State v. Santiago , 2023 Ohio 561 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Santiago, 2023-Ohio-561.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 4-22-11
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MANUEL SANTIAGO, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 4-22-12
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MANUEL SANTIAGO, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeals from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court Nos. 19 CR 13725 and 21 CR 14242
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 27, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Henry Schaefer for Appellant
Russell R. Herman for Appellee
Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Manuel Santiago (“Santiago”) appeals the
judgments of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the State
failed to comply with the terms of a plea agreement at sentencing. For the reasons
set forth below, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On October 10, 2019, Santiago was indicted on one count of robbery in
violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), a felony of the second degree; one count of
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree;
and one count of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first
degree. Doc. 2A.1 These charges became the basis of Case No. 19-CR-13725. Doc.
2A. Subsequently, on January 2, 2020, a bill of information was issued in this case
that charged Santiago with one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A), a felony of the fourth degree. Doc. 29A.
{¶3} On January 2, 2020, Santiago pled guilty to one count of robbery in
violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), a felony of the second degree and one count of
domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the fourth degree.
Doc. 34A. The prosecution indicated that, as part of plea negotiations, the State and
Santiago had reached a joint sentencing recommendation. Doc. 34A, 43A. The trial
1
This appeal arises from two cases. The docket numbers from Case No. 19-CR-13725 will be followed by
the letter “A.” The docket numbers from Case No. 21-CR-14242 will be followed by the letter “B.”
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
court informed Santiago that it was not bound by the sentencing recommendation
given by the State before he entered his guilty pleas on January 2, 2020. Jan. 2 Tr.
12. The trial court then accepted Santiago’s pleas of guilty and ordered the
preparation of a presentence investigation. Doc. 34A.
{¶4} On February 24, 2020, Santiago appeared at his sentencing hearing.
Doc. 43A. On motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the two remaining
charges to which Santiago had not entered pleas of guilty. Doc. 43A. At this
hearing, the trial judge stated the following:
At the time of the plea the Court was advised there was a joint
sentence recommendation. That he’d be admitted * * * directly
to a period of community control, with an indefinite term of not
less than five no more than seven and a half years reserved on the
Robbery, a con-current [sic] seventeen-month term reserved on
the Domestic Violence.
Id. at 2. On request by the trial court, the State then confirmed the basic terms of
the jointly recommended sentence. Id. at 3.
{¶5} After examining Santiago’s criminal history as recorded in the
presentence investigation, the trial court concluded that a reserved sentence of “five
to seven and a half years isn’t near enough based on your history and these crimes.”
Feb. 24 Tr. 9. The trial court then ordered Santiago to serve five years on
community control, reserving an indeterminate prison sentence of seven to ten-and
one-half years for the charge of robbery and a basic prison sentence of twelve
months for the charge of domestic violence. Doc. 43A. The trial court told Santiago
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
that the prison terms from these two cases could be run consecutively to each other.
Doc. 43A.
{¶6} On February 25, 2021, Santiago was indicted on one count of vandalism
in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(a), a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of
breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), a felony of the fifth
degree. Doc. 1B. These charges became the basis of Case No. 21-CR-14242. Doc.
1B. On February 25, 2021, the State also filed a motion to revoke Santiago’s
community control in Case No. 19-CR-13725. Doc. 44A. The motion cited the
charges in Case No. 21-CR-14242 as one of the alleged violations of the terms of
his community control sanction. Doc. 44A.
{¶7} On June 9, 2021, Santiago appeared for a plea hearing in Case No. 21-
CR-14242. Doc. 19B. The trial court informed Santiago “that his guilty plea in this
matter would also constitute a violation of terms of Community Control in Case No.
19 CR 13725 * * *.” Doc. 19B. The State set forth its sentencing recommendation:
The State would recommend that the Defendant be allowed to be
placed on community control. Our promises would be contingent
on no new offenses between now and the date of sentencing and
also that he continues to participate * * * in Racing for Recovery
program. And then after sentencing we’d ask that that be
condition of community control, if the Court does grant the
community control, and if all that works out that way we would
recommend that his community control not be revoked in Case
Number 13725, but that he’d be allowed to continue on
supervision. Again, subject to the condition that he successfully
complete the Racing for Recovery program.
