State v. Urdiales ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HENRY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 7-15-03
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ROBERTO G. URDIALES, JUDGMENT
ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 14-CR-0021
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: September 8, 2015
APPEARANCES:
Billy D. Harmon for Appellant
J. Hawken Flanagan for Appellee
Case No. 7-15-03
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Roberto G. Urdiales (“Urdiales”), brings this
appeal from the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Henry County, Ohio,
denying his motion to suppress, finding him guilty upon his entry of a no contest
plea to a charge of possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree in violation
of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a), and sentencing him to eleven months in prison. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Relevant Background
{¶2} On or about March 6, 2014, Sheriff Michael Bodenbender (“Sheriff
Bodenbender”), applied for a search warrant authorizing installation and
monitoring of a GPS tracking device on the target vehicle, which was a 2002 Ford
Windstar, registered to Urdiales’s mother. Together with his application, Sheriff
Bodenbender attached an affidavit, in which he attested that the information
obtained through the GPS monitoring would provide evidence of possession of
drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11, and trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C.
2925.03. (State’s Ex. 1.) The affidavit included the following facts:
Your affiant has been a law enforcement officer with the Henry
County Sheriff’s Office for over 20 years, and has extensive training
and experience in the investigation of drug offenses.
Within the past 24 hours this affiant has had contact with a
confidential and reliable informant who advised that the target
vehicle, to wit: a 2002 Ford Windstar, OH Registration DRN 6732,
is being used to transport illegal drugs, namely cocaine, into Henry
County, Ohio. The target vehicle is titled in the name of Lily
Urdiales; however, the informant advised this affiant the vehicle has
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been and will be operated by the title owner’s son, Roberto Urdiales,
to transport illegal drugs, namely cocaine, into Henry County, Ohio.
The informant further advised that the vehicle, when operated by
Roberto Urdiales, travels to Toledo, Ohio, on Friday and/or Saturday
of each week to procure the illegal drugs which are then transported
into Henry County, Ohio. Your affiant questioned the informant as
to the basis for his information, and the informant advised that he
received this information directly from Roberto Urdiales. Your
affiant believes that information received from the confidential
informant referenced herein is accurate and reliable, and your affiant
further declares that information provided by this confidential
informant in the past has proven to be accurate and has led to an
arrest and conviction.
(Id.) A judge of the trial court approved the warrant application.
{¶3} A GPS tracking device was placed on the target vehicle on March 7,
2014. (State’s Ex. 4.) Thereafter, Sheriff Bodenbender and other law enforcement
personnel from the Henry County Sheriff’s Office monitored the vehicle’s
location. The monitoring indicated that on Friday evening, March 7, 2014, the
vehicle traveled to Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio, stopping at three or four locations
in Toledo and at one location in Wood County, Ohio. When the vehicle entered
Henry County, Sergeant Marc Ruskey (“Sergeant Ruskey”), who was also
tracking the vehicle, initiated a stop. He asked the driver to step out of the vehicle
and conducted a pat-down for weapons. A K-9 unit and Sheriff Bodenbender
arrived on the scene. After the K-9 alerted to the vehicle for narcotics, Sheriff
Bodenbender searched Urdiales and recovered cocaine and some cash.
{¶4} As a result of the search, Urdiales was arrested and charged with
possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A).
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Urdiales entered a plea of not guilty and was released upon his own recognizance.
After receiving discovery, Urdiales filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained
as a result of the stop and search on March 7, 2014. In his motion Urdiales alleged
that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant was invalid as not
based upon probable cause. He further asserted that the stop and search of his
vehicle were “not based upon reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause.” (R. at
16.) Finally, he argued that the warrantless search of his person was
unconstitutional. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.
Relevant Testimony
{¶5} Sheriff Bodenbender testified about the information provided to him
by the confidential informant in this case. He attested that he had been in phone
contact with this confidential informant for two or three years and had spoken to
him “dozens of times” regarding drug activity or other criminal activity, such as,
for example, a stolen motorcycle. (Tr. at 17.) The information given by this
confidential informant had always proven reliable. (Tr. at 14-15.)
