State v. Battin , 2019 Ohio 2195 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Battin, 
    2019-Ohio-2195
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    State of Ohio,                                      :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
    No. 18AP-888
    v.                                                  :          (C.P.C. No. 15CR-835)
    James L. Battin,                                    :       (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Defendant-Appellant.               :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on June 4, 2019
    On brief:     Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.
    On brief: James L. Battin, pro se.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
    SADLER, J.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, James L. Battin, appeals the decision of the Franklin
    County Court of Common Pleas denying appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
    For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶ 2} Appellant's appeal concerns whether the trial court's consideration of his two
    pro se motions, which he filed while represented by counsel, rendered his subsequent
    sentence and conviction "illegal" and/or "void." (Oct. 18, 2018 Mot. to Correct Illegal
    Sentence at 1.)
    {¶ 3} In February 2015, appellant was indicted for kidnapping and rape, both with
    associated firearm specifications. Represented by appointed counsel, appellant initially
    No. 18AP-888                                                                                  2
    entered a plea of not guilty. In March 2015, defense counsel for appellant filed a "Motion
    for Bail" seeking a reduction in the surety bond. (Mar. 5, 2015 Mot. at 1.) A couple of days
    later, on March 9, 2015, appellant filed his own "Motion for Bond Reduction" also asking
    the trial court to lower his surety bond. (Mar. 9, 2015 Mot. at 1.) A case processing sheet
    filed the same day as the scheduled bond hearing notes "no change" in bond. (Mar. 19, 2015
    Processing Sheet at 1.) On March 15, 2015, while he was apparently still represented by
    counsel, appellant filed another motion on his own, this time asking for the trial court to
    order internet access for him while in jail.
    {¶ 4} A criminal processing sheet filed on June 10, 2015, the date set for trial, notes
    a change in the cash/surety bond from $1,000,000 to $750,000. Appellant attempted to
    appeal the June 10, 2015 order, but this court dismissed the notice of appeal as untimely
    filed. On June 17, 2015, the trial court filed an entry denying appellant's motion for internet
    usage.
    {¶ 5} Pursuant to a plea agreement and while he was represented by counsel, on
    March 16, 2016, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the "stipulated lesser included offense
    of Felonious Assault" with a firearm specification. (Mar. 16, 2016 Entry of Guilty Plea at 1.)
    The prosecution and defense jointly recommended a sentence. By a judgment entry dated
    March 21, 2016, the trial court found appellant guilty of felonious assault, ordered a nolle
    prosequi entered for the kidnapping count, and sentenced appellant according to the jointly
    recommended sentence.
    {¶ 6} On September 26, 2017, appellant filed a motion to vacate his conviction and
    sentence and to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Within it, appellant argued the trial
    court exceeded its jurisdiction in accepting his guilty pleas when felonious assault was not
    pled in the indictment. The trial court denied the motion on November 28, 2017 and, on
    December 21, 2017, denied appellant's additional motion for an evidentiary hearing on the
    matter. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the trial court's November 28, 2017
    judgment. In State v. Battin, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-911, 
    2018-Ohio-2533
     ("Battin I"), this
    court agreed with appellee and the trial court that appellant's motion should be construed
    as an untimely petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A). Therefore, we
    found the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain appellant's petition and did not err in
    denying appellant's petition.
    No. 18AP-888                                                                                                 3
    {¶ 7} On December 27, 2017, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the March 16,
    2016 judgment of conviction. This court, construing his notice of appeal as a motion for
    delayed appeal, denied appellant's motion.
    {¶ 8} On May 16, 2018, appellant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence
    requesting the trial court issue an order declaring his sentence and conviction void based
    on the argument that felonious assault is not a lesser-included offense of rape. The trial
    court denied the motion on May 29, 2018, and appellant appealed. Noting case law
    showing it is legally permissible for a defendant to plead guilty to a crime that has not been
    indicted, in State v. Battin, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-402, 
    2018-Ohio-3947
     ("Battin II"), we
    found the trial court had not erred in denying the motion to correct the allegedly illegal and
    void sentence.1
    {¶ 9} Appellant filed the motion at issue in the instant appeal on October 18, 2018.
    In his "Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence," appellant again asked the trial court to
    declare his conviction and/or the trial court judgment entry "void" and to "set aside the
    sentence." (Oct. 18, 2018 Mot. to Correct Illegal Sentence at 1.) According to appellant, on
    June 10, 2015, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing on his motion for bond reduction and
    motion for internet usage, where the trial court "subjected him to a 'hybrid' representation."
