In re Adoption of A.C.M.C. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as In re Adoption of A.C.M.C., 2019-Ohio-879.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    BELMONT COUNTY
    IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
    A.C.M.C.
    OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    Civil Appeal from the
    Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division of Belmont County, Ohio
    Case No. 18 AD 0005
    BEFORE:
    Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.
    JUDGMENT:
    Affirmed
    Atty. Joseph Vavra, Vavra Law Firm, 132 West Main Street, P.O. Box 430, St.
    Clairsville, Ohio 43950, for Appellant, and
    Atty. Grace Hoffman, Lancione, Lloyd, and Hoffman, 3800 Jefferson Street, Bellaire,
    Ohio 43906, for Appellee.
    Dated:
    March 13, 2019
    –2–
    Donofrio, J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, E.G., appeals from a Belmont County Probate Court judgment
    granting appellee’s, R.C.’s, petition to adopt appellant’s minor daughter.
    {¶2}     Appellant and C.M.C. (mother) were married on December 27, 2008.
    While mother was eight months pregnant with A.C.M.C., appellant was convicted of
    multiple offenses involving the sexual abuse of mother’s other daughter (appellant’s step-
    daughter at the time).    Appellant was sentenced to four-to-eight years in prison in
    Pennsylvania. A.C.M.C. was born in June 2010. Appellant was already in prison when
    she was born. He has never met her. Mother’s and appellant’s divorce was finalized on
    May 9, 2011. The divorce decree suspended any visitation between appellant and
    A.C.M.C. It provided that appellant would have to petition the court for visitation.
    {¶3}     Mother and appellee began a relationship when A.C.M.C. was
    approximately one-and-a-half years old.       On September 21, 2013, mother married
    appellee. Appellee has been the only father A.C.M.C. has known.
    {¶4}     On March 13, 2018, appellee filed a petition to adopt A.C.M.C. In the
    petition, appellee alleged that appellant had failed without justifiable cause to provide
    more than de minimis contact with the child for a period of at least one year immediately
    preceding the filing of the petition. Mother filed her consent for the adoption.
    {¶5}     Appellant did not consent to the adoption. Therefore, the probate court
    set the matter for hearing. Appellant was released from prison on May 16, 2018. He
    attended the hearing, which was held on June 8, 2018.
    {¶6}     The court heard testimony from mother, appellee, appellant, appellant’s
    step-grandfather, and the mother of appellant’s other child. Appellant stipulated that he
    did not have contact with A.C.M.C. for the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition
    but argued that he had justifiable cause for his lack of contact. The court determined that
    appellant failed to demonstrate justifiable cause. It noted that appellant never petitioned
    the court for any type of contact with A.C.M.C.; never made an effort to contact mother
    by using the address or phone number listed in their divorce decree; never sent a letter,
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    –3–
    birthday card, or gift to A.C.M.C.; and never attempted any other type of contact. The
    court acknowledged that appellant was in prison until May 2018, but found this fact, in
    and of itself, did not constitute justifiable cause for his failure to have any contact with his
    child.   Therefore, the court found that appellant’s consent to the adoption was not
    necessary and set the matter for further proceedings.
    {¶7}   Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 16, 2018. On appellant’s
    motion, the probate court stayed its proceedings pending this appeal.
    {¶8}   Appellant now raises a single assignment of error stating:
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT’S
    CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION WAS NOT REQUIRED AS HE DID
    DEMONSTRATE JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE AS TO WHY HE DID NOT HAVE
    CONTACT WITH THE MINOR CHILD.
    {¶9}   Appellant argues that appellee did not prove appellant failed without
    justifiable cause to communicate with A.C.M.C. for the one-year period preceding the
    filing of the petition. He points out that he was in prison during that time. He asserts
    mother moved multiple times without informing him of her most recent address. Appellant
    claims mother cut off all contact between A.C.M.C. and her paternal relatives. And
    appellant claims he was unable to call mother due to prison rules that prohibited him from
    contacting the victim of the crime for which he was incarcerated. He notes that the victim
    of his crime was his step-daughter, who resided with mother. Thus, appellant argues he
    had no means of contacting A.C.M.C.