{¶6} Sheriff Bodenbender talked about the information provided by the
confidential informant regarding Urdiales and the alleged drug activity. In
addition to repeating the facts that were in the affidavit, Sheriff Bodenbender
testified about other details given by the confidential informant. In particular, the
confidential informant told Sheriff Bodenbender that the suspect activity occurred
every week between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., on Friday or Saturday and it
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included cocaine. (Tr. at 19-20, 27.) The confidential informant indicated that
“[h]e had been told specifically by Mr. Urdiales” about these events. (Tr. at 20-
21.) Based on this information, Sheriff Bodenbender applied for a search warrant
to authorize the installation and monitoring of a GPS tracker.
{¶7} Sheriff Bodenbender further testified about the night of March 7,
2014, when the GPS monitoring of the target vehicle occurred. Based upon the
information obtained from the tracking device, Sheriff Bodenbender determined
that the vehicle’s movements and the timing of these movements were consistent
with the information provided by the confidential informant. (Tr. at 9-10.)
Therefore, relying on his experience with this confidential informant and on the
personal observations on March 7, 2014, Sheriff Bodenbender believed that
Urdiales was transporting drugs into Henry County. (Tr. at 15.)
{¶8} Sheriff Bodenbender traveled to the site of the vehicle stop and
confirmed that the driver was Urdiales. (Tr. at 10-11.) When he arrived at the
scene of the stop, Urdiales was standing outside of his vehicle, while the K-9 unit
was “sniffing around the van or inside.” (Tr. at 35-36.) The K-9 alerted the law
enforcement personnel that there were drugs present. (Tr. at 11-12.) Sheriff
Bodenbender testified that Urdiales was standing “right beside” his vehicle when
the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. (Tr. at 36-37.) While the dog continued
the vehicle search, Sheriff Bodenbender patted down Urdiales and recovered “two
little bags of what we thought was cocaine,” and some cash. (Tr. at 12-13, 37.)
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Sheriff Bodenbender testified that this pat-down search was based on all the
information available to him at this point, including the K-9 alert. (Tr. at 39.) A
field test conducted at the scene came back positive for cocaine. (Tr. at 39.)
{¶9} Sergeant Ruskey was the next person testifying at the hearing. He
indicated that on March 7, 2014, as he conducted the GPS monitoring, he was
aware that Urdiales was the person driving the vehicle and that the vehicle was
monitored for a suspicion of drug trafficking. (Tr. at 46-47, 49, 52.) He was
given the description of the vehicle. (Tr. at 54.) He knew other details of the
suspected drug activity, as they were conveyed to him by Sheriff Bodenbender,
including the time the vehicle was supposed to travel to Toledo. (Tr. at 54-56.)
When the vehicle entered Henry County, Sergeant Ruskey traveled in the direction
indicated by the GPS unit and identified the target vehicle. (Tr. at 48.) Sergeant
Ruskey testified that at this point he believed that the vehicle or its occupants
would be in possession of illegal drugs. (Tr. at 49.) Therefore, he initiated a stop
based on his belief that the vehicle would contain contraband or illegal drugs, as
indicated in the search warrant. (Tr. at 48-49.)
{¶10} When Urdiales exited the vehicle, Sergeant Ruskey patted him down
for weapons and placed him in handcuffs. (Tr. at 61-62.) He again testified that
these precautions were based on the information collected through the
investigation and the monitoring, which led him to believe that the vehicle would
contain narcotics. (Tr. at 61-63.) According to Sergeant Ruskey, Urdiales was not
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under arrest at this point. (Tr. at 70-72.) Sergeant Ruskey testified that Urdiales
was standing right behind his vehicle when the K-9 unit was deployed, within 40
feet of his vehicle. (Tr. at 51, 63.) Sergeant Ruskey specified that the search by
Sheriff Bodenbender occurred after the K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, but
the K-9 continued the search while Sheriff Bodenbender was patting down
Urdiales. (Tr. at 51-52.) Urdiales was placed under arrest upon the recovery of
the drugs from his person. (Tr. at 70-71.)
{¶11} Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
On January 13, 2015, Urdiales withdrew his previous not guilty plea and entered a
plea of no contest. The trial court found Urdiales guilty and sentenced him to
eleven months in prison. Thereafter, Urdiales filed the instant appeal in which he
raises three assignments of error, as quoted below.
