Northwest State Community College v. Northwest State Community College Edn. Assn. OEA/NEA , 2016 Ohio 8393 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as Northwest State Community College v. Northwest State Community College Edn. Assn.
    OEA/NEA, 2016-Ohio-8393.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    HENRY COUNTY
    NORTHWEST STATE
    COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,                                     CASE NO. 7-16-11
    v.
    NORTHWEST STATE
    COMMUNITY COLLEGE EDUCATION                                      OPINION
    ASSOCIATION, OEA/NEA,
    DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
    Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 15-CV-0081
    Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded
    Date of Decision: December 27, 2016
    APPEARANCES:
    Rory P. Callahan for Appellant
    Donato S. Iorio and Edward J. Stechschulte for Appellee
    Case No. 7-16-11
    SHAW, P.J.
    {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Northwest State Community College (“the
    College”), brings this appeal from the November 6, 2015, judgment of the Henry
    County Common Pleas Court confirming an arbitrator’s award to defendant-
    appellee Northwest State Community College Education Association OEA/NEA
    (“the Union”). The College also appeals the July 14, 2016, judgment of the Henry
    County Common Pleas Court awarding attorney’s fees to the Union based on the
    College’s breach of the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).
    I.     Relevant Facts and Procedural History
    a. Introduction
    {¶2} The parties in this case, the College and the Union, entered into a CBA
    titled “School Support Personnel Agreement,” which was effective from July 1,
    2011, through June 30, 2015.
    {¶3} On July 31, 2014, the Union filed a grievance pursuant to the CBA,
    claiming that the College violated the CBA by unilaterally eliminating the position
    of Associate Director of Financial Aid, a union position, and transferring the duties
    of that position to the newly created position of “Assistant Director of Financial
    Aid,” a non-union position. Per the CBA, the matter proceeded to arbitration on
    February 10, 2015.
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    b. The Arbitration Hearing
    {¶4} At the arbitration hearing, four witnesses provided testimony to the
    arbitrator.1 Amber Yokum testified that beginning in 2010 she worked as the
    Associate Director of Financial Aid for the College. Yokum testified that the
    Associate Director of Financial Aid position was a union position.2
    {¶5} Yokum testified that in December of 2013, she was promoted from her
    position as Associate Director of Financial Aid to Interim Director of Financial Aid.
    Yokum testified that a person then filled her old position as Associate Director of
    Financial Aid on an interim basis. Yokum testified that the person filling her old
    job on an interim basis left the College five or six months later, and the position of
    Associate Director of Financial Aid thereafter went unfilled.
    {¶6} Yokum testified that in her new position she worked with Kathryn
    Soards to create the position of Assistant Director of Financial Aid at the College,
    which caused the primary issue between the parties.
    1
    We will provide a brief summary of the pertinent testimony of the witnesses; however, the witness testimony
    will be provided slightly out of order for ease of understanding.
    2
    Yokum indicated that as her duties expanded in the Associate Director position, she questioned whether the
    position should have been in the union and covered by the CBA. The CBA was said to include Secretaries,
    Assistant Librarians, Custodians, Switchboard Operators, Receptionists, Computer Programmers/Lab
    Assistants, Network Technicians, Network Administrators, Computer Programmers and all other School
    Support Personnel; however, the CBA excluded professional, managerial and supervisory employees.
    Yokum felt that over time her position acquired more supervisory and managerial duties. While Yokum
    brought her questions regarding the position’s classification to the attention of various people, including her
    union representative, it is undisputed that nothing was ever done under the CBA by either party to alter, or
    attempt to alter, the classification of the Associate Director position and remove it as a union position.
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    {¶7} Kathryn Soards, the Chief Fiscal and Administrative Officer at the
    College, testified that she was involved with the creation of both the original
    Associate Director of Financial Aid position, which was being effectively
    eliminated by the new position, and the new Assistant Director of Financial Aid
    position. Soards affirmatively testified that the original Associate Director of
    Financial Aid position was a bargaining-unit position covered by the CBA.3
    {¶8} Soards testified that after Yokum was promoted from Associate
    Director of Financial Aid to Interim Director of Financial Aid, the College created
    the position of Assistant Director of Financial Aid.4 Soards testified that with the
    creation of the Assistant Director of Financial Aid position the Associate Director
    position had “probably * * * been eliminated now because we don’t have any
    intentions of filling that position.” (Tr. at 40).