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
June 9 Tr. 3. The trial court informed Santiago that it was not bound by the
sentencing recommendation that had been presented by the State. Id. at 6. The trial
court then accepted Santiago’s pleas of guilty for the two charges against him in
Case No. 21-CR-14242 and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation.
Doc. 19B. The trial court also held a final adjudicatory hearing on the motion to
revoke Santiago’s community control and found that he had violated the terms of
his community control. Doc. 49A.
{¶8} On October 5, 2021, Santiago appeared for his sentencing hearing.
Doc. 32B. In its judgment entry for Case No. 19-CR-13725, the trial court stated:
Upon review of the Defendant’s extensive juvenile and adult
criminal history, the Court finds that the Defendant is no longer
amenable to any available community control sanctions.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
that the Defendant’s Community Control is REVOKED and the
balance of the seven (7) years to ten and one half (10 ½) years of
imprisonment is imposed for the offense of Robbery * * * and the
CONSECUTIVE balance of the twelve (12) months of
imprisonment for the offense of Domestic Violence * * *.
Doc. 57A. In its judgment entry for Case No. 21-CR-14242, the trial court stated:
The Court made reference to the information contained in the
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, to the Defendant’s extensive
criminal history and to the history of this cause as known to the
Court.
Based upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that
the Defendant is no longer amenable to any available community
control sanction and that a prison term is necessary and
appropriate.
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
Doc. 32B. The trial court then imposed eleven-month prison terms for each of the
charges against Santiago to be served concurrently to the prison terms imposed in
Case No. 19-CR-13725. Doc. 32B. This left Santiago with an aggregate sentence
of eight to eleven-and-one-half years of imprisonment. Doc. 57A, 32B.
{¶9} On October 14, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry of
sentencing in each of these cases. Doc. 57A, 32B. Santiago filed his notices of
appeal on November 10, 2021. Doc. 62A, 37B. However, there was an equipment
failure that prevented the recording of the sentencing hearing on October 14, 2021
from being transcribed. Doc. 80A. As a result, the appeals were withdrawn to give
the trial court an opportunity to resentence Santiago. Doc. 84A, 50B. June 13 Tr.
3.
{¶10} On June 13, 2022, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. June 13
Tr. 2. The prosecutor stated that he “s[aw] no reason for the Court to impose
something different [from what was ordered at the October 5, 2021 hearing] at this
point in time.” June 13 Tr. 7. At this hearing, the parties discussed a letter that had
been received from the Director of Operations at Racing for Recovery. Id. at 11.
This letter read as follows:
‘This letter is written to inform you that Manuel Santiago has
completed recommended number of IOP groups for court
requirements. Due to this we can successfully complete him from
SUD services. However, it is my recommendation that he seek a
higher level of care for mental health support. The
recommendation is made because client’s emotional and
behavioral problems that left untreated will lead to further
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
destructive behaviors and likely a return to use. Examples of this
include consistent pattern of challenging or disrespectful
treatment of authority figures using verbally abusive language,
overreaction, or hostility to insignificant irritants, and dishonesty
in terms of engagement with peers in harmful situations.
After reports from numerous participants at Racing for Recovery
that Manuel was seen at a bar drinking with individuals in
treatment, it was decided that he would no longer be able to
engage in treatment or other services at Racing for Recovery. If
you have any additional questions, please feel free to contact me.’
Id. at 11. The Defense argued that others who had been involved with Santiago
through Racing for Recovery would contest this assessment. Id. at 13. The trial
judge stated:
I still don’t know that that’s the reason he should be continued on
community control because he already had a substantial
opportunity being placed on community control for two very
serious offenses and then he goes out and commits two more
felonies while on community control.
Id. Nonetheless, the trial court continued this matter to give the Defense the
opportunity to seek out an assessment from others at Racing for Recovery. Id.