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
THE SHERIFF’S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF HIS
APPLICATION FOR A GPS TRACKING WARRANT
WAS SUFFICIENT FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT
PROCURED AS A RESULT OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOP OF APPELLANT’S
VEHICLE, SAID EVIDENCE TAKEN IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 14,
ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT
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PROCURED AS A RESULT OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH OF APPELLANT’S
PERSON, SAID EVIDENCE TAKEN IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 14,
ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶12} All three assignments of error challenge the trial court’s ruling on
Urdiales’s motion to suppress. An appellate review of the trial court’s decision on
a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside,
100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8; State v. Norman, 136
Ohio App. 3d 46, 51, 735 N.E.2d 953 (3d Dist.1999). We will accept the trial
court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence,
because the “evaluation of evidence and the credibility of witnesses” at the
suppression hearing are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St. 3d
357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992); Norman at 51; Burnside at ¶ 8. But we must
independently determine, without deference to the trial court, whether these
factual findings satisfy the legal standard as a matter of law because “the
application of the law to the trial court’s findings of fact is subject to a de novo
standard of review.” Norman at 52; Burnside at ¶ 8. With this legal standard in
mind, we proceed to review the issues raised by Urdiales as they pertain to the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
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First Assignment of Error—Affidavit in Support of the Search Warrant
{¶13} In the first assignment of error, Urdiales challenges the sufficiency of
Sheriff Bodenbender’s probable cause affidavit in support of the search warrant
authorizing installation and monitoring of the GPS tracking device on the target
vehicle. When reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit
submitted in support of a search warrant, our duty is “to ensure that the magistrate
had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v.
George, 45 Ohio St. 3d 325, 332, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the
syllabus, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). We do not
conduct “a de novo determination as to whether the affidavit contains sufficient
probable cause upon which that court would issue the search warrant,” but instead
accord great deference to the trial court’s determination of probable cause and
resolve “doubtful or marginal cases” in favor of upholding the warrant. Id.;
accord State v. Jones, __ Ohio St. ___, 2015-Ohio-483, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 14, 18,
quoting George id. Thus, the question on appeal is not whether we would find
probable cause to issue the search warrant based on the submitted affidavit, but
whether the issuing judge “had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed.” George at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶14} When reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search
warrant, both the trial court and the appellate court are limited to the information
that was “brought to the attention of the [issuing judge].” State v. Graddy, 55
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Ohio St.2d 132, 134, 378 N.E.2d 723 (1978), fn.1; accord State v. OK Sun Bean,
13 Ohio App. 3d 69, 71, 468 N.E.2d 146 (6th Dist.1983) (“the affidavit’s legal
sufficiency may be determined only from the information actually furnished to the
issuing judge.”) (Emphasis sic.) But this information is analyzed under the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach, which we recognized in State v. Garza,
2013-Ohio-5492, 5 N.E.3d 89, ¶ 25-26 (3d Dist.), appeal not accepted, 138 Ohio
St.3d 1494, 2014-Ohio-2021, 8 N.E.3d 964 (2014).
“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis
of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.”
(Emphasis added.) George at 329, quoting Gates at 238; see also State v. Thomas,
61 Ohio St. 2d 223, 227-228, 400 N.E.2d 401 (1980) (“In examining the affidavit
for a search warrant in the cause sub judice, we are guided by the interpretive rules
that such affidavits are to be tested in a common sense manner * * * .”), citing
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S. Ct. 741 (1965). We will apply
this common-sense totality-of-the-circumstances test to both “the original probable
cause determination” of the issuing judge and to our determination of whether the
issuing judge had a “substantial basis” for finding that probable cause existed.
George at 329.
{¶15} Urdiales alleges that the information provided in the affidavit was
insufficient for the following reasons: (1) lack of the “underlying circumstances of
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how the confidential informant came to know that the defendant was allegedly
transporting narcotics”; (2) the informant’s “reliability was unsupported by any
facts in the affidavit”; (3) the affidavit fails to state that the informant “saw any
evidence of drug possession or transport”; (4) lack of the informant’s name or
identity; (5) lack of “the details regarding any supposed conviction this
informant’s information allegedly helped facilitate.” (App’t Br. at 3-5.) In his
argument Urdiales relies solely on Graddy, 55 Ohio St. 2d 132, 378 N.E.2d 723,
and using our analysis in Garza word-for-word, he suggests that the Ohio
Supreme Court’s holding warrants reversal in this case. Yet, neither Graddy nor
Garza supports Urdiales’s argument.