    {¶9} Soards specifically testified and admitted that a portion of the work
    done by the new Assistant Director position was “bargained for work.” (Tr. at 47).
    However, Soards testified that at one point the Union indicated it was fine with the
    3
    The duties for the Associate Director of Financial Aid were enumerated in a job posting, which was included
    in the record. There were eighteen enumerated “essential duties and responsibilities,” which included, inter
    alia, “Responsible for understanding and complying with federal, state and institutional regulations and
    policies,” “Processing of Professional Judgment applications,” “Responsible for Transfer Monitoring to
    award over funding or duplicating funding with other institutions,” “Assist in the preparation of FA nights
    with area high schools,” and “Assists with updating financial aid policies and procedures.” (Union Ex. 1).
    4
    The duties for Assistant Director of Financial Aid were enumerated in a job posting, which was included in
    the record. There were twelve enumerated duties, including, inter alia, “Responsible for overseeing and
    administering the Federal Student Loan Program including the management of the Federal Student Loan
    default prevention program by maintaining the default prevention plan and serving as the point of contract
    [sic] with any outside parties associated with this initiative,” and “Assist the Director of Financial Aid in
    preparing and making presentations at FA nights with area high schools.” (Union Ex. 2).
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    creation of the new position so long as the College reinstated the Associate Director
    position. (Tr. at 65).
    {¶10} Juan Gonzalez also testified at the arbitration hearing. Gonzalez
    testified that he was hired in the position of Assistant Director of Financial Aid after
    it was created and that he held that position as of the date of the arbitration hearing.
    Gonzalez testified that his position was not in the union. During Gonzalez’s
    testimony, the Union had Gonzalez read each of the 18 enumerated duties contained
    in the job description for the old Associate Director of Financial Aid position.
    Gonzalez’s testimony indicated that he performed 16 of the 18 duties of that old
    union job. Gonzalez testified that he would likely be performing the remaining two
    duties of the old union job in the future. (Tr. at 72-77). Thus in Gonzalez’s new,
    non-union position as Assistant Director of Financial Aid, he did all, or almost all,
    of the work that had been done in the old union position of Associate Director of
    Financial Aid.
    {¶11} Jason Rickenberg, co-president of the Union, testified that it was his
    understanding that the Associate Director of Financial Aid union position had been
    unilaterally eliminated and replaced by the College, giving the work to a non-union
    position.   Rickenberg testified that there was a process to change a job’s
    classification in the CBA and it was not used by the College in this case, which is
    why the Union filed its grievance.
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    c. The Arbitrator’s Decision
    {¶12} At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the parties filed closing
    briefs and the matter was submitted to the arbitrator for a decision. The arbitrator
    interpreted the CBA, relying in part on the following portions of the CBA he deemed
    relevant.
    Article XIV: JOB CLASSIFICATIONS
    Classification System
    Each School Support Employee position will be placed within one
    of the columns of the classification system.
    1. There shall be no change in classification unless there is a
    significant change in the job duties.
    2. The Job Audit Committee will evaluate requests for change in
    classification. * * *
    3. A request for a change in classification, based on a significant
    change in job duties may be initiated by an employee, the
    administration, or the NSCC Support Staff Negotiations
    Committee. The Party requesting the change in classification
    shall complete a Position Description Questionnaire (PDQ).
    This is used to collect sufficient information about the position,
    duties, responsibilities, and qualifications in order that an
    appropriate assignment of a classification and corresponding
    pay grade can be made by college personnel. * * *
    4. New support staff positions, unless specifically exempted by
    law, shall be assigned to the bargaining unit if the job
    descriptions specify duties that are performed by unit
    members or which by the nature of the duties should
    reasonably be assigned to the bargaining unit. All new
    position’s job description will be developed by the
    administration and will be bargained by the administration
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    and the Support Staff Negotiations Committee, along with the
    wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment.
    5. Any new classes in the classification system will be bargained
    by the administration and the Support Staff Negotiations
    Committee, along with the wages, hours, terms and conditions
    of employment for said classes.
    ARTICLE XXIX: SUBCONTRACTING
    A. There shall be no subcontracting, subletting or assignment
    outside the bargaining unit for a period exceeding a total of
    sixty (60) days in any twelve (12) month period per
    classification of work performed or which is capable of being
    performed by bargaining unit employees, with the exception
    of positions vacated by employees on leaves of absence per
    Article I (B)(2) or if paragraph B below applies. No supervisor
    or non-bargaining unit employee shall at any time perform
    work performed by, or which could be performed by,
    employees except in case of emergency and then only for a
    limited period of time.
