Sayre v. Doughty , 2017 Ohio 2707 ( 2017 )

[Cite as Sayre v. Doughty, 2017-Ohio-2707.]
STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
JAMES R. SAYRE, et al. ) CASE NO. 14 BE 0026
)
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES )
)
VS. ) OPINION
)
VERA DOUGHTY, et al., )
)
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
Case No. 13 CV 0119
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs-Appellees: Atty. Eric C. Johnson
Johnson & Johnson Law Offices
12 W. Main Street
Canfield, Ohio 44406
For Defendants-Appellants: Atty. David K. Schaffner
Schaffner Law Offices, Co., L.P.A.
132 Fair Avenue, NW
New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Hon. Carol Ann Robb
Dated: May 5, 2017
[Cite as Sayre v. Doughty, 2017-Ohio-2707.]
WAITE, J.
{¶1} Appellants Vera Doughty, Frederick W. Dowd, Bessie Estella Buckner,
and Dorothy Jean Mount (collectively referred to as “Appellants”) appeal a May 13,
2014 Belmont County Common Pleas Court decision to grant summary judgment in
favor of Appellees James R. and Jeanne V. Sayre. Appellants argue that the 2006
Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”) applies to all claims filed after June 30, 2006, thus the
trial court erroneously applied in the 1989 DMA in this matter. Pursuant to Corban v.
Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-5796, __ N.E.3d __,
Appellants’ arguments have merit and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and
this cause is remanded for further proceedings according to law and consistent with
this Court’s Opinion.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} This appeal concerns the ownership of mineral interests beneath
approximately 100 acres of land located in Union Township, Belmont County. On
October 15, 1928, Clayton A. and Orra E. Nichols conveyed the surface rights of the
property to Mary E. Estes. The Nichols reserved the mineral rights through the
following language: “Excepting and reserving from the above described tract all the
Pittsburgh or No. Eight and also the No. Seven vein of coal. Also, excepting and
reserving to the Grantors herein all the oil and gas, in and underlying the above
described real estate.” (10/15/28 Nichols Deed.) The deed was recorded on
February 22, 1930.
{¶3} Relevant to this appeal and some transactions later, Bedway Land and
Minerals, Co. conveyed the surface rights of this land to James R. and Jeanne V.
-2-
Sayre. The deed was recorded on November 22, 1996. On April 13, 2012, the
Sayres published notice of their intent to declare the mineral rights abandoned
pursuant to R.C. 5301.56. On May 16, 2012 the Sayres recorded an affidavit of
abandonment. On June 11, 2012, Vera Doughty recorded an affidavit to preserve
her interests. On June 12, 2012, Frederick William Dowd filed a similar affidavit. On
June 13, 2012, Bessie Estella Buckner and Dorothy Jean Mount also filed affidavits.
Doughty, Dowd, Buckner, and Mount are heirs of the Nichols.
{¶4} On March 27, 2013, the Sayres filed a declaratory judgment and quiet
title complaint against Doughty and Dowd. The Sayres later learned that Buckner
and Mount had filed affidavits, and the Sayres amended their complaint to add
Buckner and Mount as codefendants. On January 27, 2014, Appellees filed an
answer to the amended complaint and a counterclaim. The Sayres filed a motion for
summary judgment on March 4, 2014. Appellees filed a response and cross motion
for summary judgment on March 31, 2014. On May 13, 2014, the trial court granted
the Sayres’ motion. This timely appeal followed.
Summary Judgment
{¶5} An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s decision
to grant summary judgment, using the same standards as the trial court set forth in
Civ.R. 56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241(1996). Before summary judgment can be granted, the trial court must determine
that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, (3) it appears from the
-3-
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the
evidence most favorably in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, the conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United,
Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). Whether a fact is “material”
depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon &
Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088 (8th Dist.1995).
