Poland v. Ohio Parole Bd. , 2023 Ohio 694 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as Poland v. Ohio Parole Bd., 
    2023-Ohio-694
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    KENNETH POLAND                                           JUDGES:
    Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellant                              Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 22 CA 0065
    OHIO PAROLE BOARD
    Defendant-Appellee                               OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                              Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas,
    Case No. 22 CV 177
    JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                               March 7, 2023
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellant                               For Defendant-Appellee
    KENNETH POLAND                                        DAVID YOST
    PRO SE                                                OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Richland Correctional Institution                     MARCY A. VONDERWELL
    P. O. Box 8107                                        D. CHADD McKITRICK
    Mansfield, Ohio 44901                                 SR. ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
    30 East Broad Street, 23rd Floor
    Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                   2
    Wise, J.
    {¶1}   Appellant Kenneth Poland appeals from the August 24, 2022, Judgment
    Entry by the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the Ohio Parole Board.
    The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}   On September 17, 1996, a jury convicted Appellant of one count of Murder
    in violation of R.C. §2903.02 for beating his victim to death with a hammer.
    {¶3}   On September 20, 1996, he was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.
    {¶4}   On April 10, 2006, Appellant had his first parole hearing. Appellee denied
    parole.
    {¶5}   On July 25, 2014, Appellee held an additional parole hearing. Appellee
    found Appellant engaged in serious institutional misconduct, and parole was denied.
    {¶6}   On July 19, 2017, Appellee held a third parole hearing for Appellant.
    Appellee denied parole.
    {¶7}   On June 18, 2018, Appellee held a fourth parole hearing. Appellee denied
    parole.
    {¶8}   On April 25, 2022, Appellant filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
    judgment by the trial court stating:
    (1)    DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD DENIED POLAND
    MEANINGFUL CONSIDERATION FOR PAROLE RELEASE WHEN IT
    IMPOSED MORE THAN FIVE YEARS AFTER THE INTIAL (sic) PAROLE
    HEARING;
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                       3
    (2)   DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD’S (sic) FAILED TO
    ADHERE      TO   THE     CORRECT       VERSIONS   OF    THE   OHIO
    ADMINISTRATION CODE RULES IN EXISTENCE UNDER R.C. 5120.01
    [DIRECTOR’S SIGNATORY AUTHORITY] ON 20-JUN-96 ‘DATE OF
    OFFENSE’ WHEN IMPOSING 3 ½ YEARS MORE THAN PERMISSIBLE;
    (3)   DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD’S FAILURE TO
    PROVIDE HALF-TIME-REVIEW HEARING NOT LATER THAN 2 ½
    YEARS AFTER POLAND’S 2006 INITIAL HEARING WAIVED THE
    PAROLE      BOARD’S     AUTHORITY      OVER    POLAND’S   PAROLE
    ELIGIBILITY CONSIDERATION; SEE AR 5120:1-1-20(D)(1);
    (4)   DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD VIOLATES THE
    ‘SEPARATION OF POWERS’ WHEN CONDUCTING FRAUDULENT
    PAROLE HEARINGS FOR POLAND, A PRE:1-JUL-96 OFFENDER
    PROTECTED UNDER R.C. 5120.021(A);
    (5)   DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD ENGAGES IN
    CRIMINAL     ACTS      AGAINST   ALL     PRE:1-JUL-96   PAROLABLE
    OFFENDERS AT ALL FRAUDULENT PAROLE HEARINGS SINCE 1993
    AFTER THE SOCF RIOT, VIOLATING R.C. 5120.021(A);
    (6)   DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD DENIES EQUAL
    PROTECTION LAWS UNDER R.C. 5120.021(A) WHEN IT IMPOSES
    DISPROPORTIONATE TREATMENT ON POLAND, A PRE:1-JUL-
    5120.021(A) WHEN IT IMPOSES DISPROPORTIONATE TREATMENTON
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                  4
    POLAND, A PRE: 1-JUL-96 OFFENDER, WHILE THE PAROLE BOARD
    ACTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY;
    (7)    DECLARE THE PAROLE BOARD HAS VIOLATED THE
    PRE: 1-JUL-96 EX POST FACTO LAWS GOVERNING ALL PRE:1-JUL-96
    OFFENDERS DESCRIBED UNDER R.C. 5120.021(A);
    (8)    DECLARE    THAT     THE   BOARD   INTENTIONALLY
    DISCRIMINATED AGAINST POLAND BY ACTING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE
    OF ITS AUTHORITY AND THEREBY WAIVING THEIR AUTHORITY
    OVER POLAND’S RELEASE DECISION MAKING;
    (9)    DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD’S FAILURE TO
    FOLLOW ONLY THE PRE:1-JUL-96 RELEASING REGULATIONS, AS
    REQUIRED BY R.C. 5120.021(A), AND VIOLATED POLAND’S CIVIL AND
    CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
    (10)   DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD’S FAILURE TO
    FOLLOW THE PRE: 1-JUL-96 RELEASING REGULATIONS WHEN IT
    INTENTIONALLY INFLICTION (sic) OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL STRESS
    UPON POLAND AND HIS ENTIRE FAMILY;
    (11)   DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD’S FAILURE TO
    FOLLOW AND APPLY THE PROPER RELEASING REGULATIONS
    CAUSED OHIO’S JUDICIARY TO COVER UP THE MALFEASANCE,
    MISFEASANCE, AND NON-FEASANCE OF THE PAROLE BOARD IN
    MULTIPLE CIVIL CASES BEGINNING WITH LAYNE V. OAPA, 2002 OHIO
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                
    5 LEXIS 3054
     AND CONTINUING ON TO DATE TO HIDE SERIOUS
    MISCONDUCT;
    (12)   DECLARE THAT RECKLESS INTENT IS INFERRED WHEN
    CONDUCT IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF DUTIES AND ARE
    CONDUCTED IN BAD FAITH;
    (13)   DECLARE THAT THE LACK OF ‘SIGNATORY AUTHORITY’
    ON THE ‘DECISION SHEETS’ ISSUED TO POLAND DOES NOT
    AUTHORIZE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE BOARD MEMBERS AND IS
    FRAUD, WHERE THE CHAIR PRESENTS ITS SIGNATURE BY SIGNING
    A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER ONLY TO PROVIDE A FALSE
    APPEARANCE OF LEGITIMACY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES;
    (14)   DECLARE THAT USING THE DECISION SHEET FORM TO
    WRITE THEIR DECISIONS, ON A FORM THAT IS NOT SIGNED BY THE
    PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS WHOM CONDUCTED ALL OF POLAND’S
    HEARINGS, AND SAID DECISION SHEET FORM DID NOT EXIST UNTIL
    AFTER 20-JUNE-96 WHEN ONLY THE FORM IN CIRCULATION ON 20-
    JUN-96 CAN BE USED FOR ALL HEARINGS;
    (15)   DECLARE THAT A PAROLE BOARD DECISION SHEET
    USED FOR POLAND’S DECISION THAT IS ABSENT THE ‘SIGNATORY
    AUTHORITY’ OF THOSE MEMBERS WHO CONDUCTED POLAND’S
    RELEASE HEARING IS VOID AND FRAUDULENT;
    (16)   DECLARE THAT THE 2022 OHIO PAROLE BOARD
    HANDBOOK AND ALL OTHERS BEFORE IT, IS UNAUTHORIZED
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                   6
    BECAUSE IT IS NOT SIGNED INTO LAW VIA R.C. 5120.01 BY THE
    DIRECTOR OF THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND
    CORRECTION ON OR BEFORE POLAND’S DATE OF OFFENSE IN 1996;
    (17)   DECLARE THAT PAGE 3, RELEVANT PAGE ATTACHED,
    OF THE OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER’S ‘SIGNATORY AUTHORITY’ FOR
    ITS PREPARATION OR CIRCULATION AND IS HENCE, CLASSIFIED A
    ‘CRIMINAL TOOL’ DESIGNED TO HIDE PAROLE BOARD CRIMINAL
    ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST THE R.C. 5120.021(A) OFFENDERS’
    (18)   DECLARE THAT APPLYING THE 2003 MANDATORY
    VERSION OF AR 5120:1-1-07(A) TO POLAND’S PAROLE DECISION
    SHEET(S) IS ILLEGAL, BECAUSE HIS 20-JUN-96 DATE OF OFFENSE
    PRE-DATES 2003; AND THE DIFFERENT DECISION SHEET FORMS
    USED IN 2006, 2014, 2017, AND 2020 DID NOT EXIST ON 20-JUN-96;
    (19)   DECLARE THAT ALL OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
    BOARD AT ALL OF POLAND’S HEARINGS RESULTED IN ACTS TAKEN
    OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE PAROLE BOARD’S AUTHORITY. SEE
    R.C. 109.362;
