State v. Holland ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Holland, 2017-Ohio-921.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2016CA00111
LATRICE N. HOLLAND :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Canton Municipal
Court, Case No. 2016 TRC 0871
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 13, 2017
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
TASHA FORCHIONE ANTHONY KOUKOUTAS
Canton City Prosecutor’s Office 116 Cleveland Avenue North
218 Cleveland Avenue S.W. Suite 808
Canton, OH 44702 Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00111 2
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant appeals the trial court’s May 18, 2016 judgment entry of the
Canton Municipal Court overruling his motion to suppress. Appellee is the State of Ohio.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On February 5, 2016 appellant Latrice Holland was arrested and charged
with one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, no seat belt, and a
marked lanes violation. On March 28, 2016, appellant filed a motion to suppress and
argued there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion for the officer to stop the vehicle.
Further, that there was no probable cause to arrest appellant for OVI.
{¶3} The trial court held a suppression hearing on May 9, 2016. Appellee
presented the testimony of Trooper Carlos Castellanos (“Castellanos”). Castellanos is a
trooper with the Ohio State Highway Patrol who works the night shift and was working the
night shift on February 5, 2016. At 11:40 p.m. on that night, Castellanos was working
with his coach and initiated a traffic stop after he saw a dark purple car, driven by
appellant, commit marked lanes violations. He testified the car went over the right white
fog line by approximately one-half of a tire width and then went back in its lane again.
Castellanos stated that it was more than just riding the line.
{¶4} Castellanos stated the area where he observed the violations had lights and
it was a dry on the road. Further, that it was a two lane road with marked pavement,
marked fog lines, and a double yellow line. He testified there was nothing obstructing his
view of appellant’s vehicle as her vehicle and his vehicle were the only vehicles on the
road at that time.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00111 3
{¶5} Exhibit 1, the video from Castellanos’ car, was introduced into evidence by
appellee. Castellanos testified the first violation was for the car traveling over the fog line
and, in watching the video, he observed appellant commit a second marked lanes
violation when the left tire travels over the yellow line.
{¶6} On cross-examination, Castellanos testified he was coming over a hill when
the fog lines began on the road and that is when he observed the marked lines violation.
Further, that he was approximately ten car lengths away from appellant’s vehicle when
he observed the violation, but he sped up to get a closer look. Castellanos confirmed
appellant’s vehicle was not completely over the fog line, but was about half of a tire width
over the line.
{¶7} On re-direct, Castellanos testified when he observed the violation, he could
see the fog line. Further, that the distance between him and appellant’s vehicle did not
affect his observation of the violation as it was a clear night and he could see the violation.
{¶8} The trial court issued a judgment entry on May 18, 2016 overruling
appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court noted that, in the video, appellant’s tire
was to the left of the center line. The trial court found there was reasonable suspicion for
the stop of appellant’s vehicle based upon the trooper’s observation of appellant’s vehicle
crossing the white fog line and riding the yellow center line, including to the left of the
center line.
{¶9} Appellant pled no contest to the charges. The trial court found her guilty
and sentenced her accordingly.
{¶10} Appellant appeals the May 18, 2016 judgment entry of the Canton Municipal
Court overruling her motion to suppress and assigns the following as error:
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00111 4
{¶11} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
{¶12} In her sole assignment of error, appellant cites as error the trial court’s
decision to overrule her motion to suppress. Specifically, she contends the trooper did
not have a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that she was not traveling
within the marked lanes for travel.
{¶13} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s findings of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio
St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed
to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio
App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 726 (4th Dist. 1993). Finally, assuming the trial court’s findings of
fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly identified the
law to be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the
ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim,
an appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court’s
conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case.
State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 641 N.E.2d 1172 (8th Dist. 1994); State v. Laizure,
5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2015 AP 10 0056, 2016-Ohio-3252. As a general matter,
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo
on appeal. Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00111 5
{¶14} Before a law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle, the officer must have
a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that an occupant is or
has been engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.E.2d
889 (1968). If an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, including a
traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulate suspicion considering all the
circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid. State v. Adams, 5th Dist. Licking
No. 15 CA 6, 2015-Ohio-3786, quoting State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-
4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204.
