State v. Magri , 2018 Ohio 4275 ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Magri, 2018-Ohio-4275.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2018-G-0154
- vs - :
SAMUEL MAGRI, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2017 C
000034.
Judgment: Affirmed.
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Nicholas A. Burling, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH
44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Robert N. Farinacci, 65 North Lake Street, Madison, OH 44057 (For Defendant-
Appellant).
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Samuel Magri, appeals from his convictions for Theft
and Receiving Stolen Property in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas. The
issues to be determined by this court are whether a court abuses its discretion in
admitting business records when the foundation for the documents is provided through
the testimony of a former manager who no longer directly maintains such records and
whether a conviction for Theft is supported by the weight and sufficiency of the evidence
when items discovered missing from a business were pawned by the defendant, a
former employee, approximately a month after their disappearance. For the following
reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court below.
{¶2} On February 23, 2017, the Geauga County Grand Jury issued an
Indictment, charging Magri with Theft, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(1), and Receiving Stolen Property, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of
R.C. 2913.51(A).
{¶3} A jury trial was held on November 7, 2017. The following pertinent
testimony and evidence were presented:
{¶4} Max Coulter is a machinist and former plant manager at Troy Innovative
Instruments, which manufactures medical instruments and other items. He testified that
he was plant manager for 14 years but no longer held that position since new
management eliminated it approximately four years ago. In his roles with the company,
he became familiar with the machinery and equipment used for manufacturing and had
“set up” much of the equipment. He testified that all equipment used for the
manufacturing process belonged to Troy and not individual employees. As plant
manager, Coulter had been responsible for record-keeping, which included machine
maintenance records, purchase records, and calibration records.
{¶5} He testified that Magri had been an application engineer at Troy for
approximately two years and was terminated in the summer of 2016. Magri’s role
involved “help[ing] out on the floor” and “get[ting] the machines going.” In that role,
Magri worked with the manufacturing equipment daily. To Coulter’s knowledge, Magri
was friends with at least one employee at Troy following his termination.
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{¶6} Coulter testified that around October 2016, Troy employees started to
notice equipment was missing around the shop. Coulter testified that he did not give
permission for anyone to take items from Troy’s premises and was not “aware of”
permission being given to Magri to take any items.
{¶7} The first item missing was a Suburban Tool Master Grind used in grinding
processes, which Coulter believed went missing in October 2016. Exhibits were
presented in relation to this item, including an invoice/purchase order, identifying the
price and item number, as well as a copy of a warranty registration card which
contained the serial number. Both documents were from 2011.
{¶8} Coulter also testified regarding the other missing items, two micrometers
and a digital indicator, which are used to inspect/measure parts manufactured by Troy.
He identified three documents providing calibration records (a process completed to
ensure they were working accurately) of these items, which listed at the top the items’
name/style, the “company asset numbers,” and serial numbers. When the missing
items were reported to police, Coulter was shown an eBay listing for the grinder at Gold
Star Pawn in Eastlake, obtained the warranty card from Troy’s maintenance records,
and found that the serial numbers matched. All of the missing items were recovered
from the pawn shop and returned to Troy.
{¶9} On cross-examination, Coulter testified that he was not currently
responsible for inventory or calibration records, although he could access them when
needed. He could not identify exactly when the items, other than the grinder, went
missing.
{¶10} Detective Donald Seamon of the Geauga County Sherriff’s Office went to
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Gold Star Pawn in November 2016 after an investigation had determined Troy’s missing
items may be located there. He obtained copies of the pawn slips and receipts for a
grinder, two micrometers, and a digital indicator, which showed they were pawned by
Magri. The pawn slips also listed the serial numbers of each of the items. He testified
that the serial number from Troy’s warranty card for the grinder matched the number on
the recovered grinder. An interview between Detective Seamon and Magri was played.
Pursuant to the interview, Magri stated that the items he had pawned at Gold Star were
ten to twelve years old and some had been obtained from a “place that went out of
business” called Axiom in Mentor. When informed by police that the items had gone
missing from Troy recently, Magri stated that he had been to Troy a “couple times” to
visit a friend who works there but did not go inside of the building since he was
terminated. He stated that the only possibility would be for the micrometer to get “mixed
up” with his tools while he was still working at Troy. He denied stealing the items.
{¶11} At the close of the State’s case, Magri’s counsel objected to the admission
of exhibits from Troy’s records since they were not verified by a records custodian or
other qualified person. Defense counsel also made a Rule 29 motion to dismiss. These
requests were denied.
{¶12} On November 8, 2017, the jury found Magri guilty of both counts as
charged in the Indictment. The verdict was memorialized in a November 20, 2017
Judgment Entry.
{¶13} At the sentencing hearing, the court denied Magri’s request to merge the
two offenses and ordered him to serve a term of 90 days of residential community
control in the Geauga Safety Center and three years of community control. The trial
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court filed its Judgment Entry of Conviction memorializing the sentence on January 25,
2018.
{¶14} Magri moved to stay his sentence, which motion was denied by the trial
court. He moved this court for a stay, which was granted in a February 8, 2018
Judgment Entry.
