In re A.J. , 2014 Ohio 5566 ( 2014 )

[Cite as In re A.J., 2014-Ohio-5566.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: A.J. : APPEAL NO. C-140246
TRIAL NO. 13-3354z
:
: OPINION
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Appeal Dismissed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 19, 2014
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Ohio,
Gordon C. Magella, for Defendant-Appellant A.J.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D E W INE , Judge.
{¶1} This is an appeal of a decision adjudicating a juvenile delinquent for
being under the influence of alcohol in a public place. The juvenile, A.J., contends that
the state did not present sufficient evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol.
We do not reach the issue. Because A.J. has voluntarily completed his sentence, his
appeal is moot. We therefore dismiss it.
{¶2} During a hearing before a juvenile court magistrate, Officer Kimberly
Brucker testified that she had encountered A.J. around 2:00 a.m.—two hours after the
curfew imposed by the city of Norwood. When she approached A.J., Officer Brucker
smelled a strong odor of alcohol and noticed that A.J.’s eyes were bloodshot and watery.
Based on Officer Brucker’s testimony, the magistrate adjudicated A.J. delinquent for
being under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4301.69(E)(1), and sentenced
him to two days of work detail.
{¶3} A.J. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on September 26, 2013.
A hearing was held on the objections on October 14. Before the trial court ruled on his
objections, A.J. completed his work-detail obligation. The trial court subsequently
affirmed the magistrate’s decision.
{¶4} The state contends that A.J.’s appeal is moot because he voluntarily
completed his sentence. A.J. argues that the record does not demonstrate that he
completed his sentence, and that, even if he did complete his sentence, the mootness
doctrine should not apply.
{¶5} “[W]here a defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor, voluntarily satisfies
the judgment imposed upon him or her for that offense, an appeal from the conviction is
moot unless the defendant has offered evidence from which an inference can be drawn
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that he or she will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights stemming from
the conviction.” In re Payne, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, ¶ 2.
This court has applied the mootness doctrine to juveniles who have been adjudicated
delinquent. Id. In order for the doctrine to apply, however, it must be shown that the
juvenile has served his sentence. Id. Here, a notation dated October 26 in the transcript
of the docket states, “Work Detail Completed.” This is part of the record on appeal. See
App.R. 9(A)(1). Thus, the record demonstrates that A.J. has completed his sentence.
{¶6} A.J. next contends that even if he has completed his sentence, the
mootness doctrine should not apply. He argues that if the completion of his work detail
rendered his appeal moot, he would be denied access to the appellate court. He likens
this case to State v. Benson, 29 Ohio App.3d 109, 110, 504 N.E.2d 77 (10th Dist.1986), in
which the Tenth District held that an appeal by a defendant sentenced to “time served”
was not moot. But in Benson, the defendant served his time involuntarily; he was jailed
while his case was pending. He never had a chance to ask for a stay because he had
already completed his jail time by the time the sentence was rendered. A.J., in contrast,
was not jailed and served his time voluntarily. His objections to the magistrate’s
decision acted as a stay on proceedings. See Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(e)(i). His decision to
complete his work detail prior to the trial court’s decision on his objections was
voluntary.
{¶7} Finally, A.J. maintains that he will suffer some collateral disability as a
result of the adjudication. “[T]he completion of a sentence renders an appeal from the
related conviction moot * * * because, absent some collateral disability or loss of civil
right, there is no subject matter for the court to decide.” State v. Henry, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 25479, 2011-Ohio-3566, ¶ 16, citing In re S.J.K., 114 Ohio St.3d 23, 2007-
Ohio-2621, 867 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 9. The burden is on A.J. to demonstrate that a collateral
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
disability exists to prevent the application of the mootness doctrine. In re S.J.K. A.J.
has not met his burden. Although he suggests that his adjudication could be used
against him should he seek to apply to take the bar examination, such a consequence is
speculative. “A collateral disability must be a substantial, individualized impairment,
and a purely hypothetical statement, about what might occur in the future is not
sufficient to give viability to an otherwise moot appeal.” State v. Johnson, 43 Ohio
App.3d 1, 3, 538 N.E.2d 1082 (1st Dist.1988). We conclude that A.J. did not
demonstrate the existence of a collateral disability.
{¶8} Because A.J. has voluntarily completed his sentence and has not
demonstrated that he will suffer a collateral disability, his appeal is moot, and therefore,
we dismiss it.
Appeal dismissed.
C UNNINGHAM , P.J., and D INKELACKER , J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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