State v. Williams , 2016 Ohio 7777 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Williams, 
    2016-Ohio-7777
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 103762
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    KENNETH WILLIAMS
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    VACATED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-15-593079-A
    BEFORE:           Blackmon, J., Stewart, P.J., and Boyle, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                      November 17, 2016
    -i-
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Mark R. Marshall
    P.O. Box 451146
    Westlake, Ohio 44145
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Edward D. Brydle
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    8th Floor Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:
    {¶1} Appellant Kenneth Williams (“Williams”) appeals his conviction for theft
    and assigns the following error for our review:
    The trial court erred in accepting appellant’s no contest plea for theft when
    it was clearly based upon the proffer by the State of Ohio that appellant did
    not knowingly obtain or exert control over property without the consent of
    the owner or person authorized to give consent.
    {¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we vacate William’s
    conviction and order that he be discharged. The apposite facts follow.
    {¶3} Williams was indicted for grand theft pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and
    subsequently entered a no contest plea to the indictment. At the plea hearing, it was
    revealed that Williams defrauded the victim out of $17,000 by attempting to lease him a
    house in which Williams possessed no legal interest and also persuaded the victim to
    invest in a second home in which Williams possessed no legal interest.          After the
    prosecutor stated the facts supporting the indictment, Williams’s counsel informed the
    trial court that “we’ll stipulate to the finding.” (Tr. 35). The trial court subsequently
    found Williams guilty of grand theft.         The trial court ordered Williams to pay
    restitution to the victim and sentenced Williams to 15 months in prison.
    Trial Court Erred by Accepting No Contest Plea
    {¶4} In his sole assigned error, Williams contends that the trial court erred by
    accepting his no contest plea because the state’s recitation of the facts eliminated the
    element of “without consent” needed for theft pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).
    {¶5} A felony no contest plea differs from a misdemeanor plea because a felony
    plea does not require that a statement of facts be presented prior to the court accepting the
    plea. State v. Magone, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-94, 
    2016-Ohio-7100
    , ¶ 45. Instead,
    in a felony “[t]he plea of no contest is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an
    admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint.”
    Crim.R. 11(B)(2).        “[W]here the indictment, information, or complaint contains
    sufficient allegations to state a felony offense and the defendant pleads no contest, the
    court must find the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Bird, 
    81 Ohio St.3d 582
    , 584, 
    692 N.E.2d 1013
     (1998). “[B]y pleading no contest to the indictment,” a
    defendant “is foreclosed from challenging the factual merits of the underlying charge.”
    
    Id.
    {¶6} Williams was indicted for theft pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), which
    provides:
    (A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services,
    shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services
    in any of the following ways:
    (1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent;
    {¶7} By pleading no contest, Williams admitted to the truth of the facts alleged
    in his indictment. In the instant case, Williams’s indictment mirrored the elements set
    forth in R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).     Therefore, because his indictment contained sufficient
    allegations to state a felony, according to Bird, the trial court was obligated to find him
    guilty of the offense.
    {¶8} However, several appellate districts have recognized in dicta an exception
    to Bird where the state presents a statement of facts in a felony no contest plea that
    positively eliminates the existence of an essential element of the offense charged in the
    indictment. These districts have concluded that the trial court errs in making a finding of
    guilt under these circumstances.       See State v. Campbell, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
    C-140372, 
    2015-Ohio-1464
    , ¶ 18; State v. Cooper, 
    168 Ohio App.3d 378
    ,
    
    2006-Ohio-4004
    , 
    860 N.E.2d 135
    , ¶ 6 (2d Dist.); State v. Mullen, 
    191 Ohio App.3d 788
    ,
    
    2011-Ohio-37
    , 
    947 N.E.2d 762
     (3d Dist.); State v. Stepp, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3328,
    
    2010-Ohio-3540
    , ¶ 34; State v. Brown, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1183, 
    2009-Ohio-513
    , ¶
    11; State v. Blair, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2012-P-0145, 
    2013-Ohio-3477
    , ¶ 21; State v.
    Watson, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA20007-04-020, 
    2008-Ohio-629
    , ¶ 9.
    {¶9} The Ohio Supreme Court has not yet addressed this situation, and the Eighth
    District has not yet ruled on a similar case since the Supreme Court decided Bird.      Prior
    to Bird, this court in State v. Mehozonek, 
    8 Ohio App.3d 271
    , 
    456 N.E.2d 1353
     (8th
    Dist.1983), addressing a similar situation in a felony no contest plea held, “[w]here the
    facts presented to the trial court unequivocally negate an essential element of the offense
    charged in the indictment, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to accept the no contest
    plea of the defendant.” Id. at 273-274, citing State v. Cohen, 
    60 Ohio App.2d 182
    , 
    396 N.E.2d 235
     (1st Dist.1978).        In Mehozonek, this court reversed the defendant’s
    conviction and vacated the plea after concluding it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
    court to accept the defendant’s plea to a felony based on the facts presented by the
    prosecutor.
    {¶10} The recent cases from this district cited by the state in its appellate brief are
    not cases in which the prosecutor set forth facts in which an element of the indicted
    offense has been absolutely negated. See State v. Newrones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    97216, 
    2012-Ohio-710
     (indictment and facts were the same); State v. Baumgartner, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 89190, 91207, and 91208, 
    2009-Ohio-624
     (although defendant
    argued state’s proffers were insufficient to establish the offense, the opinion does not
    reveal that the evidence positively negated an element of the offense); State v. Cameron,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85141, 
    2005-Ohio-2831
     (evidence did not positively negate an
    essential element of the offense).
    {¶11} We agree that there is an exception to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bird.
    When the trial court asks for the recitation of the facts underlying a no contest plea to a
    felony charge and those facts negate the existence of an essential element of the offense
    charged, the trial court errs in making a finding of guilt.
    {¶12} Here, after Williams entered his no contest plea, the trial court elicited facts
    from the prosecutor prior to accepting the plea. The facts as set forth by the prosecutor
    indicated that the victim willingly gave Williams his money, but under the false pretense
    that he believed that Williams owned the properties. Thus, Williams, in fact, received
    the money with the victim’s consent.      Because “without consent” is an element of R.C.
    2913.02(A)(1), the trial court erred by making a finding of guilt. Accordingly, Williams’s
    assigned error is sustained.
    {¶13} Williams’s conviction is vacated, and he is ordered discharged.
    It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of
    Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE
    MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and
    MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR