State v. Locklear ( 2019 )

[Cite as State v. Locklear, 2019-Ohio-1041.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 17AP0025
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
MARK LOCKLEAR WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 2017 CR-B 000269
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 25, 2019
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Mark Locklear, appeals his conviction for domestic violence in the
Wayne County Municipal Court. This Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} Following an altercation between Mr. Locklear and his brother, Mr. Locklear was
charged with two counts of domestic violence and one count of aggravated menacing. Although
the municipal court appointed counsel for Mr. Locklear, Mr. Locklear filed a handwritten motion
two days before trial expressing his desire to act as his own lawyer. At trial, Mr. Locklear
represented himself with his appointed attorney acting as stand-by counsel. A jury found him
guilty of one of the counts of domestic violence but acquitted him of the other counts. The trial
court sentenced him to 90 days in jail. Mr. Locklear has appealed, assigning three errors. We
will address his third assignment of error first because it is dispositive.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR
WHEN IT PERMITTED DEFENDANT TO PROCEED PRO SE WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLYING WITH CRIM.R. 44(B), AND IN
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE 1 OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶3} Mr. Locklear argues that the municipal court failed to determine whether he
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The Ohio Supreme Court
has held that a defendant has the right of self-representation and “that he may proceed to defend
himself without counsel when he voluntarily, and knowingly and intelligently elects to do so.”
State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St. 2d 366 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus. “In order to establish
an effective waiver of right to counsel, the trial court must make sufficient inquiry to determine
whether defendant fully understands and intelligently relinquishes that right.” Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus. Part of that inquiry includes determining whether “the defendant was
advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” State v. Hunter, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 10CA009903, 2012-Ohio-1121, ¶ 14, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835
(1975). “This is because, ‘[w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.’”
State v. Dowey, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25963, 2012-Ohio-4915, ¶ 3, quoting Faretta at 835. We
review whether a defendant has made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel de novo. State v. Alexander, 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3492, 2016-Ohio-5015, ¶ 4; State
v. Griffin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-902, 2011-Ohio-4250, ¶ 26.
{¶4} The State concedes that there is no discussion on the record regarding Mr.
Locklear’s waiver of his right to counsel. We have reviewed the record and agree that there is no
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indication that the trial court explained to Mr. Locklear “the nature of the charges, the statutory
offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses,
mitigation, or other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter[.]” State v.
Martin, 103 Ohio St. 3d 385, 2004-Ohio-5471, ¶ 43; Gibson at 377, quoting Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948). We, therefore, cannot say that Mr. Locklear knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Martin at ¶ 45. In addition, Crim.R. 44(C)
provides that “[w]aiver of counsel shall be in open court and the advice and waiver shall be
recorded as provided in Rule 22.” The State concedes that the municipal court did not comply
with that rule.
{¶5} Upon review of the record, we conclude that there is no indication that Mr.
Locklear knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Mr. Locklear’s
third assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED MR. LOCKLEAR OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND
VIDEO EVIDENCE IN HIS FAVOR WHEN IT IMPOSED THE MOST
SEVERE SANCTION IN RESPONSE TO HIS COUNSEL’S VIOLATION OF
THE RULES OF DISCOVERY.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
MR. LOCKLEAR’S TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10
AND 16, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶6} In his remaining assignments of error, Mr. Locklear argues that the municipal
court incorrectly refused to allow him to introduce certain evidence because he failed to provide
discovery to the State. He also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide
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the discovery, leading to the court’s sanction. In light of our resolution of Mr. Locklear’s third
assignment of error, we conclude that these arguments are moot, and we, therefore, decline to
address them. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
III.
{¶7} Mr. Locklear’s third assignment of error is sustained. We decline to address his
first and second assignments of error because they are moot. The judgment of the Wayne
County Municipal Court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County
Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A
certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
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CALLAHAN, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
MICHELLE FINK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and ANDREA D. UHLER, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.