State v. Patterson , 2019 Ohio 5173 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Patterson, 
    2019-Ohio-5173
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    STARK COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
    Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J
    Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 2019CA00110
    BRANDON C. PATTERSON
    Defendant-Appellant                     O P I N IO N
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Stark County Court of
    Common Pleas, Case No. 2019-CR-0136
    JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        December 9, 2019
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant
    JOHN D. FERRERO                                BRANDON C. PATTERSON
    Prosecuting Attorney                           Inmate No. A564-655
    Stark County, Ohio                             Trumbull Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 901
    KRISTINE W. BEARD                              Leavittsburg, Ohio 44430
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Appellate Section
    110 Central Plaza South, Suite #510
    Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                     2
    Hoffman, P.J.
    {¶1}   Appellant Brandon C. Patterson appeals the judgment entered by the Stark
    County Common Pleas Court resentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration of
    fourteen years for his convictions of two counts of felonious assault with accompanying
    firearm specifications, and one count of having weapons under disability.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}   The facts and much of the procedural history of this case can be found in
    our previous opinions in this matter, and is incorporated herein. See State v. Patterson,
    5th Dist. Stark No. 2009CA00142, 
    2010-Ohio-2988
    ; State v. Patterson, 5th Dist. Stark
    No. 2014CA00220, 
    2015-Ohio-1714
    ; State v. Patterson, 5th Dist. Stark No.
    2015CA00125, 
    2015-Ohio-4325
    ; State v. Patterson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00153,
    
    2017-Ohio-9001
    .
    {¶3}   On March 4, 2019, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals issued a writ of
    habeas corpus vacating Appellant’s conviction for attempted felony murder and the
    accompanying firearm specification pursuant to State v. Nolan, 
    141 Ohio St. 3d 454
    , 
    25 N.E.3d 1016
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4800
    , In Nolan, the Ohio Supreme Court held attempted felony
    murder is not a crime under Ohio law, and found the defendant’s conviction to be void
    and not merely voidable. Patterson v. Bracy, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2016-T-0067, 
    132 N.E.3d 1115
    , 
    2019-Ohio-747
    , ¶13. The court remanded to the Stark County Common
    Pleas Court for resentencing on Count 2, felonious assault with its attendant firearm
    specification, holding as follows:
    As petitioner's conviction on count one, attempted felony murder, is
    void, it is vacated. He has therefore demonstrated that he is entitled to
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                       3
    release from confinement but not absolute discharge as sentencing issues
    remain that cannot be fully addressed in the context of this action regarding
    sentencing on count two and the accompanying firearm specification. It is
    clear that count two, felonious assault, and the accompanying firearm
    specification cannot merge with the void conviction on count one as ordered
    in the first sentencing entry. However, after first merging count two with
    count one, and after the Fifth District remanded for what appears to be the
    limited purpose of imposing post-release control, the trial court, in its second
    sentencing entry, merged count two with count three. Thus, an issue
    remains as to which merger order controls. See State v. Teagarden, 5th
    Dist. Licking No. 14-CA-56, 
    2015-Ohio-2563
    , 
    2015 WL 3935756
    ; State v.
    Carsey, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA5, 
    2014 WL 4181351
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3682
    ,
    ¶ 11 (a trial court lacks jurisdiction to exceed the scope of an appellate
    court's remand and actions beyond the scope are void).
    The trial court then issued what it deems to be a nunc pro tunc entry
    sentencing petitioner to three years on count two but not the accompanying
    firearm specification. An issue remains as to whether this is a proper nunc
    pro tunc order. State v. Miller, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 407
    , 
    2010-Ohio-5705
    , 
    940 N.E.2d 924
    , ¶ 15 (“ ‘Although courts possess inherent authority to correct
    clerical errors in judgment entries so that the record speaks the truth, “nunc
    pro tunc entries ‘are limited in proper use to reflecting what the court actually
    decided, not what the court might or should have decided.’ ” ’ ”). See also
    Barille v. O'Toole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82063, 
    2003-Ohio-4343
    , 2003
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                       
    4 WL 21956982
    , ¶ 50; State v. McIntyre, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25502,
    
    2013-Ohio-3281
    , 
    2013 WL 3936376
    , ¶ 5; State v. Waltz, 12th Dist.