{¶11} On July 5, 2022, Santiago appeared for the continued resentencing
hearing in Case No. 19-CR-13725 and Case No. 21-CR-14242. July 5 Tr. 2. The
State recommended the following sentence:
We were here June 14th and one of the issues that was discussed
was issues and problems that had occurred at a facility called
Racing for Recovery, and the Defendant’s connection to some
problems that had occurred there. A letter that had been received
from a managing person; I don’t know what his title officially was
from Racing for Recovering regarding the Defendant’s behavior
there. Those things were discussed at the time of the last hearing.
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
The State had initially at the time of the original sentencing had
made a recommendation for a five-to-seven-and-a-half-year term,
aggregate for both cases given the Defendant’s extensive criminal
history and multiple efforts to allow him to be, have alternative
sentencing options. But upon looking at his criminal history it’s
certainly one of the most extensive lengthy that we see in this court
and including many offensives [sic] that are indicative of volatile
behavior. Regardless of what the cause of those things are it’s our
concern that he cannot be supervised and has demonstrated that.
The State would recommend that a five-to-seven-and-a-half-year
term be imposed in the aggregate of the two cases.
Id. at 4. In its judgment entry for Case No. 19-CR-13725, the trial court stated:
Upon review of the Defendant’s extensive juvenile and adult
criminal history, also considering that new offenses were
committed while the Defendant was under Community Control
Supervision, the Court finds that the Defendant is no longer
amenable to any available community control sanctions.
Doc. July 25, 2022 Judgment Entry. The trial court then revoked Santiago’s
community control. Id.
{¶12} However, the trial court did not impose the same “eight to eleven and
a half” year aggregate sentence that it had imposed at the October 5, 2021 sentencing
hearing. July 5 Tr. 20. In recognition of some of the progress that Santiago had
made, the trial court imposed “the term of not less than five no more than seven and
a half” years in prison. Id. In Case No. 21-CR-14242, the trial court imposed an
eleven-month prison term for each of the charges against Santiago. Doc. 50B.
These prison terms were to be served concurrently to the sentence imposed in Case
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
No. 19-CR-13725. Doc. 50B. The trial court issued a judgment entry of sentencing
in each of these two cases on July 25, 2022. Doc. 84A.
Assignment of Error
{¶13} Santiago filed his notices of appeal on August 23, 2022. Doc. 87A,
53B. On appeal, he raises the following assignment of error:
It was improper for the State to not recommend community
control at sentencing.
He argues that the State breached the plea agreement by failing to recommend that
he remain on community control at the July 5, 2022 sentencing hearing.
Legal Standard
{¶14} “Regarding the joint sentencing recommendation, Ohio law is clear
that a plea bargain is a contract between the state and the defendant.” State v.
Woodrey, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2010-01-008, 2010-Ohio-4079, ¶ 10. Thus,
“a plea agreement is * * * subject to contract-law standards.” State v. Vari, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 07-MA-142, 2010-Ohio-1300, ¶ 25. “[I]f one side violates a term of
the plea agreement, the other party has a right to pursue appropriate remedies * *
*.” State v. Liskany, 196 Ohio App.3d 609, 2011-Ohio-4456, 964 N.E.2d 1073, ¶
190 (2d Dist.).
{¶15} In general, if the State “breach[es] * * * the agreement, the defendant
is entitled to either rescission (i.e., withdrawal of their plea) or specific
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
performance.” Vari at ¶ 27, citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263, 92
S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, (1971); State v. Walker, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1207,
2006-Ohio-2929, ¶ 13; Ritchie v. State, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-07-073,
2009-Ohio-1841, ¶ 9. “Since a plea agreement is a contract, to be construed strictly
against the state, the prosecutor is required to fulfill any promise or agreement of
the state.” State v. Zamora, 3d Dist. Paulding Nos. 11-07-04, 11-07-05, 2007-Ohio-
6973, ¶ 12. See State v. Soto, 158 Ohio St.3d 44, 2019-Ohio-4430, 139 N.E.3d 889,
(“When a plea rests on a promise made by the prosecutor, that promise must be
fulfilled.”).
