State v. Smith , 2012 Ohio 5962 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Smith, 2012-Ohio-5962.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2012-03-022
: OPINION
- vs - 12/17/2012
:
BRUCE A. SMITH, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 11CR27642
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael Greer, 500 Justice Drive,
Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for plaintiff-appellee
Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim, Dennis A. Lieberman, 15 West Fourth Street, Suite
100, Dayton, Ohio 45402, for defendant-appellant
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} The question on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress
the evidence found in a defendant's vehicle when he alleges his consent to search was not
voluntary. We affirm the judgment, finding from the totality of the circumstances that the
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.
{¶ 2} Defendant-appellant, Bruce A. Smith, was charged in Warren County Common
Pleas Court with possession of drugs after he was stopped for a marked lanes violation and
Warren CA2012-03-022
a search of his vehicle revealed a pill bottle that included some painkillers not prescribed for
him. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the evidence, Smith pled no contest and was
convicted.
{¶ 3} In his single assignment of error on appeal, Smith avers that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress. Smith specifically argues that "where a traffic stop is
improperly prolonged and a driver does not freely and voluntarily consent to a search of his
car, the fruits of such a search must be suppressed."
{¶ 4} An appellate court's review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Forbes, 12th Dist. No. CA2007-01-001, 2007-Ohio-
6412, ¶ 29. A reviewing court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. The appellate court then determines as a
matter of law, without deferring to the trial court's conclusions, whether the trial court applied
the appropriate legal standard. Id.{¶ 5} Smith does not contest his detention for the traffic stop for a marked-lane
violation. And generally, when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay
the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning. See State v. Howard,
12th Dist. Nos. CA2006-02-002, CA2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 15. This time period
also includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license,
registration, and vehicle plates. Id.{¶ 6} In the case at bar, the arresting officer testified that Smith was
defensive immediately, as soon as I walked up, he was wanting
to know why he was being stopped. As soon as I would ask him
a question, he was like why do you want to know that? He never
really came straight forward and answered any questions until I
explained to him why I was asking him questions and calming
him down, and he would answer the question and then I would
ask him another question and it was right back to the same
defensive mannerism. He appeared to be nervous. [sic]
{¶ 7} The officer stated that he took Smith's driver's license and insurance
-2-
Warren CA2012-03-022
information and asked Smith if he had anything illegal in his car, such as drugs, alcohol,
knives, etc. Smith told the officer he did not.
{¶ 8} When the officer checked Smith's information, he noticed that Smith had prior
convictions. According to the transcript of the suppression hearing, the officer found "several
OVI/drug/alcohol convictions on his [Smith's] record." The trial court subsequently noted in
its decision that "defendant had several prior drug and alcohol related violations on his
record." However, the state acknowledged at oral argument that it was not clear from the
officer's testimony whether Smith had any prior drug convictions. While we understand the
confusion from the officer's testimony, we will consider for purposes of this review that Smith
did not have prior separate drug convictions.
{¶ 9} After the computer check revealed the prior convictions, the officer testified,
"[a]t that point, I decided to go up and ask him some more questions. I asked him once
again, if he had anything illegal in his car that I needed to be aware of." The officer said
Smith "started looking around in his car," and answered that he did not have anything illegal
in his vehicle. The officer asked Smith, "[d]o you care if I take a look?" According to the
officer, Smith said, "No, you go ahead." Smith left his vehicle and the officer "had him stay at
the front of my vehicle" during the search. .
{¶ 10} The prosecutor asked the officer if he had issued a citation prior to asking to
search the vehicle. The officer said, "No, at that point, no because like is said, [sic] I returned
to my car and saw that there was a history of drug and alcohol and based on the way he had
answered my questions, I determined to pursue that investigation farther instead of doing the
traffic violation at that time." [sic]
{¶ 11} After reviewing the record under the applicable standard of review, we conclude
that Smith was being lawfully held when the officer asked him for permission to search, and,
while this is a close case, we draw this conclusion for two reasons.
-3-
Warren CA2012-03-022
{¶ 12} The record indicates the officer had not completed the purpose of the traffic
stop before he asked Smith for permission to search his vehicle. Where a consent to search
is sought and obtained during the period of time reasonably necessary to process the traffic
citation -- which is while a violator is being lawfully detained -- the traffic stop and resulting
detention is not unlawfully prolonged. State v. Loffer, 2nd Dist. No. 19594, 2003-Ohio-4980;
see State v. Lattimore, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-467, 2003-Ohio-6829, ¶ 15; see also State v.