{¶16} As we recognized in Garza,
In Graddy, a warrant was issued based on an affidavit alleging that a
police detective believed that drugs were located in the described
premises. That affidavit contained allegations from an informant
whose reliability was unsupported by any facts in the affidavit. Id. at
136-137. Further, the conclusion that drug activity was occurring
was also unsupported by any facts in the affidavit. Id. The Ohio
Supreme Court held that “the belief or conclusion of the affiant, or
the informant in a situation where hearsay is furnished by informant
to the affiant, without presentation of the facts to the magistrate
upon which the conclusion is based, is constitutionally an
insufficient basis upon which the magistrate may determine the
existence of probable cause.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 134. The
court specifically focused on the fact that the affidavit lacked “Any
of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded the drugs were on the premises.” Id. at 139.
(Emphasis sic.) Garza at ¶ 25.
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{¶17} The distinctions between Graddy and the current case are readily
apparent.
{¶18} First, in the instant case, the informant’s reliability was supported by
the facts in the affidavit. In particular, the affidavit stated that “information
provided by this confidential informant in the past has proven to be accurate and
has led to an arrest and conviction.” (State’s Ex. 1.) The Ohio Supreme Court
expressly recognized sufficiency of such a statement in support of the confidential
informant’s credibility. See Graddy at 137 (“when an informant has furnished
reliable information in the past, it ‘gives the magistrate a definite indication of
credibility.’ Such an averment provides an underlying circumstance for the
magistrate to independently assess the informant’s credibility.”), quoting State v.
Karr, 44 Ohio St. 2d 163, 166, 339 N.E.2d 641 (1975). The Ohio Supreme Court
contrasted the statement “information from reliable informant whose information
has proven reliable,” which was insufficient to establish the informant’s
credibility, with “information from a reliable informant ‘who has given reliable
and factual information in the past which has led to several arrests,’ ” and
“information from a reliable informant ‘who has given truthful and factual
information in the recent past,’ ” which were both found sufficient to satisfy the
minimum for establishing the credibility of the informant. Graddy at 137, quoting
Karr at 166. “An informant’s past performance is an underlying circumstance
from which an affiant can properly conclude that he is credible.” State v. Dodson,
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43 Ohio App. 2d 31, 34, 332 N.E.2d 371 (8th Dist.1974), citing McCray v. State of
Ill., 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967). Therefore, the
informant’s credibility in this case was sufficiently supported.
{¶19} Second, the affidavit here included more than just “the belief or
conclusion of the affiant” or the informant, which was found insufficient in
Graddy, 55 Ohio St. 2d at 134, 378 N.E.2d 723. It had the required “presentation
of the facts * * * upon which the conclusion is based.” Id. In addition to reciting
the fact pattern in which the criminal activity was alleged to be occurring, the
affidavit stated that the informant’s conclusions or suspicions of criminal activity
were based on the information received directly from Urdiales. The Ohio
Supreme Court recognized that the informant’s “personal observation of the fact
or events described to the affiant” is “a common and acceptable basis for the
informant’s information.” Id. at 139-140, citing Karr at 165. What the
confidential informant heard in the instant case is akin to the “observation”
expressly authorized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Graddy and Karr. See State v.
Nabozny, 54 Ohio St. 2d 195, 204-205, 375 N.E.2d 784 (1978) (finding that
affidavits “recited the events within the informant’s personal experience” when
they included statements that the informant had heard from a co-conspirator),
vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Nabozny v. Ohio., 439 U.S. 811, 99
S. Ct. 70, 58 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1978). Therefore, unlike in Graddy, the affidavit here
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included the “underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded” that
criminal activity was occurring. Graddy at 135.
{¶20} Furthermore, failure to satisfy the two elements discussed in Graddy
does not automatically invalidate a search warrant. Subsequent to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, the
affiant is not required “to reveal his informant’s ‘basis of knowledge’ and provide
sufficient facts to establish the informant’s ‘veracity’ or the ‘reliability’ of the
informant’s report” in order to give grounds for a probable cause finding. George,
45 Ohio St. 3d at 328, 544 N.E.2d 640, fn. 3. Instead, the issuing judge must be
provided with enough information to make “a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 329, quoting Gates at 238-239; see
also State v. Gibler, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-2000-06, 2000 WL 1344545, *6 (“an
unidentified informant’s ‘reliability,’ ‘veracity,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ should
not be examined as separate elements, but rather are merely part of the totality of
the information to be weighed by the [issuing judge] in making a probable cause
determination. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.”). Therefore, Urdiales’s reliance on
Graddy alone to challenge the warrant affidavit is insufficient.