{¶16} “When an allegation is made that a plea agreement has been broken,
the defendant must merely show that the agreement was not fulfilled.” Zamora at ¶
quoting State v. Legree, 61 Ohio App.3d 568, 571, 573 N.E.2d 687 (6th Dist. 1988).
In such a circumstance, “[t]he court must examine the nature of the state’s promise
and the language used by the state in the plea agreement in order to determine
whether the state actually breached the plea agreement.” State v. Bembry, 7th Dist.
Columbiana No. 13 CO 33, 2014-Ohio-5498, ¶ 22.
{¶17} However, “a breach of the contract by the defendant relieves the
prosecution of any obligations under the agreement.” State v. Payton, 6th Dist. Erie
No. E-09-070, E-09-071, 2010-Ohio-5178, ¶ 11.
‘Where a defendant enters a plea of guilty in exchange for the
prosecutor’s promise to recommend probation, an implied
condition exists that circumstances surrounding the bargain will
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
remain substantially the same, and a subsequent change is
sufficient to relieve the state of its obligation.’ State v. Hill, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-463, 2013-Ohio-674, ¶ 20, quoting State
v. Pascall, 49 Ohio App.2d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1368, (9th Dist. 1972) at
the syllabus.
“Additional misconduct during incarceration represents a substantial change in
circumstances from when the plea agreement was executed.” State v. Dowler, 4th
Dist. Athens No. 15CA7, 2015-Ohio-5027, ¶ 26.
{¶18} Notably, “trial courts generally are not a party to the plea negotiations
and the contract itself.” State v. Kocak, 2016-Ohio-8483, 79 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 20 (7th
Dist.). For this reason, “[t]t is well-established law that a trial court is not bound to
accept a sentence recommendation proffered by the prosecution.” State v. Kitzler,
3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-02-06, 2002-Ohio-5253, ¶ 9. Thus,
‘[a] trial court does not err by imposing a sentence greater than
that forming the inducement for the defendant to plead guilty
when the trial court forewarns the defendant of the applicable
penalties, including the possibility of imposing a greater sentence
than that recommended by the prosecutor.’
State v. Oakley, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-06, 2019-Ohio-2487, ¶ 12, quoting State
ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6.
{¶19} “Whether a party to a plea agreement breached the terms and
obligations of the agreement is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial
court, which will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Harrington, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-37, 2021-Ohio-343, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Tite,
6th Dist. Huron No. H-12-017, 2013-Ohio-1361, ¶ 10. See also State v. Flowers,
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22751, 2009-Ohio-1945, ¶ 6; State v. Adams, 2014-Ohio-
724, 8 N.E.3d 984, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.); State v. Perez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111296,
2023-Ohio-83, ¶ 23; State v. Cortes, 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2022-A-0019, 2022-
A-0020, 2022-Ohio-3973, ¶ 26. But see State v. Blair, 4th Dist. Scioto No.
11CA3429, 2012-Ohio-769, ¶ 16 (applying a de novo standard to this
determination).
Legal Analysis
{¶20} In this case, Santiago argues that the State violated the terms of the
negotiated plea agreement. He asserts that the State was obligated to recommend
that he remain on community control at his resentencing hearings. This
recommendation was subject to an express condition that he “successfully complete
the Racing for Recovery program.” June 3 Tr. 3. At the resentencing hearing, a
letter from the director of operations at Racing for Recovery was presented. June
13 Tr. 10-11. This letter indicated that Santiago had a number of behavioral issues
in this program; that he needs further mental health support; but that he would not
be allowed to receive that support at Racing for Recovery. Id. at 11.
{¶21} On appeal, Santiago argues that this letter should not be taken as an
indication that he did not successfully complete the Racing for Recovery program.
For this reason, he would have this Court find that he did not violate the State’s
express condition; that the prosecution was still obligated to recommend community
control at his resentencing hearings; and that the State breached the plea agreement.
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
However, to decide this appeal, we ultimately do not need to reach the question of
whether Santiago technically violated or complied with the State’s express
condition that he successfully complete the Racing for Recovery program.
