State v. Bazler , 2018 Ohio 5306 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Bazler, 
    2018-Ohio-5306
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
    Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff – Appellee                   Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 18-CA-29
    CHAD BAZLER
    Defendant – Appellant                   O P I N IO N
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Licking County Court of
    Common Pleas, Case No. 16-CR-605
    JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        December 26, 2018
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant
    HAWKEN FLANAGAN                                JAMES A. ANZELMO
    NATHANIEL H. HURST                             Anzelmo Law
    Licking County Prosecutor’s Office             446 Howland Drive
    20 South Second Street, 4th Floor              Gahanna, Ohio 43230
    Newark, Ohio 43055
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                     2
    Hoffman, J.
    {¶1}    Appellant Chad Bazler appeals the judgment entered by the Licking County
    Common Pleas Court convicting him of two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs (R.C.
    2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(a)) and sentencing him to eighteen months incarceration on each
    count, to be served consecutively. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}    In 2016, Courtney Zigan was working with Newark Police officer Todd
    Green as a confidential informant, in exchange for having her felony drug charges
    reduced to a misdemeanor. Zigan identified Appellant to police as someone she could
    purchase drugs from in a controlled buy.
    {¶3}    On June 6, 2016, Officer Green arranged a controlled buy between Zigan
    and Appellant. Zigan called Appellant to arrange to buy methamphetamine. The call was
    recorded and monitored by police. Appellant sent a text to Zigan to meet him at the Taco
    Bell in Heath in ten minutes. Police searched the informant and her vehicle, fitted her
    with a covert transmitter recorder, and provided her with $50 in cash.
    {¶4}    Officer Green followed Zigan to Taco Bell. Green knew Appellant from past
    dealings, and recognized Appellant in a silver Chevy in the Taco Bell parking lot. A
    woman, also known to Green, came out of the Taco Bell and hugged Zigan. Green
    watched the informant’s hands at all times to make sure she was not given drugs by the
    other woman. He watched a hand-to-hand exchange between Zigan and Appellant
    through the passenger door of the vehicle. The drugs Zigan purchased from Appellant
    were tested and found to be methamphetamine.
    {¶5}    Again on July 12, 2016, Green arranged another recorded phone call
    between Zigan and Appellant. Appellant told Zigan to meet him in the Giant Eagle parking
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                      3
    lot. She was again searched and fitted with a recorder. Police gave her $50 in cash for
    the drug buy. Green stayed farther away from the transaction so as to avoid being
    recognized by Appellant. However, he heard Detective Greg Collins over the radio say
    Appellant exited his vehicle and walked to Zigan’s vehicle.    Zigan again purchased
    methamphetamine from Appellant using the money provided by police.
    {¶6}   Appellant was interviewed by Officer Green on March 31, 2017. Appellant
    admitted he sold drugs in the past, but claimed he stopped because he had a new job.
    {¶7}   Appellant was indicted by the Licking County Grand Jury on two counts of
    aggravated trafficking in drugs. The case proceeded to jury trial in the Licking County
    Common Pleas Court. He was convicted on both counts and sentenced to eighteen
    months incarceration on each count, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term
    of incarceration of thirty-six months.   It is from the February 21, 2018 judgment of
    conviction and sentence Appellant prosecutes this appeal, assigning as error:
    I.    CHAD    BAZLER’S      CONVICTIONS       ARE     BASED        ON
    INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
    CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
    UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16, ARTICLE I
    OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
    II.   CHAD   BAZLER’S       CONVICTIONS     ARE     AGAINST    THE
    MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
    PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                         4
    TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16,
    ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
    III. THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY ORDERED BAZLER TO
    SERVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS
    TO DUE PROCESS, GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE
    OHIO    CONSTITUTION         AND     THE        FIFTH   AND   FOURTEENTH
    AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
    IV.   BAZLER     RECEIVED       INEFFECTIVE       ASSISTANCE       OF
    COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
    UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE
    OHIO CONSTITUTION.
    I.
    {¶8}   In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the judgment is not based
    on sufficient evidence because the State failed to prove a proper chain of custody of the
    methamphetamine.
    {¶9}   An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St. 3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
    ,
    paragraph two of the syllabus (1991).