    (Oct. 18, 2018 Mot. to Correct Illegal Sentence at 1.) Appellant contends that defense
    counsel joined in presenting the motions and "acted as lead co-counsel" when the trial court
    had not sought or secured a waiver of counsel pursuant to Crim.R. 44(C) from appellant
    nor "formally grant[ed] the leave necessary for [appellant] to proceed pro se and/or act as
    'co-counsel' " on the motions. (Oct. 18, 2018 Mot. to Correct Illegal Sentence at 2-3.)
    Appellant contended these actions divested the trial court of jurisdiction.
    {¶ 10} On November 6, 2018, the trial court denied appellant's motion as "not well
    taken." (Nov. 6, 2018 Decision and Entry at 1.) Appellant filed a timely appeal.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶ 11} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
    [1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of the appellant in
    violation of his absolute right to procedural due process by
    overruling the October 18, 2018, "Motion To Correct Illegal
    1In a memorandum decision, State v. Battin, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-402, 
    2018-Ohio-4811
     (memorandum
    decision), this court also later declined to reopen his appeal of the trial court's May 29, 2018 judgment.
    No. 18AP-888                                                                                 4
    Sentence" on the contention that the sentence and conviction
    are both VOID, on the premise of the doctrine of res judicata,
    as alleged by the State.
    [2.] The trial court, in it attempts to systematically adjudicate
    the appellant's case, failed to solicit and secure a waiver of
    counsel pursuant to Crim.R. 44(C) to demonstrate substantial
    compliance with Crim.R. 44(A) by making sufficient inquiry
    to determine whether the defendant fully understood and
    intelligently relinquished his or her right to counsel.
    [3.] The trial court committed error when it entertain pro se
    motions filed the appellant since he was represented by
    defense counsel. A defendant who is represented by counsel
    and does not move the trial court to proceed pro se may not
    "act as co-counsel on his own behalf." Where a defendant who
    is represented by counsel files pro se motion(s) and there is
    no indication that defense counsel joins in those motions or
    indicates a need for relief sought by the defendant pro se, such
    motions are not proper and the trial court may strike them
    from the record.
    [4.] The trial court was put on notice twice, the first being
    March 9, 2015 and again on May 15, 2015 of his intent to act
    as "co-counsel." At the June 10, 2015 pretrial hearing, the trial
    court failed to properly conduct any type of colloquy with him
    regards to his two pro se motions and his asserted desires and
    his intent to act as co-counsel and assist in his case. Faretta
    v. California, (1975) 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 
    95 S. Ct. 2525
    , 45 L. Ed.
    2D 562.
    [5.] The trial court committed plain Crim.R. 52(B), and
    structural error[s], affecting his substantial rights that may be
    noticed at any time, although they were not brought to the
    attention of the court in a direct appeal.
    (Sic passim and emphasis sic.)
    III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
    {¶ 12} For clarity of discussion, we will address appellant's assignments of error
    together. Appellant argues the trial court committed plain error and structural error in
    overruling his motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was based on assertions of
    "hybrid representation." (Appellant's Brief at i, ii.) Appellant contends res judicata does
    not apply here because the trial court's actions divested it of jurisdiction, thereby rendering
    his conviction and sentence void. We disagree with appellant.
    No. 18AP-888                                                                               5
    {¶ 13} As we stated in Battin I:
    " 'Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of
    conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by
    counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an
    appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of
    due process that was raised or could have been raised by the
    defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment or
    conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.' " (Emphasis
    omitted.) State v. Cole, 
    2 Ohio St.3d 112
    , 113, 
    2 Ohio B. 661
    , 
    443 N.E.2d 169
     (1982), quoting [State v. Perry, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    (1967),] paragraph nine of the syllabus. "Res judicata also
    implicitly bars a petitioner from 're-packaging' evidence or
    issues which either were, or could have been, raised in the
    context of the petitioner's trial or direct appeal." [State v.
    Hessler, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1011, 
    2002-Ohio-3321
    ,] ¶ 27.
    Id. at ¶ 12. Res judicata " 'applies to bar raising piecemeal claims' " in successive motions
    filed after the defendant is convicted. State v. Long, 5th Dist. No. 17CA15, 
    2017-Ohio-2848
    ,
    ¶ 16, quoting State v. Kent, 4th Dist. No. 02CA21, 
    2003-Ohio-6156
    ; State v. Hall, 11th Dist.
