State v. Singh , 2015 Ohio 4130 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Singh, 
    2015-Ohio-4130
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LOGAN COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    CASE NO. 8-15-04
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
    v.
    GURWINDER SINGH,                                          OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. CR13-03-0062
    Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part
    Date of Decision: October 5, 2015
    APPEARANCES:
    Mark S. Triplett for Appellant.
    Eric C. Stewart for Appellee.
    Case No. 8-15-04
    WILLAMOWSKI, J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Gurwinder Singh (“Singh”) brings this appeal
    from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County finding him
    guilty of gross sexual imposition and kidnapping and imposing a prison sentence.
    Singh challenges the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on lesser included
    offenses, the trial court’s imposition of sentence, and trial counsel’s performance.
    For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in
    part.
    {¶2} On February 25, 2013, the victim went to visit Singh at the
    convenience store where he worked. After the store closed, the victim took a wine
    cooler from the store’s cooler and went with Singh to his living quarters at the rear
    of the store. The two spoke for a while and the victim then indicated that she
    wanted to go. Singh tried to keep her there, so the victim pulled out her phone and
    dialed 9-1-1. The call connected, but Singh knocked the phone out of her hand.
    The operator heard Singh attempt to coax the victim into having sexual intercourse
    with him and the victim’s repeated refusals and attempts to get away. According
    to the victim, Singh engaged in sexual conduct with her and then let her leave.
    The police eventually located the victim and took her to the hospital where a rape
    exam was completed. Singh was then arrested.
    {¶3} On March 12, 2013, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted Singh on
    three counts: 1) Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first
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    degree; 2) Kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), a felony of the first
    degree; and 3) Disrupting Public Service in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), a
    felony of the fourth degree. Doc. 2. On October 9, 2013, Singh filed a petition to
    change his plea from one of not guilty to guilty to one count of rape. Doc. 71. A
    hearing was held that same day on the petition. Doc. 78. The trial court accepted
    the plea of guilty to one count of rape and dismissed the remaining counts of the
    indictment. 
    Id.
     On November 19, 2013, prior to the sentencing hearing, Singh
    filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Doc. 79. A hearing was held on the
    motion on November 27, 2013, and the motion was denied. Doc. 85. The trial
    court then sentenced Singh to serve a prison term of five years. 
    Id.
     On December
    23, 2013, Singh appealed from this judgment. Doc. 95. On August 4, 2014, this
    court reversed the judgment of the trial court and found the guilty plea to have
    been improperly accepted. Doc. 107, State v. Singh, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-13-25,
    
    2014-Ohio-3377
    . The case was remanded, the guilty plea was withdrawn, and
    eventually, the matter went to trial.
    {¶4} A jury trial was then held from February 18 to February 19, 2015. At
    the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of not guilty of rape as
    charged in the indictment, not guilty of sexual battery (a lesser included offense of
    the rape charge), guilty of gross sexual imposition (a lesser included offense of the
    rape charge), guilty of kidnapping as charged in the indictment, and not guilty of
    disrupting public service as charged in the indictment. Doc. 183. The trial court
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    entered judgment accepting the verdict and imposing sentence on February 24,
    2015. Doc. 189. The trial court determined that the conviction for gross sexual
    imposition merged with that for kidnapping for the purpose of sentencing and the
    State chose to proceed on the kidnapping conviction. 
    Id.
     The trial court then
    imposed a prison term of nine years. 
    Id.
     On March 6, 2015, Singh filed his notice
    of appeal from the judgment of the trial court.        Doc. 196.     The following
    assignments of error are raised on appeal.
    First Assignment of Error
    The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to instruct
    the jury on the lesser included offenses of abduction and
    unlawful restraint.
    Second Assignment of Error
    Defense counsel performed deficiently and [Singh] was
    prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
    Third Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred when it imposed costs and additional fees
    in its sentencing entry.
    {¶5} In the first assignment of error, Singh claims that the trial court erred
    by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of abduction and
    unlawful restraint as well as the kidnapping charge. Generally a jury can find a
    defendant not guilty of the offense charged, but guilty of a lesser included offense.
    R.C. 2945.74 and Crim.R. 31(C). The Ohio Supreme Court has held “that a
    charge on a lesser included offense is required when the facts warrant it and
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    improper when the facts do not warrant it[.]” State v. Wine, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 409
    ,
    
    2014-Ohio-3948
    , ¶20, 
    18 N.E.3d 1207
    .
    If the trier of fact could reasonably find against the state and for
    the accused upon one or more of the elements of the crime
    charged and for the state on the remaining elements, which by
    themselves would sustain a conviction on a lesser-included
    offense, then a charge on the lesser-included offense is required.
    Conversely, if the jury could not reasonably find against the
    state on an element of the crime, then a charge on a lesser-
    included offense is not only not required, but is also improper.
    State v. Kilby, 
    50 Ohio St.2d 21
    , 24-25, 
    361 N.E.2d 1336
     (1977). “Even though
    an offense may be statutorily defined as a lesser included offense of another, a
    charge on such lesser included offense is required only where the evidence
    presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged
    and a conviction upon the lesser included offense.” State v. Thomas, 
    40 Ohio St.3d 213
    , 
    533 N.E.2d 286
     (1988).       “In determining whether lesser-included-
    offense instructions are appropriate, ‘the trial court must view the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the defendant.’” Wine, 
    supra at ¶21
     (quoting State v.
    Monroe, 
    105 Ohio St.3d 384
    , 
    2005-Ohio-2282
    , 
    827 N.E.2d 285
    , ¶ 37).               In
    determining whether a particular offense should be submitted to the jury as a
    lesser included offense, the Ohio Supreme Court has set forth a two-tiered
    analysis. State v. Deanda, 
    136 Ohio St.3d 18
    , 
    2013-Ohio-1722
    , 
    989 N.E.2d 986
    .
    The first tier, also called the “statutory-elements step,” is a
    purely legal question, wherein we determine whether one offense
    is generally a lesser included offense of the charged offense. * * *
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    The second tier looks to the evidence in a particular case and
    determines whether “‘a jury could reasonably find the
    defendant not guilty of the charged offense, but could convict the
    defendant of the lesser included offense.’” * * * Only in the
    second tier of the analysis do the facts of a particular case
    become relevant.
    Id. at ¶6 (citations omitted).
    {¶6} In this case, Singh claims that the trial court erred by not instructing
    the jury on the charges of abduction and unlawful restraint as well as kidnapping.
    “Kidnapping”, as charged in this case, required the State to prove that Singh, by
    force, threat, or deception restrained the liberty of the victim for the purpose of
    engaging in sexual activity, which includes both sexual conduct and sexual
    contact. R.C. 2905.01, 2907.01. As charged in this case, kidnapping is a felony of
    the first degree. “Abduction” can be defined as occurring when a person, without
    privilege to do so, restrains the liberty of another by threat or force with a sexual
    motivation. R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), (B). “‘Sexual motivation’ means a purpose to
    gratify the sexual needs or desires of the offender.” R.C. 2971.01(J). One who
    commits this conduct is guilty of a felony of the third degree. R.C. 2905.02(C).
    “Unlawful restraint” can be defined as occurring when a person, “without
    privilege to do so and with a sexual motivation,” restrains the liberty of another.
    R.C. 2905.03(B). One who violates this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor of the
    third degree. R.C. 2905.03(C). All of these offenses involve the restraint of
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    Case No. 8-15-04
    liberty with a sexual purpose. Thus, abduction and unlawful restraint can be lesser
    included offenses of the charge of kidnapping.1
    {¶7} Since the other charges can be lesser included offenses, the next
    question is whether the facts in this case would support the trial court instructing
    the jury on the additional offenses. “The mere fact that an offense is a lesser
    included offense of the charged offense does not mean that the trial court must
    instruct on both offenses.” State v. Simonis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-14-05, 2014-
    Ohio-5091, ¶32. A party is only entitled to such an instruction if the evidence
    would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction
    on the lesser included offense. State v. Trimble, 
    122 Ohio St.3d 297
    , 2009-Ohio-
    2961, 
    911 N.E.2d 242
    , ¶192.                 As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, when
    conducting this analysis, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to
    the defense. Wine, 
    supra.