    {¶10} Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs in
    violation of R.C. 2925.03:
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                        5
    (A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
    (1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled
    substance analog;
    (C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of the
    following:
    (1) If the drug involved in the violation is any compound, mixture,
    preparation, or substance included in schedule I or schedule II, with the
    exception of marihuana, cocaine, L.S.D., heroin, any fentanyl-related
    compound, hashish, and any controlled substance analog, whoever violates
    division (A) of this section is guilty of aggravated trafficking in drugs. The
    penalty for the offense shall be determined as follows:
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), or
    (f) of this section, aggravated trafficking in drugs is a felony of the fourth
    degree, and division (C) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code applies in
    determining whether to impose a prison term on the offender.
    {¶11} Appellant argues in the absence of testimony from the person who
    transported the drugs to BCI for testing, the State failed to prove the drugs tested were,
    in fact, the drugs Appellant allegedly sold to the informant. This Court has previously
    recognized this argument is not cognizable in a sufficiency of the evidence claim:
    Appellant also argues that in the absence of the testimony of David
    Billings, there is a missing link in the chain of custody, which demonstrates
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                         6
    insufficient evidence that the arresting officer recovered a controlled
    substance from her motor vehicle. Chain of custody is part of the
    authentication and identification mandates set forth in Evid. R. 901. State v.
    Barzacchine (1994), 
    96 Ohio App.3d 440
    , 
    645 N.E.2d 137
    . Any break in the
    chain of custody goes to the credibility, or weight of the evidence, and not
    to admissibility. 
    Id.
     The State is not required to prove a perfect, unbroken
    chain of custody. State v. Keene, 
    81 Ohio St.3d 646
    , 
    693 N.E.2d 246
    , 1998-
    Ohio-342.
    We first note that appellant has not challenged the manifest weight
    of the evidence, but rather the sufficiency of the evidence. As a break in the
    chain of custody goes to the credibility or weight of the evidence, and not
    its admissibility, chain of custody is not an appropriate consideration on a
    claim that the State presented insufficient evidence to allow a rational trier
    of fact to find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reason [sic] doubt.
    {¶12} State v. Bias, 5th Dist. Licking No. 02-CA-00044, 
    2002-Ohio-4539
    , ¶¶ 11-
    12.
    {¶13} Appellant did not object to the admission of the methamphetamine into
    evidence, nor does he assign plain error to its admission. Appellant’s claim the State
    failed to prove chain of custody goes to the weight to be given to the evidence, and is not
    an appropriate consideration on a claim the State presented insufficient evidence to allow
    a rational trier of fact to find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                           7
    {¶14} The first assignment of error is overruled.
    II.
    {¶15} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the judgment of
    conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶16} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire record,
    weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,
    and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and
    created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
    a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 380
    , 387, 
    1997-Ohio-52
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    , quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1983).
    {¶17} Appellant argues the only witness who testified to firsthand knowledge of
    the drug transactions is the informant, and her testimony is not credible because she was
    involved with the police as an informant for the sole purpose of reducing her own drug
    charges. He argues the police only witnessed the transactions from afar, and therefore
    their testimony is of little value. He also argues the State failed to prove chain of custody,
    and therefore the record does not demonstrate the drugs trafficked were the same drugs
    tested.
    {¶18} Officer Green testified as to the procedures employed by police to ensure
    the reliability of the controlled buy. He testified prior to each buy, Zigan and her vehicle
    were searched. Careful surveillance was maintained of Zigan as she traveled to the spot
    designated by Appellant for each of the controlled buys. The controlled purchases were
    monitored through both visual surveillance and through live audio of the informant’s
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                       8
    interaction with Appellant. He testified on June 6, 2016, he carefully watched Zigan’s
    hands during the entire transaction. He also testified on June 6, 2016, he saw the hand-
    to-hand transaction between Zigan and Appellant. Det. Greg Collins identified Appellant
    as the person he observed approach Zigan’s vehicle on July 12, 2016, in the Giant Eagle
    parking lot. After each purchase, police maintained surveillance of Zigan’s vehicle until
    they reached a meeting spot, at which time she gave them the drugs purchased from
    Appellant and both her person and her vehicle were again searched.
    {¶19} Zigan testified on both occasions she received methamphetamine from
    Appellant in exchange for the money police gave her for the controlled buy. She identified
    the voices on the audio recordings of the recorded calls and the transactions themselves,
    and the recordings were played for the jury. Although she was working for the police in
    exchange for a reduction of her own drug charges, the jury was in a better position than
    this Court to judge her credibility. Further, the jury was aware of the deal she made with
    the police and the fact she had previous drug charges.
