State v. Herrell , 2017 Ohio 7109 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Herrell, 2017-Ohio-7109.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals No. L-16-1173
    Appellee                                  Trial Court No. CR0201601643
    v.
    Michael Herrell                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                 Decided: August 4, 2017
    *****
    Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Patricia Horner, for appellant.
    *****
    SINGER, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Michael Herrell, appeals the July 7, 2016 judgment of the Lucas
    County Court of Common Pleas, in which he was convicted, following a jury trial, of
    felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D), a felony of the second
    degree. Finding no error, we affirm.
    Assignments of Error
    {¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignments of error:
    I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE
    MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
    II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
    DENYING APPELLANT’S CRIM.R. 29 (sic).
    III. THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON FLIGHT WAS
    INCONSISTENT WITH THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE THUS
    VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR
    TRIAL.
    Facts
    {¶ 3} Appellant was indicted on a count of felonious assault, and the case
    proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the victim (“mother”), her daughter, and police officers
    testified. The following facts are derived from the record.
    {¶ 4} On March 12, 2016, appellant and the victim, who were married and living
    with the victim’s 16 year-old daughter, were watching television in their apartment. At
    around 9:00 p.m., the daughter went to sleep. The daughter woke up the next day and,
    around 1:00 p.m., noticed that her mother had not come out of her room. The daughter
    opened her mother’s bedroom door to find her laying on the floor in a pool of blood. The
    daughter went to the neighbor’s apartment to call 911, having to unlock the door as she
    2.
    left the apartment. Police arrived and the victim was transported to the hospital. The
    victim had no recollection of details surrounding the attack.
    {¶ 5} In describing what she could remember at trial, the victim testified that she
    and appellant had an argument before she went to bed. She then fell asleep, but testified
    that she remembers hearing appellant on the phone as he left their apartment. She
    testified that her next memory was awakening to a man standing over her. She was
    unable to identify the man because it was too dark in the room. Based on her stated
    recollection, the man then repeatedly struck her in the head with a hammer. She testified
    the next thing she remembered, after getting hit with the hammer, was waking up in the
    hospital.
    {¶ 6} The record reflects that, while being questioned at the hospital, she was very
    confused about what specifically happened. While there, her version of the story ranged
    from a car accident to falling down stairs. Based on the gathered evidence from the
    crime scene, her statements provided no reasonable explanation as to how she suffered
    her injuries, which included multiple wounds to the head and a broken arm.
    {¶ 7} According to the investigation of the crime scene, a hammer smeared with
    blood, which had both appellant and the victim’s DNA on it, was found underneath a
    mattress. Bloody clothes were found, as well as a letter from the victim to appellant
    written years before the incident. The letter mentioned past abuse of the victim, by
    appellant. Testimony of the responding officer established the contents of the letter, as
    follows:
    3.
    STATE: And Detective, what was the significance to your
    investigation in finding this letter in the victim’s bedroom?
    DETECTIVE: As I reviewed it, when I got into the letter it referred
    to [“]pushes me further away from you when you call me names and put
    your hands on me. I never thought you would do that. I went through that
    shit before and yeah, I don’t want or need that. You have a short fuse and it
    scares the daylights out of me.[”]
    {¶ 8} The record also reflects there was nothing stolen or missing from the
    apartment that day, except for appellant’s keys and a cellphone that typically stayed in
    the apartment. It was also noted on record that there was no evidence of forced entry.
    {¶ 9} At trial, the judge gave jury instructions on “flight,” and the jury found
    appellant guilty of felonious assault. Appellant was sentenced to seven years in prison,
    with a mandatory three years postrelease control to follow. Appellant appeals his
    conviction.
    Assignment of Error No. 1
    {¶ 10} In the first assignment of error, appellant argues his conviction is against
    the manifest weight. Appellee contends the conviction is amply supported by the record.
    {¶ 11} The standard of review for manifest weight is the same in a criminal case
    as in a civil case, and an appellate court’s function is to determine whether the greater
    amount of credible evidence supports the conviction. See Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio
    St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 
    972 N.E.2d 517
    , ¶ 12, citing State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio 4
    .
    St.3d 380, 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    (1997). The appellate court, as if the “thirteenth juror”
    must review the record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it,
    consider the witnesses’ credibility and decide, in resolving any conflicts in the evidence,
    whether the trier-of-fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
    justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” See State v. Leech,
    6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1156, 2015-Ohio-76, ¶ 32, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
    App.3d 172, 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    (1st Dist.1983).
    {¶ 12} R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause
    serious physical harm to another.” Moreover, “[i]dentity of the perpetrator of a crime can
    be proved by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Thompson, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-08-
    1208, L-09-1214, 2011-Ohio-5046, ¶ 71. “Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts
    by direct evidence from which the trier of fact may infer or derive by reasoning other
    facts in accordance with the common experience of mankind.” State v. Dotson, 6th Dist.
    Wood No. WD-15-060, 2016-Ohio-8085, ¶ 29, quoting State v. McFeeture, Cuyahoga
    No. 100434, 2015-Ohio-1814, ¶ 44.
    {¶ 13} Here, based on circumstantial evidence, we find ample support for
    appellant’s conviction on record. In specific, the daughter testified that the door to the
    apartment, which required a key to lock, was locked in the morning following the assault.
    There was no evidence of forced entry. These facts reasonably support that appellant was
    the only other individual to have been inside the apartment.
    5.
