State v. Sefcik ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Sefcik, 2014-Ohio-5792.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 101152
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
KEITH M. SEFCIK
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-13-577620-A
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Jones, P.J., and McCormack, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 31, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
By: Paul Kuzmins
Jeffrey Gamso
Assistant Public Defenders
Courthouse Square Suite 200
310 Lakeside Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Andrew Rogalski
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Justice Center - 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Defendant Keith Sefcik appeals from his conviction for felonious assault following
a bench trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} On August 20, 2013, Sefcik spent the day golfing with his father at a course about
45 minutes away from Sefcik’s house. On the way to the course, Sefcik’s wife Sandra called
Sefcik about her lost car keys. Eventually Sefcik realized he had accidently grabbed her keys,
and Sandra became angry. After finishing the round of golf around 2:00 in the afternoon,
Sefcik and his father enjoyed a beer before driving back to Sefcik’s house. Sefcik was dropped
off without incident, but upon entering the house, an argument occurred between Sefcik and
Sandra. Both argued the other was intoxicated.
{¶3} Sefcik’s version of the argument is as follows. The couple continued arguing about
financial issues and Sandra’s drinking. The argument escalated, and Sefcik decided to leave.
Spending nights in a hotel was a regular occurrence because of the couple’s tumultuous
relationship. Sefcik attempted to take Sandra’s car because it blocked his in the driveway.
Sandra preferred otherwise. Another disagreement erupted, and Sefcik went to get his car,
which would not start. Sandra called her father to come and help get Sefcik’s car started, and
the couple went back into the house to wait. Sefcik made a sandwich and used a sharp kitchen
knife in its preparation.
{¶4} Sandra’s father testified that when he arrived, everyone was in the living room when
he entered the house. He attempted small talk, but Sandra asked if he could get to the car and
let the couple finish discussing some things. Sandra’s father did not notice any marks on
Sandra’s face. Sandra’s father got Sefcik’s car started, and Sefcik left, driving to a Speedway to
get gas around 4:30-5:00 p.m. Sefcik called his friend during that time, corroborated by his
phone records. Sefcik claims he briefly visited his brother and then checked into a hotel. A
receipt for the hotel stay was introduced at trial. Sefcik testified that he did not return to his
house until the next morning.
{¶5} Sandra’s story is remarkably different. She claims that when Sefcik arrived home,
they immediately began to argue because Sefcik, not she, was drunk. Almost immediately,
Sefcik punched her with a closed fist so hard as to cause her to stumble backwards and cause a
mark beneath her right eye. It was then that she called her father for help and went outside to
wait in the driveway the 15 minutes it took her father to drive to the house. She claims she met
her father in the driveway. After the car was started and her father and Sefcik left, Sefcik
returned and forced his way into the kitchen where he grabbed the kitchen knife and held it
against her neck. He then threw her through the screen door and down the concrete stairs from
which she received visible cuts and bruising. Only then did Sefcik leave the house for the
evening.
{¶6} Sandra’s version of events before the car was started was contradicted by her
father’s and Sefcik’s largely consistent versions. Additionally, at trial, the prosecutor showed
Sandra a picture of her left eye, supposedly depicting the marks caused by Sefcik’s closed-fisted
punch, which was to her right eye. When confronted in cross-examination with this
discrepancy, she admitted there was no mark from the punch, corroborated by her father’s
testimony that he did not see a scratch near her eye upon first arriving. She further admitted to
not looking to see if the punch even caused a mark.
{¶7} The incident in the kitchen is the prototypical he-said/she-said type of event. She
claimed he held a knife to her throat and threw her down the concrete stairs. He claimed he was
not even there. A DNA test was conducted on the knife, which the state introduced at trial
through stipulation. The results confirmed that Sefcik held the knife at some point in time, an
issue not really in dispute, but that Sandra’s DNA was not on the knife despite her claims that the
knife was held to her neck as Sefcik threw her down the stairs. The state introduced pictures
depicting the injuries Sandra suffered from being thrown down the stairs, partially corroborating
her version of events in the kitchen.
{¶8} Upon hearing that evidence at the bench trial, the trial court found Sefcik guilty of
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), aggravated menacing, and one count of
domestic violence. At sentencing, the trial court merged all the counts for the purposes of
sentencing. The state elected to proceed on the felonious assault count, and Sefcik was
sentenced to serve five years in prison. Sefcik appealed, raising two assignments of error
challenging the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence supporting the felonious assault
conviction, claiming that there is no credible evidence a deadly weapon was used in the attack on
Sandra. He did not otherwise challenge the aggravated menacing or domestic violence
convictions. We find no merit to his claim that the manifest weight of the evidence does not
support the trial court’s verdict of guilt for felonious assault as indicted.1
{¶9} When reviewing a claim challenging the manifest weight of the evidence, the court,
reviewing the entire record, must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of
fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678
We summarily reject Sefcik’s argument that the verdict is against the sufficiency of the
1
evidence, which entirely omits any consideration of a witness’s credibility. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. If Sandra’s story is believed,
Sefcik pulled a knife and held it against her neck during the assault. Such conduct satisfies the
elements of felonious assault with a deadly weapon in and of itself.
