State v. Boyer ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Boyer, 2017-Ohio-5858.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
CASE NO. 2016-P-0061
- vs - :
KEITH A. BOYER, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2014 CR
00212.
Judgment: Appeal dismissed.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Kristina Reilly, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
John Chapman, 631 West Exchange Street, Akron, OH 44302 (For Defendant-
Appellee).
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the September 28, 2016
Order and Journal Entry of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, granting
defendant-appellee, Keith A. Boyer’s, Motion for Judicial Release. The determinative
issue before this court is whether the State may appeal the granting of a motion for
judicial release for a third-degree felony pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(B)(2). For the
following reasons, we hold that it may not and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.
{¶2} On February 12, 2015, Keith A. Boyer entered a plea of guilty to
Aggravated Vehicular Assault, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C.
2903.08(A)(1)(a), in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas. In the Written Plea of
Guilty, Boyer was advised that he was subject to a “MANDATORY PRISON TERM OF
EITHER 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 YEARS.”
{¶3} Following a sentencing hearing on May 15, 2015, Boyer was sentenced to
“a term of imprisonment of Two (2) years.”
{¶4} On June 21, 2016, Boyer filed a Motion for Judicial Release.
{¶5} On September 26, 2016, a hearing was held on Boyer’s Motion, at which
the State opposed release on the grounds that Boyer’s sentence was mandatory.
{¶6} On September 28, 2016, the trial court granted the Motion for Judicial
Release.
{¶7} On October 6, 2016, the State of Ohio filed its Notice of Appeal, raising
the following assignment of error:
{¶8} “[1.] The trial court erred in granting Boyer’s motion for judicial release
under the authority of State v. Ware, 141 Ohio St. 3d 160, 2014-Ohio-5201, 22 N.E.3d
1082.”
{¶9} Preliminarily, we consider Boyer’s argument that the State is without
authority to appeal the trial court’s judgment granting judicial release.
{¶10} The Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 2945.67 to grant the
prosecution a limited right of appeal in criminal cases which it did not enjoy historically.
State v. Davidson, 17 Ohio St. 3d 132, 134, 477 N.E.2d 1141 (1985). “Absent R.C.
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2945.67, the state has no substantive right to appeal trial-court decisions in criminal
cases.” In re M.M., 135 Ohio St. 3d 375, 2013-Ohio-1495, 987 N.E.2d 652, ¶ 22.
{¶11} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A), “[a] prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal by
leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision [apart from the
granting of a motion to dismiss, suppress, return seized property, or post conviction
relief] except the final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case * * *.” In addition, “a
prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal, in accordance with section 2953.08 of the
Revised Code, a sentence imposed upon a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty
to a felony.” Id.
{¶12} The State has not sought leave to file a discretionary appeal under R.C.
2945.67(A). Rather, the State contends “[t]his appeal is a proper appeal as a matter of
right of a sentence that is contrary to law pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(B)(2),” according to
which “a prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter of right a sentence imposed
upon a defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony or, in the
circumstances described in division (B)(3) of this section the modification of a sentence
imposed upon such a defendant,” on the grounds that “[t]he sentence is contrary to
law.” Appellant’s reply brief at 2.
{¶13} The State’s reliance on R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) is unavailing. The Ohio
Supreme Court has directly rejected the proposition that a prosecutor may appeal a
grant of judicial release for a third-degree felony (such as Aggravated Vehicular Assault)
under R.C. 2953.08(B)(2): “R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) does not authorize a prosecuting
attorney to appeal the modification of a sentence granting judicial release for a felony of
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the third, fourth, or fifth degree.” State v. Cunningham, 113 Ohio St. 3d 108, 2007-Ohio-
1245, 863 N.E.2d 120, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶14} The Supreme Court explained this ruling by reference to division (B)(3),
which expressly “grants the state a right to appeal if a court modifies a sentence
imposed for a felony of the first or second degree.” Id. at ¶ 11; R.C. 2953.08(B)(3) (the
prosecuting attorney may appeal a “sentence [which] is a modification under section
2929.20 of the Revised Code [judicial release] of a sentence that was imposed for a
felony of the first or second degree”).
{¶15} The Court recognized the legislature’s implied intent not to grant the State
an appeal as a matter of right from the granting of judicial release for felonies of the
third, fourth, and fifth degree:
First, the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(B)(3) does not include any
reference to a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree. By
including only felonies of the first and second degree within the text
of (B)(3), the General Assembly has excluded all other felony
offenses of a lesser degree because “the express inclusion of one
thing implies the exclusion of the other.” Myers v. Toledo, 110 Ohio
St.3d 218, 2006-Ohio-4353, 852 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 24.