    {¶8} In this case, the State presented the following relevant evidence.
    Robert Huffman (“Huffman”) testified that he was a police officer who was
    working dispatch the night the 9-1-1 call was received, testified to receiving the
    call, and identified Exhibit 1 as a recording of the call. Tr. 80, 85. Huffman
    testified that the call was an “open line” call and that it sounded like a sexual
    1
    We note that the State points to cases where abduction was found not to be a lesser included offense of
    kidnapping because kidnapping can be accomplished through deception and abduction cannot. However,
    those cases were decided before the current line of Supreme Court cases holding that the elements need not
    align perfectly, only that it is possible to commit both at the same time. See Deanda, 
    supra,
     State v. Evans,
    
    122 Ohio St.3d 381
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2974
    , 
    911 N.E.2d 889
    , and State v. Smith, 117 OhioSt.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-
    1260, 
    884 N.E.2d 595
    .
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    Case No. 8-15-04
    assault was occurring. Tr. 82. The CD was played in open court and the victim
    was heard repeatedly saying “you’re hurting me.” Tr. 85-86. The male voice was
    heard telling her to open her legs and the victim responded that she would do what
    he wanted if he stopped hurting her. Tr. 86. The male voice repeatedly told the
    victim to open her legs and she continued to say no and to attempt to get away
    from him. Tr. 86-93. The recording revealed multiple instances where the victim
    told the male to get off of her and to let go of her. Tr.86-93. After the call was
    disconnected, Huffman was able to contact the victim on the phone. Tr. 95. The
    victim told Huffman where the incident had occurred and indicated that she was
    going home. Tr. 95. Huffman then sent a deputy to meet her there. Tr. 96.
    {¶9} The victim testified that she and Singh were friends and that she had
    known him for approximately six months. Tr. 133. The victim admitted that
    Singh would give her and her daughter free items and she liked getting them, but
    testified that she had not wanted to be anything other than friends. Tr. 134-35. On
    the night of the incident, the victim went to the store to visit with Singh and she
    drank a wine cooler and grabbed a beer for her friend at home. Tr. 151-52. She
    then went into the back room with Singh, and then she told him she had to get
    home to her daughter. Tr. 152. Singh kept trying to talk her into staying. Tr. 152.
    When she tried to leave, he grabbed her purse from her. Tr. 152. The victim
    pulled her phone out of her pocket and called 9-1-1. Tr. 153. Singh pushed her
    onto the bed and she got back up. Tr. 153. Singh then knocked the phone out of
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    her hand and it fell to the floor. Tr. 154. After pushing the victim to the ground,
    Singh got on top of her and began kissing her and touching her breasts. Tr. 154.
    The victim testified that Singh engaged in vaginal intercourse with her.2 Tr. 158.
    {¶10} Viewing the evidence relevant to the kidnapping charge in a light
    most favorable to Singh, it is clear that a reasonable juror could conclude that the
    victim’s liberty was restrained. It is also clear from the evidence that Singh used
    force to restrain the victim’s liberty by pushing her down and getting on top of her.
    The recording of the 9-1-1 call had the victim repeatedly stating that Singh was
    hurting her and telling him to get off of her. Singh presented no evidence to
    indicate that these events did not occur. There was also evidence to suggest that
    these actions were taken for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct or sexual
    contact, as is needed for a kidnapping conviction, and not just with a sexual
    motivation.       Given the particular facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in determining that the evidence would not support a rejection of the
    kidnapping charge, yet support a conviction for either abduction or unlawful
    restraint with a sexual motivation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing
    to give instructions on those charges. The first assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶11} In the second assignment of error, Singh alleges that he was denied
    effective assistance of counsel.
