into the AWA tier system.
{¶ 3} The appellees filed separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of the
reclassification and asking the trial courts to restore the registration requirements that applied
pursuant to Megan’s law. During the pendency of their challenges, the Ohio Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Bodyke, holding that the reclassification provisions of R.C. 2950.031
and 2950.032, authorizing the Ohio Attorney General to reclassify sex offenders, violates the
separation of powers doctrine as it impermissibly permits the executive branch to review and
alter past decisions of the judicial branch. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d at paragraphs two and
three of the syllabus. The Ohio Supreme Court’s remedy to the constitutional violation was to
completely sever the offending provisions from the statute.
{¶ 4} The question presented by the current consolidated appeal is whether the act of
severing the reclassification provision affects all offenders reclassified by the Ohio Attorney
General regardless of the means in which their registration requirements arose. The trial
courts, all answering that question in the affirmative, granted the appellees’ respective petitions
and restored their registration requirements as under Megan’s law. It is from these decisions
that the state appealed, raising one assignment of error.
{¶ 5} The state’s sole assignment of error, identical in all three appeals, provides as
follows: “The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who was not classified under Megan’s law by an Ohio court
because under these circumstances there is no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.”
The state presents a question of law, the disposition of which hinges on the interpretation of
Bodyke. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield,
117 Ohio St.3d 352, 359, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12. De novo appellate review means
that a court of appeals independently reviews the record and affords no deference to a trial
court’s decision. BP Communications Alaska, Inc. v. Cent. Collection Agency (2000), 136
Ohio App.3d 807, 812, 737 N.E.2d 1050.
{¶ 6} Essentially, the state asks this court to deem the rationale behind the Bodyke
decision as controlling the outcome of the current appeals. We must decline such a request
and adhere to the effects of the remedy in Bodyke of severing a constitutionally infirm
provision. Accordingly, and based on recent precedent, we overrule the state’s sole
assignment of error. Hannah, et al. v. Ohio, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95883, 95884, 95886,
95887, 95888, and 95889, 2011-Ohio-2930, and Speight v. State, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 96041,
96042, 96043, 96044, and 96405, 2011-Ohio-2933.
{¶ 7} The legal issue in Hannah and Speight was identical to the current appeal:
whether the decision in Bodyke applies to circumstances where the reclassification did not alter
a previous judicial decision. In both cases, the sex offenders’ registration requirements arose
by operation of law and the Ohio Attorney General reclassified the offenders. The state argued
that the Ohio Supreme Court found the reclassification provision of the AWA unconstitutional
based on a separation-of-powers issue. According to the state, it therefore must follow that if
separation of powers is not an issue for a particular offender — i.e., the offender’s registration
requirements arose as an operation of law rather than by judicial decree — then the holding in
Bodyke is inapplicable.
{¶ 8} “We recognize[d] that the state raise[d] a conceivably correct interpretation of
Bodyke and that the language of Bodyke appears to limit its separation-of-powers holding to
judicially classified sex offenders and not those sex offenders classified by operation of law.
However, the remedy of Bodyke was complete and included total severance of the provisions
providing for the attorney general’s authority to reclassify sex offenders.” Id. at ¶ 28. This
district, therefore, determined that the remedy from Bodyke controlled the answer to the
question presented rather than the rationale behind the decision. Id.; Speight,
2011-Ohio-2933, ¶ 15-16; see, also, State v. Ortega-Martinez, Cuyahoga App. No. 95656,
2011-Ohio-2540 (holding that the decision in Bodyke applies to out-of-state offenders).
{¶ 9} We accordingly overrule the state’s sole assignment of error. Our precedent is
controlling. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Bodyke to sever the reclassification
provisions divested the Attorney General of authority to reclassify appellees regardless of
whether their previous registration requirements arose by judicial order or by operation of law.
{¶ 10} The decisions of the trial courts are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR