State v. Slaughter , 2018 Ohio 105 ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Slaughter, 2018-Ohio-105.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-170110
C-170111
Plaintiff-Appellee, : C-170112
TRIAL NOS. 16TRC-37026A
vs. : 16TRC-37026B
16TRC-37026C
TYRONE SLAUGHTER, :
Defendant-Appellant. : O P I N I O N.
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in C-170110 and C-170112; Appeal
Dismissed in C-170111
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 12, 2018
Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, Natalia Harris, City Prosecutor, and
Christopher Liu, Appellate Director, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Carrie Wood, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D ETERS , Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Tyrone Slaughter appeals his convictions,
following his no-contest pleas, for operating a vehicle with a prohibited breath-
alcohol content and a marked-lanes violation. In this appeal, he argues that the trial
court erred by overruling his motion to suppress evidence on the basis that an Ohio
State Highway Patrol trooper lacked probable cause or a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to stop his vehicle for a marked-lanes violation.
{¶2} The trial court based its decision to overrule the motion on a second
marked-lanes violation that it noted after viewing a video recording taken from the
trooper’s cruiser camera. But the trooper testified he had not seen that violation.
Since the trooper’s unrebutted testimony was that he had witnessed a prior marked-
lanes violation, and that testimony was not inconsistent with the video recording of
the traffic stop, the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop
Slaughter’s vehicle. We, thus, affirm the trial court’s judgments albeit for reasons
other than those stated by the trial court.
Trial Court Proceedings
{¶3} Slaughter was charged with operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), having a prohibited
breath-alcohol content under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), and crossing marked lanes in
violation of R.C. 4511.33. Slaughter filed a motion to suppress all the evidence
against him on the basis that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion or
probable cause to stop his vehicle.
{¶4} At the suppression hearing, Slaughter stipulated that he had been
arrested without a warrant. Trooper Alex Burnett testified that he was in a uniform
and in a marked cruiser on patrol on North Bend Road when he observed a Nissan
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Altima ahead of him traveling out of its lane. He testified the vehicle was in the left
lane and it traveled to the right approximately one to two feet. He sped up to catch
the vehicle and signaled to the driver to pull over. He then came into contact with
Slaughter, who was driving the vehicle. After administering field-sobriety tests, he
arrested Slaughter for OVI.
{¶5} The video from Trooper Burnett’s cruiser camera was admitted into
evidence and played during the suppression hearing. As the video was playing,
defense counsel questioned Trooper Burnett about the basis for the traffic stop. The
video showed a vehicle ahead of Trooper Burnett that turned right onto one of the
north-south streets. Trooper Burnett testified that while it was difficult to see on the
video, he had then followed a red Nissan Altima. He saw the marked-lanes violation
and sped up to stop the vehicle. The video showed that Slaughter had committed a
second marked-lanes violation near the intersection of North Bend Road and
Hamilton Avenue when he had driven his vehicle partly into the left-turn lane and
then back into the adjoining lane, before proceeding straight through the traffic light.
Trooper Burnett testified, however, that he had not seen that marked-lanes violation.
{¶6} On cross-examination, Trooper Burnett testified that even though he
was 100-110 meters behind Slaughter’s vehicle, he had a clear and unobstructed view
of the marked-lanes violation. He acknowledged it was difficult to see this violation
on the video because “the blur from the traffic lights and the headlights of the other
vehicles had blurred out some of the violation.”
{¶7} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. It found that
Trooper Burnett had probable cause to stop Slaughter based on the second marked-
lanes violation depicted on the video. Shortly thereafter, Slaughter pled no contest to
OVI with a prohibited concentration of alcohol and the marked-lanes violation. The
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
trial court accepted the pleas and found Slaughter guilty. It dismissed the remaining
OVI charge.
{¶8} In a single assignment of error, Slaughter argues the trial court erred
in overruling his motion to suppress.
{¶9} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
fact and law. See State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d
71, ¶ 8. The trial court, acting as the trier of fact, is in the best position to resolve
factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Id. Therefore, an appellate court
must accept a trial court’s findings of historical fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence, but it reviews de novo the trial court’s application of
the law to the facts. See id.; see also State v. Sweeten, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
150583, 2016-Ohio-5828, ¶ 8.
