State v. Hood , 2015 Ohio 5373 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Hood, 2015-Ohio-5373.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    State of Ohio,                                   :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
    No. 15AP-656
    v.                                               :            (C.P.C. No. 14CR-5521)
    Daniel E. Hood,                                  :         (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Defendant-Appellant.            :
    DECISION
    Rendered on December 22, 2015
    Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara A.
    Farnbacher, for appellee.
    Brian J. Rigg, for appellant.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
    HORTON, J.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel E. Hood ("Hood"), appeals from a judgment of
    conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Because
    his convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence, we affirm that judgment.
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶ 2} On October 16, 2014, the Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Hood on one
    count of felonious assault with firearm specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a felony
    of the second degree, and one count of having a weapon while under disability, in
    violation of R.C. 2923.13, a felony of the third degree.
    {¶ 3} On March 4, 2014, around 4:00 am, Theadore Craft ("Craft") and a friend
    went to a Marathon gas station located at the corner of South Central and Sullivant
    Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. (R. 103.) Upon exiting the store, a man walked up to Craft
    No. 15AP-656                                                                              2
    with a plastic bag over his hand with a gun inside. (R. 103.) The man fired multiple times
    and Craft was struck once in the stomach. (R. 103.) The gunshot missed any vital organs
    and Craft survived. (R. 103.)
    {¶ 4} When the police arrived on the scene, Craft told the officers that he had
    been shot by Danny Hood. (R. 103.) Later, at the hospital, Craft identified Hood as the
    assailant out of a photo array. (R. 103.) Prior to the shooting, Craft had ingested crack
    cocaine and also possessed four or five hundred dollars in cash. (R. 103.) A surveillance
    video from the gas station was recovered, however, the identities of the individuals in the
    video are unclear. (R. 103.) However, Craft testified that the two individuals in the video
    were himself and Hood. (R. 103.) There was no gun visible in the video but a fragment of
    a bullet was found at the scene. (R. 103.)
    {¶ 5} Craft testified that he and Hood had known one another for ten years. (R.
    103.) A month or two prior to the shooting, he and Hood had a conflict regarding Craft
    being put out of a drug house. (R. 103.) They saw each other two weeks prior to the
    shooting but nothing occurred. (R. 103.) At the time of the trial, Craft was incarcerated in
    Franklin County and had a $200,000 bond. (R. 103.) There was no testimony offered
    that the Craft was promised any benefit for testifying. (R. 103.)
    {¶ 6} On June 2, 2015, the case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict
    finding Hood guilty of felonious assault with a firearm specification, and guilty of having
    a weapon while under disability. On June 9, 2015, the trial court imposed sentences of
    five years as to the felonious assault and three years as to the weapon while under
    disability charge, to be served concurrently, and an additional consecutive three years as
    to the firearm specification. (R. 90.)
    II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶ 7} Hood appeals, assigning a single error:
    THE TRIAL COURT'S GUILTY VERDICTS TO THE
    FELONIOUS ASSAULT AND HAVING A WEAPON UNDER
    DISABILITY CHARGES WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
    WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SINCE THERE WAS
    INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PROVING THESE CHARGES.
    No. 15AP-656                                                                           3
    III. CONVICTIONS ARE NOT AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
    EVIDENCE
    {¶ 8} This court in State v. Baatin, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-286, 2011-Ohio-6294, ¶ 8-
    11, stated the applicable law:
    Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal
    concepts, manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in
    conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that a conviction is
    supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily
    includes a finding of sufficiency. State v. McCrary, 10th Dist.
    No. 10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11 * * * Thus, a
    determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of
    the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.
    