    {¶13} On April 13, 2015, the arbitrator issued a decision finding in favor of
    the Union. The arbitrator reviewed all the issues and arguments, and reasoned, in
    part, as follows.
    By not having previously pursued [the CBA] procedure before
    unilaterally eliminating the Associate Director position and
    directing that some or all of the duties of that former bargaining
    unit position be performed by one or more classified or graded
    employee(s), the College has violated not only Article XIV, Section
    3 but also Article XXIX, Section A, entitled “Bargaining Unit
    Work.” That specific section States: “No supervisor or non-
    bargaining unit employee shall at any time perform work
    performed by, or which could be performed by, employees except
    in case of emergency and then only for a limited time.” (emphasis
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    added)5 Soards did recognize that a portion of the work currently
    assigned to the Assistant Director position is “bargained for
    work.” (Tr. 47). Also, in direct response to this arbitrator’s
    question “Was there an emergency to create the Assistant
    Director position?” Soards responded, “No, it probably wasn’t an
    emergency.” As a result, the College has acted in contravention
    of the limitations recognized for reassigning what has been
    previously recognized by both parties as bargaining unit work to
    one or more non-bargaining unit employee(s).
    (Doc. No. 1, Ex. A).6
    {¶14} The arbitrator’s decision in favor of the Union ultimately “directed”
    the College “to complete the requisite Position Description Questionnaire”
    mentioned in Article XIV, Section 3, and to follow the remainder of the provisions
    outlined in the CBA. The arbitrator did not determine that a new position could not
    be created or that a job classification could not be changed; rather, he merely
    directed the parties to follow CBA procedure.
    d. The College’s Appeal to Henry County
    Common Pleas Court
    {¶15} On July 13, 2015, the College filed an “Application and Motion to
    Vacate Arbitration Award” in the Henry County Common Pleas Court seeking to
    vacate the arbitrator’s decision pursuant to R.C. 2711.10. (Doc. No. 1). The College
    argued, inter alia, that the arbitrator did not follow the CBA, that the arbitrator
    5
    This emphasis was added by the Arbitrator, not this Court.
    6
    The arbitrator ruled on additional issues in his decision as well, such as the timeliness of the grievance filed;
    however, that issue is not raised on appeal and will not be discussed further, particularly given the College’s
    counsel’s statement at oral argument that the College was no longer pursuing that argument.
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    improperly ruled against the College, that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, and
    that the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”) actually had exclusive
    jurisdiction over the matter.
    {¶16} On July 23, 2015, the Union filed a “Cross-Motion/Application to
    Confirm Arbitration Award.” In addition to seeking to confirm the arbitrator’s
    award, the Union additionally requested an award for its attorney’s fees and
    expenses.
    {¶17} Also on July 23, 2015, the Union filed an answer to the College’s
    application to vacate the arbitrator’s award.
    {¶18} On August 20, 2015, the College filed its answer to the Union’s
    motion to confirm the arbitrator’s award.
    {¶19} On September 17, 2015, the Union filed a motion for summary
    judgment seeking to confirm the arbitration award. The Union argued that there
    was no basis under R.C. 2711.10 to overturn the arbitrator’s award and that the
    arbitrator’s award was grounded in the CBA.
    {¶20} On September 17, 2015, the College filed a motion for summary
    judgment seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The College argued that the
    matter should not have gone to arbitration in the first place because SERB had
    exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and that the arbitrator’s decision did not draw
    its essence from the CBA.
    -9-
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    {¶21} Both parties filed responsive briefs and reply briefs related to the
    summary judgment motions.
    {¶22} On November 6, 2015, the trial court filed its judgment entry on the
    matter. (Doc. No. 27). The trial court ultimately ruled in favor of the Union and
    confirmed the arbitrator’s award. The trial court found that SERB did not have
    exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, citing E. Cleveland v. E. Cleveland
    Firefighters Local 500, I.A.F.F., 
    70 Ohio St. 3d 125
    , 128, 1994-Ohio-174, wherein
    the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction
    to resolve charges of unfair labor practices * * * in two general
    areas: (1) where one of the parties files charges with SERB
    alleging an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11; or (2) a
    complaint brought before the court of common pleas alleges
    conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice specifically
    enumerated in R.C. 4117.11, and the trial court therefore
    dismisses the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    The trial court determined that such circumstances giving SERB exclusive
    jurisdiction were not present in this case.