{¶10} A traffic stop initiated by a police officer constitutes a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, any seizure must comply with the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 809-810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). A police officer’s decision to
stop an automobile is reasonable where the officer has probable cause to believe that
a traffic violation has occurred. Id. Accord Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St. 3d 3, 11-
12, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). Probable cause is a complete justification for a traffic
stop. State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23;
Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St. 3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, ¶
11.
{¶11} Probable cause, however, is not required to justify a traffic stop.
Mays at ¶ 23. A traffic stop may be based on less than probable cause when an
officer possesses reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed, or is committing
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
a crime, including a minor traffic violation. Id. at ¶ 7-8. To justify a traffic stop
based on reasonable articulable suspicion, the officer must be able to articulate
specific facts that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the
driver has committed, or is committing, a crime, including a minor traffic violation.
Id. at ¶ 8 and 12. Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable and
articulable suspicion and subsumes reasonable and articulable suspicion. Id. at ¶ 23,
citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St. 3d 405, 411, 618 N.E.2d 162 (1993). Accordingly, an
officer who witnesses a traffic violation possesses probable cause, and a reasonable
articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Mays at ¶ 23-24.
{¶12} In determining whether an officer possesses probable cause or a
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle, the court must examine the totality
of the circumstances. Id. at ¶ 7. “[T]he existence of probable cause [or reasonable
and articulable suspicion] depends on whether an objectively reasonable police
officer would believe that [the driver’s] conduct * * * constituted a traffic violation,
based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the
stop.” Bowling Green, 110 Ohio St. 3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, at ¶ 16.
{¶13} Here, the record reflects that Trooper Burnett testified that he had
stopped Slaughter’s vehicle because he had observed Slaughter’s vehicle, which was
ahead of him in the left lane, travel out of that lane and into the right lane
approximately one to two feet. Trooper Burnett testified that he then sped up to
catch Slaughter’s vehicle. He testified that it was difficult to see this marked-lanes
violation on the video because the traffic lights and the headlights of the other
vehicles had blurred out some of the violation.
{¶14} The video showed Slaughter had committed a second marked-lanes
violation when his vehicle traveled out of the left-turn lane into the adjoining lane
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and then drove straight through a traffic light. Trooper Burnett testified, however,
that this was not the marked-lanes violation that he had seen. Rather, he had
stopped Slaughter’s vehicle based solely on his observation of the first marked-lanes
violation.
{¶15} The trial court’s legal conclusion that the second marked-lanes
violation provided the trooper with probable cause to stop Slaughter’s vehicle is
erroneous given that the trooper expressly denied observing this second marked-
lanes violation. However, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in overruling the
motion to suppress, because the trooper’s unrebutted testimony that he had
personally observed a prior marked-lanes violation was sufficient to provide him
with reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Slaughter’s vehicle. See State v. Lopez,
166 Ohio App. 3d 337, 2006-Ohio-2091, 850 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.); State v.
Shisler, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-050860, C-050861, C-050878 and C-050879,
2006-Ohio-5265, ¶ 7; State v. Burwell, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-09-06, 2010-Ohio-
1087, ¶ 14.
{¶16} Slaughter argues that this court cannot rely on the trooper’s
testimony because the trial court chose not to rely on the trooper’s testimony when
overruling the motion to suppress. Thus, he contends, the trial court must have
found the trooper’s testimony lacking in credibility. We disagree. The trial court did
not expressly address the credibility of the trooper’s testimony. Our review of the
record reveals that the trooper’s testimony conforms to the video of the traffic stop,
which reflects that the trooper’s vehicle was 100-110 meters behind another vehicle
and that the glare of oncoming headlights blurred out the violation. The trooper’s
vehicle accelerated and he initiated the traffic stop. Because the trooper’s testimony
that he had observed Slaughter’s vehicle, which was in the left lane, travel out of that
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
lane and into the right lane is not inconsistent with the video, it was sufficient to
establish a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that Slaughter’s vehicle
had been operated in violation of the law. See Mays, 119 Ohio St. 3d 406, 2008-
Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, at ¶ 24; State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App. 3d 550, 2002-
Ohio-3053, 771 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 50 (7th Dist.). Under these circumstances, the trial court
did not err in overruling Slaughter’s motion to suppress.
{¶17} We, therefore, overrule Slaughter’s sole assignment of error and affirm
the judgments of the trial court in the appeals numbered C-170110 and C-170112. We
dismiss the appeal numbered C-170111, which was taken from the trial court’s judgment
dismissing the R.C. 4511.191(A)(1)(a) charge.
Judgment accordingly.
CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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