    (20)   DECLARE THAT WHEN THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO
    CONDUCT THE MANDATORY ‘HALF-TIME’ REVIEW HEARING IN HALF
    OF THE LEGAL 5-YEARS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED IN
    2006, PURSUANT TO AR 5120:1-1-20(D)(1), DEPICTS THAT THE
    DEFENDANT       WAIVED   THEIR   AUTHORITY/JURISDICTION   OVER
    POLAND FOREVER; SEE 1982 OHIO APP. LEXIS 12491;
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                 7
    (21)   DECLARE THAT WHEN THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO
    RELEASE POLAND AT HIS SECOND HEARING, THAT SHOULD HAVE
    OCCURRED NOT LATER THAN 2011, PURSUANT TO AR 5120:1-1-
    10(B), EFF. 1988 INSTEAD OF 2014, THAT POLAND HAS BEEN HELD
    WRONGFULLY IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE
    14TH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION SINCE 2011;
    (22)   DECLARE THAT R.C. 2967.03 [CLEMENCY DISCRETION]
    DOES NOT APPLY TO THOSE INMATES WHOSE MINIMUM SENTENCE
    TO PAROLE ELIGIBILITY HAS EXPIRED, BUT ONLY APPLIES TO A
    PAROLE ELIGIBLE OFFENDER WHO FILES AN [APPLICATION FOR
    CLEMENCY] AND HAS NOT COMPLETED THEIR MINIMUM SENTENCE
    TO PAROLE ELIGIBILITY;
    (23)   DECLARE THAT THE 1998 VERSION OF AR 5120:1-1-
    10(B)(2) DOES NOT APPLY TO POLAND, OR ANY OTHER OFFENDER
    WHO COMMITTED THEIR OFFENSE PRIOR TO 1-JUL-96;
    (24)   DECLARE      THAT   THE   PAROLE     RELEASING
    REGULATIONS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE BOARD FAILED TO
    ‘ORIENT POLAND TOWARD RELEASE’, AND DENIED POLAND THE
    ENTITLEMENT TO RELEASE UNDER SUPERVISION WHERE THE
    ‘RETURN TO CONFINEMENT FOR THOSE WHO VIOLATE THE TERMS
    AND CONDITIONS OF THEIR RELEASE AND ARE UNWILLING OR
    UNABLE TO READJUST SATISFACTORILY UNDER SUPERVISION, AR
    5120:1-1-02(D), EFF. 2-JAN-79;
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                 8
    (25)     DECLARE THAT WHEN POLAND’S MINIMUM SENTENCE
    EXPIRED IN 2006, AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, POLAND’S ‘DEBT TO
    SOCIETY HAS BEEN PAID’, 1991 U.S APP. LEXIS 4822, HN7-8,
    INVOKING THE LIMITED AUTHORITY OF THE PAROLE BOARD UNDER
    AR 5120:1-1-10(b), EFF. 2-JAN-79;
    (26)     DECLARE THAT THE BOARD VIOLATED AR 5120:1-1-
    02(G), AS IT EXISTED ON 20-JUN-96, CONSTITUTING AN ‘ABUSE OF
    DISCRETION’ WHEN THE BOARD ACTS OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF
    ITS AUTHORITY AS OHIO’S PAROLE RELEASING LAWS APPLY TO
    POLAND’S TRIAL COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE;
    (27)     DECLARE THAT THE PAROLE BOARD VIOLATED AR
    5120:1-1-02(B) WHEN IT CONSIDERED ‘COMMUNITY OPPOSITION’ TO
    POLAND’S RELEASE WHEN THE “DIVISION OF PAROLE AND
    COMMUNITY SERVICE IS FREE FROM IMPROPER CONTROL OR
    INFLUENCE, POLITICAL OR OTHERWISE”;
    (28)     DECLARE THAT SINCE 2011 THE PAROLE BOARD HAS
    WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED POLAND IN VIOLATION OF THE PRE:
    1-JUN-96 RELEASING REGULATIONS AS PROTECTED BY R.C
    5120.021(A);
    (29)     DECLARE THAT BY FAILING TO TREAT POLAND, AND
    ALL R.C. 5120.021(A) OFFENDERS WITH FAIRNESS AND EQUITY AS
    REQUIRED, PURSUANT TO AR 5120:1-1-02G), THAT THE PAROLE
    BOARD VIOLATED POLAND’S CIVIL & CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS’
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                    9
    (30)    DECLARE THAT WHEN THE PAROLE BOARD APPLIES
    THE 1-APR-05 VERSION OF AR 5120:1-1-11) FAILS TO PROVIDE
    POLAND WITH THE IN-PERSON HEARING THE LAW REQUIRES) IT
    VIOLATED POLAND’S CIVIL RIGHTS BY CONDUCTING ILLEGAL
    TELECOMMUNICATION VIDEO HEARING, AND CAUSING POLAND TO
    BE DETERMINED FOR RELEASE BY A FULL BOARD PANEL, UNDER
    THE POST 1-JUL-86 VERSION OF AR 5120:1-1-08 THAT IS BARRED BY
    R.C. 5120.021(A);
    (31)    DECLARE THAT WHEN THE PAROLE BOARD MAINTAINS
    IMPROPER CONTROL OR INFLUENCE OVER THE R.C. 5120.021(A)
    OFFENDER, THEY VIOLATE CIVIL RIGHTS WHEN THEY PERMIT ANY
    ‘OPPOSITION’ TO RELEASE POLITICAL OR OTHERWISE BY THE
    VICTIM(S), THE COMMUNITY, OR ANYONE ELSE; SEE AR 5120:1-1-
    02(B)[.]