    {¶23} The trial court also determined that “the Arbitrator drew the essence
    of his decision from the [CBA], that it was grounded in applicable law and that the
    facts existed in the record to preclude it from being arbitrary or capricious.” (Doc.
    No. 27).
    {¶24} Finally, the trial court also found that the Union was to be awarded the
    costs of the litigation, including all reasonable attorney’s fees.
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    {¶25} The College then appealed the trial court’s judgment to this Court. On
    December 16, 2015, this Court dismissed the College’s appeal on the basis that the
    issue of attorney’s fees was still outstanding and unresolved and thus any appeal
    was premature.
    {¶26} Following this Court’s dismissal, the Union filed a motion for an
    award of attorney’s fees on February 11, 2016. The Union argued that it should be
    awarded fees based on the College’s breach of the CBA, or, in the alternative, for
    frivolous conduct committed by the College. The Union asserted attorney’s fees in
    the amount of $14,537.50. No affidavits related to the reasonableness and necessity
    of the fees were included; however, the Union attached one short summary of the
    amounts billed and the total amount owed outstanding.7
    {¶27} On June 17, 2016, the College filed a memorandum in opposition to
    the Union’s request for fees. The College argued that a fee award for breach of
    contract was not proper at all in this instance as there was a statutory agreement not
    a “common law contract,” and that there was no frivolous conduct here. The
    College also argued that the fees allegedly incurred were excessive, and that the
    amount of hours allegedly worked was not reasonable. On June 28, 2016, the Union
    filed a reply.
    7
    In a footnote, the Union noted that the hourly rate billed was $125 per hour. The Union contended that the
    prevailing market rate in the region was $225 per hour, though it provided no evidence to support that figure.
    The Union asserted that it spent 116.3 hours on this case at a rate of $125 per hour for a total fee alleged at
    $14,537.50.
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    {¶28} On July 13, 2016, the trial court filed a journal entry indicating that
    there had been a hearing on June 17, 2016, on the matter of attorney’s fees in the
    court’s chambers. No transcript, if one was created at all, was provided to this Court
    of the hearing in the trial court’s chambers. There is no indication from the trial
    court’s entry that any witnesses were called, that any evidence was presented, or
    that any stipulations were entered at that time. (Doc. No. 42).
    {¶29} On July 14, 2016, the trial court filed a judgment entry briefly stating
    the case history then determining that the Union should be awarded attorney’s fees
    for the College’s “breach of contract.” The trial court found that “attorney fees in
    the sum of $14,537.50 are reasonable and are owed by [the College] * * * to the
    [Union].” (Doc. No. 43).
    {¶30} It is from this judgment that the College appeals, asserting the
    following assignments of error for our review.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
    ARBITRATOR PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION
    OVER A REPRESENTATION MATTER THAT WAS WITHIN
    THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE STATE
    EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD UNDER OHIO LAW.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S
    FEES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BASED ON A
    BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY THAT WAS
    INAPPLICABLE IN A MOTION TO VACATE AND
    CONFIRM ARBITRATION.
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    Standard of Reviewing Arbitration Decisions
    {¶31} Ohio law favors and encourages arbitration. St. Marys v. Internal.
    Assn. of Firefighters Local 3633, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-13-29, 2014-Ohio-2575,
    ¶ 25, citing Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn.
    Assn., 
    22 Ohio St. 3d 80
    , 84 (1986). “Consequently, arbitration awards are generally
    presumed valid.” Univ. of Toledo v. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, 6th Dist. Lucas
    No. L–12–1317, 2013–Ohio–2811, ¶ 10, citing Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of
    Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn., 
    49 Ohio St. 3d 129
    , 131 (1990).
    {¶32} Revised Code 2711.10 explicitly limits the trial court’s review of an
    arbitration award to a narrow set of extreme circumstances. It reads,
    In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall
    make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
    party to the arbitration if:
    (A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
    means.
    (B) There was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the
    arbitrators, or any of them.
    (C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
    postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
    to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
    any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
    prejudiced.
    (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
    executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
    subject matter submitted was not made.
