State v. Woodward , 2019 Ohio 908 ( 2019 )

[Cite as State v. Woodward, 2019-Ohio-908.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO 5-18-21
v.
DUSTIN B. WOODWARD, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2017 CR 269
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 18, 2019
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Lora L. Manon for Appellee
Case No 5-18-21
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dustin B. Woodward (“Woodward”), brings this
appeal from the September 25, 2018, judgment of the Hancock County Common
Pleas Court sentencing Woodward to seven years in prison after he pled no contest
to, and was convicted of, six counts of Pandering Sexually Oriented Material
Involving a Minor in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), all felonies of the second
degree. On appeal, Woodward argues that the trial court erred by denying his
suppression motion.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On or about August 14, 2017, the Forest Police Department learned of
allegations that Woodward had taken explicit photographs of his six-year old
stepdaughter. On the morning of August 14, 2017, at approximately 11 a.m., before
the police had attempted to contact Woodward, Woodward went to the Forest Police
Department due to the encouragement of his wife and his own “guilt.” Outside of
the station, Woodward met Chief Southward and indicated that he wanted to talk.1
Woodward was taken inside where he was read his Miranda rights and he signed a
written Miranda waiver. He was then interviewed by Chief Southward.
1
Chief Southward testified at the suppression hearing that Woodward stated he wanted to “confess.”
Woodward disputed that issue, testifying that he had only gone to the police department because his wife told
him that the police were looking for him.
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{¶3} During the interview, Woodward stated that he had taken a total of ten
to fifteen photographs of his stepdaughter’s genitals over two or three separate
occasions spanning a multi-week period. He stated that he had since deleted the
photographs from his cell phone, but his wife found them in Google photographs,
where he did not know they had still been saved. Woodward agreed to allow the
police to search his phone.
{¶4} On August 22, 2017, Woodward was indicted for twelve counts of
Gross Sexual Imposition (“GSI”) in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), all felonies of
the third degree, and twelve counts of Pandering Sexually Oriented Material
Involving a Minor (“Pandering”) in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), all felonies
of the second degree. The bill of particulars alleged that the Gross Sexual
Imposition charges stemmed from activity between April 1, 2017, and May 31,
2017, wherein Woodward engaged in sexual contact with his stepdaughter who was
born in February of 2011. It was alleged that Woodward touched the victim’s
“pubic and vaginal region * * * for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying
either himself or [the victim].” (Doc No. 79). The Pandering charges stemmed
from Woodward taking photographs, which allegedly included the child’s pubic,
genital and/or vaginal area. (Id.) Woodward originally pled not guilty to the
charges.2
2
He also pled not guilty by reason of insanity and challenged his competence to stand trial but after a
psychological evaluation, he was found competent.
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{¶5} On October 31, 2017, Woodward filed a suppression motion seeking to
suppress statements that he made to the police department. He argued that he was
highly intoxicated and suffering from mental illness at the time he made his
statement, rendering the Miranda waiver he signed invalid. In addition, Woodward
argued that any information taken from his cell phone should be suppressed because
the search exceeded the scope of his consent.
{¶6} On December 5, 2017, the State filed a response contending that
Woodward was never actually in custody during his interview, that there were no
indications that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that his Miranda
waiver was valid even if he was in custody, and that Woodward did not limit the
scope of the search of his cell phone in any manner when he gave it to the police.
{¶7} The matter proceeded to a hearing on January 2, 2018. At the hearing
the State presented the testimony of Chief Southward, and Detective Lyle Harvitt
of the Hancock County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Harvitt interacted with
Woodward after he was interviewed by Chief Southward. The State also entered a
copy of the signed, written Miranda waiver into evidence, and a DVD of the
interview with Woodward. Woodward testified on his own behalf.
{¶8} On January 24, 2018, the trial court filed an entry denying Woodward’s
motion to suppress. The trial court determined that Woodward was not subject to a
custodial interrogation as Woodward went to the police station willingly and
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requested to meet with the Chief. Nevertheless, the trial court found that even if
Woodward was subject to a custodial interrogation, he was advised of his Miranda
rights and voluntarily signed a waiver.
{¶9} The trial court also found that Woodward displayed no observable signs
of intoxication, that both officers testified that they did not smell alcohol on
Woodward, and that Woodward did not appear intoxicated to them. In fact, the trial
court noted that Woodward himself testified that despite his “buzz” he understood
that he was not required to answer questions and he consented to a search of his
phone. Thus the trial court determined there was no police coercion in this matter
and there was no indication that Woodward’s will was overborne. Finally, the trial
court also determined that Woodward consented to the police searching his cell
phone, and he did not limit this consent in any manner.
{¶10} After his suppression motion was denied, Woodward entered into a
written, negotiated plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead no contest to six
counts of Pandering as indicted. (Doc. No. 92). In exchange the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges against him and to recommend that some of the
prison terms be served concurrently with each other.