    {¶9}   Complaint pp 1-3.
    {¶10} On May 23, 2022, Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
    {¶11} On June 9, 2022, Appellant filed a Motion for Leave of Court for a
    Continuance. The motion was granted.
    {¶12} On July 1, 2022, Appellant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee’s
    Motion to Dismiss.
    {¶13} On July 14, 2022, Appelle filed a Reply.
    {¶14} On August 24, 2022, the trial court granted Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss.
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                    10
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶15} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He herein raises the following
    Assignments of Error:
    {¶16} “I.   THE    TRIAL     COURT       JUDGE      DELIBERATELY        VIOLATED
    APPELLANT’S OHIO AND FEDERAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH
    AND FOURTEENTH AMENMENTS [sic] OF THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES
    CONSTITUTIONS WHEN IT ACTED TO PROTECT A PLETHORA OF OTHER JUDGES
    WHOM ARE ENGAGED IN A PATTERN OF CORRUPT ACTITIVIES [sic] AGAINST
    APPELLANT, AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER INMATES DEFINED AS R.C [sic]
    5120.021(A), WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEE’S UNLAWFUL MOTION TO DISMISS
    BASED ON LIES PRESENTED BY THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND IGNORED
    THE VIOLATION OF R.C. 109.362.”
    I.
    {¶17} In Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error, Appellant appears to argue three
    issues: the trial court erred by failing to find the Ohio Parole Board inappropriately used
    post July 1, 1996, parole procedures when he was convicted prior to July 1, 1996, the
    trial court erred when finding Appellant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee’s Motion
    to Dismiss was untimely, and the trial court erred by not addressing Appellant’s Civ.R.
    10(D) exhibits attached to the complaint.
    Standard of Review
    {¶18} This Court reviews judgments on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under a de novo standard.
    Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 
    49 Ohio St.3d 228
    , 229, 551
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                      
    11 N.E.2d 981
    ; Perrysburg Twp. V. Rossford, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 79
    , 
    2004-Ohio-4362
    , 
    814 N.E.2d 44
    , ¶5. A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
    relief can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel.
    Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 
    65 Ohio St.3d 545
    , 548, 
    605 N.E.2d 378
    (1992), citing Assn. for the Defense of the Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 116
    , 117, 
    537 N.E.2d 1292
     (1989). In considering a motion to dismiss, a trial
    court may not rely on allegations or evidence outside of the complaint. State ex rel. Fuqua
    v. Alexander, 
    79 Ohio St.3d 206
    , 207, 
    680 N.E.2d 985
     (1997). Rather, the trial court may
    review only the complaint and may dismiss the case only if it appears beyond a doubt the
    plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to recover. O’Brien v. Univ.
    Community Tenants Union, Inc. 
    42 Ohio St.2d 242
    , 
    327 N.E.2d 753
     (1975), syllabus.
    Unsupported conclusions of a complaint are not sufficient to withstand a motion to
    dismiss. Schulman v. Cleveland (1972), 
    30 Ohio St.2d 196
    , 198, 
    59 O.O.2d 196
    , 197,
    
    283 N.E.2d 175
    , 176.
    a. Application of post-July 1, 1996 parole procedures.
    {¶19} Appellant appears to be arguing the trial court erred by failing to find R.C.
    §5120.021 prohibited the use of parole procedures developed after July 1, 1996 to those
    incarcerated prior to July 1, 1996. We disagree.
    {¶20} R.C. §5120.021 states:
    (A)    The provisions of chapter 5120. of the Revised Code, as they
    existed prior to July 1, 1996, and that address the duration or potential
    duration of incarceration or parole or other forms of supervised release,
    apply to all persons upon whom a court imposed a term of imprisonment
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                    12
    prior to July 1, 1996, and all persons upon whom a court, on or after July 1,
    1996, and in accordance with law existing prior to July 1, 1996, imposed a
    term of imprisonment for an offense that was committed prior to July 1,
    1996.
