State v. Reece , 2017 Ohio 222 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Reece, 2017-Ohio-222.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 27081
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 1991-CR-3223
:
JIMMIE L. REECE : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 20th day of January, 2017.
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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by HEATHER N. JANS, Atty. Reg. No. 0084470, Montgomery
County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O.
Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JIMMIE L. REECE, #A606-808, Chillicothe Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 5500,
Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
Defendant-Appellant, pro se
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HALL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Jimmy Lee Reece appeals from the trial court’s overruling of his motion to
vacate and set aside his conviction and sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
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I. Background
{¶ 2} In January 1992, Reece was indicted in Ohio on multiple counts of rape and
gross sexual imposition. In April 1993, Reece was arrested in Michigan for armed robbery,
and the following November, in a Michigan court, he pleaded guilty to the crime and was
sentenced to 10-20 years in prison. Four years later, in August 1997, Reece was
extradited to Ohio to stand trial for the 1992 charges. On October 17, 1997, Reece
appeared in court. The docket does not reveal a written motion concerning speedy trial
time, but Reece admits in his brief “[t]he defendant, by and through counsel, did raise on
October 17, 1997 that the time to bring this case before the Court had long since passed.”
Merit Brief of Defendant-Appellant at p.1. Reece pleaded no contest under a plea
agreement to one count of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition. (All other
counts were dismissed.) Reece was found guilty and sentenced to prison for 5-25 years
on the rape charge and for 2 years on the gross-sexual-imposition charge. The two prison
terms were to be served concurrent to each other and concurrent to the prison sentence
that Reece received in Michigan. Shortly thereafter, Reece was returned to Michigan to
continue serving the Michigan sentence. He did not appeal the apparent denial of his
speedy trial contention.
{¶ 3} In May 2009, Reece was brought back to this state and continued serving his
Ohio sentence.
{¶ 4} Over 13 years after entry of his Ohio convictions, in April 2011, Reece filed
a pro se motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that his speedy-trial right was
violated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, codified in Ohio at R.C. 2963.30 et
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seq., which provides a procedure for prisoners in one state to obtain trial on charges
pending in another state. The trial court overruled the motion, finding that Reece failed to
submit sufficient evidence to show a violation of the Detainer Agreement or to show that
his plea was not made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Reece did not appeal.
{¶ 5} In July 2015, Reece filed a pro se motion to vacate and set aside his
conviction and sentence. He again argued a violation of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers. In addition, he argued a violation of Ohio’s speedy-trial statute, R.C. 2945.71.
The trial court overruled his motion without a hearing, finding, once again, that Reece
failed to submit sufficient evidence to show a violation of the Detainer Agreement and
finding no violation of the speedy-trial statute.
{¶ 6} This time Reece appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} Reece assigns two errors to the trial court. In the first assignment of error
Reece alleges that the court erred by denying his motion to vacate, arguing that he was
not brought to trial within the time period established by Ohio’s speedy-trial statute. And
in the second assignment of error Reece alleges that the trial court erred by not holding
an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion, arguing that he should have had an
opportunity to present additional evidence on his claims under the speedy-trial statute
and the Interstate Detainer Agreement.
{¶ 8} Reece’s speedy-trial claims stem from the amount of time that elapsed
between his indictment in Ohio in 1992 and his extradition and conviction in 1997. Reece
could have presented these claims in a direct appeal from his conviction, but he did not.
He also raised the same arguments in his 2011 motion to withdraw his plea, which the
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trial court overruled three months later, and he did not appeal. He may not now use the
same contentions to collaterally attack his conviction. “Under the doctrine of res
judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented
by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that
judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have
been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or
on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 671 N.E.2d 233(1996), syllabus. Reece was represented by counsel. Consequently, his speedy-trial
claims are barred by res judicata.
{¶ 9} Even if Reece could raise them, the claims would fail. “The Interstate
Agreement on Detainers * * * establishes procedures by which one jurisdiction may obtain
temporary custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction for the purpose of
bringing that prisoner to trial. * * * [T]he Detainer Agreement establishes procedures under
which a prisoner may initiate his transfer to the receiving State and procedures that
ensure protection of the prisoner’s speedy trial rights.” Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,
435, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981), fn.1. Under Article III of the Detainer
Agreement, a prisoner may initiate his transfer to another state in which charges are
pending by “caus[ing] to be delivered to the prison officials where incarcerated,
appropriate notice or documentation requesting a disposition of the charges.” State v.
Mourey, 64 Ohio St.3d 482, 597 N.E.2d 101 (1992), at paragraph two of the syllabus,
citing R.C. 2963.30, Art. III(a) and (b). Once a prisoner has done this, he must be brought
to trial within 180 days. R.C. 2963.30, Art. III(a); see also Mourey at paragraph one of the
syllabus. In Article IV, the Detainer Agreement provides that the state in which the charges
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are pending may also initiate a transfer of the prisoner. R.C. 2963.30, Art. IV(a). With this
type of transfer, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 120 days of the prisoner’s
arrival in the receiving state. R.C. 2963.30, Art. IV(c). When the Detainer Agreement is
invoked, its speedy-trial time periods apply rather than those in the speedy-trial statute.
See R.C. 2945.71(F) (saying that “[t]his section [R.C. 2945.71] shall not be construed to
modify in any way * * * sections 2963.30 to 2963.35 of the Revised Code”); see also State
v. Braden, 197 Ohio App.3d 534, 2011-Ohio-6691, 968 N.E.2d 49, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.)
(saying that “if the IAD [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is properly invoked, those
requirements control over the state speedy-trial statute”).
{¶ 10} Here, as the trial court found, Reece failed to show that he satisfied the
requirements of Article III of the Detainer Agreement. He did not submit any documents
showing that he requested a disposition on the Ohio charges. And nothing in the record
suggests that Michigan prison officials received any notice from Reece. Consequently,
the 180-day speedy-trial period did not apply. Rather, as it appears that Reece’s transfer
to Ohio was initiated by the Montgomery County prosecutor, the 120-day period in Article
IV applied. That period did not begin to run until the middle of August 1997, when Reece
arrived in Montgomery County. Well before the applicable time period expired, Reece
pleaded no contest and was convicted.
{¶ 11} The assignments of error are overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 12} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
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FROELICH, J., and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck
Heather N. Jans
Jimmie L. Reece
Hon. Gregory F. Singer