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{¶21} The totality of the circumstances presented in this case favors the
finding of probable cause. In addition to the information discussed above, the
affidavit included the vehicle’s year, make and model, registration number, the
name of the vehicle owner, and the name of the driver, as given to the affiant by
the informant. The Ohio Supreme Court recognized that an extensive description
of the facts or events in the affidavit may add credibility to the information
presented therein. Graddy at 140. The affidavit was further based on Sheriff
Bodenbender’s extensive training and experience.
{¶22} We note that Urdiales fails to legally support his suggestion that the
affidavit was deficient for lack of the informant’s name or identity. Conversely, it
is well-established that “[a] search warrant affidavit may properly be based * * *
on tips received from unnamed informants whose identity often will be properly
protected from revelation.” State v. Jefferson, 5th Dist. Richland No. 09-CA-20,
2009-Ohio-5485, ¶ 46, citing McCray, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62
(1967). Similarly, Urdiales fails to support his other challenges with any reasons,
and based on the above reasoning, we find them meritless.
{¶23} We hold that under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the
issuing judge had substantial basis to properly conclude that there was probable
cause to issue the search warrant based on all the facts in the affidavit.
Accordingly, we reject Urdiales’s contention that the affidavit in support of the
search warrant was insufficient and we overrule the first assignment of error.
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Second Assignment of Error—Justification to Stop
{¶24} In the second assignment of error Urdiales claims that the
warrantless stop of his vehicle by Sergeant Ruskey was unconstitutional. A
warrantless vehicle stop is constitutionally valid “if an officer has a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime,” or that the vehicle contains contraband. State v. Mays, 119 Ohio
St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7; State v. Ward, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-040379, 2005-Ohio-3036, ¶ 30. When we review the
constitutionality of a traffic stop, we “ ‘must view the stop in light of the totality of
the surrounding circumstances’ ” and determine whether “specific, articulable
facts” in support of the reasonable suspicion existed. State v. Dicke, 3d Dist.
Auglaize No. 2-07-29, 2007-Ohio-6705, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Fields, 3d Dist.
Crawford No. 3-92-13, 1992 WL 224531, *1 (Sept. 10, 1992); State v. Martinez,
3d Dist. Shelby No. 133-04-49, 2006-Ohio-2002, ¶ 8.
{¶25} In the instant case, Sergeant Ruskey testified that based on the
information available to him, he believed the vehicle would contain contraband.
In particular, he knew that the target vehicle was being monitored for suspicion of
drug trafficking. He was given the description of the vehicle and knew the details
of the search warrant. He additionally knew what time the suspected drug activity
was to occur. All these facts were confirmed by his observation of the vehicle’s
movements on the GPS tracker monitor. Upon the vehicle entering Henry County,
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Sergeant Ruskey confirmed that the vehicle matched the description previously
given to him. Based on all these specific facts, we hold that the trial court did not
err in finding that there was a reasonable suspicion to stop the target vehicle.
{¶26} At the same time, we reject Urdiales’s assertion that the stop was
invalid due to the lack of “independent corroborating information” to support
statements of the reliable confidential informant. (App’t Br. at 8.) Even though
Urdiales fails to provide any legal support for his suggestion that a traffic stop in
this case required “independent corroborating information,”1 we recognize that the
facts of the instant case provide plenty of corroboration for the confidential
informant’s statements, as further discussed in our analysis of the third assignment
of error.
{¶27} Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.
Third Assignment of Error—Warrantless Search of Urdiales’s Person
{¶28} In the third assignment of error, Urdiales challenges the warrantless
search of his person by Sheriff Bodenbender. It is well established that a
warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless certain “specifically established
and well delineated exceptions” exist. City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d
1
The case cited by Urdiales as allegedly having the example of “independent corroborating information” is
State v. Winningham, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110134, 2011-Ohio-6229, judgment vacated on other
grounds, 132 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2012-Ohio-1998, 969 N.E.2d 251. Yet, Winningham does not support
Urdiales’s position. The alleged independent corroborating information in that case was obtained prior to
the issuance of a search warrant for installation of a GPS tracking device, and it was not at issue in the case.
The First District Court of Appeals held that a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle
existed “[o]nce the GPS tracker had alerted the police officers that Winningham’s truck had left the
Interstate-275 loop and traveled to Chicago.” Id. at ¶ 25. Therefore, Winningham contradicts, rather than
supports, Urdiales’s argument.