{¶15} On appeal, Magri raises the following assignments of error:
{¶16} “[1.] The court erred to the prejudice of the defendant by admitting
documentary hearsay evidence that was not testified to by the custodian of records or
other qualified witness.
{¶17} “[2.] The court erred to the prejudice of appellant when it overruled his
Crim.R. 29(A) motions where there lacked sufficient evidence for the theft count to
proceed to jury and in the alternative, the evidence that was before the jury lacked
sufficient weight to support a conviction of theft.”
{¶18} In his first assignment of error, Magri argues that the trial court erred by
admitting exhibits presented during Coulter’s testimony, which included an invoice and
warranty registration card for purchase of the grinder, and three calibration records for
the micrometers and the digital indicator. He contends that these were not presented
by a proper records custodian and constituted hearsay not admissible under any
exception.
{¶19} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised
in line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d
269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). However, “while the trial court has discretion to
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admit or exclude relevant evidence, it has no discretion to admit hearsay.” John Soliday
Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. Pittenger, 190 Ohio App.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-4861, 940 N.E.2d
1035, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.). See also State v. Fambro, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2016-T-0063,
2017-Ohio-5646, ¶ 44.
{¶20} Hearsay is an oral or written statement, “other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). “It is axiomatic that hearsay evidence is
inadmissible unless it falls within the specific hearsay exceptions enumerated in the
Rules of Evidence.” State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 195, 509 N.E.2d 1256(1987).
{¶21} In the present matter, the parties’ argument centers around whether the
evidence was admissible hearsay under Evid.R. 803(6), which allows the admission of:
[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness or as provided by Rule
901(B)(10), unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. * * *
{¶22} “To qualify for admission under Rule 803(6), a business record must
manifest four essential elements: (i) the record must be one regularly recorded in a
regularly conducted activity; (ii) it must have been entered by a person with knowledge
of the act, event or condition; (iii) it must have been recorded at or near the time of the
transaction; and (iv) a foundation must be laid by the ‘custodian’ of the record or by
some ‘other qualified witness.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404,
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2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 171. A qualified witness is someone with “‘enough
familiarity with the record-keeping system of the business in question to explain how the
record came into existence in the ordinary course of business.’” State v. Phillips, 11th
Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-029, 2017-Ohio-1204, ¶ 26, citing State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d
137, 147, 2012-Ohio-6208, ¶ 40.
{¶23} Magri argues that Matt Coulter testified that he no longer is the keeper of
records for Troy, is employed only as a machinist, and thus, is not qualified to testify as
to the business records in question. It must be noted however, that Coulter had been
the plant manager for fourteen years. Pursuant to his testimony, when he was plant
manager, he tended to “day to day business” including the upkeep of equipment,
maintenance records, purchase records, and calibration records. As to the purchase
order and warranty card for the grinder, Coulter was plant manager at the time these
documents were created in 2011 and testified that he had maintained these documents.
The warranty document has a notation on the bottom that a copy was given to Coulter
for his files. As to these records, he was well-qualified to testify as he was directly
involved in ensuring the grinder was warrantied and keeping up to date records of
purchases. While he may no longer physically maintain such records, he was permitted
to access them from the Troy files and it is hard to imagine a more well-qualified person
to testify about the grinder paperwork than the man who was directly involved in its
registration and maintenance.
{¶24} As to the documents relating to the other equipment, these records were
created by OCS Technologies in 2016, and documented the results of calibration
services performed on the micrometers and indicator. Coulter testified that he is not
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currently involved in the calibration process, nor does he maintain the records for
calibration. However, it is worth noting again, he was a person who had extensive
knowledge of record-keeping and the calibration process from his experience as plant
manager, which would appear to satisfy the requirements that a qualified witness have
“familiarity with the record keeping system of the business.” Phillips at ¶ 26.
{¶25} Magri also argues that a witness should have been called from OCS,
since it prepared the calibration documents. As stated in Evid.R. 801(C), hearsay
includes only that which is “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” As to the calibration itself, there is no question that the prosecution did not
present the records from OCS to show the truth of the calibration, which was irrelevant
to the trial. As to the serial numbers, while these would constitute hearsay as they were
admitted to prove ownership of the items by Troy, Evid.R. 803(6)’s applicability as an
exception to the hearsay rules allows the admission of such a record.
{¶26} Even if admission of the calibration records was made in error, such error
would be harmless. See Crim.R. 52(A) (“[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”). There is no reasonable
question as to whether Coulter was a qualified person to testify about, at the very least,
the grinder, for the reasons discussed above. The grinder was purchased for
approximately $2,500 and listed for sale by Gold Star Pawn for over $1,300. Even if
evidence of other items was not admissible to prove the serial numbers of the
micrometers and the digital indicator, the evidence establishing the grinder theft alone
would have justified the fifth-degree felony Theft conviction, since this offense requires
that “the value of the property * * * stolen is one thousand dollars or more.” R.C.
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2913.02(B)(2).
{¶27} The first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶28} In his second assignment of error, Magri argues that his conviction for
Theft was not supported by sufficient evidence, nor the weight of the evidence.