    No. 2007-T-0022, 
    2008-Ohio-2128
    , ¶ 21, quoting Brick Processors, Inc. v. Culbertson, 
    2 Ohio App.3d 478
     (8th Dist.1981), paragraph one of the syllabus (" '[P]rinciples of res
    judicata prevent relief on successive, similar motions raising issues which were or could
    have been raised originally.' ").
    {¶ 14} "[T]he doctrine of res judicata does not preclude review of a void sentence."
    State v. Fischer, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 92
    , 
    2010-Ohio-6238
    , ¶ 1; State v. Holdcroft, 
    137 Ohio St.3d 526
    , 
    2013-Ohio-5014
    , ¶ 9, citing Fischer at ¶ 40 ("[A]bsent a timely appeal, res judicata
    generally allows only the correction of a void sanction."). "In general, a void judgment is
    one that has been imposed by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or
    the authority to act. * * * Unlike a void judgment, a voidable judgment is one rendered by a
    court that has both jurisdiction and authority to act, but the court's judgment is invalid,
    irregular, or erroneous." (Citations omitted.) Fischer at ¶ 6.
    {¶ 15} In Fischer, the Supreme Court of Ohio court addressed motions to correct
    allegedly illegal sentences. There, the court stated:
    "A motion to correct an illegal sentence 'presupposes a valid
    conviction and may not, therefore, be used to challenge alleged
    errors in proceedings that occur prior to the imposition of
    sentence.' " Edwards v. State (1996), 
    112 Nev. 704
    , 708, 
    918 P.2d 321
    , quoting Allen v. United States (D.C.1985), 495 A.2d
    No. 18AP-888                                                                                                  6
    1145, 1149. It is, however, an appropriate vehicle for raising the
    claim that a sentence is facially illegal at any time. 
    Id.
     The scope
    of relief based on a rule, like Fed.R.Crim.P. 35, is likewise
    constrained to the narrow function of correcting only the illegal
    sentence. It does not permit reexamination of all perceived
    errors at trial or in other proceedings prior to sentencing. See,
    e.g., Hill v. United States (1962), 
    368 U.S. 424
    , 430, 
    82 S.Ct. 468
    , 
    7 L.Ed.2d 417
    .
    Id.at ¶ 25.
    {¶ 16} The Fischer court cautioned that the "void sentence[ing]" has been contained
    to a "narrow, discrete line of cases." Id. at ¶ 31. Furthermore, even where a certain part of
    a sentence is void, "res judicata still applies to other aspects of the merits of a conviction,
    including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the ensuing sentence." Id.
    at ¶ 1.
    {¶ 17} In this case, appellant's appeal of the trial court's determination regarding
    bond reduction was dismissed as untimely, appellant did not file a timely appeal of his
    conviction and his motion to reopen his appeal was denied, and appellant did not raise any
    of these issues in either his postconviction motion or his first previous motion to correct
    illegal sentence. Therefore, the issues raised in appellant's latest motion are barred for
    review under the doctrine of res judicata unless such issues rendered the judgment void.
    {¶ 18} To this point, appellant essentially attempts to use his alleged "hybrid
    representation" at a pre-plea, pre-sentencing hearing regarding bond and internet usage to
    argue the trial court's judgment entry of conviction is "void for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction." (Appellant's Brief at 2.) Appellant does not argue hybrid representation or
    improper advisements in any way affected his guilty plea. Even if, for sake of argument,2
    hybrid representation occurred at the hearing on bond and internet usage, appellant
    presents, and we find, no authority for the proposition that such hybrid representation
    would result in the trial court losing subject-matter jurisdiction or render the judgment of
    conviction following a guilty plea void.
    {¶ 19} Therefore, because no authority supports the proposition that appellant's
    sentence and/or conviction is void from the actions of the trial court in this case, and
    2This court denied appellant's request for the transcript of the June 10, 2015 hearing be produced at state
    expense, and the transcript of the hearing remains absent from the record of appeal.
    No. 18AP-888                                                                                7
    appellant could have but did not raise these issues previously, we find res judicata precludes
    review of appellant's latest motion.
    {¶ 20} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error contesting the application
    of res judicata is overruled. The disposition of appellant's first assignment of error renders
    appellant's second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error moot. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
    IV. CONCLUSION
    {¶ 21} Having overruled appellant's first assignments of error, rendering appellant's
    second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error moot, we affirm the judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
    Judgment affirmed.
    KLATT, P.J., and NELSON, J., concur.
    _____________