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216, 218, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 454–455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). The Ohio Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement that a
warrant be obtained prior to a search:
(a) a search incident to a lawful arrest;
(b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights;
(c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine;
(d) hot pursuit;
(e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances;
(f) the plain view doctrine; and
(g) administrative search.
Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St. 3d 156, 164, 593 N.E.2d 294 (1992), fn. 4. The
burden is on the state to establish that a warrantless search is valid under one of
these exceptions. State v. Williams, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-06-46, 2007-Ohio-
5489, ¶ 19. The trial court in the instant case denied the motion to suppress,
reasoning that there existed probable cause and exigency because “the contraband
could have been discarded or lost while waiting for a warrant.” (R. at 18 at 7.)
Urdiales argues that this finding was in error because the dog alerting to the
presence of drugs in the vehicle did not give Sheriff Bodenbender probable cause
to search his person.
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{¶29} There appears to be a disagreement between courts over whether a
canine alert to the vehicle, alone, is sufficient to constitute probable cause to
search an occupant of the vehicle. See State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
10CA0022, 2012-Ohio-2428, ¶ 10 (rejecting the trial court’s determination “that a
positive canine alert alone justified the search of the vehicle and Robinson”); State
v. McCorvey, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0038, 2011-Ohio-3627, ¶ 33
(summarizing law from several jurisdictions that refused to find probable cause
based on canine alert alone and recognizing that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled to the contrary); State v. Griffin, 949 So. 2d
309 (Fla.App.2007) (recognizing the conflict between courts in Florida and urging
the supreme court of the state to review the issue in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S. Ct.
795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003), and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct.
834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005)); State v. Ofori, 170 Md.App. 211, 906 A.2d 1089
(2006) (holding that the Pringle decision is “absolutely dispositive” in establishing
that a dog alert on a car provides probable cause to search the driver and
passengers because of the “close association” between the contraband and the
car’s occupants); State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Washington No. 03CA61, 2004-Ohio-
7280, ¶ 43 (“Although the dog’s positive reaction to the vehicle while Jones was
seated in it was clearly relevant, this factor alone is insufficient to constitute
probable cause to search Jones’ person.”); Wallace v. State, 142 Md.App. 673,
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686, 791 A.2d 968 (Md.App.2002) (noting a distinction between cases where the
driver is the sole occupant of the vehicle and cases with multiple occupants and
stating that “[b]oth the Court of Appeals and this Court have implied in recent
cases, albeit in dicta, that a drug dog’s positive alert may give rise not only to the
right to search a car but the right to arrest an occupant without a warrant. * * * In
both of these cases, however, the driver was the sole occupant of the car.”); United
States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that a canine alert to
the inside of the defendant’s car provided probable cause necessary to arrest the
defendant). For the purpose of this opinion, we need not reach this issue,
however.
{¶30} “Probable cause exists when a reasonably prudent person would
believe that there is a fair probability that the place to be searched contains
evidence of a crime.” State v. Blandin, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-06-107, 2007-Ohio-
6418, ¶ 50, citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 246, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527.
In determining whether a law enforcement officer possessed
probable cause to conduct a search, a court must review the totality
of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search.
Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142.
“Probable cause must be based upon objective facts that would
justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate.” [State v.] Moore,
90 Ohio St.3d [47,] 49, [2000-Ohio-10, 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000)],
citing State v. Welch (1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 88, 92, 18 OBR 124,
127, 480 N.E.2d 384. Thus, the officer must possess sufficient facts
from a reasonably trustworthy source that a search will uncover
evidence of a crime. See State v. Hill (May 15, 1991), Jackson App.
No. 632; Beck, 379 U.S. at 91; see, also, State v. Williams, Ross
App. No. 10CA3162, 201-1Ohio-763.
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Case No. 7-15-03
State v. Kelley, 4th Dist. Ross No. 10CA3182, 2011-Ohio-3545, ¶ 23. Because the
determination of probable cause is made from the totality of the circumstances
present in a particular case, and the instant case involves more than just a dog
alerting to the vehicle, we review the multiple factors present here.
{¶31} At the time Sheriff Bodenbender arrived at the scene of the stop, he
had recent information provided by a reliable confidential informant about
Urdiales’s identity, the vehicle he would be driving, the vehicle’s owner, as well
as the time and route of travel. All this information was corroborated by Sheriff
Bodenbender’s observations during the tracking of the target vehicle and on the
scene of the stop. Sheriff Bodenbender also observed the K-9 alert to the presence
of drugs when sniffing the vehicle. The trial court determined that these facts
were sufficient for the finding of probable cause.