    Claremont, 
    2014-Ohio-2474
    , 
    14 N.E.3d 429
    , ¶ 16 (improper nunc pro tunc
    order is unenforceable as void).
    There are no factual disputes, and the parties have been afforded an
    opportunity to brief all issues. Respondent's motion to dismiss and/or for
    summary judgment is overruled, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of
    petitioner on his habeas corpus petition. It is the order of this court that a
    writ of habeas corpus is issued, under which his conviction for attempted
    felony murder and the accompanying firearm specification are declared void
    and vacated. Respondent is ordered to remand petitioner, Brandon C.
    Patterson, to Stark County for a sentencing hearing in Stark County C.P.
    No. 2009CR0136, and depending on the resolution of the multiple
    contingencies identified and further raised by the parties, sentencing on
    count two and the accompanying firearm specification.
    {¶4}   Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.
    {¶5}   The case proceeded to a resentencing hearing on Count Two of felonious
    assault in the trial court. The court sentenced Appellant to four years incarceration on
    Count Two of felonious assault and three years on the accompanying firearm
    specification, and ordered the sentence to run consecutively to his three year sentence
    on Count Three of felonious assault and the three year sentence on its accompanying
    firearm specification, and consecutively to a sentence of one year incarceration for having
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                       5
    weapons under disability, for an aggregate term of fourteen years. It is from that judgment
    of resentencing Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:
    I. DID THE TRIAL COURT EXCEED ITS JURISDICTION BY
    CONDUCTING A DE NOVO RESENTENCING HEARING ON COUNT
    TWO, FELONIOUS ASSAULT, PURSUANT TO R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)
    AND/OR (A)(2)?
    II. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSE A SENTENCE CONTRARY TO
    LAW BY IMPROPERLY EMPLOYING THE SENTENCING PACKAGE
    DOCTRINE IN VIOLATION OF THE U.S. CONST. AMEND. V AND XIV,
    ART. 1, § I, AND THE OH. CONST. V AND XVI, AND R.C. 2953.08?
    III. DID THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT
    TO DUE PROCESS WHEN THE ORIGINAL JUDGE RESENTENCED THE
    DEFENDANT TO A PRESUMPTIVELY VINDICTIVE, PEARCE, 
    395 U.S. 711
    , 726, HARSHER SENTENCE [ON COUNT TWO] WITH NO
    OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON THE RECORD?
    IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDER AND PROPERLY APPLY
    THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES, PURSUANT TO R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12,
    AND R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), WHEN EXERCISING DISCRETION TO IMPOSE
    A CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE FOR COUNT TWO, FELONIOUS
    ASSAULT?
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                     6
    {¶6}    Preliminarily, we note this case comes to us on the accelerated calendar.
    App. R. 11.1, which governs accelerated calendar cases, provides in pertinent part the
    following:
    (E) Determination and judgment on appeal
    The appeal will be determined as provided by App. R. 11.1. It shall
    be sufficient compliance with App. R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason
    for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary
    form.
    The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be
    published in any form.
    {¶7}    This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned
    rule.
    I.
    {¶8}    In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues his previously imposed
    sentence of three years incarceration on count two, felonious assault, ordered to run
    concurrently with count one, attempted felony murder, was not affected by the remand
    and could not be increased to four years. He further argues the imposition of a new
    sentence on this count violates the double jeopardy clause.