{¶22} As an initial matter, the Defense did not formally object over the issue
of whether the State was in compliance with the plea agreement and did not,
therefore, prompt a ruling from the trial court on this matter. The determination as
to whether a party has breached a plea agreement is a matter that lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Harrington, supra, at ¶ 10. In this appeal, we do
not have a ruling on this matter to review. For this reason, we will examine this
issue for plain error only. See State v. Montgomery, 2008-Ohio-4753, 970 N.E.2d
999, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.); State v. Watkins, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1213, 2016-Ohio-
5756, ¶ 9; State v. Hansen, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 11 MA 63, 2012-Ohio-4574, ¶
15; State v. Dudas, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2006-L-267, 2006-L-268, 2007-Ohio-
6739, ¶ 93; State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92037, 2009-Ohio-2138, ¶ 11.
{¶23} “Under the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, ‘[p]lain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought
to the attention of the court.’” State v. Elliott, 2022-Ohio-3778, 199 N.E.3d 944, ¶
75 (3d Dist.), quoting Crim.R. 52(B).
“In order to find plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), there must be
an error, the error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial
proceedings, and the error must have affected ‘substantial
rights.’” State v. Bowsher, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-07-32, 2009-
Ohio-6524, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
N.E.2d 1240 (2002). ‘The standard for plain error is whether, but
for the error, the outcome of the proceeding clearly would have
been otherwise.’ State v. Hornbeck, 155 Ohio App.3d 571, 2003-
Ohio-6897, 802 N.E.2d 184, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Long, 53
Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). Notice of plain error is
taken “only to ‘prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State
v. Davis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio-2916, ¶ 23,
quoting Long, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus.
State v. Eitzman, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-21-03, 2022-Ohio-574, ¶ 42, quoting State
v. Taflinger, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-20, 2018-Ohio-456, ¶ 17. Under Crim.R.
52(B), “the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plain error affected
his substantial rights.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-
Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14.
{¶24} In this case, the trial court expressed concern about Santiago’s
extensive criminal history at the very first sentencing hearing in Case No. 19-CR-
13735 on February 24, 2020 when discussing the terms of the joint
recommendation. Feb. 24 Tr. 9. After Santiago committed two offenses while on
community control, the State again recommended that he receive only community
control at the plea hearing and initial sentencing hearing in Case No. 21-CR-14242.
June 9 Tr. 3. Despite this recommendation, the trial court found that Santiago was
“no longer amenable to any community control sanction” in Case No. 19-CR-13725
and in Case No. 21-CR-14242. Doc. 32B. See Doc. 57A.
{¶25} Subsequently, a resentencing hearing was held on June 13, 2022 only
because an equipment failure prevented a record of the prior sentencing hearing
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
from being created. June 13 Tr. 3. During this initial resentencing hearing, the
Defense requested a continuance to obtain some recommendation letters for
Santiago. Id. at 13. The trial court granted the continuance but stated the following:
I still don’t know that that’s the reason he should be continued on
community control because he already had a substantial
opportunity being placed on community control for two very
serious offenses and then he goes out and commits two more
felonies while on community control.
Id. This statement came after the trial court had already found that Santiago was
not amenable to community control in its judgment entries in both cases from the
prior sentencing hearing. Doc. 57A, 32B. Given these facts, there is no indication
that the trial court would not have imposed a prison sentence had the State again
recommended community control at the resentencing hearing. Thus, Santiago has
not established that but for his complained of error, the outcome of the proceeding
clearly would have been otherwise. Accordingly, there is no plain error. See State
v. Hartley, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-14-04, 2014-Ohio-4536, ¶ 9, 13.
{¶26} In conclusion, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “[n]otice of
plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
Long, supra, at 532. The facts of this case do not present a manifest miscarriage of
justice as Santiago has not even raised an argument that would indicate that he
suffered any prejudice in this case. His sole assignment of error is overruled.
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Case Nos. 4-22-11 and 4-22-12
Conclusion
{¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgments of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas
are affirmed.
Judgments Affirmed
MILLER, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/hls
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