State v. Wiley ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Wiley, 
    2011-Ohio-3257
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 95620
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    LARRY WILEY
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-529987
    2
    BEFORE:          Sweeney, P.J., Keough, J., E. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                June 30, 2011
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Brian R. McGraw, Esq.
    1370 Ontario Street, Suite 2000
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason, Esq.
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Anne McDonough, Esq.
    Eighth Floor, Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.:
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Larry Wiley (“defendant”) appeals his 14-year prison
    sentence for two counts of felonious assault.      After reviewing the facts of the case and
    pertinent law, we affirm.
    3
    {¶ 2} On June 7, 2010, defendant pled guilty to two counts of felonious assault, in
    violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which are second degree felonies punishable by between two
    and eight years in prison.   On July 8, 2010, the court sentenced defendant to eight years in
    prison on the first count and six years in prison on the second count, to run consecutively, for
    an aggregate of 14 years in prison.
    {¶ 3} Defendant appeals and raises one assignment of error for our review.
    {¶ 4} “I.    Larry Wiley’s sentence of 14 years was excessive and an abuse of
    discretion.”
    {¶ 5} The Ohio Supreme Court set forth the standard for reviewing felony sentencing
    in State v. Kalish, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 23
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4912
    , 
    896 N.E.2d 124
    .          See, also, State v.
    Foster, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2006-Ohio-856
    , 
    845 N.E.2d 470
    . Kalish, in a plurality decision,
    holds that appellate courts must apply a two-step approach when analyzing alleged error in a
    trial court’s sentencing. “First, they must examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all
    applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is
    clearly and convincingly contrary to law.     If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court’s
    decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at ¶4.     Additionally, in
    State v. Hodge, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2010-Ohio-6320
    , 
    941 N.E.2d 768
    , ¶39, the Ohio Supreme
    Court held that “trial judges are not obligated to engage in judicial fact-finding prior to
    imposing consecutive sentences * * *.”
    4
    {¶ 6} Defendant concedes that his sentence is within the statutory range for second
    degree felonies.    R.C. 2929.14(A)(2).    Defendant argues, however, that the court abused its
    discretion by using the sentence for the assault of the second victim to punish defendant for
    the more severe assault of the first victim.
    {¶ 7} At defendant’s sentencing hearing, it was established that the victims of the
    assaults were a woman and her 11-year-old son, who were walking down a street on the day of
    the offense.   Defendant allegedly jumped out from behind bushes and beat the woman in the
    head and face with a large stick.    When the son tried to defend his mother, who was on the
    ground unconscious, defendant began to beat the boy, breaking two of the boy’s fingers.
    After the assault, the woman received phone calls and letters from defendant, threatening her
    not to prosecute.   As a result of the assault, the woman has trouble sleeping and suffers from
    chronic headaches that, at times, require hospitalization and a “powerful cocktail [of] drugs.”
    The woman continues to fear defendant and is afraid to leave her children at home, “thinking
    he’s going to come back and hurt them.”
    {¶ 8} Defendant, who is mentally ill, stated to the court that he was not taking his
    medication when the assaults occurred, and he has no recollection of the events because he
    “had a blackout” at the time.
    {¶ 9} In sentencing defendant, the court stated that it “considered all relevant
    seriousness and recidivism factors, overriding purposes and principles of felony sentencing
    5
    aimed at protecting the public from future crimes and to punish the defendant.”        The court
    found that defendant had a history of committing violent crimes and had served multiple
    prison terms, including a seven-year sentence for aggravated robbery with a firearm.         The
    court found that, in the instant case, defendant charged at the victim and struck her with a
    large stick, splitting her face open.   Defendant continued to beat her unconscious in front of
    her children, then assaulted the victim’s son after he tried to protect his mother.
    {¶ 10} Upon review, we find that the court acted within its discretion in sentencing
    defendant to the maximum term of eight years in prison for assaulting the woman, to run
    consecutive to six years in prison for assaulting her 11-year-old son.           Defendant’s sole
    assignment of error is overruled.
    It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
    Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's
    conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
    Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Judgment affirmed.
    6
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95620

Judges: Sweeney

Filed Date: 6/30/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014