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    If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
    required the award to be made has not expired, the court may
    direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
    {¶33} Generally, if the arbitrator’s award is based on the language and
    requirements of the agreement, the arbitrator has not exceeded his powers. See
    Miami Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc.,
    
    81 Ohio St. 3d 269
    , 273 (1998). Moreover, revised code 2711.10(D) is not violated
    if “ ‘the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the collective bargaining
    agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious.’ ” St. 
    Mary’s, supra
    , at ¶ 28,
    quoting 
    Findlay, supra
    at paragraph two of syllabus. An arbitrator’s award draws
    its essence from an agreement when (1) the award does not conflict with the express
    terms of the agreement and (2) the award has rational support or can be rationally
    derived from the terms of the agreement. Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining v.
    Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Assn., Local 11, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, 
    59 Ohio St. 3d 177
    (1991), syllabus. Although there are strict measures in place to review the award of
    arbitration by the trial court, and great deference is given to the arbitration process,
    we review the trial court’s decision to affirm or vacate an arbitrator’s award de novo.
    St. 
    Mary’s, supra
    , at ¶ 29.
    First Assignment of Error
    {¶34} In the College’s first assignment of error, it argues that the trial court
    erred by finding that the arbitrator properly exercised jurisdiction over this case.
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    Specifically, the College contends that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the
    case. The College also argues that the Union failed to prove that the creation of the
    “Assistant Director of Financial Aid” position violated the CBA.
    {¶35} We will deal first with the College’s argument that SERB had
    exclusive jurisdiction over this matter. In support of its argument, the College cites
    Franklin Cty. Law Enf’t Ass’n v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No.
    9, 
    59 Ohio St. 3d 167
    (1991), for the proposition that, “The State Employment
    Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it
    pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117.” Revised Code Chapter 4117 generally covers
    Public Employee Collective Bargaining.
    {¶36} In this case, the trial court directly addressed the College’s argument
    that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction over this matter. In its entry, the trial court
    stated,
    Regarding the College’s position regarding SERB having
    exclusive jurisdiction the case of City of East Cleveland v. East
    Cleveland Firefighters Local 500, IAFF, (1994) 70 Ohio St.[3d]
    125[,] is instructive in defining SERB’s exclusive jurisdiction: [It
    stated SERB has exclusive jurisdiction] (1) “where one of the
    parties files charges with SERB alleging an unfair labor practice
    under Revised Code 4117.11; or (2) a complaint brought before
    the Common Pleas Court alleges conduct that constitutes an
    unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in Revised Code
    4117.11[.]” The facts before this Court would not provide a basis
    for such a determination. * * *
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    {¶37} Notably the decision in East Cleveland Firefighter’s Local was
    decided after the Capital City Lodge No. 9 case cited by the College. Like the
    Supreme Court of Ohio in the (slightly) more recent East Cleveland Firefighter’s
    Local decision, the trial court in this case similarly found that the facts here did not
    warrant SERB having exclusive jurisdiction where unfair labor practices were not
    asserted. We agree with the trial court.
    {¶38} The parties here explicitly bargained in the CBA for a procedure to
    utilize when a job classification was being changed. Although the College attempts
    to categorize this case as one that is not related to job reclassification, we certainly
    cannot find that the arbitrator was entirely without authority to find that this case
    was principally one of a job classification change or of a situation where bargaining
    unit work was being done by a non-bargaining unit position. The College created a
    new job out of the bargaining unit that did all, or nearly all, of the work that had
    been done in the previous bargaining unit position. Thus we cannot find that the
    trial court erred in finding that SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the
    matter. This is particularly true given that the College has provided us with no on-
    point authority that would compel us to do otherwise.
    {¶39} Turning next to the College’s argument that the Union failed to prove
    that the creation of the “Assistant Director of Financial Aid Position” violated the
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    CBA, we again agree with the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s award.
    In analyzing this issue, the trial court held as follows.
    In the instant case the Association[,] in the context of a
    grievance[,] challenged whether the College followed the
    procedure outlined in Article XIV Section 3 of the Collective
    Bargaining Agreement. The Association never claimed that the
    change could not occur, but the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
    Article XIV spelled out the procedure to be followed when a
    bargaining unit position change was to be considered. It was the
    Association’s position and the finding of the Arbitrator that the
    College acted unilaterally to change the bargaining unit position.