{¶11} The trial court held a Crim.R. 11 hearing and determined that
Woodward’s pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court then
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found Woodward guilty of the six counts of Pandering that comprised the plea
agreement, and the remaining counts against him were dismissed.
{¶12} On September 25, 2018, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The trial
court imposed seven years in prison on each Pandering conviction, all to be served
concurrently. A judgment entry memorializing Woodward’s sentence was filed the
same day. It is from this judgment that Woodward appeals, asserting the following
assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court violated appellant’s due process rights and
privilege against self-incrimination under the state and federal
constitutions by finding his Miranda waiver to be voluntary.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The trial court violated appellant’s due process rights and
privilege against self-incrimination under the state and federal
constitutions by refusing to suppress involuntary statements.
{¶13} As the assignments of error are interrelated, we will address them
together.
First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶14} In Woodward’s first and second assignments of error, he argues that
the trial court erred by finding his Miranda waiver to be voluntary. Specifically,
Woodward argues that his intoxication and his history of mental health problems
prevented him from knowingly waiving his rights. He also contends, in passing,
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that the trial court erred by finding that he was not subject to a custodial
interrogation.
Standard of Review
{¶15} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed
questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372,
¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as
such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses. Id.; see also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When
reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With
respect to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de
novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable
legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th
Dist.1997); State v. Yost, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-18-03, 2018-Ohio-2873, ¶ 15.
Relevant Authority
{¶16} “A suspect in police custody ‘must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
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he so desires.’ ” State v. Lather, 110 Ohio St.3d 270, 2006-Ohio-4477, ¶ 6, quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Nevertheless, it is well-established that Miranda warnings are not required in
nonthreatening and nonconfining interrogation situations, which are noncustodial in
nature. State v. Carter, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-01, 2010-Ohio-5189, ¶ 21,
citing State v. Greeno, 3d Dist. No. 13–02–46, 2003–Ohio–3687, ¶ 12, citing State
v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 153, 694 N.E.2d 932 (1988). This is so because “[i]t
is the coercive nature of custodial interrogation that necessitates the Miranda
warnings[.]” Greeno at ¶ 12.
{¶17} In determining whether an interrogation is custodial, courts must
inquire into “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have
understood his situation.’ ” Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 154, 694 N.E.2d 932,
quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317(1984). The Supreme Court of Ohio has directed that, “[i]n judging whether an
individual has been placed into custody the test is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a ‘reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.’ ” State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429, 653 N.E.2d 253, 1995–Ohio–24,
quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d
497 (1980).
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{¶18} If it is determined that an interrogation is custodial, determining
whether a valid waiver of Miranda rights occurred also requires a consideration of
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation as to whether
statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, and whether defendant decided
to forgo his rights to assistance of counsel and to remain silent. Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); State v. Chester, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 08AP-1, 2008-Ohio-6679, ¶ 22. Voluntariness factors to consider
include: the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length,
intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or
mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement. State v. Twyford, 94 Ohio
St.3d 340, 360 (2002), citing State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 (1976), paragraph
two of the syllabus.
{¶19} Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a
suspect involuntarily waived his Miranda rights. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Absent evidence that a suspect’s
will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired
because of coercive police conduct, a suspect’s decision to waive his Miranda rights
and confess will be deemed to be voluntary. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).
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{¶20} Notably, intoxication, unto itself, is insufficient to render a statement
per se inadmissible. State v. Cameron, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-004, 2007-Ohio-
6935, ¶ 19, citing State v. Stanberry, 11th Dist. No.2002-L-028, 2003-Ohio-5700,
at ¶ 30; State v. Fairley, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-41, 2004-Ohio-2616, ¶ 21.
Rather, the presence of drugs or alcohol should be considered, but the amount must
sufficiently impair the confessor’s abilities to reason. State v. Stewart, 11th Dist.
Portage No.2001-P-0035, 2002-Ohio-7270, ¶ 49; Fairley at ¶ 21.
Custodial Interrogation
{¶21} Evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that
Woodward approached the Forest Police Department on his own accord, indicating
he wanted to talk. He was led through a shared municipal building to a room where
he could be interviewed. The door was not locked and Woodward was not placed
under arrest. However, Woodward was still read his Miranda rights and he signed
a written waiver, agreeing to speak with Chief Southward. The entire interview was
recorded on Chief Southward’s body camera.
{¶22} During the interview, Woodward provided short answers to Chief
Southward’s questions, but he did admit to taking ten to fifteen inappropriate
photographs of his stepdaughter’s genetalia. Woodward also stated that he came to
the police department that morning because his wife pressured him and because of
the guilt he was feeling.