{¶32} In arriving at its decision, the trial court relied on our opinion in
Blandin, supra. There, law enforcement officers had information from a
confidential informant, indicating that the defendant, Blandin, was involved in
illegal drug activity. Id. at ¶ 2-4. The officers conducted surveillance of Blandin
as he drove his vehicle, and “observed a passenger that Blandin picked up at a gas
station enter and leave the vehicle within a short period of time.” Id. at ¶ 6. After
Blandin picked up another passenger, the officers stopped his vehicle and
conducted a dog sniff while Blandin was still in the car. Id. at ¶ 7. Upon the dog
alerting to the presence of drugs in the vehicle, Blandin stepped out of the car. Id.
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Case No. 7-15-03
at ¶ 8-9. Officers did not find contraband in the vehicle, but they noticed “a lump
at the top line of Blandin’s pants.” Id. at ¶ 9. Additionally, the officers “had
received tips that Blandin often concealed contraband in the crotch area of his
pants,” and the passenger of Blandin’s vehicle “indicated to officers that the [sic]
Blandin placed the contraband down his pants upon being stopped.” Id. We held
that the officer had probable cause to search Blandin’s person. Id. at ¶ 50.
{¶33} While Urdiales’s case involves tips from a confidential informant,
independent police surveillance, and a dog sniff, we recognize that it differs from
Blandin in several respects. First, in Blandin, the dog alert occurred while the
defendant was still in the car, which might have been used for an inference that the
drugs were either in the vehicle or with the vehicle’s occupants. Second, the
search of Blandin’s vehicle did not reveal any drugs, which might suggest that the
dog reacted to the drugs present on Blandin or his passenger. See McCorvey, 11th
Dist. Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0038, 2011-Ohio-3627, at ¶ 35 (holding that the
canine’s alert to appellee’s car and its subsequent negative search were pertinent
factors in the probable-cause inquiry). Third, the police officers had information
that Blandin would conceal drugs in his pants. Fourth, the officers noticed “a
lump” on Blandin’s pants. These additional circumstances are not present in the
instant case. Nevertheless, this does not necessitate a conclusion that probable
cause was lacking.
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Case No. 7-15-03
{¶34} The Fourth District Court of Appeals held that the finding of
probable cause was proper in Kelley, 4th Dist. Ross No. 10CA3182, 2011-Ohio-
3545. There, detectives “received information from two confidential informants
that appellant would be traveling on State Route 104 from Chillicothe to
Columbus in a black Chevy pick-up truck in order to obtain a large amount of
crack cocaine.” Id. at ¶ 3. Upon this information, a law enforcement officer
stopped the vehicle, which included a driver and two passengers. Id. at ¶ 4, 8.
When at the scene, a canine alerted on the passenger side of the vehicle, where
Kelley was seated. Id. at ¶ 5, 27. The officer asked Kelley to exit the vehicle, and
“noticed a piece of tissue paper sticking out of the back side of appellant’s
waistband.” Id. at ¶ 5. The officer “further observed that appellant appeared
‘tense, stiff and nervous’ and that he walked ‘[k]ind of tight, stiff.’ ” Id. The
officer conducted a search of “exterior of [Kelley’s] clothing” for contraband. Id.
at ¶ 6. In reviewing the existence of probable cause under the totality of the
circumstances, the Court of Appeals noted that the information from the
confidential informants proved reliable, and the dog alerted to the side of the
vehicle where Kelley was sitting. Id. at ¶ 27. The court further recognized the
additional facts and circumstances, including “toilet paper sticking out from
appellant’s pants,” “stiff walking and nervous behavior and the observation that
appellant’s companion also had toilet paper sticking out of his pants.” Id. All of
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Case No. 7-15-03
these facts were sufficient “to warrant a reasonable person to believe that drugs
would likely be located on appellant’s person.” Id.
{¶35} A holding of the Tenth District Court of Appeals is even more
instructive on the resolution of the instant case:
Upon review, we find that the confidential informant’s tip, which, as
noted above, included the name and description of the defendant, the
location and time of the arranged transaction, a description of the
defendant’s vehicle, as well as the informant’s subsequent allegation
at the scene that he observed defendant in possession of cocaine,
furnished the police with probable cause. However, assuming that
the officers did not have probable cause to proceed based on this
information alone, we find that the subsequent actions of the
narcotics detention dog alerting to the presence of drugs on the
driver’s seat of the vehicle, in conjunction with the informant’s tip,
provided officers with probable cause to arrest.