N.E.2d 541 (1997). Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence
should be reserved for only the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction. Id. A claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence
involves a separate and distinct test that is much broader than the test for sufficiency. State v.
Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 193.
{¶10} Sefcik was convicted of felonious assault, which provides in pertinent part that no
person shall attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon. R.C.
2903.11(A)(2). In order to convict Sefcik of this violation, the state needed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sefcik used the knife in the attempt to harm Sandra. The knife was the
only instrument claimed to have been used as a deadly weapon, but Sefcik does not otherwise
challenge the verdict finding him guilty of attacking Sandra.
{¶11} Sefcik’s arguments largely revolve around Sandra’s credibility, which although a
liability, was not dispositive. Her testimony is admittedly contradicted by extrinsic evidence at
points. However, and as specifically relates to the events that occurred in the kitchen, Sandra
claimed Sefcik held the knife to her throat during the attack. DNA testing revealed that the
knife’s blade was devoid of any indication that it came into contact with her, but indicated that
Sefcik handled the knife. Although we find it problematic that the state offered no evidence
explaining this discrepancy, all that is required to convict Sefcik of felonious assault is that he
attempted to cause harm with a deadly weapon.
{¶12} We are aware that in State v. Carpenter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91769,
2009-Ohio-3593, ¶ 28-29, a panel of this court reversed a conviction as being against the
manifest weight of the evidence when extrinsic evidence demonstrated that the injury did not
occur as described by the victim. In that case, the victim testified that serious physical harm
was inflicted because the defendant beat her with a metal rod causing fractured ribs and
contusions. Id. The victim’s actual hospital records from her immediate treatment indicated
that she was not in pain, and no x-rays were even taken or deemed necessary based on the fact
that her only complaints of injury were psychological. Id. In consideration of the
contradictory, extrinsic evidence, a panel of this court determined that the jury lost its way in
finding the defendant guilty of severely beating the victim. Id. Carpenter is inapplicable to
the facts of the current case.
{¶13} In this case, the DNA test indicates that the knife was devoid of any of Sandra’s
DNA. Actually causing injury with the knife, however, is not an element of felonious assault
pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); it suffices that a knife was merely used in the attempt to harm
the victim. State v. Alexander, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22295, 2005-Ohio-2393, ¶ 14, citing State
v. Tate, 54 Ohio St.2d 444, 445-446, 377 N.E.2d 778 (1978). In Tate, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that pointing an unloaded firearm at a victim, even if the offender does not pull the trigger
and is aware the weapon is unloaded, is sufficient to sustain a felonious assault with a deadly
weapon conviction pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). Nothing distinguishes the fact of holding a
knife to a victim’s throat from pulling an unloaded gun and pointing it at the victim in terms of
determining whether the weapon was used in an attempt to harm the victim. Unlike in
Carpenter where the extrinsic evidence contradicted the mode of injury, the DNA evidence does
not contradict Sandra’s testimony that the knife was used, only that the knife caused harm.
Although Sefcik identifies inconsistencies within Sandra’s testimony, she was deemed credible
by the trier of fact and there is evidence substantiating her claims.
{¶14} Generally we must give deference to the trier of fact who has the opportunity to
assess the victim’s demeanor and inconsistencies. Such deference can be afforded in situations
where the victim’s inconsistencies are “not so great that the jurors [or trier of fact] could not have
resolved them based on personal observations of the witness and the remaining evidence.”
State v. Wente, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81850, 2003-Ohio-3661, ¶ 15. Courts may review
whether the inconsistencies can be explained by the victim’s incomplete memory, the stress of
testifying, her lack of education, her inability to understand the questions, or a combination of the
preceding, in determining whether to determine the verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Id.{¶15} There is some evidence, if believed, that Sefcik at least held a knife to Sandra’s
throat during the attack, and thus we are limited to determining whether the credible evidence
demonstrated the use of a deadly weapon. Although the DNA evidence indicates the knife may
not have actually caused discernible physical harm during the attack and the victim demonstrated
credibility issues, Sandra’s testimony was not completely incredible. There was physical
evidence supporting her version of events in the kitchen. We hold that the felonious assault
conviction based on using a deadly weapon during the attack was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Even though the particular physical harm does not come to fruition, evidence
demonstrating that the defendant held a knife to a victim’s throat is sufficient to conclude that the
offender attempted to cause physical harm with a deadly weapon.
{¶16} The trial court heard all the evidence, including the inconsistencies in Sandra’s
testimony, and determined Sandra credible on whether the knife was used. In this
he-said/she-said type of case with limited physical evidence, we must defer to the trier of fact’s
resolution of disputed facts. Nothing in the record indicates the trier of fact clearly lost its way.
Sefcik’s assignments of error are overruled, and his conviction for felonious assault pursuant to
R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds
there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed,
any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of
sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR