State v. Grant , 2014 Ohio 5378 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Grant, 2014-Ohio-5378.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2013-L-101
- vs - :
JAMES F. GRANT, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
Case No. 12 CR 000735.
Judgment: Appeal dismissed.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Alana A. Rezaee, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
James F. Grant, pro se, PID: A641084, Richland Correctional Institution, 1001
Olivesburg Road, P.O. Box 8107, Mansfield, OH 44901 (Defendant-Appellant).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} This matter is before this court on the pro se motion of James F. Grant for
leave to file a delayed appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(A). Along with his motion, Mr. Grant
filed his notice of appeal on October 18, 2013. Mr. Grant seeks to appeal the judgment
issued by the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, following a guilty plea, sentencing
him to prison for two counts of robbery: 24 months for Amended Count 2, a felony of the
third degree; and a mandatory eight-year term for Count 3, a felony of the second
degree. On March 29, 2013, the trial court ordered the prison terms to run concurrent
with each other for a total of eight years. Thus, Mr. Grant filed his notice of appeal
nearly six months past the filing deadline.
{¶2} The state of Ohio filed a response in opposition to the motion on October
25, 2013.
{¶3} There is no constitutional right to appeal under the United States
Constitution. “[A] State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). A
state is permitted to provide appellate review, within its law-making discretion, with only
one constitutional caveat:
[A] State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide
for differences [in appellate review] so long as the result does not
amount to a denial of due process or an ‘invidious discrimination.’ *
* * Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn
and we often sustain them.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-357 (1963) (citations omitted).
{¶4} Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court has continually stated that “there is no
inherent right of appeal from a judgment of a court, and that such right must be
conferred by Constitution or statute.” Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pope, 54 Ohio St. 2d
12, 18 (1978) (citations omitted). The Ohio Constitution does not state who has the
right to appeal; we therefore turn to Ohio’s statutory law. E.g., Middletown v. City
Comm. of Middletown, 138 Ohio St. 596, 603 (1941); see also Pope, supra, 18-19.
{¶5} The Ohio Revised Code provides, in relevant part:
In addition to the original jurisdiction conferred by Section 3 of
Article IV, Ohio Constitution, the [appellate] court shall have
jurisdiction upon an appeal upon questions of law to review, affirm,
modify, set aside, or reverse judgmentS or final orders of courts of
record inferior to the court of appeals within the district[.]
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R.C. 2501.02. Further, “[t]he judges of the court of appeals, or a majority of such
judges, may make and publish such uniform rules of practice, for all the districts, as are
not in conflict with statute or the rules of the supreme court.” R.C. 2501.08. The
Supreme Court of Ohio has, in fact, promulgated uniform Rules of Appellate Procedure.
“An appeal of a final order, judgment, or decree of a court [see R.C. 2501.02] shall be
governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure or by the Rules of Practice of the
Supreme Court, whichever are applicable, and, to the extent not in conflict with those
rules, this chapter.” R.C. 2505.03(C) (emphasis added).
{¶6} The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for two types of mutually-
exclusive appeals, over which the district courts of appeal have jurisdiction: (1)
“Appeal[s] as of Right,” governed by App.R. 3 & 4; and (2) “Appeals by Leave of Court
in Criminal Cases,” governed by App.R. 5.
{¶7} App.R. 3(A) states, in relevant part and emphasis added:
An appeal as of right shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal * * *
within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action
as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal. Appeals by leave of court shall be taken in
the manner prescribed by Rule 5.
Pursuant to App.R. 4(A)(1), in a criminal case, “a party who wishes to appeal from an
order that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within
30 days of that entry.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶8} Mr. Grant did not comply with App.R. 3 and App.R. 4, thus his appeal is
not an “appeal as of right.” Specifically, Mr. Grant filed his notice of appeal nearly six
months after the 30-day deadline. Accordingly, Mr. Grant is attempting to obtain an
“appeal by leave of court in a criminal case,” and App.R. 5 governs.
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{¶9} App R. 5(A)(1) provides: “After the expiration of the thirty day period
provided by App.R. 4(A) for the filing of a notice of appeal as of right, an appeal may be
taken by a defendant with leave of the court to which the appeal is taken in * * * (a)
Criminal proceedings * * *.” App.R. 5(A)(2) contains four requirements an appellant
must comply with in order to obtain leave to appeal. The movant shall (1) file a motion
for leave to appeal with the court of appeals (2) that sets forth his or her reasons for
failing to perfect an appeal as of right; (3) file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial
court that complies with App.R. 3; and (4) “furnish an additional copy of the notice of
appeal and a copy of the motion for leave to appeal to the clerk of the court of
appeals[.]” Id.
{¶10} With regard to the second requirement, the precedent of this court is that
the reason for failing to perfect an appeal as of right must be valid—i.e., the reason for
delay must justify the length of time it took to initiate an appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Johnson, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2013-T-0121, 2014-Ohio-2015, ¶6; State v. Williams,
11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2013-T-0034, 2013-Ohio-3481, ¶9. Mr. Grant’s efforts to obtain
leave to appeal fail on this second requirement.
{¶11} Mr. Grant’s main assertion for failing to file a timely appeal is that he “had
no knowledge of [his] rights of appeal.” However, courts have long held that ignorance
of the law does not excuse procedural inadequacies, such as the failure to file a notice
or motion in a timely manner. E.g., State v. Foti, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2009-L-163, 2010-
Ohio-5931, ¶86; State v. Crites, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-0065, 2012-Ohio-5127,
¶10.
{¶12} Mr. Grant further asserts that he was not informed of his rights of appeal
“by the court or [his] trial counsel after sentencing” and that he “was never informed that
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his time would be [mandatory].” However, these assertions are in direct contravention
to the guilty plea Mr. Grant signed on March 29, 2013, which indicates he was
specifically advised of the following:
The Court informed me and I further understand that: * * * If I was
convicted at trial, I would have a right to appeal.
I hereby state that I understand these rights and privileges and the
possible consequences of a “Guilty” plea. I hereby waive and reject
all of these rights.
***
My attorney has explained my right to appeal a maximum sentence,
my other limited appellate rights, and that any appeal must be filed
within 30 days of the Court’s entry of the judgement [sic] of my
sentence.
***
I understand for this offense(s) I do face mandatory time in
prison[.]
Mr. Grant signed the written guilty plea, as did the trial court, the prosecuting attorney,
and Mr. Grant’s attorney. Further, Mr. Grant’s attorney averred that he advised Mr.
Grant “that he does face a mandatory prison term with this ‘Guilty’ plea.”
{¶13} Given the length of time of nearly six months that passed from the time of
Mr. Grant’s sentence until the filing of his motion for delayed appeal, it is evident that he
was not diligent in taking the proper steps to protect his rights. As such, we find Mr.
Grant has not provided this court, as required by App.R. 5(A), with reasons to
adequately justify waiting nearly six months to initiate a direct appeal.
{¶14} For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Grant’s motion for leave to file a delayed
appeal is hereby overruled.
{¶15} Appeal dismissed.
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DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
____________________
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
{¶16} Appellant, a pro se litigant, has a constitutional right to appeal his
conviction in a criminal proceeding. State v. Awkal, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98532 and
98553, 2012-Ohio-3970, ¶2 (Blackmon, A.J.); Article IV, Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Ohio
Constitution (appeal “as a matter of right”). An appeal “as of right” is “[a]n appeal to a
higher court from which permission need not be first obtained.” Black’s Law Dictionary
74 (7th Ed.2000). In Ohio, in addition to the Ohio Constitution, pursuant to statute, “a
defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony may appeal as a matter of
right.” R.C. 2953.08(A).
{¶17} In cases wherein someone is found guilty and sentenced in a criminal
matter and there is no prejudice to the state in the delay, a motion for delayed appeal
should be granted. I suggest that we should accept the delayed appeal, and review the
record before this court. Appellate Rule 5(A) provides specifically for a delayed appeal
if the thirty-day deadline to file is missed. There is also no set deadline for a delayed
appeal to be filed.
{¶18} In this case, appellant has filed a request for a delayed appeal nearly six
months after his sentencing. The majority does not feel inclined to accept it, describing
appellant’s reasons for his delay as insufficient and contradicted by his plea agreement.
However, the mechanical enforcement of a single appellate rule should not take
precedence over enforcement of the law as a whole nor the Ohio legislature’s intent to
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create an appeal as of right. The majority, in emphasizing form over function, is placing
an unnecessary barrier in front of appellant by its strict reading of the rule.
{¶19} The Rules of Appellate Procedure are meant to provide a framework for
the orderly disposition of appeals. In re Beck, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 00 BA 52, 2002-
Ohio-3460, ¶29. However, ‘“[o]nly a flagrant, substantial disregard for the court rules
can justify a dismissal on procedural grounds.’” Id. at ¶28, quoting DeHart v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 189, 193 (1982). The Supreme Court of Ohio has instructed the
lower courts of this state that cases are to be decided on the merits, and that the
various rules of court are to be applied so as to achieve substantial justice. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Lapp Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio St. 3d
179, 2008-Ohio-850, ¶12; DeHart at 192. Consequently, strict adherence to the
appellate rules must yield when a procedural error is inadvertent, and a party or counsel
acted in good faith. See, e.g., Beck at ¶29.
{¶20} The Staff Note to the 1994 Amendment to App.R. 5(A) also indicates that
the rule is to be given a flexible, liberal interpretation. Prior to the amendment,
defendants were required to set forth the errors claimed and evidence relating to the
claimed errors. Id. The amendment merely retained the requirement that the would-be
appellant set forth his or her reasons for the delay. Id. In explanation, the Staff Note
provides in part:
{¶21} “Although there was also concern about the fairness of requiring usually
indigent, and frequently unrepresented, criminal defendants to demonstrate (often
without the benefit of a transcript) the probability of error, the primary reason for this
amendment is judicial economy. Denial of leave to file a delayed appeal for failure to
demonstrate the probability of error usually leads to subsequent litigation of the issue by
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direct appeals to the Ohio and United States Supreme Courts, petitions to vacate
sentence under R.C. 2953.21 et seq., and appeals thereon, and/or federal habeas
corpus petitions and appeals. Review of the merits by the courts of appeals upon the
initial direct (albeit delayed) appeal would thus avoid the presentation of the probability
of error issue to as many as nine subsequent tribunals.”
{¶22} Additionally, a principal purpose of the General Assembly in reforming
Ohio's sentencing structure in Senate Bill 2, including procedure relating to appeals,
was cost containment. State v. Grider, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82072, 2003-Ohio-3378,
¶29, citing Griffin and Katz, Sentencing Consistency: Basic Principles Instead of
Numerical Grids: The Ohio Plan, 53 Case W.R.L.Rev. 1 (2002).
{¶23} The intent of the General Assembly is that courts deal with criminal cases
in the most cost effective manner complying with justice. Additionally, this court has an
affirmative, constitutional and statutory duty to review the trial court for error. We are
the constitutional quality control for the citizens of the state of Ohio. By denying delayed
appeals I submit we are not performing our duties to the best of our constitutional and
statutory obligation.
{¶24} If App.R. 5(A) is to be given a flexible, liberal interpretation an appellant
should be entitled to have his case heard on a delayed appeal when there is no
prejudice to the state in the delay. As appellant pleaded guilty to the crimes for which
he was sentenced, the errors he might raise on appeal are limited. Surely it would be
more cost effective for this court to consider any such alleged error, bring this matter to
a quick, final close and thus avoid the presentation of error issues to subsequent
tribunals.
{¶25} Thus, I respectfully dissent.
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