    {¶9}    Pursuant to State v. Williams, 
    148 Ohio St. 3d 403
    , 
    2016-Ohio-7658
    , 
    71 N.E.3d 234
    , Appellant’s sentence for count two of felonious assault, which as an allied
    offense merged into count one of attempted felony murder, was void. Having vacated as
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                     7
    void the sentence for attempted felony murder which count two of felonious assault had
    merged into, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals remanded the matter for resentencing
    on count two. A remand for a new sentencing hearing generally anticipates a de novo
    sentencing hearing. State v. Wilson, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 214
    , 
    2011-Ohio-2669
    , 
    951 N.E.2d 381
    , ¶ 15. During a de novo resentencing, the trial court is free to impose the identical
    sentence which was originally imposed, or a greater or lesser sentence within its
    discretion. State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92365, 
    2009-Ohio-4995
    , ¶ 9.
    {¶10} We find the trial court was free to impose a greater sentence than the three
    year sentence, which was rendered void, it had previously imposed for felonious assault.
    {¶11} Further, we find no double jeopardy violation because Appellant’s previous
    sentence for felonious assault was void. Jeopardy does not attach to a void sentence.
    State v. Jordan, 
    104 Ohio St. 3d 21
    , 
    2004-Ohio-6085
    , 
    817 N.E.2d 864
    , ¶25.
    {¶12} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    II.
    {¶13} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the court erred in
    employing the sentencing package doctrine.
    {¶14} The “sentencing package doctrine” is a federal sentencing doctrine which
    requires federal courts to consider the sum of a defendant's convicted counts as a
    package in handing down a single overarching sentence for those counts. As such, if any
    one part of the sentence is vacated on appeal, the entire sentence may be vacated and
    the package of offenses can be remanded for resentencing. See, generally, State v.
    Saxon, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1245
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 824
    , ¶ 4-5. In Saxon, the
    Supreme Court of Ohio expressly rejected application of the doctrine for State offenses.
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                       8
    {¶15} We find nothing in the record to demonstrate the court employed the
    sentencing package doctrine.
    {¶16} The second assignment of error is overruled.
    III.
    {¶17} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the increase of his
    sentence from three years to four years on remand is presumptively vindictive pursuant
    to North Carolina v. Pearce, 
    395 U.S. 711
    , 
    89 S. Ct. 2072
    , 23 l.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
    {¶18} In Pearce, the United States Supreme Court held when a judge imposes a
    more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so
    must “be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of
    the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding,” and further
    “the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the
    record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully
    reviewed on appeal.” 
    Id. at 726
    , 
    89 S. Ct. at 2081
    .
    {¶19} However, Pearce was later altered by Alabama v. Smith, in which the United
    States Supreme Court limited the presumption of vindictiveness to circumstances in
    which there is a “reasonable likelihood” an unexplained increase in sentence is the
    product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority. 
    490 U.S. 794
    , 
    109 S. Ct. 2201
    , 2202 (1989). Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the defendant
    has the burden of proving actual vindictiveness without aid of a presumption. 
    Id.
    {¶20} Appellant has not proven actual vindictiveness in the instant case. The
    State argued for a sentence of eight years for count two of felonious assault, while
    Appellant argued for a sentence of three or five years. Resentencing Tr. 9. Appellant
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                                        9
    has not demonstrated vindictiveness, as the four year sentence imposed by the court was
    actually less than the high-end five year sentence proposed by Appellant.
    {¶21} The third assignment of error is overruled.
    IV.
    {¶22} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues the court erred in
    imposing consecutive sentences.
    {¶23} The sentencing transcript and the judgment entry of resentencing reflect the
    court considered the general sentencing guidelines set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
    2929.12, and made findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to support the
    imposition of consecutive sentences. Appellant argues there is no mention in the court’s
    consecutive sentencing findings of his conduct in prison during the ten years elapsed
    from his original sentence. The trial court is not obligated to state its reasons in support
    of the statutory findings to support consecutive sentences. State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , ¶ 37 (2014).
    Stark County, Case No. 2019CA00110                                             10
    {¶24} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶25} The judgment of the Stark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
    By: Hoffman, P.J.
    Delaney, J. and
    Wise, Earle, J. concur