    {¶20} Officer Green additionally testified when he interviewed Appellant on March
    31, 2017, Appellant admitted he had sold drugs in the past, although now he had a job
    and was no longer selling drugs.
    {¶21} Officer Green testified the manila envelopes containing the substance
    tested and found to be methamphetamine by BCI were the envelopes he placed the
    baggies of methamphetamine in and put in the evidence locker at the Licking County
    Sheriff’s Office. Appellant cross-examined him at length concerning his claim not every
    person who potentially handled the drugs appeared on the chain of custody as set forth
    on the manila envelopes. However, while there was a suggestion persons not noted on
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                      9
    the chain of custody may have had access to the drugs, the documentary evidence
    submitted in the case reflects the agency number is the same in each case on the property
    records filled out in the Licking County Sheriff’s Office, the evidence submission sheets
    at BCI, and the reports of the tests results. We find the jury did not lose its way in
    concluding the drugs tested by BCI were in fact the drugs seized by Officer Green from
    the controlled buys.
    {¶22} Based on the evidence presented at trial, we find the judgment is not against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶23} The second assignment of error is overruled.
    III.
    {¶24} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court failed to
    make the findings during the sentencing hearing required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to
    impose consecutive sentences.
    {¶25} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states:
    (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions
    of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
    terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
    and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness
    of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
    and if the court also finds any of the following:
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                        10
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
    while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
    imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised
    Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
    one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
    the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
    (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    {¶26} When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required
    findings at the sentencing hearing. State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 2014-Ohio-
    3177, 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , ¶ 29. Because a court speaks through its journal, the court should
    also incorporate its statutory findings into the sentencing entry. 
    Id.
     However, a word-for-
    word recitation of the language of the statute is not required. 
    Id.
     As long as the reviewing
    court can discern the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine the
    record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be
    upheld. 
    Id.
    {¶27} In the sentencing entry, the trial court found pursuant to R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4)(c) Appellant’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates consecutive
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                         11
    sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. While
    the court did not use the statutory language at the sentencing hearing, the trial court
    stated on the record:
    Well, Mr. Bazler, the Court’s considered the purposes and principles
    of sentencing set out under Section 2929.11, as well as the seriousness
    and recidivism factors set out under Section 2929.12. My recollection is
    that this is your fifth felony conviction since 2013, and I also recall we should
    have had this trial in August but you failed to appear for your jury trial then,
    so you’ve had ample opportunity to get that accomplished. And you didn’t
    show up until you were arrested sometime in December I believe after I’m
    pretty sure your bond forfeiture hearing was continued once or twice.
    While your case was pending before you failed to show up, you were
    dirty for Methamphetamine. You were using during that period of time, and
    if I’m not mistaken, you’ve been serving a sentence for fleeing at the jail
    from Muni Court from when they caught you on your bond. So, you’ve had
    lots of opportunity to do the right thing and you haven’t done it, it doesn’t - -
    it appears to me.
    {¶28} Tr. 234-35.
    {¶29} From the trial court’s statements at the sentencing hearing, we can discern
    the trial court engaged in the correct analysis. Appellant does not argue the record fails
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                         12
    to support the court’s findings concerning his history of criminal conduct, but only argues
    the sentence is contrary to law because of the court’s failure to make the requisite
    findings. We find the trial court’s statements at the hearing were sufficient to comply with
    Bonnell, supra., and R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
    {¶30} The third assignment of error is overruled.
    IV.
    {¶31} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to move to waive court costs.
    {¶32} In State v. Davis, 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-CA-55 (Dec. 20, 2017), ¶ 27, this
    Court reviewed this issue and determined the following:
    We find no merit in Appellant's allegation that he received ineffective
    assistance of counsel as a result of his attorney failing to request that the
    trial court waive court costs. Because R.C. 2947.23(C) grants appellant the
    ability to seek waiver of costs at any time, including after sentencing,
    Appellant has not been prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to request a
    waiver at sentencing.
    {¶33} We note this court's decision in Davis has been accepted for review by the
    Supreme Court of Ohio upon certification of a conflict with the decision in State v.
    Springer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104649, 
    2017-Ohio-8861
    . Unless a decision is rendered
    on the issue to the contrary in the future, this Court will continue to abide by its decision
    in Davis.
    Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-29                                                13
    {¶34} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶35} The judgment of the Licking County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
    By: Hoffman, J.
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Baldwin, J. concur
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-CA-29

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 5306

Judges: Hoffman

Filed Date: 12/26/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/28/2018