    (B)    (1) The provisions of Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code, as
    they exist on or after July 1, 1996, and that address the duration or potential
    duration of incarceration or supervised release, apply to all persons upon
    whom a court imposed a stated prison term for an offense committed on or
    after July 1, 1996.
    (2) The provisions of Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code, as they
    exist on or after the effective date of this amendment, apply to an offender
    who is released from confinement in a state correctional institution on or
    after that date.
    (C) Nothing in this section limits or affects the applicability of any
    provision in Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code, as amended or enacted on
    or after July 1, 1996, that pertains to an issue other than the duration or
    potential duration of incarceration or supervised release, to persons in
    custody or under the supervision of the department of rehabilitation or
    correction.
    {¶21} The language of the statute is clear. R.C. §5120.021 only effects sentencing
    duration. It does not impact the parole procedures or guidelines.
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                        13
    {¶22} Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a prisoner has no right to
    rely on the parole guidelines in effect prior to his parole hearing date. State ex rel. Bealler
    v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (2001), 
    91 Ohio St.3d 36
    , 
    740 N.E.2d 1100
    .
    {¶23} Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is not well taken.
    b. The trial court erred when finding Appellant’s July 1, 2022 Memorandum
    in Opposition to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss was untimely filed.
    {¶24} Appellant argues the trial court erred by claiming his response to Appellee’s
    Motion to Dismiss was not timely filed.
    {¶25} However, a review of the record shows that according to the trial court’s
    August 24, 2022 judgment entry, Appellant’s response to Appellee’s Motion to dismiss
    was filed on July 1, 2022, and was considered by the trial court.
    {¶26} Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue is not well taken.
    c. The trial court erred by not addressing Appellant’s
    Civ.R. 10(D) Exhibits attached to the Complaint.
    {¶27} Civ.R. 10(D)(1) states: “Account or Written Instrument. When any claim or
    defense is founded on an account or other written instrument, a copy of the account or
    written instrument must be attached to the pleading. If the account or written instrument
    is not attached, the reason for the omission must be stated in writing.” This rule is to
    ensure the Defendant is put on adequate notice of the complaint. The rule makes no
    mention of a trial court’s requirement to address such attachments.
    {¶28} Appellant does not cite any statutory, case law, rules of civil procedure, or
    learned treatise from this or any other jurisdiction to support the proposition that the trial
    court must address Civ.R. 10(D) Exhibits in a judgment entry. Accordingly, Appellant’s
    brief does not comply with App.R. 16(A)(7), which provides,
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                        14
    The appellant shall include in its brief, under the headings and in the
    order indicated all of the following * * * An argument containing the
    contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error
    presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with
    citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which
    appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.
    {¶29} “If an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of error, it is not this
    court’s duty to root it out.” Thomas v. Harmon, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 08CA17, 2009-
    Ohio-3299, ¶14, quoting State v. Carmen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90512, 2008-Ohio-
    4368, ¶31. “It is not the function of this court to construct a foundation for [an appellant’s]
    claims; failure to comply with the rules governing practice in the appellate courts is a tactic
    which is ordinarily fatal.” Catanzarite v. Boswell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24184, 2009-Ohio-
    1211, ¶16, quoting Kremer v. Cox, 
    114 Ohio App.3d 41
    , 60, 
    682 N.E.2d 1006
     (9th
    Dist.1996).
    {¶30} An appellate court may rely upon App.R. 12(A) in overruling or disregarding
    an assignment of error because of “the lack of briefing” on the assignment of error. Hawley
    v. Ritley, 
    35 Ohio St.3d 157
    , 159, 
    519 N.E.2d 390
    , 392-393 (1988); Abon, Ltd. v.
    Transcontinental Ins. Co., 5th Dist. Richland No 2004-CA-0029, 
    2005-Ohio-3052
    , ¶100;
    State v. Miller, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 04-COA-003, 
    2004-Ohio-4636
    , ¶41.
    {¶31} Appellant has not supported his general argument with citations to authority.
    Appellant’s argument has failed to cite statutes, case law, rules of civil procedure, or
    learned treatises, and apply the facts of the case to the legal authority. Consequently, we
    Richland County, Case No. 22 CA 0065                                                 15
    find that Appellant has not presented an argument, but relies only upon the assertion of
    error and unsupported accusations. Thus, we disregard this issue.
    {¶32} Accordingly, Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
    {¶33} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
    Richland County, Ohio, is hereby, affirmed.
    By: Wise, J.
    Gwin, P. J., and
    Delaney, J., concur.
    JWW/br 0303
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22 CA 0065

Citation Numbers: 2023 Ohio 694

Judges: J. Wise

Filed Date: 3/7/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/7/2023