    {¶ 14} The record also reveals that appellant did not return to the apartment or see
    the victim or her daughter again until his trial. Appellee’s disappearance and failure to
    contact could reasonably be perceived to show his consciousness of guilt. Further,
    appellant’s DNA was found on the hammer used in the assault and the victim identified
    the assailant as a man, where appellant was the only man known to have been in the
    apartment. Lastly, the victim testified that appellant had, in the past, threatened to kill
    her if she ever left him. This testimony, coupled with the contents of the letter found at
    the crime scene, which mentions verbal and physical abuse, can reasonably show that
    appellant had a history of abusing the victim.
    {¶ 15} Therefore, based on the testimony of the daughter, victim, and officers,
    along with the police reports and 911 call, we hold that the greater amount of credible
    evidence amply supports the verdict and judgment. This is not the exceptional case in
    which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.
    {¶ 16} Accordingly, there is no indication the jury lost its way or otherwise
    created a manifest miscarriage of justice, and the first assigned error is found not well-
    taken.
    Assignment of Error No. 2
    {¶ 17} In the second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
    denying his Crim.R. 29 motion because the conviction is not supported by sufficient
    evidence. Appellee contends there is sufficient evidence on record to support the
    conviction.
    6.
    {¶ 18} A Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal is reviewed under the same standard as a
    sufficiency of the evidence claim. State v. Hollstein, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1184,
    2009-Ohio-4771, ¶ 28. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a
    question of law. 
    Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 386
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    . In reviewing a
    challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing
    the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
    v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St. 3d 89
    , 113, 
    684 N.E.2d 668
    (1997), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
    St.3d 259, 
    574 N.E.2d 492
    (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. In making that
    determination, the appellate court will not weigh evidence or assess credibility of the
    witnesses. State v. Walker, 
    55 Ohio St. 2d 208
    , 212, 
    378 N.E.2d 1049
    (1978).
    {¶ 19} Here, the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to show appellant
    knowingly caused serious physical harm to the victim. See R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).
    Specifically, in viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution, it is reasonable to find
    that appellant was the man who repeatedly struck the victim with a hammer. Moreover,
    the record reflects that this infliction of harm caused multiple puncture wounds to her
    head, along with a broken arm and other fractures. We hold that any rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    {¶ 20} Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient and the second assigned
    error is not well-taken.
    7.
    Assignment of Error No. 3
    {¶ 21} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the jury instructions
    regarding his alleged “flight,” after committing the crime, were given in error because
    there was no basis on record. Appellee contends the jury instructions given were
    applicable to the facts of the case.
    {¶ 22} A jury instruction “must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.”
    State v. Price, 
    60 Ohio St. 2d 136
    , 
    398 N.E.2d 772
    (1979), paragraph four of the syllabus.
    “[O]nly those instructions which are applicable to the facts of the case should be given.”
    Avon Lake v. Anderson, 
    10 Ohio App. 3d 297
    , 299, 
    462 N.E.2d 188
    , 190 (9th Dist.1983).
    {¶ 23} We review a trial court’s decision to grant or refuse requested jury
    instructions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wolons, 
    44 Ohio St. 3d 64
    , 68, 
    541 N.E.2d 443
    (1989). To find an abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that “the court’s
    attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Endicott, 
    99 Ohio App. 3d 688
    , 693, 
    651 N.E.2d 1024
    (6th Dist.1994).
    {¶ 24} This court has stated that “a jury instruction on flight is appropriate if there
    is sufficient evidence in the record to support the charge.” State v. Johnson, 6th Dist.
    Lucas No. L-03-1206, 2005-Ohio-1222, ¶ 14. “Flight means some escape or affirmative
    attempt to avoid apprehension. It can take form of fleeing from the police or
    eyewitnesses, to changing or disguising one’s physical characteristics after the fact.”
    State v. Wesley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80684, 2002-Ohio-4429, ¶ 19, citing United
    States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 
    940 F.2d 1200
    , 1207 (9th Cir.1991). Changing clothes is
    8.
    enough to satisfy the changing of one’s appearance. State v. Braylock, 6th Dist. Lucas
    No. L-08-1433, 2010-Ohio-4722, ¶ 38. “There is no support * * * that an individual
    must run away or leave the scene rapidly in order for his actions to constitute flight.”
    Johnson at ¶ 17.
    {¶ 25} Here, appellant left the scene of the crime, which was his home, and did not
    return the following morning or anytime during the police investigation of the crime.
    The door was locked after appellant’s departure and the family’s phone was taken to
    presumably prevent a call to authorities. Further, appellant’s bloody clothes were found
    in the bedroom, which reasonably suggests that appellant changed his clothes after
    committing the assault in an effort to avoid detection.
    {¶ 26} The jury instructions, with regard to flight, stated as follows:
    If you find from the evidence that the defendant fled the scene to
    avoid arrest or prosecution, such conduct may be considered by you as
    circumstances tending to show a consciousness of guilt. However, such
    conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt and its weight and
    significance, if any, are matters for your determination.
    {¶ 27} Therefore in light of the evidence on record, we find that in the context of
    the overall charge, the relevant instructions were indeed applicable to the facts of the
    case.
    {¶ 28} Consequently we find no abuse of discretion, as the jury instructions given
    did not violate appellant’s rights. The third assignment of error is not well-taken.
    9.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
    Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay costs of this appeal pursuant to
    App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                       _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Arlene Singer, J.
    _______________________________
    Christine E. Mayle, J.                                     JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    10.