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{¶23} Based on the events that transpired, and the circumstances surrounding
the interview, the trial court found that Woodward was “not subject to a custodial
interrogation.” (Doc. No. 45). The trial court reasoned that Woodward freely
walked to the police station even though there was no warrant for his arrest. The
trial court noted that while the door to the interview room was closed, it was in a
loud, shared municipal building, and that the door was not locked. Woodward was
also told initially he did not have to talk to the police. Thus the trial court found no
custodial interrogation occurred.
{¶24} In reviewing the issue of whether there was a custodial interrogation
on appeal, we agree with the trial court’s analysis. Woodward appeared at the police
station voluntarily. There is no indication of pressure by the police; rather, the
pressure came from Woodward’s wife and his conscience. Woodward was also not
restrained and no threats were made to him. Although Woodward did not have a
significant criminal history of interaction with the law, this factor alone does not
outweigh the others indicating that the matter was not a custodial interrogation.
Voluntary Miranda Waiver
{¶25} Even assuming arguendo that Woodward’s situation amounted to a
custodial interrogation, the trial court also found that Woodward validly and
voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination. Woodward challenges the
trial court’s finding on this issue on appeal, claiming that his mental state was
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impaired by his tequila consumption, his marijuana use, and his history of mental
problems, specifically PTSD arising from his experiences with the Marines.
{¶26} More specifically, Woodford claims that before he spoke with the
Chief at the police station he had consumed twenty ounces of tequila and smoked
marijuana, despite it only being roughly 11 a.m. In fact, he actually contended that
he was drinking tequila from a water bottle during the interview itself. Finally,
Woodward argues that he was new to the criminal process and the Chief asked
leading questions, further coercing his responses. Woodford contends that all these
issues led to his statement being involuntary, rendering his Miranda waiver invalid.
{¶27} The State presented testimony disputing Woodward’s claims. Chief
Southward and Detective Harvitt, who both interacted with Woodward on the day
of his interview, indicated that they did not smell any alcoholic beverages or
marijuana on Woodward, and they both testified that Woodward did not appear
intoxicated. Chief Southward was in a small room in relatively close proximity to
Woodward, yet he noted neither signs of intoxication nor odors of an alcoholic
beverage.3 The video similarly reveals no clear signs of intoxication, though
Woodward suggests otherwise in his brief.4
3
At some points during the interview, Woodward can be seen taking sips from a plastic water bottle that he
brought into the room with him. Although there was no indication the bottle contained anything but water,
particularly given that it was a hot day in August (as Chief Southward testified), Woodward stated at the
suppression hearing that the plastic bottle was actually filled with silver, 1800 tequila, but there is no
indication that was true.
4
Woodward contends that his movements were slow and his responses were brief; however, the conversation
and subject matter were clearly uncomfortable for Woodward.
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{¶28} The trial court determined that the testimony and evidence produced
did not show that Woodward was intoxicated such that his ability to reason was
sufficiently impaired. See State v. Stewart, 11th Dist. Portage No.2001-P-0035,
2002-Ohio-7270, ¶ 49; Fairley, supra, at ¶ 21. In our own review of the matter,
giving deference to the trial court’s factual findings, but reviewing the legal issues
de novo, we agree with the trial court.
{¶29} The only evidence to support Woodward’s claims are his own self-
serving statements. As the trier-of-fact, the trial court was free to find these claims
not to be credible, particularly given that the trial court saw and heard Woodward’s
testimony at the suppression hearing and reviewed his interview with Chief
Southward. Moreover, two officers directly contradicted Woodward by testifying
that he did not appear intoxicated and that they noted no indicators of impairment.
Furthermore, although Woodward suggests otherwise, the body camera footage
from the interview does not show any clear indication of intoxication.
{¶30} Finally, even if we assumed that Woodward was intoxicated to some
degree, intoxication itself does not render a statement involuntary; rather, the
intoxicants have to limit Woodward’s ability to reason. State v. Stewart, 11th Dist.
Portage No.2001-P-0035, 2002-Ohio-7270, ¶ 49; Fairley, supra, at ¶ 21. The
interview itself showed Woodward recalling the events in question, though not the
specific dates. He recalled roughly how many photographs he took, where he took
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them, and that he took them on multiple occasions. He also specifically declined to
provide a written statement because he was worried if he said something different
in it than he had in his interview, his contradictions would be used against him. This
further establishes his ability to reason at the time.
{¶31} Woodward may have regretted speaking with police after-the-fact, but
there is simply no indication of police coercion in this case, and no indication that
Woodward’s statement was anything but voluntary.5 Based on the record before us,
we cannot find that the trial court erred in overruling Woodward’s suppression
motion. Therefore, Woodward’s first and second assignments of error are
overruled.
Conclusion
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, Woodward’s assignments of error are
overruled and the judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
5
It does not appear in his brief that Woodward renews his argument on appeal that the search of his cell
phone exceeded the scope of his consent. However, even if he did argue it, we can find no error with the
trial court’s ruling on the matter.
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