    {¶10} Pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A), consent to adoption is not required from:
    A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court,
    after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and convincing
    evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide more
    than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the maintenance
    and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period
    of at least one year immediately preceding either the filing of the adoption
    petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner.
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    –4–
    {¶11}     According to the statute, either a lack of contact or a lack of support for at
    least one year without justifiable cause can relieve the petitioner from having to obtain the
    parent's consent.
    {¶12}     An adoption case such as this involves the termination of fundamental
    parental rights. Therefore, a heightened burden of proof applies.
    {¶13} The question of whether justifiable cause exists in a particular case is a
    factual determination for the probate court that an appellate court will not disturb unless
    such determination is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of
    Holcomb, 
    18 Ohio St. 3d 361
    , 
    481 N.E.2d 613
    , 615 (1985). Clear and convincing evidence
    is that proof which establishes in the minds of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the
    allegations sought to be proved. Cross v. Ledford, 
    161 Ohio St. 469
    , 477, 
    120 N.E.2d 118
    (1954). When a party must prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence, a
    reviewing court must examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had
    sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof. State v. Schiebel, 
    55 Ohio St. 3d 71
    , 74, 
    564 N.E.2d 54
    (1990).
    {¶14} We must determine whether the probate court’s finding of no justifiable
    cause was supported by clear and convincing evidence. As mentioned above, appellant
    stipulated to the fact that he had no contact with A.C.M.C. for the year preceding the filing
    of the adoption petition. (Tr. 3).
    {¶15} Mother testified first. She testified that appellant has never made contact
    with A.C.M.C. (Tr. 5). Since her birth, appellant never sent her a card, letter, or anything
    else. (Tr. 13). She stated that when A.C.M.C. was first born, appellant’s mother and
    sisters did have contact with her. (Tr. 6). But eventually, she stated, they stopped asking
    to visit. (Tr. 10).
    {¶16} Mother’s and appellant’s divorce decree was entered as an exhibit. (Ex. 1).
    Per the terms of the divorce decree, appellant would have to petition the court for any
    type of visitation. (Tr. 6; Ex. 1). Mother testified that appellant never did so. (Tr. 6-7).
    She also testified that because appellant raped her oldest daughter, she did not want any
    of her children to ever have to deal with appellant. (Tr. 8).
    {¶17} Mother testified that she has resided at her current address for six years.
    (Tr. 8). She stated she did not inform appellant of this address. (Tr. 8). Before that time,
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    –5–
    she resided with her mother. (Tr. 8). Appellant was aware of that address because it
    was in their divorce papers. (Tr. 8). Mother further testified that appellant could have
    sent a card or gifts to A.C.M.C. to her mother’s (the maternal grandmother’s) house
    because she visits frequently and forwards any mail to her. (Tr. 11). Mother also stated
    that appellant’s grandmother frequents her mother’s place of employment. (Tr. 12). So
    she could have obtained mother’s address. (Tr. 12). Mother stated her current phone
    number was also listed in the divorce decree. (Tr. 9).
    {¶18} Mother testified that appellant never asked her to have contact with
    A.C.M.C. (Tr. 11). She stated that had he done so, she would have told him to petition
    the court. (Tr. 11).
    {¶19} Appellee was the next witness. He testified that A.C.M.C. has been in his
    life since she was one-and-a-half years old. (Tr. 14). He stated that since that time,
    appellant has never attempted any contact with A.C.M.C. that he was aware of. (Tr. 14-
    15).
    {¶20} Kristy M., the mother of appellant’s other child (T.M.), testified next. She
    testified that appellant was incarcerated for most of her child’s life too. (Tr. 18). Recently,
    upon his release from prison, Kristy stated that appellant has had visitation and telephone
    contact with T.M.      (Tr. 18).   Kristy testified that during the years appellant was
    incarcerated, appellant still had contact with T.M. (Tr. 18). She stated that he called
    every week and on holidays and birthdays. (Tr. 18). Kristy stated appellant also sent
    letters, drawings, birthday cards, and Christmas cards.          (Tr. 18-19).   She testified
    appellant had both her address and her telephone number. (Tr. 19).