State v. Walker, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APA09-1219, 1998 WL 429121, *6
(July 28, 1998). The reasoning of the Tenth District Court of Appeals suggests
that the confidential informant’s tip alone, if sufficiently corroborated, may give
the police “probable cause to conduct a search for contraband.” Id. See also
McCorvey, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0038, 2011-Ohio-3627, at ¶ 21-25
(distinguishing McCorvey, where an anonymous tip without an independent
corroboration was insufficient to give probable cause for the search, from cases
where an informant’s tip was sufficiently supported by independent
corroboration).
{¶36} To the extent that other Ohio courts have refused to find probable
cause to search an occupant of a vehicle after a canine alert to the vehicle, we find
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Case No. 7-15-03
these cases distinguishable or not persuasive. For example, in Robinson, 9th Dist.
Wayne No. 10CA0022, 2012-Ohio-2428, a police officer observed Robinson’s
vehicle in an area known for drug trafficking. Id. at ¶ 6. After learning that the
vehicle’s owner had a prior drug conviction, the officer followed it and stopped it
upon observing two traffic violations. Id. Robinson told the officer that his reason
for a visit in the area was “dropping off an individual,” who was known to the
officer “as one involved in illegal drug activity.” Id. While the officer was talking
to Robinson, who was still in his car, a canine brought to the scene alerted to the
presence of drugs at the driver’s door. Id. at ¶ 7. After Robinson stepped out of
the car, the K-9 officer discovered loose marijuana in the vehicle. A subsequent
search of Robinson’s person revealed “a wad of money” in his pocket and two
bags of cocaine in his socks. Id. Appeal of the case concerned State’s arguments
that the searches were consensual, they were merely Terry-type2 searches, or they
were incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at ¶ 8. The appellate court rejected these
arguments. Furthermore, the Ninth District Court of Appeals rejected the trial
court’s determination “that a positive canine alert alone justified the search of the
vehicle and Robinson.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 10. Without engaging in the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the court concluded, “in the facts before us,
the canine alert did not justify the full search of Robinson’s person.” Id.
2
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
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Case No. 7-15-03
{¶37} The Ninth District Court of Appeals focused on the fact that the trial
court’s probable cause determination was based on “the canine alert alone.” Id. at
¶ 10. Yet, the facts of the case indicated that the police officers had additional
reliable information on which they could have based their belief of a fair
probability that the place to be searched contained evidence of a crime. In
particular, Robinson was in an area known for drug activity and admitted contact
with a person known for being involved in illegal drug activity. Additionally, the
search of Robinson’s socks occurred after marijuana had been found in the vehicle
and after the officer had noticed “ ‘a large bulge on the inside of [Robinson’s]
right sock .’ ” (Alteration sic.) Id. at ¶ 31. Because the Ninth District Court of
Appeals did not consider all of the circumstances in its determination of probable
cause,3 we decline to follow its holding in the instant case. Additionally, we note
that the case is distinguishable because it did not involve any tips from a
confidential informant. Similarly, we do not find applicable the holding of the
Eleventh District Court of Appeals in McCorvey, supra, where the court held that
due to unreliability of an unverified tip from an anonymous informant, probable
cause was lacking to search the defendant upon a canine alert.
{¶38} We hold that under the totality of the circumstances present in this
case, the finding of probable cause was sufficiently supported by multiple factors,
including a detailed tip from a reliable confidential informant, who had supplied
3
It appears that the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis was used to review justification for the Terry-
type search and voluntariness of the search, but not for the probable cause analysis. See id. at ¶ 16-17, 29.
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Case No. 7-15-03
accurate information in the past. The tip was corroborated with respect to Urdiales
by the surveillance and observations on the scene. The K-9 alert served as an
additional factor to support the finding of probable cause.
{¶39} Urdiales does not challenge the trial court’s finding of exigency.
Accordingly, we hold that because the State sufficiently established an exception
for the warrantless search of Urdiales’s person, the trial court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress for allegations of unconstitutional search. The
third assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶40} Having reviewed the arguments, the briefs, and the record in this
case, we find no error prejudicial to Appellant in the particulars assigned and
argued. The judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Henry County, Ohio, is
therefore affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/hlo
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