Landers, 10 Dist. No. 07AP-475, 2007-Ohio-7146.
{¶ 13} Further, if during the initial detention, an officer ascertains reasonably
articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may then further
detain and implement a more in-depth investigation of the individual. State v. Robinette, 80
Ohio St.3d 234, 241(1997). Reasonable articulable suspicion exists when there are specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion. State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 (1988).
{¶ 14} In forming reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers may "draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions
about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained
person." State v. Troutman, 3rd Dist. No. 9-11-17, 2012-Ohio-407, ¶ 25, quoting United
States v. Arviza, 534 U.S. 266, 273-274, 122 S.Ct. 744 (internal citations omitted).
Therefore, determining whether the officer's actions were justified depends upon the totality
of the circumstances, which must "be viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent
police officer on the scene who must react to the events as they unfold." State v. Andrews,
57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991).
{¶ 15} When questioned by defense counsel, the officer indicated that he investigated
further on the traffic stop because of Smith's OVI record, and "the fact that he appeared to be
agitated when I was asking questions, he appeared to be nervous. He did not seem to want
-4-
Warren CA2012-03-022
to be in contact with me at that time." We note that the officer previously testified that Smith
looked around the vehicle while responding to the question about any contraband present in
his vehicle.
{¶ 16} Based on the distinctive combination of factors present for the officer in this
case, we find the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate further. See
State v. Christopher, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-08-041, 2010-Ohio-1816, ¶ 26 (courts have held
that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion).
{¶ 17} The officer testified that Smith consented to a search of his vehicle during the
encounter. To establish the consent exception to the probable-cause and warrant
requirements of the federal and Ohio constitutions, the state has the burden of establishing
by "clear and positive" evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily given, and not the
result of a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority. State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420,
427 (1988); State v. Taylor, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-02-003, 2001-Ohio-8676; State v.
Lattimore, 2003-Ohio-6829 at ¶ 15.
{¶ 18} Every search situation is unique unto itself and no set of fixed rules will be
sufficient to cover every situation. Robinette at 242. When the subject of a search is not in
custody and the state attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the state demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-249, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973); see also Christopher at ¶ 45-46
(additional factors gleaned from Bustamonte include evaluation of words and conduct of
suspect, whether suspect was a "newcomer to the law;" and his or her education and
intelligence).
{¶ 19} Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all of the
circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken
-5-
Warren CA2012-03-022
into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a
prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Robinette at 244-243, citing Bustamonte at
248-249.
{¶ 20} After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Smith's consent
to search his vehicle, we find Smith was not a "newcomer to the law," there is no evidence he
was of limited intelligence, there is no indication Smith consented under duress or coercion,
express or implied, there is every indication he was capable of questioning the officer's
motives or methods and did not simply submit to the officer's claim of lawful authority. See
Lattimore, 2003-Ohio-6829 at ¶ 17 (defendant's consent to the search demonstrates only his
desire to resolve the situation, and there is no evidence of any coercive police procedure).
Therefore, we find that Smith voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.
{¶ 21} We also note that Smith argued that he was not sufficiently informed the officer
was asking to search the vehicle when he agreed to the officer taking "a look." As previously
noted, the officer asked Smith if he had anything illegal in his vehicle, and when Smith looked
around the vehicle and stated he did not have anything illegal, the officer asked Smith if he
cared "if I take a look?" Smith reportedly said, "No, you go ahead." We find that
conversation sufficient to inform Smith that the officer was asking to search, as the record
indicates Smith had previous interactions with law enforcement.
{¶ 22} We have considered all of the arguments set forth by Smith in his appeal and
find none of them warrants a reversal of the trial court's decision denying Smith's motion to
1
suppress the evidence. Smith's single assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} Judgment affirmed.
RINGLAND and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur.
1. While we are aware of the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Gardner, Slip Opinion No. 2012-
Ohio-5683, it is distinguishable because, in Gardner, the trial court relied on the subsequently discovered arrest
warrant and did not analyze the propriety of the defendant's detention and search.
-6-