    ***
    The Court would conclude that the Arbitrator drew the
    essence of his decision from the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
    that it was grounded in applicable law and that the facts existed
    in the record to preclude it from being arbitrary or capricious.
    (Doc. No. 27).
    {¶40} In this case, evidence from both parties established that the Associate
    Director of Financial Aid position was a bargaining unit position. It was also
    undisputed that the Assistant Director of Financial Aid position was not in the
    bargaining unit. The only testimony in the record indicates that the person hired to
    be the Assistant Director of Financial Aid did essentially all of the old work that
    had been assigned to the Associate Director of Financial Aid. Further, the only
    testimony in the record indicates that the Associate Director of Financial Aid
    position will go unfilled and has “probably” been eliminated.
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    {¶41} Under Article XXIX, Section A, of the CBA, no subcontracting or
    assignment of bargaining unit work was supposed to be done for a period in excess
    of 60 days except in the case of emergency. The only testimony indicated that there
    was no emergency here and that the new job was going to continue to do bargaining
    unit work indefinitely. Based on the evidence presented, we cannot find that the
    trial court erred in determining that the arbitrator’s award drew its essence from the
    CBA.
    {¶42} Finally, we would note that the College’s entire challenge to the
    arbitrator’s decision seems nearly moot given that the CBA’s effective date ended
    June 30, 2015, and presumably all of the jobs the CBA applied to would likely have
    to be renegotiated.    Therefore, the arbitrator’s award ordering the parties to
    negotiate over the bargaining unit work is something that already had to take place.
    {¶43} Nevertheless, even putting the final point aside as it was neither raised
    nor briefed by the parties, we do not find the College’s arguments well-taken for the
    reasons previously stated, and the College’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    Second Assignment of Error
    {¶44} In the College’s second assignment of error, it argues that the trial
    court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to the Union in this case. Specifically, the
    College argues that the “American Rule” generally has each party bear its own
    attorney’s fees absent an express statutory or contractual provision otherwise, that
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    the parties did not have a “common law contract,” and that the trial court
    erroneously relied on cases cited by the Union indicating that this was a breach of
    contract case when those cases were distinguishable.
    {¶45} In the alternative, the College argues that the fee award was excessive
    because the Union would have had to file to confirm its own arbitration award
    anyway, and that similar briefing to the briefing in this case had been done by the
    Union previously in another case, which should have dramatically reduced the
    amount of time spent on this case. The College also argues that the issues in this
    case were relatively straightforward, that they did not require an evidentiary hearing,
    and thus 116.3 hours of allotted time was excessive.
    {¶46} We will deal first with the College’s alternative argument related to
    the amount of the fees, as it is dispositive of this assignment of error.
    {¶47} Generally, “[b]efore awarding attorney fees, a trial court must
    determine the reasonableness of the time spent on the matter and the reasonableness
    of the hourly rate.” Hubbard v. Hubbard, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-08-37, 2009-
    Ohio-2194, ¶ 12, citing Bagnola v. Bagnola, 5th Dist. Stark No.2004CA00151,
    2004-Ohio-7286. “Courts have recognized that merely submitting an attorney’s
    itemized bill is insufficient to establish the reasonableness of the amount of work
    billed.” United Assn. of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting
    Industry v. Jack’s Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing, Inc., 3d Dist. Hardin No.
    -19-
    Case No. 7-16-11
    6-12-06, 2013-Ohio-144, ¶ 24 (citations omitted); see also Inverness v. Maher, 3d
    Dist. Hancock No. 5-15-16, 2015-Ohio-3816, ¶ 72; 
    Hubbard, supra
    , at ¶ 12.
    Evidence must be presented that the hours expended on the case by the attorney
    were necessary and that the rates are comparable to those in the community for
    similar services by attorneys of a similar level of skill. Jack’s Heating at ¶ 20.
    “Although trial court judges may have experience and knowledge regarding the
    setting of fees, they ‘must base the fee determination upon evidence adduced and
    cannot substitute [their] own knowledge for evidence.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Jack’s
    Heating at ¶ 31, quoting In re Wood's Estate, 
    55 Ohio App. 2d 67
    , 75, 
    379 N.E.2d 256
    (10th Dist.1977).
    {¶48} The party requesting attorney’s fees carries the burden of proof to
    show that the request was reasonable. Jack’s Heating at ¶ 22. Trial courts should
    not speculate as to whether the hours were necessary or that the fee itself is
    reasonable. 