{¶29} Crim.R. 29(A) provides, in pertinent part: “[t]he court * * * shall order the
entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged * * * if the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks,
61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus,
following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
{¶30} Whereas “sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether
the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, * * * weight of
the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Wilson, 113
Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). “[A] reviewing court asks whose
evidence is more persuasive—the state’s or the defendant’s?” Id. An appellate court
must consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, the credibility of
the witnesses, and whether, “in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.” (Citation omitted.) Thompkins at 387. “Since there
must be sufficient evidence to take a case to the jury, it follows that ‘a finding that a
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conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence necessarily must include a finding
of sufficiency.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Arcaro, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-
0028, 2013-Ohio-1842, ¶ 32.
{¶31} To convict Magri of Theft, the State was required to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he did, “with purpose to deprive the owner of property or
services * * * knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any
of the following ways: (1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give
consent.” R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).
{¶32} Here, evidence was presented to support a conclusion that Magri had
possession of property that had been stolen from Troy, in that property alleged by a
Troy employee to have been stolen was pawned using Magri’s name and identification.
Magri admitted to having pawned the items in question. The testimony and exhibits
demonstrated matching descriptions, including serial numbers, of the items missing
from Troy and those recovered from the pawn shop. Coulter testified that Magri did not
have permission to possess these items. In Magri’s interview, he admitted he had
returned to Troy to visit friends after his termination.
{¶33} It is a reasonable inference that Magri intended to deprive the owner of the
property, given that he pawned it. While there was no specific evidence presented to
show exactly how the property was acquired, it was also reasonable to infer that Magri
took the property from Troy or, at the least, was involved with other parties in taking the
items and would have realized this property belonged to Troy, having worked with the
equipment while employed there.
{¶34} Magri’s main contention is that there “is no evidence that [he] is the person
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who stole the items subject of the Indictment.” The State counters that even if he did
not steal the items himself, having a friend steal the items and provide them to him
constitutes Theft.
{¶35} It has been held that, “a jury may reasonably infer that a defendant
committed theft or burglary based on the following circumstantial evidence: (1) the
stolen items were found in the defendant’s possession ‘soon thereafter,’” i.e., with “close
temporal proximity” between the commission of the crime and defendant’s possession
of the items and “(2) there are ‘other circumstances indicative of guilt’—for example, the
lack of a credible explanation of how the defendant came to possess the stolen items so
soon after the crime occurred.” State v. Smith, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-16-1113, et al.,
2017-Ohio-5762, ¶ 45, citing Methard v. State, 19 Ohio St. 363, 368 (1869); see
also State v. McAllister, 53 Ohio App.2d 176, 180, 372 N.E.2d 1341 (8th Dist.1977)
(“unexplained possession by a defendant of recently stolen property may give rise to a
permissible inference from which a jury may conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the accused is guilty of the theft”). This principle has been applied to cases for Theft
under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), the same charge present in this matter. In re R.T., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 101093, 2014-Ohio-5686, ¶ 13-17; State v. Boone, 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-16-1246, 2018-Ohio-772, ¶ 16-19.
{¶36} Here, the items were found in a pawn shop approximately a month after
the timeframe during which they went missing, as described by Coulter (although he
was uncertain as to the exact time they disappeared). While Magri explained in his
interview with police that he had either previously owned the property or accidentally
mixed up Troy property with his own tools while employed there, we find that the jury
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was entitled to determine this was not a reasonable explanation. Coulter testified that
no permission was given to take the items and that while some employees had some
personal equipment used on the job, these were the type of items that remained within
the shop to complete the manufacturing process. At least one item, the grinder, was a
larger tool that would not be removed from Troy property “accidentally.” Further, the
items went missing after Magri’s employment terminated. Any contention that they were
Magri’s personal items from a prior job is entirely inconsistent with the records and
testimony demonstrating that they belonged to Troy. See State v. Cody, 6th Dist. Huron
No. H-88-33, 1989 WL 65113, *1, 3 (June 16, 1989) (finding, in the context of a
receiving stolen property conviction, that a stolen item, including unique qualities,
identified by the owner, found three months after the item was stolen, and which was
inexplicably in the defendant’s possession, met the requirements for a “permissive
inference that the defendant is guilty of a theft offense”).
{¶37} While this case is based on circumstantial evidence, a fact with which
Magri takes issue, the well-established law of Ohio is that a defendant may be convicted
solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 151,
529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988). “Circumstantial evidence is not less probative than direct
evidence, and, in some instances, is even more reliable.” (Citation omitted.) Id.{¶38} Based on the foregoing, we reject Magri’s argument that the Theft
conviction was against the weight of the evidence, and, therefore, that there was
insufficient evidence for such conviction. While much of his argument relies on the
belief that the evidence was essentially too circumstantial to allow a conviction, this was
primarily based on the belief that his possession of the items could not prove Theft.
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However, possession was a primary factor in demonstrating his guilt, especially when
tied to the circumstances that he had recently been terminated from his employment
and had no reason to be in possession of the items.
{¶39} The second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶40} For the foregoing reasons, Magri’s convictions in the Geauga County
Court of Common Pleas are affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., concurs,
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., dissents.
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