{¶15} R.C. 4511.33(A) provides, in pertinent part: “Whenever any roadway has
been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic * * * a vehicle * * * shall be
driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall
not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such
movement can be made with safety.”
{¶16} According to appellant, Castellanos had no reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop the vehicle she was driving because she travelled within the single lane
as required by R.C. 4511.33. Appellant cites this Court’s decision in State v. Marcum,
5th Dist. Licking No. 12-CA-88, 2013-Ohio-2652, and argues this case is analogous to
the Marcum case.
{¶17} In Marcum, the trooper conducted a traffic stop of the appellee’s vehicle and
testified he saw the vehicle go over the solid white fog line on the right and then over the
double yellow line on the left. Id. However, the trial court, after reviewing the video, stated
it was not convinced the appellee drove completely over the white line and that while
appellee did drive on the white line, driving on the white line was not a violation of R.C.
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00111 6
4511.33. Id. The trial court further found the appellee did not completely cross over the
double yellow line and, therefore, there was no violation of R.C. 4511.33. Id. We held
that, due to the trial court’s factual determinations that the appellee drove on the white
line, not over it, and drove on the double yellow line, not over it, the trial court did not err
in finding the trooper did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the
appellee. Id.{¶18} However, we find the instant case to be distinguishable from Marcum.
Unlike in Marcum, the trial court in this case considered the testimony of Castellanos,
reviewed the videotape, and made the factual determination that appellant’s vehicle
crossed the white fog line and rode the yellow center line, including to the left of the center
line.
{¶19} The trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 797 N.E.2d 71 (2003). The
fundamental rule that the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses are
primarily for the trier of fact applies to suppression hearings as well as trials. State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, we must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
{¶20} In review of the videotape, at the point where Castellanos stated he
observed appellant go over the right fog line, the video is blurry and not clear. However,
the video where Castellanos observed appellant riding the center line is clear and it
appears that appellant’s tire was to the left of the center line. Here, Castellanos, the only
witness at the hearing, provided consistent and unrebutted testimony that he observed
appellant’s tire cross the fog line by half a tire width and that appellant was riding the
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00111 7
yellow center line, including to the left of the center line. He described appellant’s going
over the fog line as more than riding the line.
{¶21} Castellanos was cross-examined and confirmed there was nothing
obstructing his view of appellant’s vehicle as her vehicle and his vehicle were the only
vehicles on the road at that time. Castellanos further testified that while he was
approximately ten car lengths away from the car when he observed the fog line violation,
he could see the fog line at that point and the distance between him and appellant’s
vehicle did not affect his observation of the violation as it was a clear night and he could
see the violation. The trooper’s testimony and the portion of the video as to the center
lane violation represents competent and credible evidence that appellant was not
traveling within the lanes marked for travel. See State v. Landon, 5th Dist. Coshocton
No. 09-CA-0009, 2009-Ohio-6818, State v. Muller, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 12 CAC 11
0080, 2013-Ohio-3438.
{¶22} Reviewing courts should accord deference to the trial court’s decision
concerning the credibility of the witnesses because the trial court has had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections that cannot be
conveyed to us through the written record. Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 523 N.E.2d
846 (1988). “A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply because it holds a
different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted
before the trial court. A finding of an error of law is a legitimate ground for reversal, but a
difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and evidence is not.” Seasons Coal Co.
v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77,461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984); see also State v. DeHass, 10
Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967).
Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00111 8
{¶23} We find the trial court’s factual findings are supported by competent and
credible evidence and, reviewing the traffic stop under the totality of the circumstances,
find the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because the trooper had
a reasonable, articulable suspicion upon which to base the stop of appellant. Appellant’s
assignment of error is overruled. Thus, we affirm the May 18, 2016 judgment entry of the
Canton Municipal Court overruling appellant’s motion to suppress.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Hoffman, J., and
Wise, John, J., concur