{¶6} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial
court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.” (Emphasis deleted.) Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,
296, 662 N.E. 2d 264 (1996). If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving
party has a reciprocal burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293. In other words, when presented with a properly
supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce some
evidence to suggest that a reasonable factfinder could rule in that party’s favor.
Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 386, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th
Dist.1997).
{¶7} The evidentiary materials to support a motion for summary judgment
are listed in Civ.R. 56(C) and include the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written
stipulations of fact that have been filed in the case. In resolving the motion, the court
-4-
views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Temple, supra,
at 327.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
The trial court erred in applying the 1989 version of the Ohio Dormant
Mineral Act to the subject case.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
The trial court erred in determining that the 1989 Dormant Mineral Act
"automatically" vested the mineral interests in the surface owners.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
The trial court erred in failing to address Appellant's [sic] claims that the
1989 Dormant Mineral Act is unconstitutional in that it denies mineral
owners of their due process rights.
{¶8} In Appellants’ three assignments of error they collectively assert that
the trial court erroneously applied the 1989 DMA for three reasons. First, Appellants
argue that the 2006 DMA became effective on June 30, 2006, well before the Sayres
filed their complaint. Second, Appellants argue that the 1989 DMA is not automatic
or self-executing, thus the 2006 DMA applies to all complaints filed after June 30,
2006. Third, and finally, Appellants argue that the 1989 DMA is unconstitutional
because it strips valuable mineral interests from holders without notice or the ability
to contest a surface landowner’s claims.
-5-
{¶9} In response, the Sayres argue that our decisions in Walker v.
Shondrick-Nau, 7th Dist. No. 13 NO 402, 2014-Ohio-1499, rev’d, Corban, supra and
Swartz v. Householder, 7th Dist. Nos. 13 JE 24, 13 JE 25, 2014-Ohio-2359, 12
N.E.3d 1243, rev’d, Corban, supra, are directly on point and should be followed in
this case. Pursuant to these cases, the Sayres argue that the 1989 DMA should be
applied. As no savings event had occurred between March 22, 1969 and March 22,
1992, the Sayres conclude that the mineral interests automatically vested with them
effective March 22, 1992.
{¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court had recently resolved this issue in Corban.
According to Corban:
[A]s of June 30, 2006, any surface holder seeking to claim dormant
mineral rights and merge them with the surface estate is required to
follow the statutory notice and recording procedures enacted in 2006 by
H.B. 288. These procedures govern the manner by which mineral
rights are deemed abandoned and vested in the surface holder and
apply equally to claims that the mineral interests were abandoned prior
to June 30, 2006.
Stalder v. Bucher, 7th Dist. No. 14 MO 0010, 2017-Ohio-725, ¶ 10, quoting Corban,
supra, ¶ 31. The Corban Court further held that the provisions within the 1989 DMA
were not self-executing and did not serve to automatically transfer ownership rights of
dormant minerals by operation of law, thus any attempt to declare mineral interests
-6-
abandoned after June 30, 2006 must comply with the notice requirements of the
2006 DMA. Stalder at ¶ 10, citing Corban at ¶ 28.
{¶11} Here, the Sayres filed their complaint on March 27, 2013, and the 2006
DMA controlled. While the Sayres contend that their mineral interests vested prior to
the effective date of the 2006 DMA, the Corban Court clearly held otherwise. As
such, the trial court erroneously applied the 1989 DMA. Accordingly, the judgment of
the trial court is reversed. As the Sayres sought summary judgment pursuant to their
1989 DMA claims, the matter is remanded for consideration of the 2006 DMA claims
as questions of fact remain regarding those claims. Accordingly, Appellants first two
assignments of error have merit and are sustained. Based on our decision, here,
Appellants’ third assignment is moot.
Conclusion
{¶12} Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously applied the 1989
DMA instead of the 2006 DMA. Pursuant to Corban, Appellants are correct.
Because questions of fact remain in this matter regarding application of the 2006
DMA, the matter is remanded for consideration of these claims. Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.
Robb, P.J., concurs.