State v. Thomas , 2015 Ohio 187 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Thomas, 2015-Ohio-187.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-140265
TRIAL NO. 14CRB-6304
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
SHAQUIL THOMAS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From is: Reversed and Defendant Discharged
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 23, 2015
Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, Charles Rubenstein, City Prosecutor, and
Marva K. Benjamin, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Marguerite Slagle, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
C UNNINGHAM , Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Shaquil Thomas appeals his conviction for escape in violation of R.C.
2921.34(A)(1). Because the state failed to prove that Thomas was “under detention,”
an essential element of the offense, we reverse the conviction and discharge Thomas
from further prosecution.
Background Facts
{¶2} Thomas was charged with escape in violation of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1)
when he tried to leave without permission the Bridge at Talbert House, a facility that
primarily serves children under the age of 18 with mental-health and severe
behavioral issues.
{¶3} At the bench trial, the state presented testimony from Al Caldwell, the
operational police supervisor for the facility. Caldwell stated that Thomas, now over
the age of 18, had been brought to the facility as a juvenile to address his mental-
health issues as “court ordered by Job and Family Services,” referring to the
Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“JFS”). On March 15,
2014, according to Caldwell, Thomas had attempted to escape from the locked
facility. But Caldwell could not remember when Thomas had arrived, and he did not
present any “court order” authorizing the detention.
{¶4} Thomas testified that before his arrival at the facility he had been
living with his mother, who had custody of him. When he was banned from his
mother’s apartment complex, he was taken to the facility by employees of JFS. He
further testified that he did not know why he was residing in the facility and that he
was not handcuffed when the JFS workers walked him into the facility. Thomas
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
acknowledged that he had tried to leave the locked facility, but he claimed that he did
not know that he was not allowed to leave without permission.
{¶5} In contesting the sufficiency of the state’s evidence, Thomas argued, in
part, that the state failed to establish that he was “under detention,” a necessary
element of the offense. The trial court disagreed and convicted Thomas of escape, in
violation of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1).
Analysis
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Thomas argues that his conviction for
escape was not supported by sufficient evidence. In the review of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a conviction, the relevant inquiry for the appellate court “is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
{¶7} The escape statute, R.C. 2921.34, provides in relevant part that “[n]o
person, knowing the person is under detention, * * * or being reckless in that regard,
shall purposely break or attempt to break the detention * * *.” Thomas argues that
the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was detained, or alternatively, that he
had knowledge of the detention or was reckless in that regard. We hold that the state
failed to prove that Thomas was detained, and sustain his assignment of error on
that basis.
{¶8} “Detention” as used in the escape statute means (1) “arrest”; (2)
“confinement in any public or private facility for custody of persons charged with
or convicted of [a] crime * * * or alleged or found to be a delinquent or unruly child
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
* * *”; (3) “hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in any public or
private facility that is ordered pursuant to or under the authority of section
2945.37, 2945.371, 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401, or 2945.402 of the Revised
Code”; (4) “confinement in any vehicle for the transportation to or from any facility
of any of those natures”; (5) “detention for extradition or deportation”; (6) “except as
provided in [R.C. 2921.01(E)], supervision by any employee of any facility of any of
those natures that is incidental to hospitalization, institutionalization, or
confinement in the facility but that occurs outside of the facility; supervision by an
employee of the department of rehabilitation and correction of person on any type of
release from a state correctional institution; or confinement in any vehicle, airplane,
or place while being returned from outside of this state into this state by a private
person or entity pursuant to a contract entered into under division (E) of section
311.29 of the Revised Code or division (B) of section 5149.03 of the Revised Code”;
and (7) “[f]or a person confined in a county jail who participates in a county jail
industry program pursuant to section 5147.30 of the Revised Code, ‘detention’
includes time spent at an assigned work site and going to and from the work site.”
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2921.01(E).
{¶9} The state suggested below that it had presented sufficient evidence
that Thomas was confined as an alleged or adjudicated unruly or delinquent child, in
accordance with the second statutory definition of detention. But the record does not
support this claim. At best, the evidence demonstrated that JFS had custody of
Thomas and placed him in the facility to address his mental-health issues. And the
state has cited no authority that a JFS placement for mental-health treatment is
equivalent to a detention due to an allegation or adjudication of delinquency or
unruliness.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶10} The state now argues that it established the element of detention by
demonstrating that Thomas was “ordered” to the facility “by the court” for a
“competency evaluation,” for a “mental health evaluation,” or for “[mental health]
treatment.” The state is apparently relying on the third statutory definition of
detention, which generally refers to “hospitalization, institutionalization, or
confinement” in a facility that is ordered by the court in a criminal action pursuant to
certain statutes upon a claim of incompetency to stand trial or a plea of insanity.
{¶11} But there was no evidence that Thomas was court ordered to the
facility pursuant to or under the authority of the specific statutory sections
referenced in that definition of detention. Based on the plain language of the statute,
the state’s argument fails.
Conclusion
{¶12} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in finding Thomas guilty
of escape, because the state failed to establish that Thomas was detained as defined
in R.C. 2921.01(E), a necessary element of the offense. The evidence demonstrated
only that the defendant had been placed in the facility as a juvenile by JFS to address
his mental-health issues, and not, as the state argues, that he had been confined as
an alleged or adjudicated unruly or delinquent child, or that he had been ordered to
the facility by the court in a criminal action for issues related to a claim of
incompetency to stand trial or a plea of insanity. The judgment of the trial court is
reversed and Thomas is discharged from further prosecution.
Judgment reversed and defendant discharged.
HENDON and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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