Zakel v. State ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as Zakel v. State, 
    2022-Ohio-4637
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOSEPH C. ZAKEL,                                  :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,             :
    No. 111379
    v.                               :
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :
    Defendant-Appellee.              :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 22, 2022
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-21-949673
    Appearances:
    Valore & Gordillo, LLP, and Matthew O. Williams,
    for appellant.
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Callista Plemel, Assisting Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
    Plaintiff-appellant Joseph C. Zakel (“Zakel”) appeals from the
    decision of the trial court denying his application for relief from a weapons disability.
    For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
    Factual and Procedural History
    In 2000, Zakel was convicted of domestic violence, a first-degree
    misdemeanor. Zakel’s conviction created a disability under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) that
    states:
    (g) It shall be unlawful for any person ─
    ***
    (9) Who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of
    domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
    commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
    ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
    shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
    On July 8, 2021, Zakel filed an application in the Cuyahoga County
    Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 2923.14 seeking relief from the weapons
    disability. On March 9, 2022, the trial court denied the application finding that
    although Zakel had no further criminal convictions since 2000:
    the court now finds that petitioner has not been convicted of any
    qualifying disabling offense under O.R.C. 2923.13(A) from which relief
    can be granted by this court. A trial court does not have the statutory
    authority to relieve petitioner of a federal firearms disability
    (specifically, a disability arising from a misdemeanor domestic violence
    conviction). See [State ex rel. Suwalski v. Peeler, 
    167 Ohio St.3d 38
    ,
    
    2021-Ohio-4061
    , 
    188 N.E.3d 1048
    ].
    Petitioner is not under a state law disability and therefore cannot be
    afforded relief by this court. Accordingly, petitioner’s application is
    denied.
    Zakel appeals and assigns the following error for our review:
    Assignment of Error
    The trial court committed reversible error prejudicial to appellant in
    holding it lacked authority to consider appellant’s application for relief
    from weapons disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.14 pursuant to the Ohio
    Supreme Court’s decision in State ex. Rel. Suwalski v. Peeler, a wrongly
    decided case.
    Zakel asks this court to overturn the decision of the trial court.
    Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred when it relied on the Ohio Supreme
    Court’s decision in State ex rel. Suwalski v. Peeler, 
    167 Ohio St.3d 38
    , 2021-Ohio-
    4061, 
    188 N.E.3d 1048
    , to deny his application. Zakel, in essence, asks this court to
    overturn the trial court’s decision, because Suwalski, in his opinion, was wrongly
    decided.
    Standard of Review
    In the instant case, the trial court determined that it did not have
    authority to grant Zakel’s application on the basis of Suwalski. Zakel argues that the
    trial court’s decision was an error of law. Accordingly, the recent decision of
    Johnson v. Abdullah, 
    166 Ohio St.3d 427
    , 
    2021-Ohio-3304
    , 
    187 N.E.3d 463
    , is
    applicable here. In that case, the trial court allowed the testimony of a witness who
    did not meet the requirements of Evid.R. 601. The First District Court of Appeals
    found that decision was reversible error. The Supreme Court agreed noting that
    “courts lack the discretion to make errors of law.” Id. at ¶ 39. In the instant case,
    Zakel argues that we must overturn the trial court’s decision because Suwalski was
    wrongly decided. To the contrary, we must determine whether the trial court’s
    decision was contrary to law.
    Scope of Appellate Review
    At the outset, as an appellate court, we are a midlevel court of review.
    As such we do not have the authority to review or overturn decisions of the Ohio
    Supreme Court. See State ex rel. Duley v. Eberlin, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 07 BE 51,
    
    2008-Ohio-3084
    , ¶ 17 (“[W]e cannot overturn or ignore the various Supreme Court
    cases, which are in fact binding upon this court as precedent.”); Darrah v.
    Baumberger, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 15 MO 0002, 
    2017-Ohio-8025
    , ¶ 24 (“An
    appellate court is an intermediate court and is therefore bound by Ohio Supreme
    Court decisions. Davis v. Montenery, 
    173 Ohio App. 3d 740
    , 
    2007-Ohio-6221
    , 
    880 N.E.2d 488
    , ¶ 31 (7th Dist.). An appellate court cannot overrule an Ohio Supreme
    Court decision or declare an Ohio Supreme Court decision unconstitutional. State
    v. Sheets, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-04-032, 
    2007-Ohio-1799
    , ¶ 16”).
    Therefore, the only question for this court is whether the trial court
    made an error of law when it denied Zakel’s application based on the holding in
    Suwalski, 
    167 Ohio St.3d 38
    . If the holding applies to the facts of this case, then the
    trial court did not err, and we are bound by the precedent set by the Ohio Supreme
    Court.
    Law and Analysis
    The underlying facts of Suwalski involved a domestic violence
    conviction from 2017. Ewing was convicted of domestic violence and violation of a
    temporary protection order, both misdemeanors of the first degree. Suwalski was
    the victim. As a result of the domestic violence conviction, Ewing became subject to
    a disability under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). In 2019, Ewing petitioned the common pleas
    court for relief from the disability. The state did not contest the petition. However,
    the state submitted to the court an unsworn statement from Suwalski objecting to
    the petition. Nevertheless, Judge Peeler granted the petition, restoring all Ewing’s
    firearm rights. The state did not appeal the decision. Suwalski subsequently filed a
    writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Peeler’s order from going into effect. The court
    of appeals granted the writ, holding that Judge Peeler lacked judicial power to
    relieve Ewing of the federal firearms disability. Ewing, who was permitted to
    intervene in the appellate case, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
    Suwalski, 
    167 Ohio St.3d 38
    , ¶ 1-2. The bulk of the Supreme Court decision
    addresses whether Suwalski had standing to bring her case under Article I, Section
    10(a)(1) of the Ohio Constitution (Marsy’s Law).            The four-justice majority
    determined that Marsy’s law allowed her to file the writ.
    Nevertheless, the entire court agreed that the common pleas court did
    not have authority to lift Ewing’s disability. The majority, noting that Ohio law does
    not create a disability when a person is convicted of a misdemeanor domestic
    violence offense found “[a]s a matter of federal law, Ewing was ineligible to have his
    firearms rights restored because he never lost those rights under Ohio law.”
    Suwalski, 
    167 Ohio St.3d 38
    , at ¶ 28. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s
    application of Marsy’s law but agreed with its conclusion that the trial court did not
    have authority to rule on the application. Id. at ¶ 51.
    The Suwalski decision recognizes that a weapons disability as a result
    of a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction is imposed under federal law in this
    state. Consequently, because Ohio does not impose a disability for that type of
    conviction, the common pleas court had no authority to relieve Zakel of his
    disability. To do so would be contrary to law. The trial court, therefore, had no other
    choice but to summarily deny Zakel’s application for relief from disability.
    Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
    into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    ____
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 111379

Judges: Groves

Filed Date: 12/22/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/22/2022