    {¶21} Donald D., appellant’s step-grandfather, was the next witness. He stated
    that appellant now resides with him and appellant’s grandmother. (Tr. 23). Donald
    testified that he and his wife used to visit with A.C.M.C. when she was approximately a
    year old. (Tr. 24-25). But they had not visited with her in the last five to six years. (Tr.
    25). Donald testified that his family had the maternal grandmother’s address. (Tr. 27).
    He stated that she (the maternal grandmother) works at a store that they frequent. (Tr.
    27). Nonetheless, Donald testified that he never tried to contact mother or bring any gifts
    for A.C.M.C. through the maternal grandmother. (Tr. 28).
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    –6–
    {¶22} Appellant was the final witness.              Appellant admitted that he was
    incarcerated before A.C.M.C. was born after he was convicted of “charges of a sexual
    nature” against his step-daughter. (Tr. 30). He further admitted he has never met
    A.C.M.C. (Tr. 34).
    {¶23} Appellant testified that during his time in prison, he maintained contact with
    his other child T.M. (Tr. 30). He stated that initially, his mother or sister contacted T.M.’s
    mother and she approved him calling T.M. once or twice a week. (Tr. 30). Appellant
    testified that he also wrote letters to T.M. and sent her holiday cards and pictures. (Tr.
    31). He stated that he kept in contact with T.M. because Kristy allowed him to. (Tr. 31).
    {¶24} As to A.C.M.C., appellant stated that he never filed for any kind of visitation
    rights because he was incarcerated until May 2018. (Tr. 32). He stated he was awaiting
    the result of this case before filing for visitation. (Tr. 33).
    {¶25} Appellant testified that mother has never contacted him regarding A.C.M.C.
    (Tr. 34). He claimed he has not known mother’s address since the day he was arrested.
    (Tr. 34). He denied knowing that she was living with her mother for some time. (Tr. 35).
    Appellant also denied knowing mother’s telephone number. (Tr. 35). He stated that he
    tried to have his sisters contact mother to ask for her phone number or address. (Tr. 36).
    {¶26} Additionally, appellant testified that it was the Pennsylvania Department of
    Corrections’ policy that he could not have contact with his victim. (Tr. 36; Exs. B, C). He
    claimed this prevented him from calling A.C.M.C. because his victim (A.C.M.C.’s half-
    sister) resides with A.C.M.C. and he did not want to risk her answering the telephone.
    (Tr. 36). Mother, however, testified that she has joint custody of A.C.M.C.’s sister with
    the girl’s father so she only resides with mother half of each week. (Tr. 11).
    {¶27} On cross examination, appellant stated he did not recall whether he
    received a copy of his divorce decree. (Tr. 42). He stated he was unaware that mother’s
    address and telephone number were listed in the divorce decree. (Tr. 42-43). Appellant
    admitted that his parents and grandparents knew where the maternal grandmother
    worked. (Tr. 42). Nonetheless, he stated that he never attempted to send a gift or letter
    to A.C.M.C. through his or mother’s family members. (Tr. 43). He claimed he was unsure
    if the maternal grandmother would pass it on, so he never tried. (Tr. 43). Appellant
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    –7–
    claimed that if he had mother’s address or telephone number he would have attempted
    to contact A.C.M.C. (Tr. 43).
    {¶28} The evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s finding of no
    justifiable cause for appellant’s lack of contact.
    {¶29} Appellant has had absolutely no contact whatsoever with A.C.M.C. He has
    been in prison almost her entire life. He has never petitioned the domestic relations court,
    pursuant to the divorce decree, to have contact with A.C.M.C. The fact that he was in
    prison did not prevent appellant from having contact with his other child. Appellant
    maintained contact with his other child through weekly phone calls and by sending cards,
    letters, and gifts. Thus, the fact that he was in prison will not be construed as justifiable
    cause for no contact.