    2
    Although the State alleges in its brief that there was a question as to whether penetration occurred, the
    testimony on the victim was that it did. There was not a question as to whether there was evidence of
    penetration, but rather a question of the credibility of the victim when testifying.
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    In evaluating whether a petitioner has been denied effective
    assistance of counsel, this court has held that the test is “whether
    the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial
    and substantial justice was done.” State v. Hester (1976), 
    45 Ohio St.2d 71
    , 
    74 O.O.2d 156
    , 
    341 N.E.2d 304
    , paragraph four of
    the syllabus. When making that determination, a two-step
    process is usually employed. “First, there must be a
    determination as to whether there has been a substantial
    violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client.
    Next, and analytically separate from the question of whether the
    defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated, there must
    be a determination as to whether the defense was prejudiced by
    counsel's ineffectiveness.” State v. Lytle (1976), 
    48 Ohio St.2d 391
    , 396–397, 
    2 O.O.3d 495
    , 498, 
    358 N.E.2d 623
    , 627, vacated on
    other grounds (1978), 
    438 U.S. 910
    , 
    98 S.Ct. 3135
    , 
    57 L.Ed.2d 1154
    .
    On the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has the
    burden of proof, since in Ohio a properly licensed attorney is
    presumably competent. See Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 
    2 Ohio St.2d 299
    , 
    31 O.O.2d 567
    , 
    209 N.E.2d 164
    ; * *915 State v.
    Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d at 110–111, 18 O.O.3d at 351, 413 N.E.2d
    at 822.
    State v. Calhoun, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 279
    , 289, 1999–Ohio–102, 714 N .E.2d 905.
    {¶12} Singh alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-
    examine the victim on her history of making 9-1-1 calls. Singh alleges that cross-
    examining the victim on this history would have further damaged her credibility.
    “The scope of cross-examination falls within the ambit of trial strategy, and
    debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v.
    Conway, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 412
    , 
    2006-Ohio-2815
    , 
    848 N.E.2d 810
    , ¶101. Other than
    a potential challenge to the victim’s credibility, there is no reason given as to why
    the calls were relevant at all and there is no reason given why the decision not to
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    question the victim regarding her prior calls to the police was not a valid trial
    strategy.3     The jury heard a recording of the incident in which the victim
    repeatedly stated that she wanted to leave and Singh repeatedly told her no and
    repeatedly told her to open her legs. Given this evidence, any attempt to argue
    that the victim has been the alleged victim of many offenses or made up the
    offenses would not likely have changed the jury’s verdict as to the kidnapping
    charge. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to cross-examine the victim
    on her prior calls to 9-1-1. The second assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶13} The final assignment of error challenges the imposition of court costs
    and fees in the sentencing entry without addressing them at the sentencing hearing.
    The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the failure to address court costs and fees at
    the sentencing hearing and then imposing them in the journal entry is reversible
    error that requires remand for the limited purpose of remedying the error. State v.
    Joseph, 
    125 Ohio St.3d 76
    , 
    2010-Ohio-954
    , 
    926 N.E.2d 278
    . The State concedes
    that the trial court erred in this case by failing to address the imposition of costs
    and fees at the sentencing hearing. Based upon the holding in Joseph, this court
    agrees. The third assignment of error is sustained.
    {¶14} Having found prejudicial error in the particulars assigned and argued,
    the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Logan County is affirmed in part
    3
    It is possible that showing that the victim had repeatedly been the victim of domestic abuse would have
    made the jury more sympathetic towards her.
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    Case No. 8-15-04
    and reversed in part.    The matter is remanded to the trial court for further
    proceedings in accord with this opinion.
    Judgment Affirmed in Part,
    Reversed in Part
    ROGERS, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
    /hlo
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