Cunningham at ¶ 20.
{¶16} The court next foreclosed the possibility of appealing the granting of
judicial release for felonies of the third, fourth, and fifth degree under R.C.
2953.08(B)(2):
A careful examination of R.C. 2953.08(B)(2), however, reveals that
it does not refer to the modification of a sentence; rather, it
authorizes the prosecuting attorney to appeal, as a matter of right,
a sentence imposed on a defendant on the grounds that “[t]he
sentence is contrary to law.” Thus, it does not apply to a
modification of a sentence that is allegedly contrary to law.
Id. at ¶ 22.
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{¶17} The State has failed to properly invoke the jurisdiction of this court and,
therefore, the appeal must necessarily be dismissed.
{¶18} Although I share fully in the dissent’s desire to vacate the trial court’s
illegal release of Boyer prior to the expiration of his mandatory sentence, I cannot
endorse the employment of the “void judgment” doctrine, raised sua sponte, to achieve
this result. The fact that this court may have inherent power to vacate a void judgment
does not obviate the need to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction prior to the exercise
of such power. If a court does not have jurisdiction, how does the court have the ability
to exercise its inherent authority? A lower court may have inherent authority to vacate a
void judgment, but an appellate court still has to have jurisdiction to take any action with
respect to the lower court’s ruling. State v. Atwood, 61 Ohio App. 3d 650, 654, 573
N.E.2d 739 (4th Dist.1990) (“[i]t is a rule of universal application that [the] jurisdiction of
a court lies dormant” and “must be invoked in some manner and the action commenced
in the regular course of judicial procedure”). In Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d
31, 215 N.E.2d 698 (1966), relied upon by the dissent, the inherent power to vacate was
not an issue since the court’s jurisdiction was provided by statute. Id. at paragraph two
of the syllabus (“[w]here a party files a motion after term to vacate a judgment for
irregularities, he does not invoke the court’s inherent power to vacate but only its
statutory power under Section 2325.01 of the Revised Code”).
{¶19} To correct an erroneous judgment by a blatantly illegal exercise of
jurisdiction is a dubious precedent. The dissent’s expansive claim that void judgments
may be vacated at any time and under any circumstances provides litigants with an
alluring “nuclear option” by which legal technicalities, such as a timely filed notice of
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appeal or final order, may be circumvented. It is no exaggeration to say that the
number of appeals challenging purportedly “void” judgments, particularly sentencing
judgments, has increased and will continue to do so given the obvious advantages of
claiming that the challenged judgment was void ab initio.
{¶20} Moreover, the doctrine is not properly invoked under the circumstances of
this case. The void judgment doctrine, as conceived of in this “modern era” with its
“more sophisticated understanding of individual rights,” holds that “[t]he only sentence
which a trial court may impose is that provided for by statute,” and that the failure to
impose a statutorily mandated sentence is more than a mere error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, but, rather, “an act that lacks both statutory and constitutional authority.”
(Citation omitted.) State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St. 3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d
332, ¶ 20 and 22.1
{¶21} Even so, the trial court’s error in the present case does not constitute the
imposition of a sentence that is not statutorily mandated but, as explained above, the
illegal modification of a properly imposed sentence. The void sentence doctrine is not
properly invoked in the present circumstances.
{¶22} Appeal dismissed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
____________________________________
1. It must also be acknowledged that the doctrine, as applied to “the unusual void-sentence line of
cases[,] * * * continues to play havoc with [Ohio] jurisprudence.” State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St. 3d 403,
2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 35 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).
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CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
{¶23} The majority maintains the instant appeal should be dismissed because
the state failed to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction. I do not disagree with the
majority’s general analysis on this substantive point. I dissent because the trial court
transcended its authority in releasing appellee, an ineligible offender serving a
mandatory term of imprisonment. Because the trial court’s action of granting an
ineligible offender judicial release was not authorized by R.C. 2929.20, the governing
statute, the trial court’s judgment is void. I would accordingly hold that, notwithstanding
the state’s failure to properly move this court pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A), we should
exercise our inherent authority to vacate the trial court’s void judgment. Thus, under
these unique circumstances, the trial court’s judgment should be reversed and
remanded for further proceedings with instructions to the trial court to deny appellee’s
motion for judicial release.