    Id. at ¶
    28. We review a trial court’s decision on whether to award
    attorney’s fees under an abuse of discretion standard. Jack’s Heating at ¶ 15
    citing Bittner v. Tri–Cty. Toyota, Inc., 
    58 Ohio St. 3d 143
    , 146 (1991). A trial court
    will be found to have abused its discretion when its decision is contrary to law,
    unreasonable, not supported by the evidence, or grossly unsound. Jack’s Heating
    at ¶ 15 citing State v. Boles, 2d Dist. No. 23037, 2010–Ohio–278, ¶¶ 17–18, citing
    Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.2004).
    -20-
    Case No. 7-16-11
    {¶49} In this case the trial court initially stated in its judgment entry
    confirming the arbitrator’s award that it would award attorney’s fees to the Union.8
    Before the trial court had determined the amount, the reasonableness, and the
    necessity of any fees, the College appealed. This Court dismissed that appeal as
    premature, due to the issue of attorney’s fees still outstanding.
    {¶50} Following this Court’s dismissal, the Union filed for attorney’s fees in
    the amount of $14,537.50 and the College argued against those fees, making the
    same arguments it does now on appeal. As far as the record indicates, the trial court
    did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the record or collect evidence on the matter
    of attorney’s fees before granting the fees in the requested amount.
    {¶51} As no evidentiary hearing was held and no evidentiary materials were
    produced in this case, no actual evidence whatsoever was presented as to the
    reasonableness of the rate charged. No actual evidence whatsoever was presented
    as to the necessity of the amount of time spent. No actual evidence whatsoever was
    presented that the amount of time spent was reasonable. No stipulations were
    presented by the parties that the rates were reasonable and that the hours expended
    were reasonable and necessary. We are merely left with contested allegations made
    by the Union in its motion for fees that its fee-rate was reasonable, and that the
    amount of work done was reasonable and necessary.
    8
    The actual original judgment entry indicated fees would be awarded to the College, but that was corrected
    by a nunc pro tunc entry.
    -21-
    Case No. 7-16-11
    {¶52} In the Union’s motion for fees, there was one exhibit attached that
    contained a table covering approximately one-quarter of a page adding up the total
    hours spent, the bill total, and the balance due. There were no affidavits along with
    this exhibit attesting to the reasonableness and necessity of the work, and there was
    certainly no other testimony attesting to it either by the attorneys who did the work
    or another attorney altogether claiming that the time and rate were both reasonable
    and necessary. This Court has stated that submitting an itemized bill is insufficient
    to establish attorney’s fees, let alone a brief table summary containing no sworn
    evidentiary statements. See Jack’s 
    Heating, supra
    , at ¶ 24; Inverness v. 
    Maher, supra
    , at ¶ 73.
    {¶53} In the absence of any actual evidence presented as to the
    reasonableness and necessity of the fees rather than mere allegations, the trial court
    had to engage in speculation that the fees in this case were reasonable and necessary.
    While the hourly rate itself might seem reasonable, particularly given the
    comparable rates cited by the Union in its motion to the trial court, no actual
    evidence was presented confirming those rates and stating that they were actually
    reasonable.
    {¶54} In sum, the Union produced absolutely no evidence establishing the
    reasonableness and necessity of its fees or the hours spent and the College
    challenged this issue, particularly the amount of hours, both at the trial court level
    -22-
    Case No. 7-16-11
    and to this Court. In order to uphold the trial court’s award of fees, this Court would
    have to improperly speculate that the rate was reasonable and that the amount of
    hours spent was both reasonable and necessary. Thus we have no choice but to
    reverse the trial court’s award of fees to the Union as the amount is simply not
    supported by any actual evidence in the record. Therefore, the College’s second
    assignment of error is sustained.
    {¶55} For the foregoing reasons, the College’s first assignment of error is
    overruled and its second assignment of error is sustained. Therefore, the judgment
    of the Henry County Common Pleas Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part
    and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    Judgment Affirmed in Part,
    Reversed in Part and
    Cause Remanded
    PRESTON and WILLAMOWKSI, J.J., concur.
    /jlr
    -23-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 7-16-11

Citation Numbers: 2016 Ohio 8393

Judges: Shaw

Filed Date: 12/27/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/27/2016