In re D.M. , 2017 Ohio 2710 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as In re D.M., 
    2017-Ohio-2710
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SEVENTH DISTRICT
    IN THE MATTER OF D.M.                            )
    )
    )
    )         CASE NO. 16 MA 0166
    )
    )               OPINION
    )                AND
    )           JUDGMENT ENTRY
    )
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                        Motion to Dismiss
    JUDGMENT:                                        Dismissed
    APPEARANCES:
    For Appellant                                    Charlyn Bohland
    Assistant State Public Defender
    250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400
    Columbus, Ohio 43215
    For Appellee                                     Paul Gains
    Prosecutor
    Ralph M. Rivera
    Assistant Prosecutor
    21 W. Boardman St., 6th Floor
    Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1426
    JUDGES:
    Hon. Gene Donofrio
    Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
    Hon. Carol Ann Robb
    Dated: May 2, 2017
    [Cite as In re D.M., 
    2017-Ohio-2710
    .]
    PER CURIAM.
    {¶1}    Appellant D.M. appeals a judgment entry of the Mahoning County
    Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, transferring the case back to the General
    Division pursuant to R.C. 2151.121(B)(3)(b).         Following a reverse bindover, the
    juvenile court conducted an amenability hearing and, upon determining that Appellant
    was not amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, sent the case back to the General
    Division for imposition of the adult sentence. The state has filed a motion to dismiss
    arguing that the entry appealed from is not a final appealable order. Appellant has
    filed a response in opposition. We conclude that the entry does not constitute a final
    appealable order.
    {¶2}    In 2013, a three-count delinquency complaint was filed against 16-year-
    old Appellant in juvenile court. Two counts were for offenses that if he were an adult
    would have constituted aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), first-
    degree felonies. One count was for an offense that if he were an adult would have
    constituted aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11, a first-degree felony. All
    three counts contained firearm specifications.
    {¶3}    The juvenile court appointed counsel and Appellant entered pleas of
    denial to the complaint.         Subsequently, Appellant waived the right to a probable
    cause hearing and stipulated to probable cause. Pursuant to the mandatory transfer
    statute, the juvenile court transferred Appellant’s case to the adult court.
    {¶4}    Once in adult court, Appellant reached a plea agreement with the state.
    Appellant agreed to plead guilty to one count each of aggravated robbery and
    aggravated burglary. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss all other charges
    since they would have merged with the aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary
    offenses to which Appellant was pleading guilty.            The state also agreed to
    recommend consecutive terms of four years in prison for each of the offenses for an
    aggregate term of eight years, and that it would not oppose an application for judicial
    release when Appellant becomes eligible in four and half years.           Also, the state
    dismissed the firearm specifications because the instrument Appellant used in the
    commission of the offenses turned out to be a starter pistol which was incapable of
    shooting a projectile.
    -2-
    {¶5}   In 2014, the adult court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the
    state’s recommendation and he appealed. Because the offenses to which Appellant
    pleaded guilty would not have required a mandatory transfer of the case from the
    juvenile division to the general division, this court found that the reverse bindover
    procedure set forth in R.C. 2152.121(B)(3) was activated requiring transfer of the
    case back to the juvenile court.
    {¶6}   Upon remand to the juvenile court, the state objected to the imposition
    of   a   Serious    Youthful   Offender   dispositional   sentence   pursuant   to   R.C.
    2152.121(B)(3)(b) and the court conducted an amenability hearing. Following the
    hearing, the juvenile court determined that Appellant was not amenable to
    rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. Subsequently, in a judgment entry
    filed September 29, 2016 which is the subject of this appeal, the juvenile court
    ordered the case returned to the general division for imposition of the adult sentence.
    {¶7}   The general division conducted a resentencing hearing on November 3,
    2016, pursuant to R.C. 2929.19 and R.C. 2152.121(B)(3) and imposed the previously
    agreed upon 8-year prison term.           The judgment entry of sentence was filed
    November 21, 2016, and no appeal was filed from that entry.
    {¶8}   Turning to a review of the juvenile court’s order appealed in this case,
    Ohio Supreme Court precedent is clear: “[a]n order by a Juvenile Court, pursuant
    R.C. 2151.26 [now R.C. 2152.12], transferring a child to the Court of Common Pleas
    for criminal prosecution, is not a final appealable order.” In re Becker, 
    39 Ohio St.2d 84
    , 
    314 N.E.2d 158
     (1974), syllabus. Ohio appellate courts have adhered to Becker.
    See, e.g., In re J.L., 11th Dist. No. 2015-T-0137, 
    2016-Ohio-644
    , 
    2016 WL 697800
    ,
    ¶ 6-7; In re D.H., 2d Dist. No. 27074, 
    2016-Ohio-5265
    ; State v. McKinney, 2015-
    Ohio-4398, 
    46 N.E.3d 179
    , ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).
    {¶9}   Appellant argues this case is distinguishable from Becker and other
    appellate court decisions applying Becker simply because a conviction has already
    occurred in this case.     However, Appellant does not explain how the procedural
    posture of this case (i.e., discretionary transfer after a reverse bindover) takes it
    outside the purview of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Becker.             Nor does
    -3-
    Appellant cite any caselaw that would support even an inference to that effect.
    {¶10} Moreover, Appellant’s argument overlooks the interlocutory nature of
    this appeal.   Although Appellant was convicted in adult court, the sentence was
    automatically stayed by operation of law pursuant to R.C. 2152.121(B)(3).              A
    judgment of conviction is not a final appealable order until a sentence is imposed.
    State v. Chamberlain, 
    177 Ohio St. 104
    , 106-107, 
    202 N.E.2d 695
     (1964); State v.
    Pasqualone, 
    140 Ohio App.3d 650
    , 655, 
    748 N.E.2d 1153
     (11th Dist.2000); State v.
    George, 
    98 Ohio App.3d 371
    , 374, 
    648 N.E.2d 597
     (12th Dist.1994). The adult
    sentence cannot be imposed by the adult court until the juvenile court transfers
    jurisdiction of the case back to adult court. In this instance, Appellant’s conviction
    and sentence became a final appealable order when the adult court, pursuant to R.C.
    2919.121(B)(3), reinvoked the previously stayed sentence on November 21, 2016,
    from which no appeal was taken.
    {¶11} Accordingly, Appellant’s appeal of the juvenile court’s order transferring
    the case back to the adult court is dismissed. Appellant’s pending motion to strike
    the use of Appellant’s full name rather than his initials in Appellee’s motion to dismiss
    is overruled as moot. Costs taxed against Appellant.
    {¶12} Final order. Clerk to serve notice as provided by Civil Rules.
    ______________________________
    Judge Gene Donofrio
    ______________________________
    Judge Cheryl L. Waite
    ______________________________
    Judge Carol Ann Robb
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16 MA 0166

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ohio 2710

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 5/2/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/8/2017