    {¶30} Moreover, appellant claims he did not know mother’s phone number or
    address. But mother testified that her phone number has never changed and is listed in
    their divorce decree. Appellant also claimed he did not call because he did not want to
    risk contacting the victim of his crime. Mother, however, testified that A.C.M.C.’s sister
    only resides with her for half of each week. Thus, appellant would have had many
    opportunities to call A.C.M.C. had he attempted to do so. Additionally, mother’s address
    in the divorce decree is that of the maternal grandmother, which also has not changed.
    Yet appellant testified that he never attempted to send a card or gift to A.C.M.C. through
    her grandmother.
    {¶31} Appellant asserts this case in analogous to In re Adoption of C.L.B., 
    191 Ohio App. 3d 64
    , 2010-Ohio-5190, 
    944 N.E.2d 1190
    (3d Dist.). In C.L.B, the mother and
    father divorced and a shared parenting plan was implemented for their son. The mother
    remarried. Approximately six years after the divorce, the father was sentenced to a four-
    year prison term. Approximately 14 months after the father was sentenced to prison, the
    step-father filed a petition to adopt the child. The petition alleged the father’s consent
    was not necessary because he failed without justifiable cause to communicate with the
    child for a period of one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition and
    he failed without justifiable cause to provide for the child’s maintenance and support for
    a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition.
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    –8–
    {¶32} The court held a hearing on the issue of consent. The mother testified that
    the father had had no contact whatsoever with the child during the year leading up to the
    petition. She denied that she had permitted the child to visit the father in prison despite
    the fact that she signed a notarized permission slip and was shown a photograph of the
    child with the father in the prison. She also admitted that she moved and did not provide
    the father with her address.        The father testified that his parents (the paternal
    grandparents) brought the child to see him for a Christmas party during the year preceding
    the filing of the petition. In order for the child to attend, the mother had to sign a
    permission slip. The father also presented a photograph of him in his prison uniform, his
    parents, and the child at the party. The father further testified that he mails a letter or a
    card to the child every two weeks and uses the money he earns in prison to purchase
    postage and envelopes from the prison commissary. He also mailed him a shirt from the
    party. Because no letters were returned to him, he assumed the child received them. He
    stated he was unable to call the child because he did not have a current phone number.
    The grandmother corroborated the father’s testimony regarding the Christmas party. And
    she testified that she was the one who brought the permission slip to the mother to sign.
    {¶33} The trial court found the father’s consent was not required due lack of
    contact and lack of support. The father appealed.
    {¶34} On appeal, the Third District noted that the trial court found that there was
    de minimis contact. 
    Id. at ¶
    12. It found that given the lack of cooperation by the mother,
    as indicated by her attitude towards the visit, there was a facially justifiable reason for any
    further lack of communication. 
    Id. Thus, it
    concluded that the step-father failed to prove
    by clear and convincing evidence that the limited contact between the father and the child
    was not justifiable given the limitations in ability the father had. 
    Id. {¶35} This
    case is easily distinguishable from C.L.B. Although the appellant in
    each case had been in prison leading up to the petitions for adoption, the similarity ends
    there. In C.L.B., the appellant actively sought to maintain contact with his child. He
    regularly sent gifts and letters and even arranged for his child to visit him in prison. In this
    case, however, appellant took no action at all to contact A.C.M.C. The evidence here is
    clear and convincing that appellant had no justifiable cause for his lack of contact with
    A.C.M.C. in the year preceding the adoption petition.
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    –9–
    {¶36} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit and is
    overruled.
    {¶37} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.
    Waite, P. J., concurs.
    Robb, J., concurs.
    Case No. 18 BE 0043
    [Cite as In re Adoption of A.C.M.C., 2019-Ohio-879.]
    For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error
    is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
    Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division of Belmont County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs
    to be taxed against the Appellant.
    A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
    in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
    a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    NOTICE TO COUNSEL
    This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18 BE 0043

Judges: Donofrio

Filed Date: 3/13/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021