    Id. * *
    *.
    The weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the
    greater amount of credible evidence offered to support one
    side of the issue rather than the other. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 380
    , 387, 1997-Ohio-52 * * *.
    When presented with a challenge to the manifest weight of the
    evidence, an appellate court may not merely substitute its
    view for that of the trier of fact, but must review the entire
    record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
    consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in
    resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost
    its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
    the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
    Id. at 387.
    An appellate court should reserve reversal of a conviction
    as being against the manifest weight of the evidence for only
    the most " 'exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
    heavily against the conviction.' " Id.; State v. Strider-
    Williams, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-334, 2010-Ohio-6179, ¶ 12.
    In addressing a manifest weight of the evidence argument, we
    are able to consider the credibility of the witnesses. State v.
    Cattledge, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-105, 2010-Ohio-4953, ¶ 6.
    However, in conducting our review, we are guided by the
    presumption that the jury * * * " 'is best able to view the
    witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
    inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
    credibility of the proffered testimony.' " 
    Id. * *
    * Accordingly,
    we afford great deference to the jury's determination of
    witness credibility. * * *
    (Citations omitted.)
    No. 15AP-656                                                                                 4
    {¶ 9} Hood argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
    evidence due to lack of physical evidence, and because "the State did not provide sufficient
    evidence showing that [Hood] carried or used a firearm or committed felonious assault.
    The prosecution's evidence consisted of [Craft's] testimony and a surveillance video"
    where there was "no gun visible" and the "individuals in the video were unrecognizable."
    (Appellant's Brief, 7.)
    {¶ 10} In addition, Hood challenges Craft's credibility and argues that the
    "prosecution relied solely on [Craft's] testimony" and the two had "argued two months
    prior to this incident" and Craft had "more of a motive to retaliate against [Hood]" and
    was "under the influence of crack cocaine at the time of the shooting." (Appellant's Brief,
    7-8.)
    {¶ 11} Firstly, "[a] conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
    because the jury chose to believe the state's version of events over the defendant's
    version." State v. Hawk, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-895, 2013-Ohio-5794, ¶ 59. A lack of
    physical evidence does not warrant interfering with the jury's decision or preclude a
    conviction. See State v. Hunter, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-599, 2011-Ohio-1337, ¶ 24; State v.
    Jones, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-977, 2008-Ohio-3765, ¶ 16. In addition, the testimony of one
    witness, if believed by the jury, is enough to support a conviction. State v. Strong, 10th
    Dist. No. 09AP-874, 2011-Ohio-1024, ¶ 42.
    {¶ 12} In weighing the evidence, the record reveals that Craft was consistent in his
    identification of Hood, whom he had known for ten years, as his assailant. Immediately
    upon the arrival of the police, while lying on the ground bleeding and in pain, Craft
    identified Hood as the shooter. Craft also identified Hood as the shooter while in the
    hospital from a photo array. The surveillance video corroborated Craft's testimony
    regarding the sequence of events, and that the shooter held the gun inside a white bag. In
    addition, the testimony of the state's other witnesses, Officer Dustin McKee and Detective
    Randy Vanvorhis, were consistent with Craft's testimony.
    {¶ 13} Despite the attacks on Craft's credibility, the jury believed his identification
    of Hood as the assailant. The challenges to Craft's credibility based on his prior conflict
    with Hood, criminal convictions, and drug abuse of that night, were matters that were
    No. 15AP-656                                                                                 5
    presented to, and considered by, the jury. The jury was in the best position to evaluate the
    witnesses credibility, and there is no persuasive reason for rejecting that determination.
    {¶ 14} After a thorough review, we find that the jury did not lose its way, nor create
    a manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Hood's convictions are not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence. This conclusion is also dispositive of Hood's claim that
    his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence. State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. No.
    10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 17. Therefore, we overrule Hood's assignment of error.
    IV. DISPOSITION
    {¶ 15} Having overruled Hood's single assignment of error, we affirm the
    judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
    Judgment affirmed.
    BROWN, P.J. and SADLER, J., concur.
    _________________
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15AP-656

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ohio 5373

Judges: Horton

Filed Date: 12/22/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2015