{¶24} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.20(A)(1), judicial release is available only to
“eligible offenders.” An “eligible offender” is one who is serving one or more non-
mandatory prison terms. Id. Appellee was serving a two-year, mandatory term. He was
not an “eligible offender” for judicial release and, as a result, the trial court lacked
authority to grant his motion.
{¶25} The Supreme Court has observed that “[a]ny attempt by a court to
disregard statutory requirements when imposing a sentence renders the attempted
sentence a nullity or void.” State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St. 3d 74, 75 (1984). Although this
statement is directed at a trial court’s authority to impose a sentence, in State v.
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Cunningham, 113 Ohio St. 3d 108, 2007-Ohio-1245, the Supreme Court extrapolated,
by analogy, that “a trial court may grant judicial release and modify a sentence only as
provided for by statute.” Id. at ¶23. Unlike the defendant in Cunningham, appellee was
subject to a mandatory, two-year term of imprisonment and, as a matter of law, was not
an “eligible offender” under R.C. 2929.20(A)(1). When the trial court granted appellee’s
motion, it disregarded the statutory mandate that judicial release is a remedy available
only to those serving non-mandatory terms.
{¶26} Moreover, in granting an “ineligible offender” judicial release, the trial
court, in effect, reconsidered its own valid judgment of conviction in a criminal case.
Such an action is outside a trial court’s jurisdiction. See e.g. State ex rel. White, 80 Ohio
St.3d 335, 338 (1997) (“trial courts lack authority to reconsider their own valid final
judgments in criminal cases.”)
{¶27} With the foregoing in mind, the underlying judgment granting appellee
judicial release is void. A void judgment is a nullity and open to attack at any time.
Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St. 3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, ¶46. “A court has inherent power
to vacate a void judgment because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the
judgment was always a nullity.” Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31 (1966). The
phrase “inherent power” is defined as “[a]n authority possessed without its being derived
from another. A right, ability, or faculty of doing a thing, without receiving that right,
ability, or faculty from another.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 782. Hence, “[i]f an
appellate court is exercising its inherent power to vacate a void judgment, it does not
matter whether the notice of appeal was timely filed or whether there is a final,
appealable order.” (Emphasis added). State v. Bedford, 184 Ohio App. 3d 588, 2009-
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Ohio-3972, ¶12 (9th Dist.) citing Card v. Roysden (June 7, 1996), 2d Dist. No. 95 CA
108, 1996 WL 303571, *1 (June 7, 1996); Reed v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Mental
Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 10th Dist. No. 94APE10–1490, 1995 WL
250810, *3 (Apr. 27, 1995) (concluding that if an entry is void ab initio, “[w]hether or not
the * * * entry constitutes a final appealable order does not affect appellant’s ability to
appeal the matter”).
{¶28} Because the court possesses the inherent and independent authority to
vacate a void judgment, irrespective of jurisdictional barriers that would otherwise
preclude action, the state’s failure to invoke this court’s jurisdiction by statute or via
motion, per R.C. 2945.67(A), is without consequence. The trial court’s judgment,
granting appellee, an ineligible offender, judicial release is void. As a result, I would
vacate that judgment and reverse and remand the case for further proceedings,
pursuant to our inherent authority.
{¶29} I recognize this disposition stands in conflict with several of our sister
districts that have dismissed similar cases based upon a prosecuting attorney’s inability
to appeal under R.C. 2953.08(B), notwithstanding a trial court’s lack of authority to
award judicial release to an ineligible offender serving a mandatory prison term for
felonies of the third, fourth, or fifth degree. See e.g. State v. Shipman, 5th Dist. Stark
No. 2011CA00251, 2012-Ohio-2377; State v. Fox, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 2007-Ohio-
3893 (Stewart, J., dissenting); State v. Sparks, 178 Ohio App. 3d 272, 2008-Ohio-4664
(4th Dist.) (Kline, J., dissenting). In light of my position, I would additionally certify for
conflict the following issue for consideration to the Supreme Court of Ohio:
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{¶30} Whether an appellate court, pursuant to its inherent authority to vacate a
void judgment, may properly consider a trial court’s granting of a motion for judicial
release filed by an ineligible offender who was serving a mandatory prison term for a
felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree when a prosecuting attorney is not authorized
by R.C. 2953.08(B) to file an appeal as of right?
{¶31} I therefore dissent.
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